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Humanitarian Intervention in a Community
of Power Part II
JAMES A.R. NAFzIGER*
Civilization is hooped together, brought
Under a rule, under the semblance of peace
By manifold illusion, but man's life is thought ....
Collective security in the post-Cold War era is less than a reality
but more than an illusion. Wars rage on, but a new community of
power is gradually taking shape. Even the terrible flames of Bosnia
and Somalia cannot obscure this development. Indeed, the tragic im-
plosion of Yugoslavia and the savagery of war lords on the loose in
Somalia sparked a new agenda for peace that calls for collective inter-
vention." Public opinion generally favors this new activism,' as do
both stable and wobbly governments that face the threat of armed
bands outside their control.4 Having witnessed a Hobbesian nightmare
of political chaos in failed states, responsible leaders welcome a new
* day of multilateral supervision, trusteeship, community building, and
state building.5 Whether the United Nations should become the
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; BA4, M.A., Universi-
ty of Wisconsin; J.D., Harvard University. This article is a continuation of Self-Deter-
mination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power, 20 Deny. J. Int'l
L. & Pol'y 9 (1991), by the same author. The research for this study was completed
in June 1993.
1. William Butler Yeats, Meru, in SELECTED POEMS AND TWO PLAYS OF WIL-
IAA BUTLER YEATS 157 (Macha Louis Rosenthal ed., 1962). The poem was written
in 1934.
2. See BOUTROS BOuTRoS-GHAL, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREvENTIvE DIPLOMA-
CY, PEACEMAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING (1992). The United Nations Secretary-General
prepared this report on the invitation of the Security Council at its first Summit
Meeting of Heads of States (January 31, 1992). The Agenda seeks to strengthen and
make more efficient four types of collective activity under United Nations leadership:
preventive diplomacy (including preventive deployment of troops and use of demili-
tarized zones); peacemaking (including peace-enforcement and other collective use of
military force); peacekeeping; and post-conflict peace-building. Other topics on the
Agenda include cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations,
safety of personnel, and financing.
3. See Roper Organization, Public Opinion on Collective Security (March 1992),
reported in UNA-USA, PARTNERS FOR PEACE: STRENGTHENING COLLECrIVE SECURITY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28 (1992)[hereinafter PARTNERS FOR PEACE].
4. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Is Developing Control Center to Coordinate Growing
Peacekeeping Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at 10.
5. Paul Johnson, Colonialism's Back - and Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, April 18, 1993 (Magazine), at 22.
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world's policeman is, however, a troubling issue.
I. THE TREND TOWARD MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION FOR HUMANI-
TARIAN EASONS
A consolidated framework for collective humanitarian intervention
is high on the agenda for peace in the international legal community."
At the crossroads of nonintervention and humanitarian intervention,
the United Nations is proceeding cautiously down the humanitarian
intervention road. The trend toward multilateral intervention is re-
flected in statements by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe7 and decisions by the United Nations Security Council."
Until recently, endless debates about two issues stymied humani-
tarian intervention. One issue was the legitimacy of unilateral inter-
vention despite the rule against the use of force9 and the principle of
nonintervention. The other issue involved the legitimacy of multilater-
al intervention despite the rule against United Nations intervention in
the domestic jurisdiction of states."0 Today, however, the World Court
has endorsed humanitarian relief measures,"1 and an expansive mul-
6. For background as of 1991, see Nafziger, supra note *. Accord, Jane E.
Stromseth, Self-Determination, Secession and Humanitarian Intervention by the Unit-
ed Nations, 1992 Am. Soc. Int'l. L. Proc. 370; Jost DelbrUck, A Fresh Look at Hu-
manitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887
(1992); David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992). But see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on
UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903 (1992XThreats to international peace
and security that would justify Security Council action are limited to those by one
state against another. Therefore, the United Nations should not intervene in civil
wars, even for humanitarian reasons).
7. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights,
Pluralistic Democracy, The Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding, reprinted
in 30 LL.M. 1670 (1991). The Moscow Concluding Document confirms the CSCE's
power to conduct investigations of human rights abuses in member states without
their consent. See also Nafziger, supra note * at 33; Malvina Halberstam, The Co-
penhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy, 34 HARV. INT L.J. 163
(1993).
8. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
9.
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
10.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7Xemphasis added).
11. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nica-
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tilateral competence has largely displaced unauthorized unilateral
measures, in fact and in law. Redefining the term "humanitarian inter-
vention" according to the emerging practice is therefore essential."
Security Council Resolution 688,' which provided for relief and
protection of displaced Kurds in the brutal aftermath of the Gulf War,
was particularly significant. First, it confirmed the ability of the Per-
manent Members to develop a common plan of humanitarian action,
albeit under unusual circumstances and by a mixed vote.1 Second,
Resolution 688 established that civil war and a massive deprivation of
human rights might constitute a threat to international peace and
security. The term "international" therefore is to be interpreted broadly
and functionally, rather than being limited to strictly inter-state rela-
tionships. After all, people come first: The United Nations Charter
begins with the words, "We, the peoples," not "We, the States" or "We,
the High Contracting Parties" as in the League of Nations Covenant.
Third, it follows from the United Nations Charter' that in providing
humanitarian assistance, the Security Council may exercise its en-
forcement powers or authorize the use of force by member states. Al-
though Resolution 688 neither provided for United Nations enforce-
ment measures nor authorized unilateral intervention, it nevertheless
ragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 124 (June 27) states that '[t]here can be no doubt that the
provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, what-
ever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful interven-
tion, or as in any other way contrary to international law."
12. Standard definitions of intervention fail to take account of the new
multilateralism. According to one definition, for example, intervention is "interference
by a State in the domestic or foreign affairs of others in opposition to its will and
serving by its design or implication to impair its political independence." CHARLES C.
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 246 (1945). According to an even more questionable definition, "[ilntervention
is dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state .... " 1IASSA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (8th ed. 1955). These definitions are quoted
and discussed in Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and
Haiti - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law - Part I, 20 DENY. J. INYL L. & POLY 305, 307 (1992).
13. U.N. SCOR, 46th Ses., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/688 (1991), reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991).
14. Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe voted against the Resolution. China and India
abstained. Id.
15. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides the following means by
which the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security:
... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and remov-
al of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts or aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace;
U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1).
Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may
act "to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
1994
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granted the Security Council substantial powers of humanitarian as-
sistance and relied for its implementation on Big Power occupation of
Iraqi territory. Fourth, in implementing Resolution 688, the Security
Council minimized the customary gesture of obtaining a target state's
consent. Iraq did consent but was more or less compelled to do so.
Since then, the balance of community power has tilted further
away from the principle of nonintervention and toward multilateral
humanitarian assistance. With a little help from the broadcast media
and public opinion, collective measures have become more intrusive.
The first response by the Security Council to the civil wars in Somalia
and Bosnia are illustrative. Resolution 7946 authorized the use of
force in Somalia, and Resolution 81317 authorized deployment of Unit-
ed Nations troops there (UNOSOM II), with the power to use neces-
sary force to ensure the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Reso-
lution 743" established a United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in the thick of the battle for Croatia, and Resolution
770' authorized member states to take all measures necessary to pro-
tect relief missions in Bosnia. Resolution 816' similarly provided for
all measures necessary to enforce a "no flight zone" in Bosnia, and
Resolution 8361 authorized "necessary measures, including use of
force" against forces that had been besieging safe areas designated by
the Security Council in Bosnia.
Flush with the new esprit de corps, the French Foreign Minister
even claimed a legal duty to intervene for humanitarian reasons.'
Although the French enthusiasm for a nouveau regime may be a bit
extravagant, the steady flow of action-packed Security Council Resolu-
tions is certainly significant. After all, in its first forty-seven years, the
Security Council specifically authorized the use of force on only three
occasions: against North Korea in 1950; against a tanker bound for
Portuguese Mozambique with oil for the embargoed Rhodesia in 1966;
and against Iraq in 1990.'
16. U.N. SCOR, 47th Seas., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1794 (1992); Paul Lew-
is, U.N. Will Increase Troops in Somalia, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1993, at 3.
17. U.N. SCOR, 48th Seas., 3187th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (1993).
18. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sees., 3055th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/743 (1992), reprinted
in 31 LLM. 1447 (1992).
19. U.N. SCOR, 47th Seas., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992), reprinted
in 31 LL.M. 1468 (1992).
20. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/816 (1993); Paul Lew-
is, U.N. Approves Plan to Enforce Bosnia Flight Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, April 1, 1993, at
A12; Julia Preston, U.N. Council Votes to Use Force Against Military Flights in
Bosnia, WASH. POST, April 1, 1993, at A37.
21. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES1836 (1993).
22. See PARTNEES FOR PEACE, supra note 3, at 44.
23. On a number of other occasions the Security Council seemed to call for force-
ful action. For example, during the Rhodesian crisis the Council called upon the
United Kingdom "to quell this rebellion of the racist minority' and " . . . to take all
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A noteworthy development has been the acquiescence by States in
the understanding that collective measures generally preempt unilat-
eral intervention. Repeated decisions of the Security Council in re-
sponse to the imbroglios in Somalia, Croatia, and BosniaO have been
particularly instrumental in converting a controversial, unilateral
doctrine of humanitarian intervention into a more accepted, collective
process. The results of the new activism may be disappointing and the
future of multilateral capacity uncertain. There is little doubt, howev-
er, that the international community is prepared to undertake humani-
tarian measures as a substitute for unilateral intervention. The latter
is now seen as "a Pandora's box that should be opened with only the
greatest care."2
II. The Issues
Despite the trend toward collective security, critical questions
remain. What is the scope of collective intervention? What are, or
should be, the limitations on Security Council decisions? A collective
process cannot altogether replace substantive rules. There must be
limits on the Security Council's authority, even when it merely autho-
rizes action by Member States rather than organizing and controlling
the action itself. But what limits precisely? When should the United
Nations and its members be allowed to brandish their swords on be-
half of human rights and humanitarian reief?
A. The Principle of Nonintervention
The first problem is to reconcile humanitarian intervention with
the noninterventionist principle reflected in such provisions as Article
2(7) of the United Nations Charter' and Article 18 of the OAS Char-
terY Under Article 2(7) the Security Council may take action under
Chapter VII, but its options may be limited to the last resort of en-
forcement measures. The Chapter VII exception is not, however, the
other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority
of the usurpers and in bringing the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to an
immediate end .... " S/RES/216 (1965), reprinted in 5 LL.M. 167, 168 (1966). The
Council also called upon the United Kingdom to *enforce" both its own measures
and those prescribed by the Council. S/RES/217 (1965), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 167,
168 (1966).
24. See Documents Regarding the Conflict in Yugoslavia [September 25, 1991 -
November 16, 1992), in 31 I.L.M. 1421 (1992).
25. PARTNERS FOR PEACE, supra note 3, at 47.
26. U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
27.
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State.
Charter of the Organization of American States, done April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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last word. Rather, a functional interpretation of the basic rule against
intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states has established that
the protection of human rights is simply no longer confined to domestic
jurisdiction.' The Security Council therefore has a broad range of
coercive and noncoercive options available to respond to humanitarian
crises.
B. The Legitimate Scope of Intervention
This leaves open the question of what options? For instance, could
the Security Council decide to impose U.N. supervision of Mexican
elections, or could it have provided for military intervention to acceler-
ate the complete elimination of apartheid in South Africa? On the
other hand, should intervention be confined to the protection of relief
missions and civilian victims in time of emergency? When a U.N. mis-
sion is attacked, may the Blue Helmets retaliate by going on the at-
tack against the responsible government? May humanitarian interven-
tion be employed in order to compel a ceasefire and a peaceful settle-
ment of a dispute under Article 33 of the Charter?
As Judge Shahabuddeen asked in the Libya Case:
Are there any limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the
equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the United
Nations within the evolving international order, is there any con-
ceivable point beyond which a legal issue may properly arise as to
the competence of the Security Council to produce such overriding
results? If there are any limits, what are those limits and what
body, if other than the Security Council, is competent to say what
those limits are?'
28.
[A] majority of UN member states now agrees that compliance with
basic human rights standards, including protection of the rights of mi-
norities, can no longer be regarded as a matter of domestic jurisdiction.
Stromseth, supra note 6, at 372.
29. Case concerning questions of interpretation and application of the 1971 Mon-
treal Convention arising from the aerial incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.XOrder
with regard to Request for the indication of provisional measures of Apr.
14.XSeparate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen), 1992 I.C.J. 114 [hereinafter Libya
Case]. Judge Weeramantry described the expansive scope, if not unbridled discretion,
of the Security Council, as follows:
However, once we enter the sphere of Chapter VII, the matter takes on
a different complexion, for the determination under Article 39 of the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of ag-
gression, is one entirely within the discretion of the Council. It would
appear that the Council and no other is the judge of the existence of
the state of affairs which brings Chapter VII into operation. That deci-
sion is taken by the Security Council in its own judgment and in the
exercise of the full discretion given to it by Article 39. Once taken, the
door is opened to the various decisions the council may make under
that Chapter.
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Unfortunately, neither Judge Shahabuddeen nor anyone else has pro-
vided very complete answers to these important questions. Nor does
the muddled doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention or state
practice offer much guidance.
All United Nations intervention must conform to the Purposes
and Principles of the organization' under Article 24(2) of its Charter,
but the parameters of this text are inexact. The usual justifications of
humanitarian intervention are to relieve human misery and to rescue
the intervening state's nationals from serious threats to their persons
and their liberty. A human rights premise for such intervention is
generally understood, but what is its breadth? Treaty law offers partial
guidance. For example, the Genocide Convention" encourages states
to call upon the United Nations to take "appropriate" action, pre-
sumably to include collective intervention in order to prevent or sup-
-press that crime. "Ethnic cleansing,' as in the former Yugoslavia,
may be a form of genocide."
Id. at 176 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry). For cogent discussions of the
issue of Security Council competence, see W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional
Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT)L L 83, 92 (1993); Thomas M. Franck,
The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM.
J. INTL. L. 519, 521 (1992).
30. Article I of the Charter defines the purposes of the U.N. as follows: '[t]o
maintain international peace and security ... [t]o develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples ... to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ...
[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms .. . * and '[t]o be a centre
for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
done Dec. 9, 1948, KAV2303, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (hereinafter Genocide Convention].
32. Id. art. VIII.
33.
At the most general level . . .ethnic cleansing can be understood as the
expulsion of an 'undesirable" population from a given territory due to
religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological consid-
erations, or a combination of these.
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, 72 FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 110.
34. Article II of the Convention defines 'genocide' to include
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 31.
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Short of genocide, however, what level of human rights depriva-
tions would justify collective intervention? A famous dictum in the
Barcelona Traction Case' explains that fundamental human rights
are enforceable erga omne, but it does not tell us which rights and by
what means of enforcement. Ultimately, the cases will make the law.
So far, for example, it would seem that a threat to a right of participa-
tion or democracy would not alone justify humanitarian intervention.
In the depressing case of Haiti, the Security Council, the General As-
sembly, and the Organization of American States (OAS) agreed at first
that free elections and installation of the democratically elected Presi-
dent were not issues of international peace and security.
A very useful checklist to evaluate the permissibility of humani-
tarian intervention proposes five criteria: the severity of the rights
violation (the necessity criterion); the nature of the intervention (the
proportionality criterion); the purpose of the intervention; the extent of
multilateral participation in the intervention; and the balance of alter-
natives and outcomes.' This checklist might well serve as a basis for
defining the legitimate scope of humanitarian intervention.
C. Definition of 'All Measures Necessary"
A third, related issue is whether the Security Council can autho-
rize the use of force regardless of the type or level of humanitarian
assistance.' Former Under Secretary-General Brian Urquhart has
35. Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Judgment of Feb.
5).
36. More specifically, the checklist includes the following factors:
1. The Severity of the Rights Violations--The Necessity Criterion
a. Genocide
b. Gross, Persistent and Systematic Violations of Basic Human
Rights
2. The Nature of the Intervention-The Proportionality Criterion
a. Duration
b. Was the force proper/excessive?
3. The Purpose of the Intervention
a. Humanitarian Concern?
b. Self-interest?
c. Mixed?
4. Was the action:
a. Collective?
b. Unilateral?
5. Balancing Alternatives and Outcomes
a. Does the intervention maximize the best outcomes?
Nanda, supra note 12, at 330.
37. One writer, distinguishing 'forcible* from 'non-forcible" forms of humanitarian
intervention, would allow the Security Council greater power to 'intervene" non-forc-
ibly by, for example, providing assistance after natural disasters without state con-
sent. Scheffer, supra note 6, at 266, 288. If, however, a target state should resist
such assistance forcibly, "a threat to international peace and security would clearly
arise" and "the Security Council should consider applying economic sanctions and, if
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described the types of military operations in the Agenda for Peace as a
"Sears catalogue of international peace and security."" Can the Secu-
rity Council authorize the deployment of troops and give them attack
orders regardless of the operation? The establishment of safe havens or
areas to protect persons in the killing fields of fratricidal conflict raises
important questions of military security. Experiences in Kurdish and
Bosnian areas validate the efficacy of this kind of humanitarian mea-
sure" but raise serious questions about expanding the use of force be-
yond the normal bounds of humanitarian missions.
Until recently, peacekeeping missions were authorized to fire only
in self-defense. Even in the Korean and Gulf Wars, the Security
Council authorized the use of force, under Chapter VII, only to counter
aggression by one state across established international boundaries. In
the Congo, the Council's authorization was even more limited. Now,
however, the Security Council has repeatedly authorized U.N. forces in
Somalia and Bosnia to take all measures necessary to accomplish their
missions. Precisely when should "all necessary measures" of humani-
tarian relief include the use of force, especially its initiation? The an-
swer is unclear.
D. Institutional Coordination
A fourth issue relates to the role of other organs within the Unit-
ed Nations framework. The Security Council was not intended to go it
alone. Ever since the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Uniting for
Peace Resolution,' it has indicated its readiness to respond to a
threat to international peace and security in the absence of Security
Council action. Its recent pronouncements on humanitarian assis-
tance" provide important guidance, particularly on the sensitive is-
sues of state consent. On the other hand, the General Assembly's con-
demnation of Serbian aggression in Bosnia and recommendation to lift
the arms embargo there may have exceeded the jurisdictional
boundaries imposed by Article 12(1)' 2 of the Charter. The Secretary
these prove ineffective, authorizing a military intervention.* Id. at 289. Ultimately,
then, a non-forcible intervention carries with it the threat of forcible intervention if
non-forcible intervention is resisted by the target state.
38. Brian Urquhart, Remarks, 1993 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 284, 286.
39. See, e.g., Geraldine Brooks, For Kurds, at Least, 'Safe Area' Designation Pro-
vides Protection, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1993, at 1.
40. Uniting for Peace Resolution, GA. Res. 337A(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951).
41. See, e.g., GA Res. A/RES/46/182 (1991).
42.
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the Gener-
al Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 12(1).
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General also has important responsibilities to call problems to the
attention of the Security Council and to work with it in resolving those
problems. Regional organizations must assume greater responsibility,
however spotty their past efforts may have been. The World Court
seems to have confirmed its powers to review actions taken by other
organs of the United Nations. That would seem to be the implication of
its preliminary decision in the Libya case,' which may be the
Marbury v. Madison" of the United Nations. Also, the World Court
may serve as a source of advisory opinions on issues of intervention.
E. Multilateral Preemption of Unilateral Intervention
A fifth question is whether, as a matter of law, collective interven-
tion should completely displace unilateral prerogatives. The answer is
probably a qualified yes-or yes except in exceptional cases.' Cer-
tainly, it is no longer possible to justify unilateral intervention on the
posse comitatus theory of the Cold War that a state may use force,
despite the injunction against it in Article 2(4) of the Charter, in the
absence of a collective sheriff." Such an application of rebus sic stan-
tibus in Cold War circumstances is invalid today because it turns out
that there was no permanent change of systemic circumstances. The
Security Council can be effective, after all.
Moral bases of unilateral intervention are persuasive' but can-
43. Supra note 29.
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Franck, supra note 29.
45. One writer has listed seven conjunctive requirements for such interventions:
(1) The Security Council is deadlocked indefinitely on the issue and has
not explicitly prohibited intervention to meet the humanitarian cri-
s . . . .
(2) Alternative peaceful remedies, including economic sanctions, have
been exhausted within the period of time during which the humanitar-
ian need has not reached crisis dimensions.
(3) The severity of the human rights violations is apparent.
(4) Every effort is made to diversify the intervening forces among many
nations. A unilateral intervention can only be justified if efforts to cre-
ate a multinational force have failed.
(5) The humanitarian purpose and objective of the intervention is para-
mount.
(6) The intervention will have a convincingly positive effect on human
rights in the target country. In other words, more good than harm will
come of the intervention.
(7) The long-term political independence and territorial integrity of the
target state will not be imperiled by the intervention.
Scheffer, supra note 6 at 290-91. Noting the difficulty of separating humanitarian
principles from political objectives, the author suggests that the circumstances justi-
fying unilateral or unprescribed multilateral interventions should encompass 'a very
narrow range.' Id. at 293.
46. Reisman, supra note 29, at 98; See also W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and
Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT L. 642 (1984).
47. See FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
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not override the Charter's preference for collective action when feasi-
ble. To resolve any ambiguity the extent to which, and the process by
which, Security Council action preempts unilateral intervention for
humanitarian reasons must be clarified. What kind of collective mea-
sures may preempt such actions? When would a crisis warrant inter-
vention? Although a convention defining permissible circumstances for
unilateral intervention does not seem feasible at the present time, the
General Assembly and Security Council might jointly adopt a standard
operating procedure for humanitarian intervention.' An ad hoc ap-
proach invites cynicism.'9
F. Consent of the Target State
A sixth issue is whether humanitarian intervention requires the
consent of a target state, as the General Assembly's Resolution on
humanitarian assistanceO seems to suggest. In practice, the General
LAw AND MORALrIY (1988).
48. In part I of this study, I proposed that
the General Assembly and the Security Council might jointly adopt a
resolution on humanitarian intervention. It should preempt unilateral
actions. Accordingly, member states would be authorized, only under the
resolution, to undertake measures in other states that are deemed nec-
essary to vindicate fundamental human rights. Such measures might in-
clude the use of force, unless the target state agreed within a reason-
able period of time to submit immediately to fact-finding and concilia-
tion procedures, and in good faith to carry out any resulting recommen-
dations or decisions. Under Articles 98 and 99 of the U.N. Charter, the
Secretary-General might continue to play a central role. Rescue missions
requiring an immediate response would be an exception; these would be
governed primarily by customary rules of law, such as immediacy, pro-
portionality, and necessity. Thus, humanitarian intervention by one state
would be permissible only under two circumstances: first, if a target
state had declined to submit a dispute to impartial review within a rea-
sonable period or time; second, if after agreeing to do so, the target
state failed to comply in good faith with resulting recommendations or
decisions. Humanitarian intervention would be subsumed within a pro-
cess of community decision, and would be authorized only as a last
resort when Article 33 procedures have failed. Effective community de-
liberations and collective initiatives, rather than unilateral argument and
doctrinal justification of intervention, would become the hallmark of a
new process of multilateral dispute resolution.
Nafziger, supra note *, at 38-39; accord, Scheffer, supra note 6, at 291 ('a unilateral
intervention can only be justified if efforts to create a multilateral force have
failed").
49. A summary of the ambiguities that beset decision making by the United
States in the absence of a clear restatement of broader community expectations may
be found in Gaddis Smith, What Role for America?, 92 CuRRENT HISTORY 150, 152-
53 (1993).
50. The pertinent part of the Resolution provides as follows:
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must
be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the Urited Nations.
In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the
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Assembly has turned a blind eye to the Secretary-General's dispatch of
assistance to Africa without first gaining the consent of the states in-
volved. Although the Security Council has paid lip service to the ges-
ture of consent, it has demonstrated a capacity to arrange or compel
consent whenever the Permanent Members are willing and able to
supply the force."1 In any event, the Security Council's powers under
Chapter VII would trump anything to the contrary in the General
Assembly Resolution. Consent is thus more of a political than a legal
issue."'
G. Hegemony by Permanent Members of the Security Council
A seventh question involves the purported skepticism of weaker
states towards the new "Superpower" of the Security Council.' The
spectre of a modern Holy Alliance of the Great Powers is said to alarm
these states. Indeed, they are said to feel more threatened by conspira-
cy among the Permanent Members than by the former Cold War rival-
ry.-" Many of those states argue that the General Assembly should be
consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an ap-
peal by the affected country.
G.A. Res. A/RES/46/182(199lXemphasis added). Presumably the words "should be"
establishes a requirement, rather than merely suggesting an option.
51. See, e.g., Resolution 771, U.N. SCOR, 46th Seas., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/771 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470 (1992). This Resolution first:
Further demands that relevant international humanitarian organiza-
tions ... be granted immediate, unimpeded and continued access to
camps, prisons and detention centres within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and calls upon all parties to do all in their power to facili-
tate such access.
Id. at 1471. Then, the Security Council
Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all
military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall comply with the provi-
sions of the present resolution, failing which the Council will need to
take further measures under the Charter;
Id. (emphasis added).
52.
Contemplating UN action to protect a repressed people such as the
Kurds, one realizes that the issue is not so much the authority of the
United Nations to act, but rather whether there will be sufficient politi-
cal consensus on the Security Council in favor of action, and whether
agreement can be reached on the goals of such an action. These goals
will be either negotiated among the parties consensually or determined
by the members of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. Ei-
ther way it will be difficult.
Stromseth, supra note 6, at 373.
53. See Franck, supra note 29, at 523.
54.
The East-West rapprochement and the invigoration of the Security Coun-
cil have left many developing countries deeply concerned about their
vulnerability to international intervention in the post-cold war era.
There is now no counterbalancing political bloc to discourage Western
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more involved in making decisions about humanitarian intervention
lest the United Nations be simply the pawn of the big powers." On
the other hand, smaller states involved in making decisions show no
reluctance to lead crusades for intervention.'
H. Financial and Operational 188ue8
Finally, we should note that the competence of the Security Coun-
cil and the cooperation of states are not the only issues. Capacity, cost,
control, command, and credibility may ultimately determine the suc-
cess of multilateral intervention.
Most of these factors have been severely tested in the course of
United Nations actions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. It has
been argued that the United Nations lost its military credibility in re-
sponding to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and even that U.N.
humanitarian measures made matters worse."' Although such an as-
sessment is questionable over the long haul, it is hard to gainsay that
the global community faces serious financial and operational issues in
conducting intervention.
In confronting these issues, a new community of power has re-
vived the stillborn effort to install an effective global system of collec-
tive security. This will require the United Nations to enter into Article
43 agreements with states to provide standby forces. Related issues
include the precise obligations of member states,M the status of the
Military Staff Committee," and specific provisions for the composition
countries from using economic pressure to force a developing-country
government to make the sort of internal changes they believe desirable;
and the big powers have now demonstrated the potential for forceful
intervention under the aegis of the Security Council. Governments of
weak and poor states, acutely aware of the limited nature of their "sov-
ereignty" in confronting the global tides of economic, social, environmen-
tal, and communication changes, have drawn the line to assert at least
their political sovereignty. They have blocked efforts by Western powers
to add to the Security Council agenda such issues as environment,
drugs, and democratization - issues that, they fear, might be used to
justify international intervention in their affairs - insisting that such
matters are the province of the General Assembly, whose one-state/one-
vote rule of decision-making embodies the Charter principle of the "sov-
ereign equality of states."
UNA-USA, THE COMMON DEFENSE; PEACE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 34
(1992).
55. Id. at 39.
56. For example, Cape Verde, a member of the Security Council in 1993, argued
that "[tihe U.N. has to go beyond peacekeeping .... It needs an interventionist role.
To circumscribe it to traditional peacekeeping is to relegate the U.N. to failure."
Quoted in Trevor Rowe, Is the U.N. Failing?, 19 The Interdependent (UNA-USA),
Spring 1993, at 6.
57. William Pfaff, Invitation to War, 72 FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 97,99.
58. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 44, 45, 48, 49.
59. Id. arts. 45, 46, 47. It is uncertain, however, whether the big powers favor a
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and marshalling of United Nations forces."o
An Article 43 agreement between the United States and the Unit-
ed Nations would seem to require not only the advice and consent of
the Senate but implementing legislation enacted by both houses of
Congress as well." Under the U.N. Participation Act of 194 5 ,' such
legislation might provide advance approval of United Nations mandat-
ed or authorized use of force, presumably under a combination of pres-
idential and United Nations command. Advance approval would obvi-
ate the problem that loomed on the eve of the Gulf War' when Con-
gress, exercising its declaratory powers, reviewed the competence of
the Commander-in-Chief to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf under
Security Council Resolution 678." Advance approval would also help
resolve the issue whether the War Powers Resolution governs the
duration of all military deployments by the President and whether
United States troops may serve under foreign command.' Implement-
ing legislation under an Article 43 agreement should clarify the re-
spective spheres of U.N. and presidential authority to command stand-
by or ready troops.
II. CONCLUSION
An emerging community of power, under United Nations leader-
ship, has brought at least a semblance of peace and more coherent
rules of law. We are being "hooped together" by more than some kind
of manifest illusion. Collective security, expressed today in more user-
friendly terms, may be moving toward a third phase in which it relies
more heavily on the protection of human rights.' A comprehensive
stronger Military Staff Committee.
60. See Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Le-
gal Alternatives, 81 GEO. LJ. 773 (1993).
61. See Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of The United Na-
tions Charter, 85 AM. J. INr*L L. 74 (1991).
62. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945).
63. See Comment, Collective Security v. Constitutional Sovereignty: Can the Presi-
dent Commit U.S. Troops Under the Sanction of the United Nations Security Council
Without Congressional Approval?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1055, 1084 (1992).
64. UN SCOR, 45th Sees., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. SfRES/678 (1990) reprinted in
30 I.L.M. 1565 (1990). Resolution 678 demand.4 that Iraq comply with previous
resolutions by January 15, 1991, authorized the use of *all necessary means to up-
hold and implement" the resolutions after that date, and requested all states to
support the measures taken under the provision. The Resolution also authorized the
necessary means to "restore international peace and security in the area."
65. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973Xcodified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)). For a good summary of the War Powers Resolution
and literature about it, see Comment, supra note 63, at 1058, n. 13.
66. Lewis, supra note 16. For the first time in U.S. history, UNOSOM II placed
U.S. troops under foreign field command (initially, a Turkish general).
67. For an outline of this approach, see James A.R. Nafziger, The Security of
Human Rights: A Third Phase in The Global System, 20 CAL W. IN' L.J. 173
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definition of international peace and security must consider the threats
of poverty and environmental degradation as well. Collective interven-
tion for humanitarian reasons has become feasible because of this
reinterpretation of "international peace and security" under the United
Nations Charter and a far more assertive Security Council in the post-
Cold War era. As a result, the global community has rescued the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention from the quicksand of
unilateralism.
Several key questions remain, however: What is the scope of the
Security Council's powers to prescribe, organize, or authorize interven-
tion? Is unilateral intervention any longer permissible? If so, must an
intervening state first exhaust international or regional remedies?
When should the United Nations condition intervention on a state's
consent? May the Security Council authorize the Blue Helmets to take
"all necessary measures," including the use of force, regardless of the
purpose or type of operation? Is the new Superpower of the Security
Council simply a bully in multilateral disguise? We, the peoples, must
find answers to all of these questions, for the authority, legitimacy,
and effectiveness of a new community of power are at stake.
(1990).
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Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the
Former Yugoslavia: The Case for an
International War Crimes Tribunal
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER7
I. INTRODUCTION
War is an evil phenomenon. Its consequences reach far beyond the
armed forces and borders of the belligerent parties involved. The trag-
edy and suffering of these realities are amply exemplified today in the
pervasive regional violence that has followed the political disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia into Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (comprised
of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro).
Ongoing armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since June 1991 have produced numerous allegations of grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international hu-
manitarian law.' These charges, which have been leveled primarily
* Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington
University. Ph.D., Foreign Affairs, 1977, University of Virginia; M.A, Government,
1973; MA4., International Affairs, 1972; B-A., International Relations, 1970, Florida
State University. The author would like to thank Mr. Paul Szasz and Mr. Richard
Rodero for their valuable assistance in securing documentary materials in the course
of research for this article.
1. A considerable number of reports containing allegations of grave breaches of
international humanitarian law have been submitted to the special Commission of
Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). Governments
issuing reports included Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Germany,
Norway, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United States and Yugoslavia. Reports from United
Nations agencies and authorities directly concerned with the humanitarian situation
include those of the Special Rapporteur appointed under resolution 1992/S-I1l of the
Commission on Human Rights to investigate first hand the human rights situation
in the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Human Rights Committee and the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe has submitted several reports, including its report on the
CSCE Mission to detention camps in Bosnia, the report of CSCE Human Rights
Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia, and the Report of the Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina and to Croatia under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism of the
CSCE. Finally, reports have also been prepared by several nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), many of which contain detailed information about grave breaches
and other violations of humanitarian law. Among these NGOs are Amnesty Interne-
tional, International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins sans frontieres, Helsinki
Watch, International League for Human Rights, Union for Peace and Humanitarian
Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and World Campaign to Save Humanity.' See Letter
dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR,48th Year, Annex I, at 7-8 (Jan. 26, 1993), U.N. DOC.
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against the government and armed forces of Serbia, are starkly remi-
niscent of charges made during the Nuremberg trials against major
German war criminals, i.e., war crimes, crimes against the peace, and
crimes against humanity." Typifying these crimes in the Yugoslavian
situation is the genocidal practice of "ethnic cleansing," by which mass
numbers of Bosnian Muslims have been systematically driven from
their homes, incarcerated in concentration camps, tortured, raped, and
murdered.! While violations of the laws of war no doubt have occurred
on all sides, it is the horrendous atrocities by Serbian forces associated
with ethnic cleansing that have propelled international humanitarian
concern to the forefront of these conflicts.
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council approved the estab-
lishment of a special international tribunal for the prosecution of per-
sons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."
War crimes trial proceedings are therefore likely to be brought against
certain persons in Yugoslavia's successor governments and their armed
forces, as well as civilians. This article aims to accomplish three pur-
poses: First, it examines the legal scope and juridical underpinnings
for those criminal proceedings as fixed in the Nuremberg Precedent
(i.e., the principles of international humanitarian law that were formu-
lated and carried out by the Nuremberg Tribunal). In this way, the
range of relevant law can be weighed within the context of humani-
tarian considerations. Second, it analyzes the nature and scope of re-
S/25274 (1993) [hereinafter Commission of Experts Report]. See also Theodor Meron,
The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFr., Summer 1993, at 122.
2. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Prose-
cution of State-Sponsored Mass Murder, 11 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. 325
(1990); Steven Fogelson, Nuremberg Legacy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 870 (1990); and
ROBERT JACKSON THE NUREMBERG CASE (1947).
3. In his third report to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council, the
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights defined the odious notion of "ethnic cleansing"
as "the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of
members of other ethnic groups." Report on the situation of human rights in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Com-
mission resolution 1992/S-11 and Economic and Social Council decision 1992/305, in
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of the Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item
97(c), U.N. DOC. A/47/666, S/24809 (1992). "Ethnic cleansing" involves violations of
international humanitarian law because of the intentional methods used in its perpe-
tration, which include, inter alia, threats, harassment, and intimidation; shooting or
using explosives against homes, shops, and places of business; destruction of places
of worship and cultural institutions; forcible transfer and relocation of populations;
summary executions; committing torture, rape, and mutilation of corpses; disregard
for the sick and injured; and targeting areas of civilian activity or residence. Id. See
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 110, 116-21.
4. U.N. DOC. S/RES/827 (1993).
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ported ongoing violations of humanitarian law in Bosnia to determine
whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed with international mea-
sures to remedy the situation. Third, the article assesses the progres-
sive efforts by the international community, particularly through the
United Nations, to halt atrocities being perpetrated in Bosnia and to
move toward a special war crimes tribunal for prosecuting alleged
perpetrators. The intent here is neither to accuse nor indict; rather, it
is to evaluate the prospects for and direction of such war criminal
proceedings. Finally, it examines some realistic conclusions about the
feasibility of applying the Nuremberg Precedent further in the so-
called New World Order.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE NUREMBERG PRECEDENT
The horrendous violations of the laws of war by the Axis powers
during World War II prompted demands for effective postwar punish-
ment of those individuals responsible. On August 8, 1945, the govern-
ments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union concluded in London the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European War Axis."
This instrument contained details of and the Charter for the establish-
ment of an International Military Tribunal.'
The Nuremberg Tribunal marked the first time that adjudication
was convened pursuant to an international prescription defining par-
ticular crimes liable for prosecution. The fact that German high offi-
cials were given fair trials in itself was no small achievement, as it
demonstrated respect for the law contained in that Charter. That re-
spect was further evidenced by the establishment of the International
Military Tribunal for the just and prompt trial of alleged war crimi-
nals.7
Key among the Nuremberg Charter's central provisions was Arti-
cle 6, which defined the jurisdiction of the court:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:
(a) Crimes against the Peace: Namely, planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
5. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Mqjor War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. [hereinafter London Charter]. See also 13 DEPT OF STATE BULL 222
(1945).
6. 13 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL, supra note 5, at 223.
7. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg 40 Years After: An Introduc-
tion, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 261 (1986).
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foregoing;
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but shall not be limited to, mur-
der, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or from any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, town or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population before or during the war, or per-
secutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan .... 
The body of modern international humanitarian law has been
constructed on this foundation of criminal jurisdiction. Regarding
crimes against the peace, contemporary international law clearly as-
serts that launching and waging a war of aggression is unlawful. The
critical point here turns on the presumption that individual responsi-
bility is paramount. Planning, preparing, and carrying out a war of
aggression is done by people in one state against the people in some
other state. Crimes against international law are committed by per-
sons, not by abstract polities called states. Only by punishing individu-
als who commit such crimes can tenets of international humanitarian
law actually be enforced.
War crimes are multiple in character and are defined as acts that
violate the law of armed conflict - i.e., the rules established by cus-
tomary law and conventional international law regulating the conduct
of warfare and that have been designated as war crimes.9 It is impor-
8. London Charter, supra note 5, art. VI.
9. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, NWP 9 (REV.A/FMFM 1-10) 6-27 (1989). The following acts are consid-
ered representative of war crimes: (1) Offenses against prisoners of war, including
killing without just cause, torture or inhuman treatment; unhealthy, dangerous, or
otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and denial of fair trial
for offenses; (2) offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including
killing without just cause, torture or inhuman treatment, forced labor, deportation,
infringement of religious rights, and denial of fair trial for offenses; (3) offenses
against the sick and wounded, including killing, wounding, or mistreating enemy
forces disabled by sickness or wounds; (4) denial of quarter (i.e., denial of the clem-
ency of not killing a defeated enemy) and offenses against combatants who have laid
down their arms and have surrendered; (5) offenses against the survivors of ships
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tant to realize that the laws of war embody rules of international law
with which belligerents have agreed to comply should hostilities break
out. Such laws involve specified mutual legal obligations and duties
pertaining to warfare. The right of a belligerent to punish persons who
violate the laws and customs of war as war criminals is a well-recog-
nized principle of international law.
War crimes must be distinguished from "crimes against the peace"
and "crimes against humanity." While the distinction between crimes
against the peace and war crimes is not overly difficult, the distinction
between war crimes and crimes against humanity appears more prob-
lematic. In general, crimes against humanity constitute offenses
against the human rights of individuals perpetrated in a pervasive,
systematic manner. Isolated offenses are excluded from crimes against
humanity, and proof must confirm that acts alleged to be crimes
against humanity resulted from premeditated, systematic governmen-
tal policies. 0 Significantly, acts constituting war crimes may be com-
mitted by members of the armed forces of belligerent states or by indi-
viduals belonging to the civilian population."
Crimes against humanity come in two general varieties. One con-
cerns the execution type of crime, which includes acts such as murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation and the like. The second per-
tains to the persecution type of crimes, which include acts committed
on racial, religious, or political grounds. Both groups of crimes against
humanity are committed against civilian populations. In this connec-
tion, isolated offenses fall outside the scope of crimes against humani-
ty. Authoritative, systematic, mass action is necessary to pervert the
common crime, punishable solely under municipal law, into a crime
against humanity that generates the concern of international law.
Such crimes by their sheer magnitude and savagery shock the con-
science of humankind.'
and aircraft lost at seas, including killing, wounding, or mistreating the shipwrecked;
and failing to provide for the safety of survivors as military circumstances permit;
(6) wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages or devastation not justified by
the requirements of military operations; and bombardment, the sole purpose of which
is to attack and terrorize the civilian population; (7) deliberate attack upon medical
facilities, hospital ships, medical aircraft, medical vehicles or medical personnel; (8)
plunder and pillage of public or private property; (9) mutilation or other mistreat-
ment of the dead; (10) use of prohibited arms or ammunition; (11) misuse, abuse, or
firing on flags of truce or on the Red Cross device, and similar protective emblems,
signs, and signals; (12) treacherous request for quarter (i.e., feigning surrender in
order to gain a military advantage). Id. at 6-32-6-34.
10. Id. at 6-28. Victims of crimes against humanity encompass a wider range of
persons than those who might be made the objects of war crimes. In addition, vic-
tims may include nationals of the state committing the offense, as well as stateless
persons. Id.
11. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1, at 16.
12. See generally W.J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NuREMBERG: AMERICAN ATrITUDES
TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIME TRIALS (1970); CHARLES W. ALEXANDER &
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A cardinal principle emerging from the Nuremberg Precedent
asserts that the rights of humanity should prevail over the province of
municipal law. In a real sense, crimes against humanity have been
made liable to prosecution through an international tribunal because
the heinous nature of those crimes offends humanity itself." Simi-
larly, such crimes can be reasonably viewed as threats to world peace
since their ramifications might well give rise to transnational conflict.
As a consequence, the precept that crimes against humanity--given
that they so egregiously contravene standards of civilized na-
tions--could be made subject to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal furnished a notably progressive development toward the codi-
fication of international humanitarian law.14
A second core principle stemming from the Nuremberg Precedent
holds that individuals have international duties that go beyond na-
tional obligations set by domestic governments.' Irrespective of
whether an individual is a private citizen or government official, that
person is subject to punishment under international law."6 To be sure,
this principle poses challenges for the state centric system in at least
two ways. First, if a state's nationals are accused of war crimes, that
state may be bound to relinquish jurisdiction over them to internation-
al jurisdiction. 7 As a second and resultant corollary, the state's sover-
eignty is made more circumscribed by the demands of international
law.' The use of force by governments within states, as well as that
between them, has now become subject to centralized international
legal control. The international community has clearly come to accept
a special legal regime for governing the actions of states and individu-
als during armed conflict."9 Nuremberg represented an early effort at
conscientiously designing the procedures and norms of this regime.
ANNE KEESHAN, JuSICE AT NuRMBERG (1946); and ROBERT K. WOETLEL, THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1962).
13. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2556 (1991). See also Whitney K.
Harris, A Call for An International War Crimes Court: Learning from Nuremberg, 23
U. TOL. L. REv. 229, 243 (1992).
14. See generally Louis Rene Beres, The United States Should Take the Lead in
Preparing International Legal Machinery for the Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA.
J. INT'L L. 381 (1991).
15. Matthew Lippman, Civil Resistance: The Dictates of Conscience and Interna-
tional Law Versus the American Judiciary, 6 FLA. J. INTL L. 5, 32 (1991).
16. Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 833, 870 (1990). See also Principles of International Cooperation in the Detec-
tion, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G. Res. 3074, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
17. Measures to Deal with International Crimes, in UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS IN
THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (1983).
18. RICHARD FALc, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 159 (1968).
19. See generally JEAN PICTET, DEVEWDMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (1985) and JEAN PICTET, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN-
ITARIAN LAw (1988).
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Related to individual duty and war crimes are the twin concepts
of command responsibility and superior orders. The Nuremberg experi-
ence firmly established the principle that a person who gives an order
to commit a war crime against humanity and the person who carries it
out are equally guilty of the offense. In fact, a responsible commander
could be subject to trial even if he did not order such crimes but knew
or should have known of the unlawful conduct and failed to take rea-
sonable actions to prevent, suppress, and punish it.' This principle
applies both to military superiors of regular or irregular armed forces
and to civilian authorities. Similarly, the fact that an individual com-
mits a war crime under orders from his military or civilian superior
does not relieve him of responsibility under international law. Respon-
sibility is established when the order given is manifestly unlawful and
the person receiving the order knows (or should know) of its unlawful
character under international law."
A third principle associated with the Nuremberg Precedent is
contained in the definition of war crimes as it prohibits the wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages. The Nuremberg definition es-
sentially mandates that violence and devastation of civilian areas not
justified by military necessity are forbidden.' To be sure, the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal went to great lengths to demonstrate that ac-
tions producing unnecessary damage and destruction were already war
crimes, and were therefore unlawful. The Tribunal eventually held
liable those persons who intended to perform such unlawful acts.'
The normative implications of the Nuremberg Precedent are real
and profound. The Tribunal at Nuremberg embodied the international
community's resolve to ensure that persons responsible for heinous
acts systematically perpetrated as part of a mass campaign of discrimi-
nation and persecution must not go unpunished. Such a conviction has
roots in the 1907 Hague Convention, which refers to the laws of hu-
manity as principles governing the conduct of international war." A
20. See The High Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb), 12 L Rep. of
Trials of War Criminals 1, 71 (1949). See generally William Hayes Parks, Command
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL L REV. 1 (1973).
21. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 9, at 6-39.
A situation involving superior orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment,
however. Id. See generally L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (1976).
22. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Individual Responsibility in Warfare, in LAW AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 194, 195 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975).
23. Id. at 207-208.
24. Hague Convention No. 1V Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]. The
famous de Martens. clause in the Preamble to this instrument makes clear the
broad, evolutionary scope for the positive the law of war. It provides that
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
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critical theme for the viability of international humanitarian law con-
sequently emerges: emphasis on the permissibility of international
jurisdiction underscores the firm insistence of international law that
these crimes not go unpunished.'
The Nuremberg Tribunal represented the first major attempt to
use the rule of law to protect the rights of all persons and foster a
more peaceful, humane, and secure world.' That experience also con-
tributed significantly in propelling the drafting of the four 1949 Gene-
va Conventions.' Especially salient is Article 3, common to each of
these conventions, that guarantees humane treatment for persons
taking no active part in the hostilities. This provision stipulates that
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, with-
out any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humili-
ating and degrading treatment;
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of
the public conscience.
Id. at Preamble.
25. The case for international jurisdiction over violations of international humani-
tarian law is facilitated by the permissible application of universal jurisdiction to
such offenders. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAw
AND PRACTICE (vol. II, ch. 6, 1983); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNrrED STATES, §§ 402-404 (1987).
26. Lippman, supra note 15, at 48.
27. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. No. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1949 Gene-
va Conventions].
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(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of exe-
cutions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly con-
stituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict."
The decision to try the crimes set out in the Nuremberg Charter
grew out of its reliance on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced
war as an instrument of national policy." Also, carrying out the
Nuremberg Charter's mandate clearly necessitated difficult legal judg-
ments, especially concerning legal questions of precedent, jurisdiction,
and scope. Once made, however, these legal judgments formed the bed-
rock on which modern international humanitarian law is grounded.'
28. Id. art. 3.
29. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. As assert-
ed in Article I of this instrument, "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another." Id. art. I.
30. On November 21, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Reso-
lution 177 (II), which affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." As subse-
quently formulated by the U.N. International Law Commission, the text of these
principles are as follows:
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to pun-
ishment.
Principle I. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty
for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not
relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under
international law.
Principle IlI. The fact that a person who committed an act which
constitutes a crime under international law acted as a Head of State or
responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law.
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to
him.
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international
law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Principle VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as
crimes under international law: (crimes against the peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity are thereafter defined substantially as they
appear in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg].
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It is this same humanitarian law that must be applied to the armed
conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
III. NUREMBERG AND THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The war in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, remains a violent armed conflict that has generated seri-
ous political, military, and legal implications throughout the interna-
tional community. In the process, the tragedy of that war proffers the
first realistic opportunity since the Nuremberg experience to prosecute
persons responsible for committing grave breaches of international
humanitarian law."1
A. The Legal Issues
1. International Humanitarian Law
The armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has
generated a number of legal issues involving facets of "international
humanitarian law." But how is international humanitarian law to be
defined? As applied to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, such law gen-
erally refers to the "rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict." 2 Some of these rules are set out in the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conven-
tions," to which the former Yugoslavia was a party. The Federal Re-
Principle Vfl. Complicity in the commission of a crime against the
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Prin-
ciple VI is a crime under international law.
Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session, U.N.
GAOR, 5th sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11-14 (1950).
31. At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in early 1991 serious suggestions
were made that war crimes trials of Iraqi soldiers and governmental officials were
in order, but neither formal proceedings nor a tribunal was ever promulgated. For
discussion of the prospects of Iraqi war crimes, see Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam:
Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. bWL L. 351 (1991);
Beres, supra note 14; and John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in
the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. INTL L. 403 (1991).
32. Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating
to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflict, art. 2, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1399 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. For the fundamental
principles of modern humanitarian law, see Lippman supra note 15. For a general
discussion of international humanitarian law, see PICTET, supra note 19.
33. For the Geneva Conventions, see note 27 supra. In Protocol I, specific provi-
sions of humanitarian law are contained in two categories of acts designated as
"grave breaches' of that instrument. The first category requires that both willfulness
and death or serious injury to body or health be caused, and includes the following
acts as grave breaches:
(a) making the civilian population or individual citizens the object
of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian popu-
lation or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause
extensive loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian ob-
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public of Yugoslavia, said to be the successor to that state, is bound by
these treaties." Also legally significant, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina have declared themselves likewise bound.'
Other international instruments also hold specific relevance to the
situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, given that the vio-
lence there has risen to the level of an armed conflict. International
agreements that specifically relate to the conduct of hostilities and the
treatment of local persons include the 1907 Hague Convention IV and
jects.... ;
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause extensive
loss of life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects .... ;
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the
object of attack;
,(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he
is hors de combat;
(f) the perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive
emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun, or other
protective sign recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol.
Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 85(3). A second category of grave breaches contained
in Protocol I requires only willfulness to be an offense and includes the following:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civil-
ian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or trans-
fer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or
outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Conven-
tion;
(b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or
civilians;
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading prac-
tices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial dis-
crimination;
(d) making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of
- art or places or worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heri-
tage of peoples and to which special protection has been given by spe-
cial arrangement ... the object of attack, causing as a result extensive
destruction thereof ... ; and
(e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to
in paragraph 2 of this article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
Id. art. 85(4).
34. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1, at 13.
35. In the 1992 Programme of Action concluded at the London International Con-
ference, these governments pledged to abide by the provision that "all parties to the
[Yugoslav] conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under the Internation-
al Humanitarian Law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Additional Protocols thereto, and that persons who commit or order the commission
of grave breaches are individually responsible.* United Nations, General Assembly,
Security Council, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia; Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992,
48th Sess., Annex III, U.N. Doc. A/48 - S/25341 at 78 (1992) [hereinafter 1992
Programme of Action].
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the Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land;" the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide;" the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict;' and the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
may be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, and Protocols.' Relevant human rights laws are also applica-
ble to this conflict in the Balkans.'
2. Legal Status of the Conflict
Another legal consideration is the status of the conflict. Do the
various armed conflicts occurring in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia qualify as international armed conflicts entailing belligerent
hostilities between two or more states? Or do they more closely resem-
ble non-international (i.e., internal) armed conflicts taking place within
the territory of a single state?
The character and complexity of the regional situation make such
a determination difficult at best. At times, armed conflict has occurred
involving the armed forces of one state in the territory of another
state. But at many other times, indigenous ethnic groups (primarily
Serbs) have operated as irregular guerrilla forces against other ethnic
groups (primarily Muslims) within the territory of a single state
(mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina). The status of the conflict is relevant
since it may determine which treaties apply to what circumstances,
when and where. No easy solution is available. It is important to re-
alize, however, that both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954
Hague Convention present the opportunity for parties involved in an
internal armed conflict to negotiate special arrangements that would
36. Hague Convention lV, supra note 24.
37. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, The
United States and the Genocide Convention, 27 IND. ImL & CoMp. L. Rev. 441 (1987).
38. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240-88.
39. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 95/15 and Corr. 1 - 5 (1980).
40. Among the human rights instruments offering protection to persons affected
by the armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 and 1967 Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 18, 1966, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.IA.S. 6577; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, GA. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46 at
193 (1979); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, GA Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
51, at 197 (1984); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 LL.M. 352; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200 (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (1967); and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (1967).
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permit all or part of these conventions to be activated."' The parties
involved in these armed conflicts in the Balkans have concluded such a
series of special agreements."
Considering the shifting character and complicated nature of the
situation - as well as the agreements made among the respective gov-
ernments on humanitarian issues - the most appropriate approach
would seem to be to apply the law for international armed conflicts to
all warfare in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Greater legal pro-
tection under the laws relating to armed conflict would be afforded to
more persons in all the afflicted states without the complications of
reviewing each incident of violence to determine if it qualified for na-
tional or international status. Potential excuses premised on national
sovereignty would be subsumed to legal conditions implicating interna-
tional responsibility.
3. Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
a. Background
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia began shortly after Croatia and
Slovenia formally declared their independence on June 25, 1991.' In
Croatia, fighting broke out between Croats and ethnic Serbs. Serbia
sent arms and supplies to ethnic Serbian rebels in Croatia, leading to
numerous clashes between Croatian forces and Yugoslavian army units
with their Serbian supporters."
On October 15, 1991, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopt-
ed a declaration of sovereignty' and on February 29, 1992 a referen-
dum for independence was passed.' Indigenous Serbs, who account
for some thirty one percent of Bosnia's population and who opposed the
referendum, immediately launched attacks aimed at seizing Bosnian
territory and dissuading the international community from recognizing
the independence of the new state.'7 The republics of Serbia and
Montenegro proclaimed a new "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" on
April 17, 1992.' Fierce fighting persisted throughout Bosnia-
41. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 38, art. 19.
42. 1992 Programme of Action, supra note 35.
43. See Chuck Sudetic, 2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al; Chuck Sudetic, Croatia Says Call-Up is Next
Move, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1991, at AS.
44. More Yugoslavs Roll Into Croatia; Civilian Leader Ponders His Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, at A3.
45. Francis X. Clines, Serbia and Croatia Agree to Another Cease-Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A10.
46. Chuck Sudetic, Turnout in Bosnia Signals Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1992, at A3.
47. Chuck Sudetic, Rebel Serbs Disrupt Travel Into Yugoslavia Republic, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. .3, 1992, at A9.
48. John F. Burns, Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New
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Herzegovina during the spring and the summer of 1992, as Serbs mas-
sacred thousands of Bosnians, many of them civilians. Throughout the
conflict, Serbia continued to furnish arms and military supplies to
ethnic Serb guerrillas fighting in Bosnia.
In February 1992, the United Nations Security Council responded
to the situation by adopting Resolution 721 (1992), which authorized
sending a special peacekeeping force, the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR), to Bosnia." In mid-1994, UNPROFOR remained
in place, comprised of some 23,200 troops, mostly from France and
Great Britain.
b. Commission on Human Rights
The violence in Bosnia and Croatia has escalated to the level of a
full-scale regional conflict, bringing with it widespread violations of
international humanitarian law, euphemistically described as "ethnic
cleansing." The severity of the conflict was pushed to the forefront of
international attention when the Commission on Human Rights con-
vened the first exceptional session in its history on August 13, 1992, to
"discuss reports of detention camps, arbitrary imprisonments and exe-
cutions, and destruction of homes and villages in the former Yugosla-
via.'
This extraordinary session of the Commission on Human Rights
was prompted by disturbing reports that many governments had re-
ceived concerning gross abuses of the human rights of Bosnian Mus-
lims by Serbs in direct contravention of international law. Most appall-
ing were reports of deliberate targeting of civilians, a grave breach of
the humanitarian law as set forth in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.5 The entire Bosnian population was suffering from bru-
tal Serbian pressures designed to create a Greater Serbia through the
policy of "ethnic cleansing."
Since his appointment by the Commission on Human Rights in
August 1992, the Special Rapporteur has issued four reports on the
human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia to the General As-
sembly and to the Security Council." These reports contain substan-
Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1992, at Al.
49. U.N. Doc. S/RES1/21 (1992).
50. United Nations Information Service, "Human Rights Commission Opens Ex-
ceptional Session on Situation in Yugoslavia," Press Release HR/3139, Aug. 13, 1992,
at 1.
51. See generally 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27.
52. U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Letter dated 5 August 1992
from the permanent representative of the U.S. of America to the United Nations
Office at Geneva Addressed to the Under-Secretary General for Human Rights, Re-
port on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia sub-
mitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human
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tial evidence detailing pervasive violations of international humanitar-
ian law, attributed mainly to the Serbian policies of "ethnic cleansing."
In his initial report of August 28, 1992, the Rapporteur indicated
that ethnic cleansing has been pursued openly throughout territory in
Bosnia-Herzegovina that was controlled by ethnic Serbs." In these
areas, grave breaches of international humanitarian law by local Serbs
included a raft of offenses: nighttime shooting at homes belonging to
other ethnic groups; forced displacement of Muslims from their homes;
armed attacks on churches and mosques; and the cutting off of food aid
and other supplies, including the use of direct attacks on humanitarian
aid personnel." Among the egregious violations of international hu-
manitarian law reported were the shelling of civilian population cen-
ters, the shooting of innocent civilians by snipers, and the detention of
civilians as a means to pressure them to leave the territory.' Evi-
dence also revealed that untold numbers of Muslim prisoners in
Bosnia-Herzegovina died of torture and systematic execution during
1992. Some three thousand disappearances were reported to have
occurred in the aftermath of the fall of the Bosnia city of Vukovar."
The second report by the Rapporteur was based on a visit to
Bosnia during October 1992."' Its conclusions were no less alarming
than those of the first investigation: serious violations of human rights
had intensified, and the indigenous Muslim population had clearly be-
come the principal victims of aggression." The situation of displaced
Rights, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Commission Resolution 1992/S-/l of 14 August
1992 [hereinafter First Report]; U.N. ESCOR, Commission of Human Rights, Letter
dated 5 Aug. 1992 from the permanent representative of the U.S. of America to the
United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Under-Secretary General for Hu-
man Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia submitted by M. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission of Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Commission Resolution
1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1992/S-1/10 [hereinafter Second
Report]; U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia; Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Commission Resolution
1992/S-1/I and Economic and Social Council decision 1992/305, U.N. Doc. A/47/666-
S/24809 (1992) [hereinafter Third Report]; U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human
Rights, 49th Seas., Situation of human rights in the terriroty of the former Yugosla-
via, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-Il of 14 August 1992,
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1993/50 [hereinafter Fourth Report].
53. First Report, supra note 52, at 2.
54. Id. at 2-4.
55. Id. at 3-5.
56. Id. at 9, para. 41.
57. Second Report' supra note 52.
58. The Rapporteur averred:
Grave and massive violations of human rights continue to occur in the
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persons was becoming increasingly serious, particularly in Travnik
where the plight of some fourteen thousand refugees was being han-
dled by local authorities.' Before their arrival in Travnik, many of
these refugees had been taken to the front battle lines and subjected to
beatings, robbery, rape, and sometimes shooting.' Brutal methods
associated with ethnic cleansing had occurred in the Bosnian towns of
Pijavija, Prikepolje, and Pribj."1
The Third Report of the Special Rapporteur was issued on Novem-
ber 17, 1992 and specifically highlights violations of the various
parties' legal obligations under modern international humanitarian
law." In areas under Serbian control, the multifaceted process of eth-
nic cleansing was being systematically practiced to drive out Bosnian
Muslims from their homes, including widespread use of torture, artil-
lery shelling of civilian neighborhoods, and summary mass executions
- some of which claimed as many as five thousand victims.' The
Rapporteur asserted that ethnic cleansing was clearly following the
political objective by Serbian nationalists to gain control over all terri-
tories inhabited by significant numbers of Serbs, with the ultimate
goal of incorporating Serbian-occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina
into a "Greater Serbia.' The Third Report also underscored the hu-
manitarian crisis in the region. Out of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population
of four million, at least 1.5 million have become refugees and displaced
persons, with seventy five percent of the latter being children and the
elderly.'
The Fourth Report by the Special Rapporteur was the most com-
prehensive and concluded that massive violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law are not simply features of armed con-
flict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, such heinous means were being
used systematically and deliberately by Serbs to achieve ethnically
homogenous areas.' Ethnic cleansing had clearly been successful in
territory of the former Yugoslavia. The military conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is aimed at 'ethnic cleansing", remains a matter of
particular and most urgent concern .... [Hiuman rights violations
continue to be committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in certain
respects have intensified .... As indicated in the first report, the Mus-
lim population are the principal victims and are virtually threatened
with extermination.*
Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. To escape terrorist bombings and burning by paramilitary groups, an esti-
mated 70,000 Muslims were reported to have fled this region since June of 1991. Id.
at 6.
62. Third Report, supra note 52.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 6-7.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 6.
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obtaining its objectives: nearly two-thirds of Bosnia had been put un-
der Serbian control.' Summary executions, mass arrests and arbi-
trary detention, widespread rape, deprivation of children, forced trans-
fer of populations, attacks on civilian population centers, wanton de-
struction of property, and harassment of humanitarian relief convoys
have all been used by Serbs against Bosnians to achieve "ethnic
cleansing" in the region."
In Croatia, the Fourth Report indicated that discrimination had
occurred against Serbian civilians, particularly as regards their citizen-
ship and political rights.' In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
situation of human rights in Kosovo had deteriorated as discrimination
was intensifying by Serbs against the Albanian minority.0 As for the
Republic of Slovenia, the main pressures have come with the influx of
large numbers of refugees from Bosnia - at least 70,000 since June
1991.71 Macedonia, thus far, has managed to avoid becoming em-
broiled in the military conflict, although nearly 32,000 refugees have
fled there from Bosnia and Croatia.'
The conclusions of the Special Rapporteur are bold, stark, and
troubling: ethnic cleansing violates fundamental principles of inter-
national humanitarian law; evidence of war crimes during the conflict
in both Bosnia and Croatia is pervasive and growing; the rape of wom-
en, including minors, is widespread in both conflicts; and the "political
and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs bear the primary responsi-
bility for the ethnic cleansing policy carried out there in total disregard
of their obligations. However, with the prolongation of the conflict,
more and more atrocities are being committed by other parties. ""3
c. The Warburton Mission
The European Community sent an additional mission, headed by
Dame Ann Warburton, to investigate the treatment of Muslim women
in the former Yugoslavia. The mission spent two weeks in that territo-
ry - from December 18-24, 1992 and January 19-26, 1993 - and
issued a report to the U.N. Secretary-General on February 3, 1993.T'
The findings of this mission are profoundly disturbing. On the basis of
its investigations, the mission concluded that the rape of Muslim wom-
en has been perpetrated on a wide scale and in such a systematic,
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 6-24.
69. Id. at 26-30.
70. Id. at 34-39.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id. at 47-53.
73. Id. at 55-56.
74. European Community investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim wom-
en in the former Yugoslavia: Report to European Community Foreign Ministers, U.N.
Doc. S/25240, Annex I, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter Warburton Mission Report].
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premeditated manner as to be considered part of an intentional war
strategy. While the number of Muslim women raped during the conflict
will likely never be precisely known, the mission estimated that the
number of victims ranged between 10,000 and 60,000, with "the most
reasoned estimates" put at around 20,000."' The mission was not able
to gauge precisely how many women had become pregnant as a result
of rape, but one estimate suggested a possible figure of 1,000.76 Re-
garding the systematic nature of the rapes, the mission heard substan-
tial and compelling testimony that "a repeated feature of Serbian at-
tacks on Muslims towns and villages was the use of rape, often in
public, or the threat of rape, as a weapon of war to force the popula-
tion to leave their homes."" It became clear to the investigators that
rape was being used as "part of a pattern of abuse, usually perpetrated
with the conscious intention of demoralizing and terrorizing communi-
ties, driving them from their home regions and demonstrating the
power of the invading forces.'1 The Warburton report concluded,
therefore, that rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not incidental to the
main purpose of the aggression. Rather, it was being perpetrated as a
strategic purpose in itself. The type and scale of rapes reported to the
mission clearly suggested a deliberate pattern."
d. Conclusions
These abuses of human rights clearly constitute grave breaches of
international humanitarian law. This conclusion is patently obvious as
regards common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the
Laws of War, particularly as it relates to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.' This pro-
vision protects the rights of civilians and others who are hors de com-
75. The report goes on to assert that:
The enormity of the suffering being inflicted on the civilian population
in this conflict defies expression. Indications are that at least some of
the rapes have been committed in particularly sadistic ways, so as to
inflict maximum humiliation on the victims, on their family and on the
whole community. In many cases there seems little doubt that the in-
tention is deliberately to make women pregnant and then to detain
them until pregnancy is far enough advanced to make termination im-
possible, as an additional form of humiliation and constant reminder of
the abuse done to them.
Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. Id. Subsequent investigations by the United Nations confirmed the use of
rape by the Serbs as a deliberate war weapon, but concluded there were only about
3000 victims. See Paul Lewis, Rape Was Weapon of Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
80. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27. See also supra text accompanying
note 28.
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bat in times of internal conflict, and it specifically prohibits violence to
life and person, the taking of hostages, inflicting degrading treatment
on an individual and conducting summary executions. In the same con-
nection, forced movements of civilian populations, in this case Bosnian
Muslims, are generally prohibited under international humanitarian
law as codified in Article 17 of the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Con-
ventions.81 That same instrument renders unlawful any acts of hostil-
ity directed against historic monuments or places of worship.'
It is also significant to realize that parties to the armed conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are liable for breaches of the Programme of
Action on Humanitarian Issues adopted by them at London on August
27, 1992.8 Under this agreement, the parties agreed to respect the
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War and its two protocols, as
well as to hold responsible those persons who order or commit grave
breaches of them."
B. United Nations" Reactions
It is noteworthy that world public opinion manifested itself in a
principal organ of the United Nations, the Commission on Human
Rights. Asserting the rule of law as the basis for their deliberations
and decisions, the Commission demanded the cessation of these report-
ed violations and in effect upheld the relevance and importance of
international humanitarian law. The Commission in particular drew
upon the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and recom-
mended establishment of an International Humanitarian Fact-Finding
Commission."
The Security Council, concerned and alarmed over the increasing
reports of mass killings and ethnic cleansing, requested the Secretary
General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to analyze
such reports." In formulating this commission to investigate crimes
against the peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the Secu-
rity Council left open the possibility that the conclusions of this body
might well constitute the basis for "recommendations for further ap-
propriate steps.' This indeed proved to be the basis for creation of
the Balkans war crimes panel approved by the Security Council to
determine the liability of individuals accused of such crimes.
81. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 606, at art. 17.
82. Id. at art. 16.
83. See 1992 Programme of Action, supra note 35.
84. Id.
85. Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1992/S-2 of Dec. 1, 1992.
86. U.N. DOC. S/RES/780 (1992).
87. Id.
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The Security Council, by mandate of the U.N. Charter, plays the
critical role in maintaining international peace and security. Regarding
implementation of international humanitarian law for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Security Council has undertaken considerable effort
to demand respect for humanitarian law from all parties; to determine
that certain acts constitute violations of that body of law; to condemn
violations of certain humanitarian laws; and to request that govern-
ments take specific actions in reaction to those violations. The para-
mount realization becomes plain: the Security Council, as the principal
U.N. organ endowed with the responsibility for maintaining peace (un-
der Article 24 of the Charter), possesses the lawful capacity to demand
that grave breaches of international humanitarian law cease.' This
can be accomplished by determining the applicability of relevant hu-
manitarian instruments and by informing the international community
about the actual legal situation at issue.
This responsibility of the Security Council underpinned its cre-
ation of the Commission of Experts on October 6, 1992. The Council
specifically referenced provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
demanded that all parties "cease and desist from all breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law." Significantly, persistence of such grave
breaches would permit the Security Council to take further measures
against these violations. This explains why the fact-finding missions of
the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, as well as
investigations by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
Conference on European Cooperation and Security, Human Rights
Watch (especially Helsinki Watch), Amnesty International, and other
human rights organizations have served as impressive supplements for
substantiating conclusions drawn by the Commission of Experts. Re-
ports and data from all these groups furnished vital ingredients in the
Security Council's deliberations."
Credible enforcement measures encourage respect and confidence
in institutions that contribute to participation of individuals in a
rights-based community. When applied to the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the sensible approach suggests that states and organiza-
tions should persist in their investigations of violations of human
rights. The war crimes tribunal must be made to work to ensure that
law upholds justice. The duty to investigate violations has been repeat-
edly stressed in international instruments, including the four 1949
Geneva Conventions," the Genocide Convention," the Convention
Prohibiting Torture," and the International Covenant on Civil and
88. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100.
89. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/780, at para. 2 (1992).
90. See Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1.
91. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, arts. 52, 53, 132, 149.
92. Genocide Convention, supra note 37, art. VIII.
93. Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, art. IO.
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Political Rights." Furthermore, Article IV of the Genocide Conven-
tion, Article 6(b) of the London Charter (1945), and Principle VI of the
Nuremberg Principles, adopted by General Assembly resolution 95(I)
in December 1946, affirm that violation of these laws is punishable.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
On February 22, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 808 (1993), which formally decided that an international
tribunal should be established "for the prosecution of persons responsi-
ble for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
inthe territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."' Three months
later, on May 25, the Security Council adopted Resolution 827 (1993),
formally establishing such a tribunal." The creation of a tribunal to
investigate and prosecute war crimes during the armed conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia reaffirms the necessity of dealing with violations of
humanitarian law and the laws of war - particularly crimes against
civilians - and with individual penal liability of those responsible for
such violations.
The traditional objection to an international war crimes court
turned mainly on the presumption that such a tribunal would not be
capable of applying international laws of war to individual persons.
International law was deemed binding only on states per se, and hence
only a particular state could punish an individual offender. The
Nuremberg court and subsequent trial proceedings have rendered that
argument moot. That objection has been overtaken by the principle
that violations of the laws of war constitute both a national and an
international crime and are therefore justiciable both in a national or
international court. The new International Tribunal for dealing with
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia reaffirms the international com-
mitment to that principle.
A. Legitimacy of an International Criminal Tribunal
The legitimacy of creating an international tribunal for prosecut-
ing serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territo-
ry of the former Yugoslavia is predicated on the principle of nullum
crimen sin lege: there can be no punishment for a crime unless it has
been a priori defined by law." Justification for such a court has been
94. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 41.
95. U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, at para. 1 (1993).
96. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
97. This criticism was leveled at the Nuremberg Trials, and in particular at the
charges of crimes against humanity that did not formally exist until expressly de-
fined in the Charter of the Military Tribunal. Even so, it is undeniable that most
crimes against humanity were also war crimes, committed in violation of the law of
belligerent occupation. See W'Aliam V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the
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fixed through the Nuremberg Precedent, indisputable norms of cus-
tomary international law, various international treaties, and resolu-
tions of the United Nations.
The legitimacy underpinning the International Tribunal for prose-
cuting war crimes in the former Yugoslavia will not be undercut by the
stigma of an institution created to mete out victors' justice. Interna-
tionalization of the prosecution and trial for both victims and accused
will work to ensure that impartial justice is rendered without interfer-
ence by any of the affected principal governments. In order to guaran-
tee such impartiality, the Tribunal is international in character, com-
position, and authority; it is endowed with multiple jurisdictions over
actions, persons, places, and time; and it avoids being transformed into
an unwieldy international bureaucracy.
At least three procedures for establishing the proposed tribunal
were available to the international community. First, an international
treaty might be concluded among concerned states. This was the
course followed for the Nuremberg Tribunal, and this route has also
been the means sought by the United Nations to establish a perma-
nent international criminal court. Serious disadvantages, however,
would likely encumber the treaty approach to creating an international
Balkans tribunal. Not least among these are difficulties associated
with concluding multilateral negotiations and the prolonged time re-
quired for governments to complete the signature, ratification, and
entry into force of the agreement. Even then, some states whose partic-
ipation is indispensable (e.g., the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Russia) might decide not to participate in the treaty arrangement.
A second approach would be for the United Nations itself to estab-
lish the tribunal. Clearly, as spelled out in the U.N. Charter, the orga-
nization enjoys competence in the field of human rights and has long
studied proposals for the establishment of an international criminal
court." Still, given the nature of United Nations debates in general,
and deliberations over an international criminal court in particular,
enthusiasm about the efficiency or eventual success of the U.N. ap-
proach can hardly be expected.
The most expeditious manner for establishing a war crimes panel
- and the approach taken through Security Council Resolutions 827
and 808 - is to have the Security Council create an ad hoc tribunal
designed specifically to prosecute accused perpetrators of atrocities in
Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INTL L. 391, 395 (1991).
98. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (2nd ed. 1987); BENJA-
MIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRnmAL COuRt. A STEP TOwARD WORLD PEACE:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1980); and M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christo-
pher Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New Interna-
tional World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992).
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the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council is
empowered to do so on the basis of the authority conferred to it in
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Article 39 provides that the Security
Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Under this mandate, the Council has the lawful authority to make a
determination that heinous war crimes and serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law committed during the armed conflicts in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia constitute threats to or breaches
of the peace. Such a tribunal is also necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security in the region. This approach is em-
braced in Security Council Resolutions 827 and 808.
Given its legal authority, the operative provision enabling the
Security Council to establish an ad hoc tribunal is found in Article 41
of the Charter, which provides the following:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations."
At first blush, the measures in Article 41 might appear far estranged
from the creation of a war crimes court. The point must be under-
scored, however, that this list is only illustrative of certain options,
and not inclusive of all measures that might be employed by the Secu-
rity Council. Clearly, the phrase declaring that the Security Council
may determine "what measures not involving the use of armed force" it
may wish to employ implicitly leaves open any available options. The
creation of an international tribunal stands as an appropriate measure
if such a court would contribute to attaining or facilitating the restora-
tion of international peace and security in the region. This fundamen-
tal premise provides the foundation for the Security Council's actions
in adopting Resolutions 827 and 808.
B. Competence of the International Tribunal
1. Lawful Authority
The Statute of the International Tribunal will govern the tribunal
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
100. Id. art. 41.
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and provide the framework for its deliberations." 1 A similar docu-
ment was drafted for the Nuremberg trials, and such a charter is criti-
cal for structuring the organization, responsibilities, and functions of
the tribunal.
The Secretary-General drafted specific language for the present
Statute, based on formulations for provisions found in existing interna-
tional instruments as well as from suggestions for draft articles re-
ceived from states, organizations, and individuals during 1992-
1993."~ The legal rationale for the Tribunal's creation and the expla-
nation of provisions comprising the Statute are contained in the "Re-
port of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)."1" In adopting Resolution 827, the Se-
curity Council approved this report, thereby creating the Tribunal and
adopting the language prepared by the Secretary-General.
In terms of international law, a critical consideration underpin-
ning the Balkans war crimes tribunal is that it has been established
by international authority and exercises a jurisdiction that is interna-
tionally conferred. This will entail enforcement of the laws of war
through military courts set up by the armed forces of the aggrieved
state, whose power of law enforcement stems from that state govern-
ment alone.
The International Tribunal established under U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 827 and 808 was adopted unanimously. Under the U.N.
Charter, to which 184 states are now party (including the Republic of
Yugoslavia [Serbia], Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia), member states
are bound in Article 24 to abide by substantive decisions adopted by
the Security Council.'" These Security Council decisions are legally
binding, authoritative, and controlling."° They carry the force of law.
Creation of the Balkans tribunal under that procedure, therefore, en-
dows that body with international legitimacy and authoritative juris-
diction.
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Now formally established, the International Tribunal is allocated
the legal competence to deal with designated crimes that are of an
101. The Statute of the International Tribunal is annexed to the Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), at 36 [hereinafter Statute of the International
Tribunal].
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
105. As substantiated in Article 25, "the Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter.* Id. art. 25.
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international character, perpetrated by certain persons, during a speci-
fied time period, in a given territory. In this respect, the competence of
this court flows from its Statute and its jurisdiction over criminal sub-
ject matter. Four clusters of crimes can be prosecuted under the Stat-
ute: (1) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; (2) violations
of the laws or customs of war; (3) genocide; and (4) crimes against
humanity.
a. Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The Tribunal has been given the competence to prosecute certain
punishable crimes, including those laid down by the Nuremberg Pre-
cedent, that protect persons under international humanitarian law.
Perhaps the clearest enumeration of these offenses is found in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular common article
50/51130/147 of those instruments.1' This provision defines the
"grave breaches" of international humanitarian law that states are
required to punish and that are contiguous to the offenses contained in
Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.1' Common article
50/51130/147 also prescribes minimum rules applicable to situations of
armed conflict that are not international in character.
The Statute of the International Tribunal incorporates the essen-
tial language of this common provision of "grave breaches" into Article
2, which gives the Tribunal power to prosecute persons "committing or
ordering to be committed" the following acts:
(a) willful killing-,
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
106. As defined in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, certain "grave breaches"
are crimes committed against persons or property protected by the conventions and
include:
(a) Willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment of protected persons;
(b) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or health of
protected persons;
(c) Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,
(d) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected
person;
(e) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile power, and,
(f) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights
of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions.
1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, arts. 50, 51, 130, 147.
107. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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of a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.'u
Two notable improvements are made in Article 2 over the 1949
Geneva Conventions. First, in paragraph (b), "biological experiments"
have been specified as a form of prohibited "inhuman treatment." Sec-
ond, the language in the provision has been adjusted to replace the
notion of "protected persons" with a specific designation of "civilians."
In this way, commission of grave breaches of the laws of war are di-
rectly referenced to civilians under the Statute, regardless whether the
conflict is legally interpreted to be an internal or an international war.
b. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Another important part of international humanitarian law is
found in the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and the regulations annexed thereto."°
While covering facets of international humanitarian law later incorpo-
rated into the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations im-
portantly stipulate that the right of belligerents to fight war is not
unlimited. Indeed, the rules of land warfare prohibit certain methods
of waging war. As prescribed in the Statute, persons may be
prosecuted for violating the laws or customs of war (as derived from
the Hague Regulations), including, but not restricted to, the following:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering,
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works or art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.1
The origin of these provisions lies in Articles 23-28 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations. These provisions are specifically intended to punish per-
sons who have engaged in indiscriminate bombardment of civilian
population centers without military need or justification.
108. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 2; cf. 1949 Geneva
Conventions, supra note 106, arts. 50, 51, 130, 147.
109. See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 24.
110. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 3; see also Hague
Convention No. IV Annex (Regulations), supra note 24, arts. 23, 25, 27, 28.
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c. Genocide
Also, within the context of crimes committed within the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide directly relates to actions to be prosecuted by
the tribunal."' The Statute for the new court makes this plain, pro-
viding in Article 4 that the Tribunal will prosecute persons accused of
genocide. In this provision, genocide is defined as any of the following
acts, "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such":
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to an other group."2
In paragraph 3 of Article 4, the Statute stipulates that the following
acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity to commit genocide."
It is significant that these paragraphs in Article 4 of the Statute were
incorporated verbatim from Articles II and III, respectively, of the
1948 Genocide Convention. Much has been made about the incredible
violence directed specifically against the Muslim population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina - violence motivated principally by ethnic, cultural, and
religious heritage. Specific inclusion in the Statute for prosecution of
the crime of genocide is intended to redress such gross violations of
international humanitarian law.
d. Crimes Against Humanity
The Tribunal must address the most serious war crimes: those
that have been committed on a massive scale, in a systematic manner,
that cause acute revulsion, and make necessary a direct international
response. The Tribunal must assert its jurisdiction over cases that
allege crimes against humanity, for which there are no statutory limi-
tations. 4 As criminal conduct, such acts have their origins in the
111. Application of the Genocide Convention is warranted by the purposeful use of
.ethnic cleansing" to drive out Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
112. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 4, para. 2.
113. Id. art. 4, para. 3.
114. This is provided for in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
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Nuremberg Charter.11 Crimes against humanity are aimed at any
civilian population and are prohibited in armed conflict, regardless of
its international or internal character. The Statute acknowledges this
critical point in Article 5, then enumerates eight categories of specific
acts that will be treated as crimes against humanity by the Tribunal:
(1) murder; (2) extermination; (3) enslavement; (4) deportation; (5)
imprisonment; (6) torture; (7) rape; and (8) persecution on political,
racial or religious grounds. A ninth category, "other inhumane acts," is
included to make the list potentially all-inclusive.1 6
Crimes against humanity emanate from Article 6 of the 1945
Nuremberg Charter."' In the case of the former Yugoslavia, two new
acts have specifically been designated as crimes against humanity:
torture and rape. The heinousness and condemnation of acts of torture
finds expression in the 1984 Convention Against Torture, 8 which
now is in force and accepted as a peremptory norm in human rights
law. The crime of rape, the criminality of which largely was overlooked
in past wars, took on great urgency with the reported massive viola-
tions of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 and 1993. 9 By
designating rape as a crime against humanity, the criminality of the
act in international law has been spotlighted, and international con-
cern has been directly focused on the need to punish perpetrators.
A final point merits mention. The Balkan War Crimes Tribunal
will not specifically address crimes against the peace, i.e., it will not
prosecute persons for participation in planning and waging of a war of
aggression. Proving these allegations would be protracted and extraor-
dinarily difficult. The amount of documentation containing plans and
war strategies is unknown, and securing access to military and diplo-
matic records of the governments involved - especially the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (for Serbia), as well as Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina - would not come easy. Confirmation that all requested
documents have been duly turned over to court investigators is highly
unlikely from government leaders who themselves are likely to be the
targets of investigation. Such persons will not automatically escape
prosecution, however, since individual criminal responsibility is ac-
knowledged for planning gross violations of international humanitari-
an law.
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754
U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
116. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 5.
117. See supra text accompanying note 8.
118. Convention Against Torture, supra note 40.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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3. Personal Jurisdiction
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is critical to the
function of the Tribunal. The Statute of the Tribunal addresses this
concern in Article 7, as it asserts that "a person who planned, instigat-
ed, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime."'
The war crimes court thus confronts the principle that individuals may
be held criminally liable under international law, even though their
conduct might have been considered valid or even mandated by domes-
tic law.
It will not be enough to enforce the laws of war only against ordi-
nary soldiers and officers of law of mid-level rank. The Tribunal's hand
of punishment must reach up to military elites and civilian govern-
ment officials. Article 7 of the Statute provides for such punishment:
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate pun-
ishment.
3. The fact that any of the [criminal] acts... of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.2
All persons who participate in the planning, preparation, or execution
of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia share in the commission of the crime and are therefore
individually responsible. The Tribunal will also hold that the principal
responsibility for war crimes pursuant to orders falls to those in au-
thority who gave the orders.
The Tribunal may find it difficult to draw a clear line between
war crimes proper and "crimes against humanity." It may also be dif-
ficult to set the precise scope of the latter.' In any event, it has be-
come a recognized precept of contemporary international law that
persons pledged to obey orders of their superiors, in particular those
issued by heads of state and governments, are held personally respon-
sible for acts committed by their subordinates.' The Statute of the
120. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 7, para. 1.
121. Id. art. 7, paras. 2, 3.
122. The law relating to war crimes is clear and has been set out in numerous
international law-making instruments. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 24, arts.
46, 50, 52, 56; 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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Tribunal makes this clear and unambiguous.
This expansion of individual liability aims to reaffirm the princi-
ple that the laws of war and other rules of international humanitarian
law are superior to domestic law, and that individuals are accountable
to them. In contemporary international law, individuals have interna-
tional duties that transcend facets of national obedience required by a
particular state. Violation of international law in allegiance to national
law is a violation nonetheless; that circumstance can not remove the
stigma of contravention. Accordingly, persons who violate the laws of
war in the name of their state are no less accountable for their actions.
Indeed, the Tribunal implicitly embraces this point. Individuals who
violate international humanitarian law or the laws of war can not find
automatic immunity in the authority of national law or allegiance to
the state.
Establishment of the International Tribunal was not intended to
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction of national courts in the prosecu-
tion of persons responsible for serious violations of law committed
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The Statute
asserts that concurrent jurisdiction will exist between the Internation-
al Tribunal and national courts to prosecute such persons.u Even so,
to avoid complications arising from the principle of non-bis-in-idem
(i.e., a person may not be tried twice for the same crime), the Statute
asserts "primacy" over national courts. This means that the Tribunal
may request national courts to defer prosecution to the competence of
the International Tribunal.'
4. Territorial and Temporal Jurisdiction
The competence of the Tribunal has also been fixed in terms of
territorial and temporal jurisdiction. Regarding the scope of the Inter-
national Tribunal's territorial jurisdiction, the territory of the former
Yugoslavia is construed to mean that of "the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and terri-
torial waters."' The Tribunal's jurisdiction will extend only to acts
that have been committed by persons since the dissolution of the for-
mer Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which precipitated the
outbreak of hostilities in the region. The Secretary-General decided to
fix to begin the precise date for violations to begin on or after January
1, 1991, a neutral date not linked to any specific event.27
124. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 9, para. 1.
125. Id. art. 9, para. 2.
126. Id. art. 8.
127. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. DOC. S/25704 (3 May 1993), at 16; Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal, supra note 101, at art. 8. Other commentators suggested the
beginning date for violations as June 1, 1991, the month that Croatia and Slovenia
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C. Composition of the Tribunal
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is interna-
tional in character. As a result, single-nation courts are welcome but
insufficient for issuing authoritative interpretations of international
law and for establishing international jurisdiction and operable admin-
istrative procedures that might permit international penal law to func-
tion satisfactorily. The Statute provides for concurrent jurisdiction
with national courts; in cases where jurisdiction overlaps, however,
primacy is reserved for the International Tribunal.
The International Tribunal consists of three main organs: (1) the
Chambers, comprised of two Trial Chambers and one Appeals Cham-
ber; (2) the Prosecutor; and (3) the Registry.
1. The Chambers
The organization of the Tribunal reflects its intended functions.
There are to be eleven independent judges, no two of whom are nation-
als of the same state. Three judges serve in each of the two Trial
Chambers, and five judges serve in the Appeals Chamber.'
Judges on the Tribunal must be qualified in international law,
international criminal law, and have a special appreciation for human
rights law. In the language of the Statute, judges must be "persons of
high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the quali-
fications required in their respective countries for appointment to the
highest judicial offices."' They should also be representative of the
principal legal systems of the world. Unlike the Nuremberg court,
which had representatives only from France, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and the United Kingdom (the four victorious powers of
World War II), the Balkans tribunal will reflect a multinational,
multicultural composition.
A critical necessity is that judges selected for the Tribunal be
considered without dispute and reservation legitimate representatives
formally proclaimed their independence from Yugoslavia. See Chuck Sudetic, 2 Yugo-
slav States Vote Independence to Press Demands, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al.
128. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 12. In its formal
proposal to the U.N. Secretary-General, France suggested fifteen judges appointed by
the Security Council to serve on the Tribunal. Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25266 (1993), at 60 [hereinafter French Tribunal Proposal].
The United States proposed that eighteen judges be selected, nine for the Tribunal
and nine for an appeals court. Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United States to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Gener-
al, U.N. DOC. S/25575 (1993), UNITED NATIONS, CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, at 1 (art. 2.) [mimeographed].
129. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 13, para. 1.
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to the court.' This is assured through the procedure of their election
by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security
Council."' As formally set out, the Secretary-General invites nomina-
tions for candidates from member states in the United Nations as well
as from non-member states maintaining permanent observer missions
at U.N. Headquarters. Those nominations are forwarded to the Securi-
ty Council, which then composes from them a list of at least twenty
two, but no more than thirty three, candidates. That list of candidates
is then forwarded to the General Assembly, which elects by absolute
majority eleven judges to serve on the Tribunal. Judges serve a term of
four years, and are eligible for re-election."" Judges are also made
responsible for drafting and adopting rules of evidence and procedure
that the Tribunal will use in the pre-trial phase of its proceedings as
well as in the conduct of trials and appeals, the admission of evidence,
and the protection of victims and witnesses.'
2. The Prosecutor
An independent Prosecutor is to be entrusted with the responsibil-
ity of conducting investigations and prosecutions of persons alleged to
have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991."
The need for such an office is clear. The Tribunal is endowed with
sufficient powers as necessary and appropriate to conduct criminal
trials and appeals. These powers, which are spelled out clearly in the
Statute establishing the Tribunal's authoritative legal competence,
include the powers to issue arrest warrants, to summon and question
130. One proposal to ensure this precondition would have had existing interna-
tional jurisdictions elect from the ranks of their sitting or former members persons
to serve on the Tribunal. International juridical bodies that offered well-established
guarantees of impartiality would have included the International Court of Justice,
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and the African Commission of Human Rights. See French Tribunal Proposal, supra
note 128, at 45.
131. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 13, para. 2.
132. Id. art. 13. On September 17, 1993, the U.N. General Assembly selected the
eleven judges to serve on the Balkans tribunal. They are Elizabeth Odio Benito
(Costa Rica), Jules Deschenes (Canada), Antonio Cassese (Italy), Georges Michel
Abisaab (Egypt), Li Haopel (China), Germain le Foyer de Costil (France), Lal Chand
Vohrah (Malaysia), Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia),
Adophus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), and Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (United
States). Significantly, none of the judges is Muslim, although judges were selected
from three Muslim states - Pakistan, Egypt, and Malaysia. War Crimes Judges
Named, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at 18.
133. Id. art. 15. Such rules of evidence and procedure have recently been pro-
mulgated to guide the investigation and prosecution of alleged offenders. See Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32, Mar. 14, 1994.
134. Id. art. 16.
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witnesses, to require submission of documents and evidentiary mate-
rials, to administer oaths to witnesses, and to conduct appropriate
proceedings aimed at securing evidence. Concerning the intricate de-
tails of juridical functions, certain fundamental questions must be ad-
dressed in prosecuting each case:
(1) What is the offense that is alleged?
(2) Can the offender(s) be identified?
(3) To what degree was the accused offender responsible?
(4) Was the offense committed on the offender's own initiative, or in
obedience to orders?
(5) What evidence is available to support the charge?
(6) What will be a probable defense?
(7) Can an offender be put on trial with reasonable expectation of con-
viction?
Depending on the number of cases to be handled by the Tribunal,
these queries are neither insignificant in scope nor potty in substance.
The role of the Prosecutor becomes essential for transforming these
queries into a prosecutable case.
Prior to trial before a Chamber of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor
will undertake preparatory work relating to cases submitted for trial.
The Prosecutor's staff will work to gather facts and evidence, facilitate
examination of individual cases submitted by investigators, and com-
pile lists of accused war criminals. The purpose of this special
Prosecutor's office is to determine whether ex parte material submitted
for prosecution is sufficient to disclose a prima facie case. Such a pros-
ecutorial staff does not have juridical functions; rather it operates
more in the manner of a grand jury. The notion of "independence" here
is critical; the Prosecutor should neither seek nor receive instructions
from any government or other source.M
Regarding case preparation, this investigatory body must confirm
evidence already gathered and seek further evidence for and against
the accused. Toward this end, several investigatory measures will have
to be undertaken, including, inter alia, questioning the accused, ob-
taining testimony from victims and witnesses, confronting witnesses
and taking depositions, compiling written and other documentary evi-
dence, and conducting visits to crime scenes. These measures are pre-
scribed in the Statute.13
The Prosecutor will have to rely on the good faith, accuracy, and
135. Id. art. 16, para. 2.
136. Id. art. 18.
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diligence of investigators in presenting cases involving actual viola-
tions of the laws of war. In examining whether prima facie evidence
existed in each instance, the investigatory-prosecution staff must ex-
amine the charges to determine, first, whether there had been a viola-
tion of international humanitarian law and, second, whether there
existed sufficient facts to constitute violation of that law. In these
regards, certain critical questions must be addressed by investigators:
(1) Do the charges made disclose the existence of a violation of human-
itarian law?; (2) Does sufficient evidence exist to identify an alleged
offender?; and (3) Does a good reason exist for assuming that, if
prosecuted, an alleged offender would be convicted? Negative answers
to any of these questions might be sufficient cause for dismissal of a
case.
Once an investigation has been completed, at least three options
are available for each case. First, a case can be dismissed on grounds
of insufficient evidence. Second, a case can be turned over to an appro-
priate national court if the offenses of an accused defendant are deter-
mined to be less than those within the Tribunal's competence. Third, a
case can be transmitted for review to a judge of a Trial Chamber in the
form of an indictment that specifies the particular charges."1 If that
judge confirms the indictment, the judge then issues, at the request of
the Prosecutor's office, the necessary orders and warrants for the ar-
rest, detention, surrender, or transfer of that person so that a trial can
be conducted.'
3. Trial Proceedings
There is little doubt that it will be difficult to secure physical
jurisdiction over certain persons, particularly high government officials
accused of committing or ordering indictable offenses. This opens up
consideration for the possibility of trials being conducted against ac-
cused offenders in their absence. The Statute of the Tribunal, however,
clearly rejects this possibility. A trial can not begin until the accused is
physically present before the court.'"
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 19.
139. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 21, para. 4(d).
This requirement avoids the controversial possibility that persons might be tried in
absentia. While not desirable, trials in absentia reflect political realities of the situa-
tion. Even so, the option for such trials and details of undertaking that procedure
were rejected by the Secretary-General in favor of the requirement for having a
defendant present so that fairness of proceedings can not be impugned. Id. at art.
26, para. 101.
The argument supporting trials in absentia is understandable: Persons who have
been indicted, but who managed to avoid apprehension, would be made subject to
justice under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Guilty defendants would be made
susceptible to apprehension, arrest, prosecution, and punishment by all governments,
and extradition could be performed back to the Tribunal or the properly designated
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Under the Tribunal's Statute, the accused are guaranteed certain
internationally recognized rights and standards, as contained in Arti-
cle 14 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights."4 The Statute incorporates those rights of the accused in
Article 21 as four fundamental rights of all persons: (1) to be equal
before the Tribunal; (2) to be entitled to a fair and public hearing; (3)
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; and (4) to be entitled to
minimum guarantees. The minimum rights guaranteed to defendants
are as follows: (a) to be informed promptly and in a comprehensible
language of the nature of the charge; (b) to have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defense; (c) to be tried without un-
due delay; (d) to be tried in his own presence and to defend himself in
his own person or through legal assistance if unable to afford payment;
(e) to examine witnesses against him; (f) to have the free assistance of
an interpreter; and (g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or
confess guilt."' Similarly, given the nature of the crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia, especially in cases of rape and sexual as-
sault, the Statute mandates that victims and witnesses must be pro-
tected, including in camera proceedings and protection of a victim's
identity.14
4. Judgment and Appeal
The Trial Chambers are given the authority to pronounce judg-
ment and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of viola-
tions of humanitarian law and the laws of war. A judgment is ren-
dered by a majority of the judges in a Chamber and publicly delivered
by written opinion.1' Significantly, unlike Nuremberg, penalties are
limited to imprisonment. The International Tribunal is not authorized
national authority after the court has been disbanded. In addition, under the 1951
Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, which has some 111 parties, including
the former Yugoslavia, parties are prohibited from granting refugee status to any
person when serious grounds exist for believing that person "has committed a crime
against the peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes."
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(F), 189 U.N.T.S.
150. This provision further erodes the possibility that an accused defendant might be
granted asylum by some government on grounds of the political offenses exception.
As a consequence, guilty verdicts by the Tribunal would leave in absentia offenders
isolated in their states, susceptible to extradition and trial once they travel abroad.
Guilty verdicts might also serve as particular deterrents to government officials and
military personnel elsewhere who come to contemplate similar genocidal atrocities
against civilians.
These arguments aside, as prescribed by the Statute, the International Tribu-
nal will not conduct such trials in the physical absence of a defendant.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 14.
141. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 21.
142. Id. art. 22.
143. Id. art. 23.
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to issue the death penalty to convicted persons.'M Obviously, any
judgment rendered by the Tribunal must be done in accordance with
the general principles of international law."
To ensure the basic norms of due process, the right of defendants
to appeal to an independent appellate panel is included. The Statute
establishes an Appeals Chamber comprised of five judges.' This
court will hear appeals from a person convicted by the Trial Chambers
on grounds that the Trial Court committed an error of law that invali-
dates the decision or that an error of fact occurred that caused a mis-
carriage of justice. 4 Enforcement of sentences will be done by states
that indicate their willingness to do so to the Security Council. En-
forcement will be done in accordance with the domestic laws of those
states, outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Establishment of the International Tribunal by the Security Coun-
cil on the basis of a Chapter VII decision is sufficient to create the
obligation for U.N. member states to cooperate in implementing that
decision. Member governments are therefore expected to cooperate
with the International Tribunal in gathering evidence, locating wit-
nesses and suspects, identifying persons, and servicing documents such
as arrest warrants, search warrants, and surrender warrants. In this
connection, states are expected to surrender or transfer those persons
indicted and ordered for trial by a Trial Chamber.1"
5. Other Considerations
Four final administrative points are worth noting. First, the Stat-
ute provides for the establishment of a special Registry to service the
International Tribunal. This organ, headed by a Registrar, will be
responsible for such functions as providing public information, record-
ing the proceedings, printing and publishing documents, administering
budgetary and personnel matters, and serving as the communications
channel for the Tribunal.1"' Second, funding for the Tribunal can not
help but complicate the United Nations's tight budgetary situation.
Nevertheless, since the Tribunal is considered a subsidiary appendage
of the United Nations, its activities will be financed out of the regular
United Nations' budget, in line with Article 17 of the U.N. Charter 5°
144. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
145. London Charter, supra note 5, art. 26.
146. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, arts. 12, 25.
147. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
148. Id. art. 29.
149. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, at 23, art. 17.
150. Id. art. 32. If, however, the Tribunal had been considered part of a Security
Council peacekeeping operation, created under Chapter VII of the Charter, financing
might have been performed through a weighted scale of contributions from U.N.
Security Council members. The possibly also existed of soliciting voluntary contribu-
tions from member states for the Tribunars activities.
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Third, the site most likely for the International Tribunal is in the
Hague, Netherlands."' Fourth, the Tribunal's working languages will
be English and French."-
V. THE BALANCE SHEET
Law consists of rules for determining conduct and is the servant
of its creators. The function of law must be derivative, not overbearing.
While law strives for standards of responsibility, those standards must
be fixed with due regard to the demands of justice. Similarly, a rela-
tionship exists between legal norms and humanitarian values, though
that relationship is sometimes skewed by political interests. Legal
norms rest in the body of humanitarian law fashioned for the most
part during this century. International law becomes a definite and
positive reality, both in character and consequences, when competent
courts acting under legal sanction prosecute persons and sentence
them to punishments that are carried out by competent authorities.
There exists under contemporary international law a principle of indi-
vidual liability. In ordinary war crimes, those who carry out unlawful
acts are personally liable. No moral or logical justification exists for
applying different rules in the case of generalized crimes charged
against leaders of unjust belligerent states.
Establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia offers a signal opportunity for the contemporary law of armed
conflict: the international community has the potential to reassert an
international jurisdiction for the development of the international
penal law of war, to reaffirm compellingly the individual's obligation to
comply with internationally recognized standards of conduct, to re-
awaken application of law prohibiting war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity, and to expand considerably the individual's
criminal liability for violations of the laws of war.
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also holds
the potential to reaffirm the sense of moral and political purpose that
underpins the laws of war. Since the Nuremberg trials, prosecution of
violations of the laws of war have been mainly cloistered in little-publi-
cized, national court-martial proceedings. The new Tribunal offers the
opportunity to bring to justice accused persons of all the warring fac-
tions, of all ranks - from the partisan irregular, to the lowly army
private, to commanding military officers and high government officials.
In these regards, it is imperative that the Tribunal not be used as
a bargaining chip in the diplomatic dealing aimed at bringing about an
end to the conflict. The Balkans war crimes panel appears principally
aimed against the Serbs, since the evidence overwhelmingly indicates
151. Id. art. 31.
152. Id. art. 33.
1994
DENV. J. INVL L. & POL',y
most human rights abuses have been perpetrated by partisan Serb
forces. It would be wrong to trade away the Tribunal's proceedings in
exchange for Serbian concessions in negotiations for bringing about an
end to the hostilities. Resort to brutal, unlawful means to accomplish
an unlawful geopolitical end should not be rewarded by casting aside
the institutional means for obtaining just restitution under interna-
tional law.
The laws of war, long established and well recognized by states,
remain blurred around the margins. Their enforcement is sporadic and
often susceptible to change given rapid development in the circum-
stances and technology of warfare. In part this is attributable to the
customary nature of the laws of war and to the lack of any authorita-
tive source or systematic means of enforcement. There is no standing
legislature to prescribe an authoritative text of the rules, there is no
standing court to deal with transnational violations, and there are no
universally prescribed penalties for violations. In sum, the laws of war
are earmarked by amorphous, shifting qualities that comport with the
nature of war itself.
The lex lata in international human rights law has evolved from
such sources or dictates of public conscience and laws of humanity.
The linkage between the Nuremberg Precedent, international humani-
tarian law, and the broad body of human rights law must not go unap-
preciated. For in truth the Nuremberg principles remain a challenge to
governments and elites who systematically violate the laws of war and
fundamental principles of human rights. In a statist system earmarked
by considerations of sovereignty, the legal situation must be recast into
an international community that seeks to attain a higher legal order
- one in which the rule of law is more humane, more just, and more
acutely conscious of its place in regulating, punishing, and being more
committed to preventing violence and conflict. The tragic armed con-
flict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia offers a proving ground
for reviving the relevance of the Nuremberg Precedent and its atten-
dant legal principles for modern international law.
The process to codify human rights norms has obtained a sense of
legitimacy, especially over the last five decades. This applies to inter-
national humanitarian law, which also provides for the protection of
basic individual and collective human rights. In essence, the manner
in which the legal structure has developed makes it politically more
costly for states and individuals to suppress human rights and to vio-
late principles of international humanitarian law. Justice remains a
cherished concept; demonstrating respect for victims of human rights
abuses ranks among the most visible manifestations of that justice.
The keystone for making this respect real is the availability of credible
sanctions to punish violators. It is here especially that the Internation-
al Tribunal for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia takes on
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landmark significance.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
It is widely believed today that persons in the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in particular, the Republic of Serbia)
are guilty of committing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. There is no question that the state, as a juridical person
under international law, is responsible for crimes committed by per-
sons in its government and armed forces against peoples in other
states. Furthermore, given the record at Nuremberg, no doubt exists
that Serbia's government leaders, civilian elites, military officers, and
enlisted personnel could be made personally liable to trial and punish-
ment by an international tribunal if evidence intimates that they or-
dered, participated in, or failed to halt the commission of these crimes.
Violation of the laws of war on orders of a government or an individual
military commander does not remove the stigma of a war crime from
that act. Acting on superior orders no longer constitutes a valid de-
fense for an individual accused of committing a war crime. These prop-
ositions entail what has become known in international law as the
"Nuremberg Precedent."
International law is partially a product of natural law. It has
grown and developed from workings of moral impulses and needs of
humankind through a quasi-instinctive evolution, as well as by de-
crees, authoritative pronouncements, and treaty agreements. Interna-
tional law in general, and the law of Nuremberg in particular, takes
shape and definition when such law is recognized by common consen-
sus of the international community and administered and enforced by
competent courts.
The case of prosecuting persons responsible for committing atroci-
ties in the territory of the former Yugoslavia highlights this funda-
mental obligation to obtain justice for wrongs inflicted upon the inno-
cent. A principal duty exists therefore for states, international organi-
zations, and individuals to work within the framework of an interna-
tional legal regime.
For the armed conflicts ongoing in the Balkans, that legal regime
takes the form of a competent court to prosecute and punish persons
who have grossly committed violations of international humanitarian
law. Only in this manner can credibility be restored to the Nuremberg
principles. Only in this manner can just restitution be made to redress
the pervasive suffering caused by brutal violations of fundamental
human rights throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only in this manner
153. Compare with the argument advanced by James C. O'Brien, The Internation-
al Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugosla-
via, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 639 (1993).
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can international humanitarian law obtain sufficient legal integrity in
the post-Cold War era to render it politically effective as a deterrent
against future depredations of fundamental human rights during situ-
ations of armed conflict.
Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the
Post-Communist Era
DR. SAM BLAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-determination is commonly defined as the right allowing a
people to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." The general view
during the pest-World War II (WWII) period, and particularly since the
1960s, has been that self-determination has emerged as an operative
legal right in international law2 and has arguably acquired the status
of jus cogens.' The character of self-determination recognized as a le-
gal norm, however, is usually narrowly confined to the cases of people
under colonial rule. Indeed, among international lawyers there is a
controversy as to whether self-determination is a recognized legal
norm outside the colonial context."
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia. This
work is part of a broader research undertaken by the author while working as a
Humboldt Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for International and Public
Comparative Law in Heidelberg, Germany. The author thanks the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation for its kind assistance.
1. This is a standard United Nations (U.N.) definition adopted in most U.N.
literature on the subject. See, e.g., G. Res. 545, U.N. GAOR, 6th Ses., Supp. No.
20, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952); GA Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4884 (1960); GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Seas.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
2. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 120-21 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 597-98 (4th ed. 1990).
3. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 304
(Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun); Hector G. Espiell, Self-Determination
and Jus Cogens, in U.N. LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979); Georg Ress, The Legal Status of Hong Kong
After 1997, 46 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDisCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT [HEIDELBERG JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] [hereinafter ZAORV]
647, 651 (1986).
4. One school argues that as a mechanism for decolonization, self-determination
is applicable only to colonial situations, and that the beneficiaries in respect of
whom self-determination is recognized as a legal right are colonial peoples. See
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOM-
MODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 49 (1990). The proponents of this view argue
further that nationalities, tribes, or minorities that are not recognized as subject to
colonial rule do not have a legitimate claim to self-determination. The logical exten-
sion of this view is that while the territorial entity as a whole may exercise its
right of self-determination to become established as a state, the constituent parts of
the state do not individually possess the right. Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination,
65 AM. J. INTL L 459 (1971).
Another school of thought argues that self-determination is a right for all
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There is substantial literature in international law to support the
thesis that self-determination applies in the post-colonial context."
Nevertheless, the debate on the subject persists. The problems with
post-colonial self-determination are best demonstrated in the case of
Africa. In the colonial period, Africa, which had the largest collection of
colonies, naturally became the center of intense nationalist activity.
For the colonies of Africa, independence came within the framework of
international law under the banner of self-determination. The reality
of the African situation, however, was that almost every colony was in
fact made up of different ethnic groups that had been brought together
by the colonial administrators. The result was that the colonial bound-
aries did not coincide with ethnicity. They certainly provided no evi-
dence of the willingness of the ethnic groups to cohabit under the same
administration.
In the process of decolonization, African nationalists sought, and
were granted, self-determination on the basis of these colonial units. It
is therefore the case that the independent states that emerged after
colonialism in Africa were political entities with boundaries coinciding
with those of the colonies they used to be, with all the arbitrary de-
marcations imposed by colonial rule. The result, as noted by one au-
peoples as such and not restricted to only colonial peoples. Accordingly, it is argued,
the beneficiaries of the right could be any distinct group that can be classified as a
people, irrespective of whether they live under a colonial situation or they are a
part of a sovereign state. This school sees self-determination as an aspect of human
rights and a necessary condition for the proper exercise of democratic rights. See
generally, Robert Rosentock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations, 65 AM. J. INTL. L. 713 (1971); ARISTIDS S.
CALOGEROPOULOs-STRATIs, LE DRorr LES PEUPLES A DISPOSER D'EUX-MEMES 342-48
(1973); UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 199
(1972); MICHAEL B. AXEHuEsT, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53
(4th ed. 1982); Sam K.N. Blay, Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of
an Old Conflict, in 10 AUSTL. Y.B. INTL L. 67 (1983).
5. See generally M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination: The Bangladesh
Experience, 7 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMMES [HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL] 231, 258
(1974); M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self Determination Beyond the Colonial Context:
Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX INTL L.J. 321 (1975); Olga Sukovic, The Principle of
Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 323 (Milan Sahovic ed.,
1972); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: A Tragic Tale of Two
Cities, 66 AM. J. INT'L L 321 (1972); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under Inter-
national Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 257, 275
(1981). Compare Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry,
in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 307, 313
(Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980); and Eisuke Suzuki, Self-De-
termination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation,
16 VA. J. INTL L. 790 (1976); with Lung Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human
Right, in TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNM 198 (W. Michael Reisman &
Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); and S. Prakash Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12
COLUM. J. TRANSATL. L 260 (1973) (discussing various viewpoints on the applicabili-
ty of self-determination in the post-colonial context).
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thor, is that in the post-1945 era, the Latin American notion of uti
possidetis and the general notion of self-determination were synthe-
sized into the doctrine of decolonization.6
After decolonization, the scene was set in Africa for a second gen-
eration of self-determination demands. After the successful application
of self-determination to decolonize the continent, many of the ethnic
groups within the newly emerged states sought the right to establish
themselves as independent states. Within the post-colonial context in
Africa, the right of self-determination was therefore to become synony-
mous with the right of secession. In spite of persistent demands lead-
ing to endemic wars in several parts of the continent, African states
have generally resisted the application of the right in the post-colonial
context. The basis for their rejection of the right has been principally
political. But on the other hand, they have been helped considerably by
the uncertainty of international law on the subject. If decolonization
demonstrated the success of international law in assisting the peaceful
transition from colonial rule to statehood in places like Africa, then the
law has been a monumental failure with respect to post-colonial self-
determination.
However, just as the international community appears to have
settled with the ambivalence and the failure of the law towards post-
colonial self-determination, political events in Eastern Europe have
brought up the issue of self-determination in a context that, though
not identical to that of post-colonial Africa, is nonetheless very similar
to the African scenario. Since the end of communism in Eastern Eu-
rope, not only has the former East Germany been absorbed into the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), but the world has witnessed the
emergence of several new states that used to be constituent parts of
the Soviet Union (USSR); Czechoslovakia has divided into two states;
and Yugoslavia is still going through the painful traumas of secession-
ist wars that have now turned into wars for territorial acquisition. The
events in Eastern Europe bear some resemblance to post-colonial self-
determination in Africa. In their substance, however, they have suffi-
cient differences to justify including them in a separate category.
These may be categorized as "cases of self-determination in the post-
communist context" rather than the post-colonial context.
A significant feature of the cases of self-determination in the post-
communist context is that they have all attracted responses different
from those in the post-colonial context. All the cases, including Yugo-
slavia, have attracted favorable responses leading to the recognition of
the new states and their subsequent membership in the U.N. The
question of the validity or applicability of self-determination to these
6. Thomas M. Franck, Post Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in
PEOPLES AND MINORmEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3, 5 (Catherine Brblmann et al.
eds., 1993)
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cases has never been at issue, let alone been disputed.
In this article, the principal objective is to examine the differences
between the post-colonial cases and the post-communist cases of self-
determination and the responses they have tended to attract. The focus
of the article will be on post-communist self-determination and the
interplay between international law and politics in determining the
acceptance or rejection of the right in either case.
II. THE POSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON POST-COLONIAL SELF-
DETERMINATION
The phrase "post-colonial self-determination" can be used in one of
two senses. In a broad sense, it describes the application of, or demand
for, self-determination in any context that is not colonial. In this re-
gard, it specifically relates to the operation of the right after the wave
of decolonization in the post-1945 period. The phrase can also be used
in a narrower sense. In this second sense, it means demands for, and
application of, self-determination in the states that were colonies in
the post WWII period. In this sense, the operation of self-determina-
tion is a genuine "second generation" phenomenon. For the purposes of
this paper the second and narrower meaning of post-colonial self-deter-
mination is preferred because it reflects more accurately the phenome-
non of the self-determination operation under consideration here.
The term "post-colonial" in its broader sense can be misleading.
The range of beneficiaries for self-determination is very wide. For
instance, sovereign states are unquestionably subjects of self-determi-
nation, but the operation of the right in respect of such beneficiaries is
anything but post-colonial. One cannot, therefore, safely use the term
"post-colonial" to refer to all cases of self-determination occurring after
the wave of decolonization. The use of the term in a broader sense also
implies a temporal element. "Post-colonial" interpreted to mean the
period after decolonization, generally without reference to a specific
place and context, presupposes a definite cut-off date for decoloniza-
tion. But decolonization occurred at different places at different times.
It is also debatable whether decolonization has in fact ended, given
cases such as New Caledonia and the other French colonies. On the
other hand, "post-colonial" used in the narrower sense refers to the
specific context involving a claim against a state in the period after the
state itself has exercised self-determination and emerged from colonial
rule.
A. The Normativity of International Law and the Issue of Post-
Colonial Self-Determination.
In their assessment of the law's position on specific issues, inter-
national lawyers state the law as lex lata. In so doing, the usual prac-
tice is for the lawyers to assess specific factual and related issues
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against a background of the accepted sources and evidence of interna-
tional law and draw appropriate conclusions. Thus, in the specific case
of post-colonial self-determination, the validity of the right is tested
against the sources of law: general or particular conventions, inter-
national custom as evidence of state practice, general principles of law
accepted by civilized nations, decisions of tribunals and the writings of
publicists. These sources do not generally support the existence of the
right. International lawyers using this methodology were therefore
bound to draw negative conclusions after a systematic analysis. The
problem with this methodology is that it seeks to address a normative
issue using non-normative criteria. The point here is that the standard
methodology of testing an issue against a background of the sources of
law to help determine its validity is only useful when we are consider-
ing the issue as lex lata.
In the context of the U.N. Charter and, in particular, regarding
decolonization, the sources clearly establish the legal status of self-
determination as lex lata. However, once the inquiry is expanded to
include post-colonial self-determination as such, within the established
criteria for (colonial) self-determination generally, the result is bound
to be negative because the established criteria make no room for this
variation of self-determination. For instance, a survey of relevant in-
ternational conventions does not indicate any positive recognition for a
right of post-colonial self-determination in international law. In more
specific terms, the U.N. Charter and the Human Rights Covenants
only provide for self-determination in the colonial context. While the
Helsinki Accords (Accords) seem to support post-colonial self-determi-
nation, a careful evaluation of the Accords and the history of their
negotiations reveals at best tepid support for the right.
The formulation of self-determination in the text of the Accords
was the result of intense negotiations between the Western State par-
ticipants and-the Eastern Bloc countries, particularly the former Soviet
Union.' In pursuing the inclusion of self-determination in the Accords,
the Western States were motivated primarily by the desire to restrain
the Soviet Union from any future Czechoslovakia-style invasion under
the Brezhnev Doctrine and to provide a recognized basis for the claims
of self-determination by the Baltic Nations under Soviet rule.' In spe-
cific reference to the Baltic Nations, it was suggested that self-determi-
nation as incorporated in the Accords is a recognition of the "universal
nature of [the principle] for all peoples who have lost their political
independence through force or who have been separated against their
7. Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in HuMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINI ACCORDS 83 (Thomas Buergenthal
ed., 1977).
8. Harold S. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM.
J. INT'L. L 242, 253-56 (1976).
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will.' It is not at all clear that the parties meant to recognize post-
colonial self-determination as such by incorporating the principle in
the Accords. In any case it is instructive to note that before the demise
of the Soviet Union, neither the Baltic States nor post-colonial claim-
ants were able to make any successful claims based on the Accords
because the provisions of the Accords are not legally binding.'" In
pressing for the inclusion of self-determination, the West had therefore
been aware that its practical effects could well be marginal for the
intended beneficiaries.' 1
On the other hand, the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) implicitly rejects post-colonial self-determination through
a commitment to the maintenance of territorial integrity.' The Afri-
can position, as reflected in the OAU Charter, is reinforced by a persis-
tent opposition to separatist claims by African states based on an
agreement by the states to respect their pre-existing colonial bound-
aries and on other political considerations. In the African context,
however, whereas the general opposition to post-colonial claims, on
first impression, gives the appearance of an emerged opinio juris pro-
viding the basis for a regional customary international law rule
against post-colonial claims, a closer examination reveals a different
situation. States that oppose a claim in one instance may quite easily
support a similar post-colonial claim in another instance. Thus, Tanza-
nia recognized Biafra but made no attempt to support the Eritreans.
In the case of the Western Sahara, the OAU members were, and are
still, divided on the admissibility of the claims of the Polisario against
Morocco.' In more recent times, the Banjul Charter has been adopted
incorporating provisions that implicitly support post-colonial self-deter-
mination that undermines the OAU Charter position."' Thus, contrary
to common opinion, one can hardly argue that there exists a regional
rule that precludes post-colonial self-determination in Africa.
General international practice as reflected through the U.N. has
also been far from uniform. The U.N. was silent on the claims of
Biafra, but it tacitly admitted the claims of Bangladesh when the terri-
tory effectively separated itself from the parent state. On the other
hand, the U.N. actively assisted the suppression of the Katanga
claims' and has condemned the purported secession of Cyprus in
9. Boris Meissner, The Right of Self Determination after the Helsinki Accords
for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INTL L. 375, 378 (1981).
10. See Russell, supra note 8, at 246-49; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence
of Non-Binding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INVL L. 296 (1977).
11. Russell, supra note 8, at 256.
12. ORGAMATiON OF AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER, art. II.
13. See Sam Blay, Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self-Determina-
tion in the Wake of the Bariul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 29 J. AFR. L.
147, 155-56 (1985).
14. Id. at 157-59.
15. S.C. Res. 5002, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 148,
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recent times.16 Apart from the inconsistent treatment of the cases, the
response of the U.N. in each was not based on any existing interna-
tional law rule against post-colonial self-determination. In all, the
practice of the organization neither supports nor rejects the existence
of the right as a matter of law.
No general principle of law recognized by the legal system of inde-
pendent States permits post-colonial self-determination. On the other
hand, no principle prohibits such claims. Regarding judicial decisions,
the most relevant and direct one is the Aaland Islands Case," which
seemed to support the right but only as a last resort or in very excep-
tional circumstances where a section of a state's population is deprived
of the state's protection. As a rule, however, the decision unequivocally
rejected the existence of the right of self-determination for peoples in a
non-colonial context. 8 With the exception of the African case and the
decision in the Aaland Islands dispute, the various law determining
agencies we have examined do not indicate any recognition or rejection
of a right of post-colonial self-determination in international law. The
African practice only relates to a regional situation and is consequently
restricted. The Aaland Islands decision stands isolated without any
collaboration from international practice, conventions, the general
principles of law or even other judicial decisions. As a result, the cur-
rent international law position on the status of the right of self-deter-
mination in the post-colonial context seems more or less "neutral."
There are no definite international law rules that forbid or permit a
claim to the right. Past cases would suggest that, in general, the law
would accept a claim if it is successful. On the other hand, where
the claim is unsuccessful, the law would recognize the authority of the
parent state as legitimate irrespective of the internal conditions that
may have necessitated the claim in the first place.
In describing international law as neutral, there is the risk of an
implicit suggestion that the law is an abstract machinery that evolves
by itself to assume a positive or negative, or indeed a neutral position
U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961). See also, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1961,
at 132, U.N. Doc. S/4985/Rev.1 (1961) (Draft of resolution submitted by Ceylon, Libe-
ria, and the United Arab Republic); 1961 U.N.Y.B. 57, 65-71, U.N. Sales No. 62.1.1
(discussing the debates).
16. S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2500th mtg., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1983,
U.N. Doc. S/541 (1983).
17. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920); The Aaland Islands
Question: Report to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of
Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.F. 21/68/106 (1921). See also Charles N.
Gregory, The Neutralization of the Aaland Islands, 17 AM. J. IN7L L. 63 (1923)
(commenting on the decisions on the Aaland Islands question).
18. LKAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., supra note 17; JAMES BARROS, THE AALAND IS-
LANDS QUESTION: ITS SETrLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1968) (providing a
detailed documentary account of the dispute).
19. Bangladesh is the best example in this regard.
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on a particular subject matter. International law is not a self-evolving
institution. The development of the law is the product of state activity.
To this extent, the position of the law on a subject matter is in many
respects a reflection of the consensus, or absence thereof, in the com-
munity. This is particularly so in the case of post-colonial self-determi-
nation. A claim of self-determination in the post-colonial context is a
claim on the integrity of the centralized state system. In the countries
where the claims have been made, it is therefore hardly surprising
that the claims have generally met with disapproval. In all the cases,
the rest of the international community has tended to support the
claimants or the parent states depending on political expediency rather
than any set legal standards. The element of political expediency is
perhaps the single most important factor that accounts for the absence
of any coherent rules of international law on post-colonial self-determi-
nation.
In the absence of specific international law rules that deal with
post-colonial self-determination, any inquiry on the subject must neces-
sarily be normative rather than putative. International law is both
normative and dynamic. To this extent, it provides the standard for
measuring state behavior. But in its normativity it can also be molded
to accommodate prescriptions for particular conduct or the develop-
ment of new rules. It is within this context that the issue of post-colo-
nial self-determination needs to be considered.
Before decolonization, self-determination was applied extensively
in Europe. During its evolutionary stages, the beneficiaries of the prin-
ciple had been distinct minorities or peoples who were non-self-govern-
ing or subject to rule by other nationalities. With the emergence of
colonialism and the subsequent need for decolonization, colonial peo-
ples came to be identified as a new category of beneficiaries. As a re-
sult of the focus of self-determination on decolonization since 1945,
international lawyers have tended to dwell on the relevance of the
principle only to colonial peoples. They have thus glossed over the es-
sential similarity between the significance of the principle (as applied
to minorities and nationalities) in the pre-1945 era on the one hand,
and the post-1945 era on the other hand. More importantly, they have
ignored the teleological basis of self-determination over the years as a
right that has applied mutatis mutandis to nationalities, minorities,
occupied territories, and colonial units to remedy situations of subordi-
nation.
The application of self-determination to diverse groups is evidence
of its flexibility. It also lends weight to the view that the right of self-
determination is dynamic and applicable to different beneficiaries in
different circumstances. Just as the right was used to "rectify" cases of
political subordination in previous stages of its evolution and as a
mode of expression of popular will and sentiment for specific forms of
political association, so can it be applied in modern times to similar
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situations irrespective of whether they are colonial or not.
The case for self-determination, as discussed in this context, re-
lates to the principle as lege ferende rather than as lex lata. Given the
normativity and dynamism of international law, it should be possible
for the law to accommodate this variant of self-determination as it did
with respect to the principle through the period of decolonization. But
to the contrary, not only has the law failed to regulate post-colonial
self-determination, it has tended to be passive when the principle has
been in dispute, even in cases involving major conflicts that threaten
international peace such as the cases in Biafra, Eritrea, and the Su-
dan. Where the law has responded, it has tended to be indeterminate
and inconsistent. In the recent case of self-determination claims in
Europe following the demise of communism, the response of the inter-
national community has been markedly different. The former constitu-
ents republics that chose independence have all been admitted to the
U.N. Even in the case of Yugoslavia, the community has shown a will-
ingness to accept the dismantling of the former Yugoslavian state and
to admit the right of self-determination of Croatia and the other for-
mer regions of Yugoslavia. Does the international community's position
on these post-communist cases indicate a double standard, or is it in
fact an indication of the probable normative development in interna-
tional law of self-determination generally and post-colonial cases for
that matter? Finally, if the responses indicate no double standards, or
if there is not a normative development, then is there a justifiable
basis that adequately explains the difference in attitudes towards
these cases?
III. POST-COMMUNIST SELF-DETERMINATION: THE BACKGROUND
To understand self-determination in the post-communist context,
one must first understand it in the communist context. In WWII, the
Soviet Union was a major power and played a significant role in the
victory of the Allies. During the immediate post-war period, the Soviet
Union emerged as a superpower, consolidated its communist regime,
and established itself as a post-modern empire. In relative terms, the
Soviet empire lasted for only a short period. However, within its brief
fifty year existence, it wielded great influence and power as one of two
international power blocks. Within its sphere of influence were trapped
sovereign states compelled to take up the communist ideology and to
subscribe to the ideals of socialist internationalism. Ethnic, tribal, and
national groups were trapped within the Soviet Union itself and, in
some instances, they were compelled to be part of the union. Even
though the union was made up of independent republics, the constitu-
ent republics were anything but independent entities that could sepa-
rate from the union at will. Communist-style authoritarianism kept
such separatist ambitions under control, usually by the threat of force.
The right of peoples in the Soviet empire to self-determination was no
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more than a Leninist chimera.
A. Self-Determination in the Communist Context
The Russian Empire was primarily a conglomerate of many na-
tionalities ruled over by the Romanovs. What the Bolsheviks inherited
after the 1917 revolution was, therefore, a mosaic of an Empire with
the risk of disintegration into component nationalities. The task for the
Bolsheviks was the reconstitution of what was once the Tsarist domain
and its subsequent harnessing as the basis of the socialist empire that
was to emerge later2
The multinational composition of the Soviet Union was unique
because the territory inherited by the Bolsheviks comprised peoples of
European, Asian, and other racial backgrounds. Uniting the different
nationalities under a post-revolutionary authority was a Herculean
task.2 If the nationalities were to be fused together as a basis for the
grand union of the Soviet State, they needed to be brought together in
the first place. From the beginning, there was evidence of strong resis-
tance from nationalities such as the Ukrainians, the Central Asian
Peoples, and the Transcaucasians, who had been known to demon-
strate strong separatist tendencies. To meet the demands of such
groups, and indeed to appease them, Lenin opted for a strategy of as-
surance that, among other things, nationalities would not be subject to
Russian domination, they would have autonomy, and they would have
the right to secede should they so desire. This provided the motivation
20. After the Civil War and once they were in power, the Bolsheviks made no
secret of their territorial ambitions and their intention to take over the Tsarist
territorium. They perceived themselves as the legitimate heirs of the Tsarist Empire
and looked on themselves as the true successors to the Romanov regime. By the
mid-1920s, Soviet historiography was using this perception as a crucial part of its
claims to rule over the non-Russian population. Quite apart from the justifications
based on Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, early Soviet leaders promoted the idea of replace-
ment as the basis for their right to rule in loco of the Tsarist government because
of the indivisibility of the Tarist Empire. This is a significant point and was later
to be used by Stalin as a justification for the seizure and subsequent annexation (in
his words, the seizure was a reintegration) of eastern Poland, the Baltic countries,
and northern Romania. See Henry R. Huttenbach, Towards a Unitary Soviet State:
Managing a Multinational Society, 1917-1985, in SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES: RUL-
ING ETHNIc GROuPS IN THE USSR 1, 4 (Henry R. Huttenbach ed., 1990) [hereinafter
SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES].
21. As Huttenbach notes,
[t]he re-emergence anywhere after WWI of a viable multinational po-
litical entity of great geographic expanse seemed improbable and, cer-
tainly, unrealistic given the trends embodied in the dramatic contempo-
rary events. The disintegration of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires
and the continued rise of ethnically driven nationalism strongly dictated
against the wisdom of pursuing a more imperial - some would have ar-
gued, indeed Utopian - dream of believing in the possibility of ruling
over diverse and mutually antagonistic peoples within the same borders.
Id. at 1-2.
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for the leadership to make provision for national self-determination22
In the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, assurances
were given to induce the nationalities to join in the grand union of the
Soviet State. The assurances included a range of options that em-
braced self-determination.
As a result, a federal structure of government was established
under which "independent national statehood was granted to some of
the most numerous nationalities. To the smaller ethnic groupings, a
system of national autonomy was granted. The system resulted in the
establishment of 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 auton-
omous oblasts, and 10 national oblasts. Even though the union repub-
lics were assured of the right of secessionist self-determination by the
Soviet Constitution, Lenin made it clear that this did not mean that
the leadership supported secession as such. This is well illustrated by
his often quoted statement that the "right of divorce is not an invita-
tion to all wives to leave their husbands.'
Self-determination in the Soviet Constitution was perceived prin-
cipally as the right to secede. It served the politically important pur-
pose of reassuring nationalities with separatist ambitions. Paradoxical-
ly, it was meant to bring the nationalities into the union and not to
provide the vehicle for secession.' For all practical purposes, the
right of self-determination as such did not exist under the Soviet Con-
22. The nationality question, however, posed a special problem for the Bolshe-
viks. Communist ideology did not allow for different nationalities or for commitments
to ethnicity. Marxist ideology saw nationalism as a bourgeois condition and product
of class society. In the words of Lenin, "workers know no fatherland.* As far as the
architects of the Soviet Union were concerned, nationalism was doomed to oblivion
in the Soviet system once communism was achieved. This objective was to be
achieved by fusing (sliianie) all of the nationalities into the Soviet system. However,
the logic of this strategy was that the stage of separate republics in the union was
to be only a transition towards the eventual sblizhenie or merger of all the groups
into one citizenry. To Lenin, then, self-determination was politically expedient rather
than an inherently functional political theory that had to be put into practice. On
the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power and during the meeting of the second All-
Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the official position
authorized by Lenin was to guarantee autonomy (self-determination) to all the non-
Russian nationalities that found themselves under Soviet rule. Id.
23. The Other Political Issues Raised and Distorted by P. Kievsky, in 23 V.I.
LENIN, SOCHNENIA [LENIN: COLLECE WORKS] 68, 72 (4th ed., Institute of
Markism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU ed., 1960).
24. Lenin and his co-architects believed that while a guarantee of secessionist
self-determination was necessary to encourage the participation of separatist minded
nationalities in the union, with time such nationalities, and in particular the non-
Russian nationalities, would come to realize the benefits of belonging to the union
and would therefore not want to secede. Within Marxist-Leninist ideology, in any
case, nationalist sentiments underlying secessionist demands would wither away with
the development of communism in the Soviet state. To achieve this objective, it was
also part of the strategy to Sovietize the peoples of the various nationalities into a
homogenous group of citizenry with no ethnic oriented allegiances as such.
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stitution or its legal system. Despite the attempts at Sovietization of
the nationalities, parochial nationalist sentiments remained, particu-
larly among the non-Russian nationalities.'
The strict dictatorial system under the Soviet leadership prevent-
ed the non-Russian nationalities from airing their deep resentment
and discontentment. The nationalities were kept in the union through
a system of inducements and whenever necessary by force. Neverthe-
less, they managed to maintain their ethnic identities."
Despite the multi-ethnic character of Soviet society, it was un-
questionably governed from Moscow, which in fact took it for granted
that a diverse population was evolving into a single citizenry under the
great socialist reforms. Indeed, the Bolsheviks and the subsequent
leadership avoided recognition of the highly visible fact of the multina-
tional character of the Soviet Union. In post-revolution propaganda,
emphasis was always placed on the unity of Soviet citizenry rather
than the plurality of the society.
By the 1960s, Soviet leadership was content to suggest that the
nationality issue had been successfully resolved within the socialist
framework, as envisaged in Marxist-Leninist writings. At the 22nd
Party Congress in 1961, for instance, Khrushchev optimistically noted
that "the Party has solved one of the most complex of problems which
has plagued mankind for ages and remains acute in the world of capi-
talism to this day - the problem of relations between nations.' In
25. To bring the nationalities together, the leadership needed an administrative
machinery that could provide the umbrella for an effective integration program. The
Communist Party was to be used as the instrumentality for this purpose. The imme-
diate goal for the party and indeed for the leadership was to neutralize the mutual
antagonisms of the various groups and to bring them together into a common
friendship of nations (druzhba narodov). As a supra-republic institution, the party
was to be ethnically neutral and be managed by cadres drawn from the component
ethnic groups of the union. In many respects, this was in fact the case under a
program called korenizatsiia within the party until the late 1930s when Stalin
changed course and embarked upon a program of Rusification as the basis for dena-
tionalization. The approach of Stalin was different from that advocated by Lenin.
Stalin's Russification strategy undermined the smooth pre-sliianie program of
equal development and comradeship among the nationalities as envisaged by Lenin.
Many of the nationalities suffered glaring disparities. The non-Russian nationalities
were to develop a deep sense of alienation towards Moscow that would last for the
life of the Soviet Empire. The resentment was exacerbated by mass deportations of
some of the nationalities across the Soviet Union in their leadership's effort to cre-
ate that single bend of Soviet citizenry envisaged in Marxist-Leninist ideology.
26. Huttenbach notes that =[n]either carrots nor sticks proffered by tsars or com-
missars, neither generous economic inducements nor violent assaults, ranging from
mass deportation to mass starvation, fundamentally altered the multinational,
multicultural demographic reality of the Soviet Union.* Huttenbach, supra note 20,
at 7.
27. Gregory Gleason, Leninist Nationality Policy: Its Source and Style, in SOVIET
NATIONALITY POLICIES, supra note 20, at 9, 15 (quoting Pravda, October 18, 1961).
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the same vein, the new Party Program adopted by the 22nd Party
Congress went on to suggest that the "borders between the union re-
publics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former signifi-
cance" and that this was the result of the fact that the republics are
"all united into one family by common vital interests and are advanc-
ing together toward a single goal - Communism.' In later years,
Brezhnev put it differently, asserting that a new historical community,
the Soviet people, had emerged.' As recently as 1986, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Party Program adopted a resolution
stating that "the nationality question, as it has been inherited from
the past, has been successfully solved.' ° However, Gorbachev ex-
pressed it in more realistic terms at the 27th CPSU Congress, observ-
ing that [olur achievements should not create the impression that
there are no complications in nationality processes. The contradictions
characteristic of all development are unavoidable in this sphere as
well."31
B. Self-Determination and the Disintegration of the USSR.
The candid admission by Gorbachev that nationality problems still
existed in the Soviet Union must be understood against a background
of his political reforms introduced through glasnost and perestroika.
Not only did glasnost allow a great measure of freedom of speech, it
also provided the nationalities with the avenue to express their resent-
ment and the associated desire to separate from the union. Dozens of
nationalities began to openly voice demands for self-determination,
sometimes interpreted principally in terms of secession. Pent-up na-
tionalist sentiments, most predating the Bolshevik revolution, surfaced
and forced the Soviet leadership to reassess the national question.
The first nationalist challenge to Gorbachev came with the
Kazakh riots of mid-December 1986 in Alma Ata.' From the Kazakh
riots onwards, it appeared the lid had been taken off the Soviet nation-
ality problems. In what appeared to be a chain reaction, the hitherto
ethnically harmonious Soviet Empire seemed to explode into ethnic
unrest. Throughout 1987, there were demonstrations by the Crimean
28. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovet8kogo Soiuza [Program of the
Soviet Communist Party], KOMMUNIST, No. 16, 1961, at 84.
29. Gleason, supra note 27, at 16.
30. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza [Program of the
Soviet Communist Party], KOMMUNIST, No. 4, 1986, at 127.
31. Gleason, supra note 27, at 10
32. The riots had erupted after the Kazakh First Party Secretary had been re-
placed with a Russian. This was a break with tradition; in the past, the practice
had been to replace party officials in the periphery with natives from the nationality
in question. To the Kazakhs, the replacement of a local with a Russian amounted to
a blatant act of Russification and an obvious indication of Moscow's insensitivity to
the ethnic realities of the region.
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Tatars, the Baltic peoples, and the Ukrainians. In 1988, the problems
moved to the Transcaucasians. Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian en-
clave administered as part of Azerbaijan, adopted a resolution asking
for the transfer of the territory to Armenia. The resulting demonstra-
tions and riots led to bloodshed, prompting Gorbachev to admit that
the nationality question was far from resolved in the Soviet Union. In
1989, there were further problems in Georgia between Georgians and
Abkhazians that resulted in the use of force by the central government
to bring the situation under control.
The atmosphere of freedom ushered in by glasnost and the gener-
al situation of ethnic unrest provided an excellent basis for increased
nationalist demands. In December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist
Party unilaterally declared its decision to separate from the CPSU. On
March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian Parliament, in an action that seemed
rather courageous at the time, declared independence from the Soviet
Union. In an effort to bring the situation under control, the central
government took a series of actions aimed at compelling Lithuania to
rescind its unilateral declaration of independence. But the central
government took further steps to deal with the increasingly nationalist
demands in the other republics, such as Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan. In April 1990, the Supreme Soviet passed a law providing
for a waiting period of five years to secede from the Federation. From
this point onwards, the dismantling of the Soviet Union became only a
question of time.
The general situation of ethnic unrest was exacerbated by econom-
ic decline. These factors, coupled with Gorbachev's rapprochement with
the West and his willingness to negotiate to scale down the military
arsenal of the Soviet Union, were considered by the conservatives as
contributing to the decline of the Kremlin's political control, as well as
the power and influence of the USSR internationally. Disenchanted
members of the Politburo and the military conspired to stage a coup in
August 1991 while Gorbachev was away on holiday. The coup collapsed
within a few days. The conservative forces engineered the coup to stop
the ethnic unrest and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but their
failure further weakened the power of Gorbachev, who had courted
their support, and provided a catalyst for the dismemberment of the
union.
After the collapse of the August coup, it seemed that Moscow
lacked the political clout, or the appropriate justification, to stop the
secession of the three Baltic states - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
On September 17, 1991, the three states were admitted as members of
the United Nations.' Their right to self-determination and the issue
33. See G.A. Res. 46/4, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/4
(1991) (admitting Estonia); G-A. Res. 46/5, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/46/5 (1991) (admitting Latvia); G.A. Res. 46/6, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
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of their admissibility was never disputed. For all practical purposes,
the three republics ceased to be part of the Soviet Union. Their effec-
tive secession left the union with only twelve republics: the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Georgia.
In an effort to forestall any possible domino effect flowing from
the secession of the three republics, Gorbachev negotiated a new all-
union treaty for what was left of the USSR. The treaty aimed at grant-
ing more autonomy to the republics to meet their separatist demands.
But the treaty soon fell into disrepute when, on December 1, 1991,
Ukrainians voted in a referendum for independence by a massive ma-
jority." A week later, the leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus
met in Minsk (Belarus) and proclaimed the establishment of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS).' The CIS at this stage com-
prised only the three "independent" states. The Soviet Union still ap-
peared intact with Gorbachev describing the Minsk Declaration as an
"illegal and dangerous" constitutional coup.' This did not deter the
remaining republics from leaving the union. On December 21, 1991,
the remaining republics, except Georgia, joined the CIS through a
Protocol to the Minsk Agreement, concluded in Alma Ata.87 At this
point in time, the dismemberment of the USSR was complete;' the
union existed in name only. It had no members, and President
Gorbachev became the leader of a union devoid of membership. On
December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned after the Soviet Parliament
voted to dissolve itself. The Soviet Union legally ceased to exist.
Since the break up of the USSR, all the former republics have
become full-fledged independent states and have been subsequently
admitted into the U.N. The validity of their right to self-determination
and their admissibility to the U.N. has never been disputed.
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/6 (1991) (admitting Lithuania).
34. End of Soviet Union - Formation of CIS - Resignation of Gorbachev, 37
KERSING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38,654 (1991).
35. Minsk Declaration and Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, Dec. 8, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 138, 142 (1992).
36. KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS, supra note 34.
37. It is thus worth noting that the CIS comprises the whole territory of the
former USSR, with the exception of the three Baltic Republics and Georgia. See
generally Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The CIS: Acronym as Anachronism, 29 COEXIS-
TENCE 377 (1992) (discussing the complex international legal status of the CIS and
the relationship between the CIS and the former USSR).
38. It is of interest to note that as far as the members of the CIS are concerned
the demise of the USSR occurred before this period. The Minsk Agreement expressly
mentioned the former Soviet Union.
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C. Self-determination and Disintegration in Other States in the
Eastern Block
Of the Soviet satellite states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were
two of the most ethnically conscious states, being composed of older
nationalities with separatist ambitions that predate World War I
(WWI). These two states also had the most potential for ethnic strife,
given the history of the sometimes antagonistic relations between their
component groups. The former East Germany, on the other hand, was
the most homogeneous, being composed primarily of people who were
ethnically Germans. When these states were incorporated into the
Soviet Block, they became subject to Marxist-Leninist tenets that regu-
lated their nationality questions and, indeed, their political restructur-
ing.
The Soviet theory of international relations divided the world into
three categories of states: capitalist, socialist, and developing states.
The relationship with the capitalist states was based on peaceful coex-
istence. Peaceful coexistence postulated that there was an antagonistic
class struggle between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.
gowever, this struggle was to be characterized, and for that matter
mitigated, by two critical factors: the absence of the use of force on the
one hand, and cooperation where appropriate on the other. The class
struggle was thus described as peaceful. Since peaceful coexistence
presupposed the existence of a class struggle, it did not apply to the
relationship between the USSR and the other socialist states because
there was not supposed to be a class struggle between such states. The
relationship between Moscow and the socialist states was based on "so-
cialist internationalism." Under the doctrine of socialist international-
ism, the states in the socialist camp were subject to a number of du-
ties. In their domestic sphere, they were obliged to build up socialism
on the Soviet model. In the international sphere, they had the duty to
subordinate their specific national interests to the interest of the
group, the socialist camp. They were also not to terminate their mem-
bership in the Warsaw Pact Organization or the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance.' Within the communist context then, any act of
secessionist self-determination in any of the multinational states was
simply not permissible. In the case of East Germany, any attempt at
political restructuring or act of self-determination purporting to inte-
grate the state with West Germany would have been equally imper-
missible, even if the communist leadership had contemplated such an
act before 1989. Socialist international lawyers tended to describe the
authoritarian relationship between Moscow and the satellite states in
terms of "socialist international law."'
39. Theodor Schweisfurth, The New Approach to the Law of Peaceful Coexistence,
in THE CHANGING POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPE: ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 29, 30 (Rene Lefeber et al. eds., 1991).
40. In the view of socialist international lawyers, this law was supposed to be
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After the rise to power of Gorbachev and the subsequent introduc-
tion of perestroika, the changes in Soviet domestic policies were also
reflected in its policy on international relations and in particular, its
relationship with the other states in the Eastern Block. In 1986, the
Party Program of the CPSU revised and redefined peaceful coexistence
in light of the new thinking that increasingly characterized Soviet
international relations. Under the revised program, coexistence includ-
ed principles very similar to those contained in the U.N. Declaration of
Friendly Relations of 1970. They included the rejection of war and the
use of force, or threat thereof, in international relations, non-interven-
tion in the internal affairs of states, the right of peoples to determine
their own political destiny independently (the right of self-determina-
tion), strict respect for the principle of sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, and international cooperation on the basis of equality and
mutual advantage.
The revision and redefinition of the concept of peaceful coexistence
was significant because the new principles were of general application
and not just restricted to classical conceptions of class struggle be-
tween capitalist and socialist states. More significantly, it meant that
peaceful coexistence, with its attendant principles of non-intervention
and equality of states, respect for sovereignty, and for self-determina-
tion of peoples, was applicable to the relations between Moscow and
the other states in the socialist camp. The full implication of these
changes were emphasized by Gorbachev in his address during the 70th
anniversary of the October Revolution. He noted that relations with
the socialist states should be based on the "strict observance of the
principles of peaceful coexistence by all, [and] on that rests the prac-
tice of socialist internationalism." More importantly, he noted that "we
have convinced ourselves that socialism has not and cannot have a
'model' which all have to follow." He completed this point with the
observation that all communist parties in the socialist camp are "com-
pletely and irrecoverably independent."1
These pronouncements meant a shift from the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which had hitherto characterized the relationship of the Soviets to
their satellite states, and opened the way for the free development of
policies in these states without Soviet intervention. The exercise of
self-determination was first to lead to the disintegration of East Ger-
many, which voted to be absorbed into West Germany. The disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia followed with the declaration of independence by
Croatia, Slovenia, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ethnic tensions
that developed engulfed the state in a war that continues today. In
the international law of the future once the majority of states became socialist. See
generally THEODOR SCHWEISFURTH, SOzALISriHES VOLKERRECHT? (1979).
41. Id. at 36-37.
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Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks amicably agreed to break
up their federation and to form separate independent states.
IV. THE RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE POST-COMMUNIST
CHANGES
From a political stand point, the failure of communism appeared
to be a vindication of the policies of western capitalist democracy. The
changes, which were accompanied by popular and democratic elections
in all cases, were therefore welcome. In all cases, the U.N., and the
entire international community for that matter, accepted the creation
of the new states without question. At the U.N., the admission of the
new states was undertaken without debate or dissenting votes. The
admission of each new state constituted the legal recognition of that
entity as a state and its concomitant right to self-determination. Even
the African and Asian States that have generally opposed demands for
self-determination in instances outside the classical colonial cases
supported the admission of the new states.
So, what is the fundamental difference between these post-com-
munist cases and the post-colonial demands for self-determination that
warrant different treatment? Even though the post-colonial cases fall
within the framework of the same historical events, the dynamics in
each country leading to disintegration varied. In dealing with this
question, therefore, it is best to consider the cases separately.
A. The States of the Former Soviet Union
1. The Baltic States
The Baltic States comprise Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For
the period of their integration into the USSR, their nationalists per-
sistently argued that the incorporation of the states into the Soviet
Union was illegal because it was not based on their free consent.'2
42. During the expansionist rivalry between Russia and Prussia in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, Russia annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.
In WWI, it ceded all four territories to Germany under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.
However, with the Allied victory in 1918, the Treaty was canceled and all four
states emerged as sovereign nations. They remained independent until the outbreak
of WWII. See generally BERNARD NEWMAN, THE BALTIC BACKGROUND 11, 18 (1948).
See also CouNciL OF EUROPE, THE BALTIC STATES AND THE SOvIET UNION (Estonian
Information Center, Problems of the Baltic Series, No. 1, 1962); ALBERT N. TARULiS,
SovIr PoLicY TOwARD THE BALTIC STATES, 1918-1940 33-68 (1959); U.S. CONGRESS,
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST 1216 AGGRESSION, THE BALTIC STATES: A
STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THEIR SEIZURE AND INCORPO-
RATION INTO THE USSR, (Intl. Military Law and History Reprint Series No. 4, 1972);
Max M. Laserson, The Recognition of Latvia, 37 AM. J. INTL. L. 233 (1943).
On the eve of the War, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Agreement. The secret protocols to the accord divided Central Eastern
Europe into two spheres of influence. The Baltic States came within the Soviet
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During the period of incorporation, the general claim of Baltic nation-
alism was summed up by Boris Meissner: "the incorporation of the
Baltic States into the Soviet political alliance... did not constitute a
voluntary union based on federal principles, but rather a forcible ac-
quisition forbidden in modern international law."' 8 On the basis of
this illegality, the Baltic States demanded the right to self-determina-
tion as expressed through a return to their pre-incorporation status.
Their demands were basically secessionist.
Under international law, there is no doubt that the Baltic States
were not states as such during the period of their incorporation in the
USSR. Despite their persistent demands for self-determination
throughout the period, Soviet military, political, and economic control
ensured that they could hardly be described as rebel republics. Not-
withstanding the totality of their incorporation, Western states gener-
ally supported their right to self-determination" and declined to rec-
sphere. See Meissner, supra note 9, at 379; STEPHEN P. DUNN, CULTURAL PROCESSES
IN THE BALTIC AREA UNDER SOVIET RULE 17 (Univ. of California, Berkeley, Inst. of
Int'l. Studies Research Series No. 11, 1966). In pursuance of the secret agreements,
the Soviets concluded Pacts of Mutual Agreement with the States of Latvia, Estonia,
and Lithuania in early 1940. The new accords gave the Soviet Union substantial
military concessions in each state. In return, the Soviets undertook not to interfere
in the internal affairs of the Baltic States. Soviet Minister Molotov emphasized this:
"The Pacts ... in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal
affairs of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ... [the] foolish prattle of Sovietization of
the Baltics is of use merely to our common enemies." NEwMAN, supra at 160-161.
Stalin also promised that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the three
states after the war. In the summer of 1940, with the Germans advancing into
Western Europe the Soviet Union changed its position on the Baltics. In a dispatch
to the three states, it declared that '[i]n view of the anti-Soviet policy of the govern-
ments of the Baltic States, the USSR [is] compelled to demand from all three States
the formation of such governments as would be capable and willing to ensure that
the Pacts of Mutual Assistance would be loyally carried out.* Id. at 162.
In response, all the political parties in the three states were dissolved and
new ones formed under communist control. In Lithuania, the "Labour Alliance" was
formed; Estonia formed the "Alliance of Working Peoples;* and Latvia inaugurated
the 'Labouring People of Latvia." Id. at 162-64. In the general elections that fol-
lowed, the voting was open for all adults, but the voters had no choice of candi-
dates. Thus, in the three states, communist-controlled parties assumed power by
July 1940. In Lithuania, the party was returned by 99.90% 'yes" votes; Estonia
returned the Working Peoples Party by 93% "yes* votes; and Latvia returned its
party by 97% "yes" votes. A week after the elections it was reported that 'the repre-
sentative assemblies elected by universal suffrage, established Soviet governments in
the three Baltic States, met and decided on the entry of these States into the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics." The incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR
was achieved quite easily under a facade of legitimacy.
When Germany overran the Baltics in WWII, Russian forces were pushed out
of the area. Before the German occupation of the region, the Lithuanians proclaimed
a Provisional Government of the Independent Republic of Lithuania. In 1944, howev-
er, Russia halted the German advance and drove them out of the Baltics. The Baltic
States were thus "liberated" and brought back under Soviet control.
43. Meissner, supra note 9, at 381.
44. This was well demonstrated with the inclusion of the right of self-determina-
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ognize the Soviet annexation or occupation of the Baltic States. They
thus rejected the legality of the Soviet occupation. While this was evi-
dently consistent with the Stimson Doctrine of ex injuria non oritur
jus, it is important to note that there were no acts of recognition, de
facto or de jure, of any of the Baltic States.
There is no duty under international law to recognize entities as
states.' Even where an entity meets all the criteria for statehood,
there is no duty on other states to recognize that entity. On the other
hand, there is a duty not to recognize illegal entities. In general, this
duty arises where the entity to be recognized is an illegal creation or
lacks the accepted attributes of statehood. There would also seem to be
a duty of non-recognition in relation to rebel territories in the process
of seceding from their parent states.' In the case of such territories,
recognition is only permissible in law where the parent state has indi-
cated or demonstrated that it is unwilling or incapable of exerting
control over or reclaiming the territory. In the absence of such con-
ditions, the recognition of the rebel territory may not only be prema-
ture but also constitute an intervention in the affairs of the parent
state.
47
In the specific case of the Baltic Republics before 1990, they could
not be, and were not recognized as states, despite the general support
for their right to self-determination. The reason for this was that they
were not states. Even if they had been rebel territories, which they
were not before 1990, recognition for them would still not have been
possible or prudent given the control exercised over them by the USSR
and the potential for what would most certainly have been classified as
intervention in the affairs of the USSR.
Before 1990, the non-recognition of the Baltic Republics placed
many Western nations, and in particular the United States, in an
awkward legal position. The Baltic Republics existed as independent
states before their annexation by the Soviet Union. The raison d'etre
for the refusal to recognize the Soviet annexation was that it was ille-
gal. The non-recognition of the illegal state of affairs would imply that
Western States subscribed to the status quo ante. This would further
imply that they in fact had the legal justification to recognize the re-
publics if they chose to. More significantly, their recognition of the
republics would not necessarily have been an infringement of the duty
not to recognize. Indeed, for the states that recognized the republics
tion in the Helsinki Accords.
45. See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION (L.C. Green
ed., 2nd ed. 1951); Phillip M. Brown, The Legal Effects of Recognition, 44 AM J.
INT'L L. 617 (1950).
46. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 127-28 (Herach Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955).
47. Id.
VOL. 22:2,3
SELF-DETERMINATION
before their illegal annexation, there may well have been no need for a
second statement on recognition. At the most, they may only have had
to reaffirm their recognition. This not withstanding, they declined
recognition of the republics. The situation underscores the fact that
even though recognition has juridical implications, it is essentially
political in character. Whatever the illegal basis of the annexation of
the republics may have been, the political realities before 1990 militat-
ed against their recognition. Under the control of the Soviet Union, the
republics were for all practical purposes part of the Union. They lacked
independence, both economically and politically. In the cold war envi-
ronment, any attempts to recognize the republics may possibly have
produced a backlash to their disadvantage.
If the cold war environment did not encourage the recognition of
the republics, then the emergence of glasnost came to pave the way for
it. In a referendum on February 9, 1991, seventy six percent of Lithua-
nians voted in support of the independence of the republic. Even
though Moscow declared the referendum illegal, Iceland formally rec-
ognized Lithuania's independence a mere three days later. Denmark
followed with its recognition on February 28.
It is arguable that at this stage, the actions of Denmark and Ice-
land were in breach of the duty of non-recognition since the situation
in the Soviet Union, and indeed in Lithuania itself, was far from set-
tled. In any case the Soviet Union, beset by ethnic demands, was tak-
ing steps to resist the unilateral declaration of independence by Lithu-
ania. Nonetheless, the recognition by Iceland. and Denmark was a
significant morale booster. On May 8, 1991, President Bush met with
the leaders of the three Republics in the White House. While this was
not an act of recognition in itself and had little legal significance, it
was indicative of the sympathies held by the U.S. administration, and
it was an important political step. After the failure of the August coup,
more states came to accept the secession of the Baltic states. Norway
and Argentina recognized Lithuania on August 25, and Sweden and
Finland followed the next day. Sweden subsequently opened embassies
in all the three republics on August 29. On August 27, all the 12 Mem-
bers of the European Community (EC), at a special meeting of EC
foreign ministers, formally recognized the three republics and unani-
mously decided to establish diplomatic relations with them. Australia
recognized the republics on the same day. The United States recog-
nized the Baltic States on September 2. The secession of the three
republics became a fait accompli when the State Council of the USSR
(what was left of it) formally recognized the republics. The admission
of the republics to the U.N. followed these acts of recognition.
It is important to note that apart from the isolated cases of Ice-
land and Denmark, all the acts of recognition for the Baltic states
came after the failure of the August coup. Before this period, the Sovi-
et Union was actively engaged in dissuading the republics from seces-
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sion through constitutional means, negotiations, and the use of eco-
nomic sanctions. There was also the potential to use military force,
given the presence of Soviet troops in the three republics. For states
that admitted the reality of Soviet control over the republic, there
existed a duty of non-recognition pending the resolution of the crisis by
the USSR.
If there came a spate of recognitions after the failure of the coup,
it was because the coup's failure changed the political realities in the
USSR with definite legal implications. For instance, the Lithuanian
Communist Party, which had allegiance to Moscow, was banned and
its property confiscated by the Supreme Council of Lithuania. The new
government assumed more control of the territory and established a
greater degree of independence with the departure of the Soviet Interi-
or Ministry special (OMON) troops and the issuing of visas to foreign
visitors. These factors provided legal conditions that distinguished the
case of the three republics from the post-colonial cases and justified
the international responses to them. In specific terms, the legal con-
ditions may be summarized as follows.
(a) The Incapacity or Unwillingness of the USSR to Exercise
Control Over the Territory
As indicated earlier, there is a duty of non-recognition in relation
to seceding territories in transition where evidence indicates that the
parent state is making efforts to exercise or regain control of the terri-
tory. The converse of this condition is that where there is indication
that the parent state is either unable or unwilling to assume such con-
trol, recognition is permissible. Events in the USSR after the failure of
the August coup indicated ample evidence of the incapacity or unwill-
ingness of the central administration to exert control over the repub-
lics. After the failure of the coup, the hardliners who opposed reforms
in the USSR and the secessionist demands of the republics were either
arrested or neutralized. Within days after the coup's failure, the Rus-
sian Federation, which was still a member of the USSR, formally rec-
ognized Lithuania as an independent state. All these factors, coupled
with the withdrawal of OMON troops from Lithuania, were indications
of the softening of Moscow's stance and, at the very least, evidence of
its unwillingness, if not incapacity, to exert control.
(b) Absence of Contest from the USSR and the Multiplier Effect
of Recognitions
The apparent unwillingness or incapacity to exert control was
reinforced by the absence of protest from the USSR to the initial acts
of recognition by Iceland and Denmark. Since the USSR had initially
declared the Lithuanian independence to be illegal and had followed
with an economic blockade, it would have been logical and appropriate
to indicate unequivocally to the international community that recogni-
VOL. 22:2,3
SELF-DETERMINATION
tions would be considered intervention in the internal affairs of the
USSR. But the central administration failed to offer any meaningful
protest or deterrent to prospective recognitions.
The absence of protest, coupled with the failure of the August
coup encouraged further recognitions, which in turn spurred a multi-
plier effect for future recognitions. In other words, the unchallenged
initial acts of recognition encouraged other recognitions, which were
then used by more states as "justification" for their own recognition of
the Baltic Republics. The recognitions in this context tended to have a
constitutive effect to the extent that they gave the appearance of a fait
accompli to the secessionist efforts of the Republics. Indeed, the recog-
nition of the Republics by the State Council of the USSR, after the
recognition by the members of the EC and the United States, seemed
to indicate the acceptance of this fait accompli.
(c) The Attainment of the Attributes of Statehood
Recognition of an entity is conditional on the entity's possession or
attainment of the attributes of statehood. In the case of the three Bal-
tic Republics, there is of course no doubt that each possessed the basic
attributes of land, population, and government. The capacity of each to
enter into international relations was also not disputed. Their inde-
pendence may have been an issue before the failure of the August
coup, since Moscow controlled their territories militarily, economically,
and to some extent politically. After the failure of the coup, however,
the republics gained greater control over their territories. The estab-
lishment of national guards, the issuing of visas to visitors, the enact-
ments of their parliaments dealing with issues ranging from defense
policy, foreign policy, and property previously controlled by the central
administration, helped to confirm their new independent status.
(d) The Differences Between the Post-Communist Cases of the
Three Baltic Republic and Post-Colonial Cases
The Baltic cases have three fundamental features: The parent
state was either unable or unwilling to exercise or regain control over
the seceding territories, a significant degree of independence and the
attainment of the other attributes of statehood, and the absence of
protest against recognition by states. These three important features
are persistently absent in the post-colonial cases. With the exception of
Bangladesh, there has been no case wh-3re the parent state has demon-
strated an incapacity or unwillingness to exert or regain control over a
part of its territory engaged in secessionist conflict. In the case of Ban-
gladesh, once it became apparent that Pakistan was unable to regain
control, the condition was created for its recognition and subsequent
admission into the U.N. To this extent, the post-colonial case of Ban-
gladesh is no different from the Baltic cases.
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The critical difference between the three post-communist cases
and the post-colonial cases is the absence of control by the parent
state. Once the parent state loses control over the seceding territory,
and if the other indicia of statehood are present, the territory becomes
an independent state in nacsendi. All that is required to complete its
"creation" as a state is its recognition by other states. The Baltic cases
belong in this category. On the other hand, when the parent state
continues its efforts to exert control, the territory remains an integral
part of it. The principles of non-intervention and respect for territorial
integrity impose a duty on states to desist from recognizing the seced-
ing territory in such circumstances. The post-colonial cases belong in
this category.
A logical extension of the critical difference between these two
categories of cases is that the Baltic cases appeal to, and are accommo-
dated within, the existing putative rules of international law on recog-
nition and the creation of states. On the other hand, the post-colonial
cases involve a demand for acceptance or recognition even where the
parent states still exert control, or are making efforts to do so. In this
regard, they appeal to the normativity of international law and not to
its putative rules. This is because current international law does not
allow the recognition of an independent territory that is still effectively
part of another territory. The issue whether the international system
can and should evolve rules to admit cases of secession, even where the
parent state is capable of exerting or is willing to exert control, is the
principal difficulty confronting post-colonial cases. The Baltic Republics
had no such difficulties.
2. The Other Soviet Republics
The emergence of the twelve remaining republics was the result of
the Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Protocol.' Central to the
Agreement and the Protocol was the mutual agreement of the constitu-
ent republics to dismantle the union. The republics did not secede as
such from the union, they dissolved it. It is arguable, however, that
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus concluded the Minsk Agreement to form
the CIS without the remaining nine republics of the union. Thus, in
spite of references in the Alma Ata Agreement to the "former Soviet
Union," the USSR in fact existed after the Minsk Agreement, consist-
ing of the nine remaining Republics. To this extent, the conclusion of
the Minsk Agreement amounted to a secession from the union. If this
is indeed the case, the secession itself is of relative significance in
assessing the legal aspects of the international responses to the CIS.
This is because international recognition for the CIS members and
their subsequent admission into the U.N. came after the constitutional
dissolution of the USSR and the resignation of Gorbachev. Following
48. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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the dissolution of the USSR, the constituent republics emerged as
independent entities, and each possessed the basic attributes of state-
hood. International recognition completed the process of their estab-
lishment as independent states.
(a) The Differences Between the CIS States and Post-Colonial
Cases
There are several differences between the cases of the former
Soviet Republics and the post-colonial cases. The emergence of the
states was the result of a mutually agreed dissolution of their parent
state. No rule of international law prohibits the mutual dissolution of a
state by its component units and the subsequent creation of states out
of those units. The dissolution of a state leaves the component units
free to exercise their self-determination through complete indepen-
dence, association with an existing state, or integration into another
state. The dissolution by itself also means there is no parent state to
resist the break away or to attempt to exert control over the new enti-
ties, thereby undermining the legality of any act of recognition. Such
cases differ significantly from the post-colonial cases where the seced-
ing territories continue to be part of an existing parent state and thus
subject to conditions that bar their recognition.
B. The Unification of Germany
Before 1989, the general view was that the division of Germany
was permanent 9 and that, in any case, the "German question" will
remain unresolved so long as the Brandenburg gate remained
closed.' On November 10, 1989, however, the Berlin Wall opened.
Less than a year later, the two "Germanies" united. The unification of
Germany is without a doubt one of the most significant events in the
modem history of Europe. Coming in the wake of glasnost and
perestroika in the Soviet Union and the general situation of liberaliza-
tion in Eastern Europe, the unification was the culmination of a cata-
logue of political events in Europe. In many respects, the word "unifi-
cation" used to describe the event is a misnomer. This is because the
"unification" occurred after the disintegration of the former East Ger-
many, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was not, therefore,
the coming together of two states as such. For the purposes of our
present discussion, the label that may be appropriately used to de-
scribe the event is immaterial. What is material is that the two related
49. Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Status of Germany in International Law:
Deutschland aber Deutschland?, 38 INTL & CoMip. L. Q. 609, 634 (1989).
50. See, e.g., President von Weizsdcker, Address Before the 21st Convention of
the Evangelical Church, (June 8, 1985), in U.S. DEPr OF STATE, THE AXIS IN DE-
CLINE: DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1985, at 1415 (1985) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE].
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phenomena of the disintegration of the GDR and the subsequent unifi-
cation were made possible by the breakdown of communism and were
pursued within the context of self-determination. They therefore con-
stitute a legitimate subject for discussion under post-communist self-
determination.51
1. Background to the Disintegration and Unification
The unification of Germany has its roots in the division of the
country after WWII and the subsequent disintegration of the GDR.
Following the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany in
WWII, the country was divided into different zones of occupation,1
2
but this was only for the purposes of the occupation by the Allied Pow-
ers. The division of the country into separate political units as such
was not made part of the agenda of the Allied Powers.' However,
51. In an address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Ger-
many, Chancellor Kohl declared that "[amny one who today, in an attitude of resigna-
tion and fatalism, draws a final line under the German question is rejecting the
right of self-determination and the realization of human rights .... " Chancellor
Kohl, Address to the Bundestag on the State of the Nation in Divided Germany,
(Feb. 27, 1985), in U.S. DFP'T oF STATE, supra note 50, at 1387, 1396. Chancellor
Kohl concluded his address by quoting a declaration by the Bundestag adopted a
year earlier:
Our country is divided, but the German nation lives on .... It re-
mains our task to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the
German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination. The
German Bundestag reaffirms the right of the German people to exercise
peacefully its right of self-determination.
Id.
52. At the end of the War, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
USSR concluded agreements providing for the division of Germany and Berlin into
separate zones of occupation. Each of these States was to occupy about one third of
Germany. Berlin, although situated in the Soviet zone, was to be administered sep-
arately by the three Powers, each having its own sector in the city. While each of
these States had full authority to run its own zone and sector, decisions with regard
to Berlin and Germany as a whole were to be taken jointly. At a later stage, France
was invited, and it agreed, to participate in the administration of Germany and
Berlin. It took over responsibility for its own occupation zone in Germany, taken
from the American and British zones, and its own sector in Berlin, also from the
sectors controlled by these States. See generally Protocol on Zones of Occupation and
Administration of the 'Greater Berlin Area," Sept. 12, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2078, 227
U.N.T.S. 279.
53. From the outset there was no apparent intention that Germany should be
divided. Indeed, it was clear that, while suggestions had been made that the country
be split up (the Morgenthau Plan, for instance), the Four Powers actually intended
to treat Germany as one country. Following the unconditional surrender of Germany,
they issued a declaration that was of crucial significance for Germany in two ways.
First, the declaration provided that the Four Powers would 'assume supreme author-
ity with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German
Government, the High Command and any state, municipal or local government au-
thority. The assumption ... of the said authority and powers does not effect the
annexation of Germany." Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the
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disagreements between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Un-
ion made the joint administration of the defeated state as a single unit
impossible. The economic and political division between the zones ad-
ministered by the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union, exac-
erbated by the Berlin blockade, led to the establishment of West Ger-
many, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in September 1949.'
In October 1949, the Soviet Union responded to these developments
with the establishment of the GDR.' Even though both states pos-
Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Allied Powers,
June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, 1650, 68 U.N.T.S. 189, 190. This meant that the Four
Powers were assuming total authority, almost akin to sovereignty, over Germany,
but they nevertheless explicitly refused to annex it. This statement manifested a
clear intention to maintain the existence of Germany as one State; it was not to be
divided. The second major provision in the declaration was the express assumption
by the Four Powers of the right and obligation to 'hereafter determine the bound-
aries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at
present being part of German territory." Id. 60 Stat. at 1650-51, 68 U.N.T.S. at 190-
92. That. Germany was to be maintained as a single unit is evident also from the
Potsdam Agreement, which provided that a Council of Foreign Ministers was to be
set up, inter alia, to prepare "a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the
Government of Germany when a Government adequate for the purpose is estab-
lished." Protocol of Proceedings Approved at Berlin (Potsdam), Aug. 2, 1945, 3
Bevans 1207, 1208. However, in that same agreement it was clear that, while Ger-
many would continue to exist, there would be limits to its freedom of action. Thus it
was agreed in principle that the northern part of East Prussia, including
Kbnigsberg, should become part of the Soviet Union subject only to final determi-
nation at the peace settlement. Similarly, large areas of "former German territory"
(including southern East Prussia, Pomerania, parts of Mazuria and Lower Silesia)
were placed under Polish administration subject to final delimitation at a peace
settlement. Id. at 1218.
54. At this stage, the FRG was not a fully independent State. The process of
moving towards independence lasted for six years, and the western powers clearly
retained a substantial amount of control. The country remained under occupation
until 1955, when the Paris Protocol came into effect. See Convention on Relations
Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, 6
U.S.T. 4251, 331 U.N.T.S. 327; Paris Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation
Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany [hereinafter Paris Protocol], Oct. 23,
1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 253. Moreover, the FRG constitution, the
Grundgesetz, was subject to the veto of the three western Powers, a veto which was
employed significantly when they refused to allow Berlin to be treated as part of the
Federal Republic - a measure that had been proposed by the framers of the
Grundgesetz. By exercising authority with regard to Berlin, the western Powers as-
serted rights over Germany as a whole, the same rights that may impede the
Germans' right to self-determination.
Following the establishment of the FRG, the Soviet Union, on October 1, 1949
sent a note to the United Kingdom, the United States, and France protesting this
development as a "completion of the policy of splitting Germany . . . in violation of
the Potsdam Agreement under which these States, jointly with the Soviet Union
assumed the obligation of treating Germany as one single whole .... " Note from
the Soviet Union to the United States Protesting the Formation of a Separate Gov-
ernment for the Western Zones of Germany (Oct. 1, 1949), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
supra, note 50, at 274.
55. In a statement regarding the establishment of a provisional Government for
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sessed most of the attributes of statehood, they were subject to many
restrictions, including the issue of unification.'
the .GDR, the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany made it clear
that, like the FRG, the independence of the new State would be limited by the
existence of certain rights and obligations of the Four Powers with regard to Germa-
ny as a whole. "In the place of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, a
Soviet Control Commission will be established charged with exercising control over
the fulfillment of the Potsdam and other joint decisions of the Four Powers in re-
spect of Germany.- Statement by the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in
Germany on the Establishment of a Provisional Government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, (Oct. 10, 1949), in U.S. DEFPT OF STATE, supra note 50, at 306-08.
The reference to fulfilling the Potadam and other decisions acknowledged the re-
quirement that Germany would remain under the control of the Four Powers until it
had been prepared for a peace settlement, at which time final decisions were to be
made regarding its status and boundaries. This acknowledgment showed that the
USSR continued to recognize that the Four Powers jointly rights and responsibilities
that it could not unilaterally abrogate.
56. In terminating the occupation regime in the western zones, the United King-
dom, the United States, and France made it clear, and West Germany accepted, that
their rights with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole subsisted.
[I]n view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the
reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the
Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exer-
cised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole,
including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement [emphasis
added].
Paris Protocol, supra note 54, 6 U.S.T. at 4121-22, 331 U.N.T.S. at 260 (Schedule I
Amendments to the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the
Federal Republic of Germany, signed as part of the Paris Protocol).
In other words, the FRG expressly accepted that the reunification of Germany
lies in the competence not of itself but of third States. Moreover, it is clear from the
text of the treaty that these rights do not derive from the agreement itself but rath-
er possess an independent foundation, viz, the assumption of supreme authority with
regard to Germany by the Allies in 1945. Thus, mere denunciation of the treaty by
the FRG would not remove the retained competence of the western Powers. It
seems, therefore, that even after the termination of the occupation regime, the Fed-
eral Republic, though it may have become an independent State, was nevertheless
subject to major restrictions to its freedom of action as far as the German question
was concerned.
A similar position was adopted by the USSR vis-a-vis the GDR. In a state-
ment issued on March 25, 1954 attributing full sovereignty to the GDR, the USSR
asserted that the GDR "shall be free to decide internal and external affairs, includ-
ing the question of relations with Western Germany, at its discretion.' Statement by
the Soviet Union Attributing Full Sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic,
(Mar. 25, 1954), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 50, at 418. On its face, this
stance seems to be contrary to that of the Western Powers. However, in that same
statement, the USSR "retain[s] in the German Democratic Republic the functions
connected with guaranteeing security, and resulting from the obligations incumbent
on the USSR as a result of the [Potsdam] Agreement.* Id. A similar approach was
adopted the following year in the Treaty on Relations between the USSR and GDR.
While article 1, paragraph 2 refers to the GDR as being "free to take decisions on
all questions pertaining to its domestic and foreign policy, including its relations
with the Federal Republic of Germany," this has to be read in light of the statement
in the Preamble that refers to the obligations of the USSR and the GDR "under
existing international agreements relating to Germany as a whole." Treaty Concern-
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Because of the limitations imposed upon the FRG and the GDR
when they were founded, they had no prima facie right to reunify,
except with the consent of the Four Powers. In 1945, the Allies as-
sumed supreme authority over Germany, including the right to decide
upon its status and frontiers. When Germany was divided and the two
new States set up, these rights were maintained. Indeed, the treaty
giving the FRG full independence expressly retained for the Powers
the right to decide upon the unification of Germany.57 Thus, in the
early 1970s, when the FRG concluded its Ostpolitik treaties, which
served to establish that State's relations with certain socialist States
on a more normal footing, it was always emphasized that the rights
and duties of the Four Powers subsisted." When East and West Ger-
many applied for admission to the U.N., similar declarations were
forthcoming.
The developments regarding Germany since 1945 made clear that
the country lost control of its destiny to the Four Powers. While this
was intended to be a temporary state of affairs, political developments
made the achievement of a peace settlement impossible. The extent of
the collapse in relations between the USSR and the Western Powers
was such that each side preferred to establish its own German client
State rather than allow Germany to remain united under the influence
of the other. To safeguard their own influence over Germany, they
concluded treaties in which the new states accepted the subsistence of
the rights, established in 1945, to decide Germany's status and fron-
tiers. Any serious move towards reunification was dependent upon the
political will of the Four Powers to reach agreement, rather than ini-
tiatives by the German States."
ing Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, Sept. 20, 1955, U.S.S.R.-G.D.R., 226 U.N.T.S. 201. Thus the GDR,
like the FRG, was given full freedom to conduct its own affairs, including its inter-
national relations, subject to the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers con-
cerning Germany as a whole. The GDR, again like the FRG, was bound by the four
Power agreements on Germany, even if it had elected to denounce the treaty with
the USSR.
57. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, supra note 54.
58. Note from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany Confirming,
with Respect to a West German-Poland Treaty, the View of the Federal Republic on
Quadripartite Rights (Nov. 19, 1970), in U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 50, at
1113.
59. Ryszard W. Piotrowicz, The Arithmetic of German Unification: Three into One
Does Go, 40 INTL & COMP. L Q. 635, 641 (1991). The question remains whether the
unification process could have gone through without the consent of the Four Powers.
See Jochen A. Frowein, Die Verfassungslage Deutschlands im Rahmen des
V6lkerrechts, in DEuTScHLANDS AKTUELLE VERFASSUNGLAGE 7, 12-14 (1990).
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2. The Unification of Germany
Unification was central to German politics. From the outset, the
FRG always regarded the division as a temporary state of affairs. The
authorities avoided the writing of a constitution, which they believed
would seal the division forever. When a constitution was finally adopt-
ed, it was condemned "as a bastard Constitution produced in nine
months through pressure by the military occupation.' ° To emphasize
its temporary nature, it was called the Basic Law rather than the Con-
stitution." It was only passed by Parliament and not by popular ref-
erendum. Many aspects of the Basic Law reflected very clearly the
temporary nature of the division." The Basic Law at any rate under-
scored the temporary state of affairs with the provision in Article 116
that German citizenship extended to the people of East Germany."
Despite the resolve of the FRG statesmen to ensure that the divi-
sion did not become permanent, it was also generally accepted that
unification could not occur without the cooperation, and indeed con-
sent, of the Four Powers. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Four Pow-
ers met occasionally to discuss issues relating to Germany, including
the question of unification. There was a general agreement that uni-
fication should be the result of free election. However, the Soviet Union
added the significant condition that unification could only be achieved
through an agreement between the two Germanies. This condition
tended to place the Western allies in an impossible position. While
they favored unification, they did not recognize the GDR and were
consequently unwilling to accept its consent and role in the unification
arrangements. There was also the obvious possibility that a GDR
blessed with the implied recognition from the West might in any case
refuse to accept unification.
In spite of the failure to agree on a modus operandi for unification
of the two Germanies, considerable advances were made towards
greater cooperation in the 1970s through Willy Brandt's policy of
Ospolitik.' In 1972, the two Germanies concluded a treaty of coopera-
60. DAvID P. CONRADT, THE GERMAN POLITY 17-18 (3rd ed. 1986).
61. In this regard, it is interesting to notice the wording of Article 46, which
states that the Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day that a constitution
adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force. Id. at 17.
62. Judgement of Aug. 17, 1956, BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], 5
Entscheidungen des Bundesverewaltungsgericht [BVerfGE] 85, at 127 (F.R.G) (show-
ing the response of the German courts to the temporary state of affairs as far as
the division was concerned).
63. Gregory S. McCurdy, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of
Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 253, 258-61
(1990).
64. Willy Brandt stated that his policy was, first, to renew negotiations without
discrimination for the purpose of achieving a treaty of cooperation, and, second, to
relax relations between the two Germanies and to achieve togetherness after a peri-
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tion." While the treaty constituted the first formal act of recognition
of the GDR, it also, ironically, paved the way for increased cooperation
and eased the way to eventual unification. As a result, several commis-
sions were established during the 1970s that enhanced intra-German
relations. The close relations developed further in the 1980s with a
series of meetings between political leaders from both sides and the
conclusion of a range of cultural agreements in 1986. In 1987, Eric
Hoenecker visited the FRG, becoming the first leader of the GDR to do
so since 1949. The close relationship that had grown, beginning in the
1970s, resembled a cordial relationship between two independent
states. Whatever the wishes of the FRG politicians may have been,
unification as such was not considered part of the immediate agenda.
It took the political changes in the Soviet Union to make unification
possible on October 3, 1990.
3. The Differences Between the German Unification and Post-
Colonial Cases
Even though German unification was commonly accepted as an
act of self-determination, there are significant differences between it
and the post-colonial cases. For one thing, the Federal Constitution of
Germany expressly provides for unification in Article 23, which allows
the accession to the German Federation by other parts of Germany.
Indeed, in 1956, the Saarland joined the Federal Republic through the
operation of Article 23." The accession was affected after a decision
favoring unification had been made democratically by the representa-
tive organs of the GDR.
For the purposes of German internal law, the unification was simply
an act of accession consistent with the Constitution. From the perspec-
tive of international law, the accession was also consistent with exist-
ing norms. An existing state such as the FRG may accept the accession
of any territorial entity so long as the accession is not in breach of any
international agreements or the territorial integrity of another state.
Logically, a state also has the right to accept the reintegration by ac-
cession of a part of its own territory that had been separated. Indeed,
od of regulated existence side by side. See F.W. Hess, German Unity: Documentation
and Commentaries on the Basic Treaty, in EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS 23 (1974). See
also LAWRENcE L. WHETTEN, GERMANYS OsTPOLrrlI RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FED-
ERAL REPmusc AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES (1971) (describing the policy of
Ostpolitik generally).
65. The treaty was approved by the Bundestag on May 11, 1973 and subse-
quently by the Bundesrat on May 25, 1973. Despite the formal recognition of the
GDI, the treaty did not extend such recognition to East Berlin. The validity of the
treaty itself was contested before the German constitutional court. See Judgement of
July 31, 1973 (Intra-German Treaty Case), BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 1, 7-10 (F.R.G).
66. The Saarland is one of the lAnder (states) in the German Federation. See
Fritz Miinch, Zum Saarvertrag vom. 27 Oktober 1956, 18 ZA6RV 1 (1958). See also
Jochen A. Frowein, Germany Reunited, 51 ZA6RV 333, 336 (1991).
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in such cases the principles of territorial integrity and self-determina-
tion warrant the encouragement and the recognition of the reintegra-
tion.
The unification can also be considered in terms of the actions of
two independent states. Despite the anomalies relating to the creation
of the GDR and the unique position of the Allied Powers over the two
parts of Germany, for all practical purposes the two entities were inde-
pendent states. International law permits the unification of any two or
more states so long as the union is based on the free consent of the
states concerned and the union is not in breach of any international
agreements. The unification was partly the result of the Treaty of
Unification concluded between the two German states on August 31,
1990. The Treaty, which regulated the details of the unification, came
into effect on September 23, 1990 after approval by the houses of par-
liament - the Bundestag in the FRG and the Volkskammer in the
GDR. An interesting aspect of the unification of the two states is that
the Unification Treaty provided quite specifically that "with the com-
ing into effect of the accession of the German Democratic Republic to
the Federal Republic of Germany... the ILAnder Bradenburg,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thiiringen
[all states in the GDR] become LAnder of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many." The GDR ceased to exist after the unification, while the FRG
continued, albeit with an expanded territory. It has been argued,
therefore, that there was no unification between two states as such,
but that there was instead an absorption.' The label one employs to
describe the union between the two states is of no great relevance to
this work. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the unification,
however described, was made possible partly because of the agreement
of the two German states and it was consistent with international law
norms. Another important aspect of the unification was that it was
not the simple result of an agreement between the uniting parts of
Germany but of a complex agreement between the Four Powers and
the two German states. Three of the powers - France, Great Britain,
and the United States - as occupation powers had undertaken treaty
obligations to cooperate to achieve the common aim of unification of
Germany pending a peace settlement.6 The treaty was concluded
with the FRG as the recognized successor of the state of Germany that
had surrendered unconditionally after the war. Even though the treaty
was not concluded with the GDR and the Soviet Union, there was no
doubt about its propriety and the desire of the three Powers to fulfil
their obligations in 1990. As a result, the unification and the recogni-
tion of its validity comprised an important aspect of the final peace
settlement between Germany and the Allied Powers.
67. Piotrowicz, supra note 59, at 635.
68. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, supra note 54, art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 4258, 331 U.N.T.S. at 334.
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Like the preceding cases, the unification of Germany and its sub-
sequent acceptance, while presented on the basis of self-determination,
fits into existing international law norms. Unlike the post-colonial
cases, the unification does not require the application of new rules of
self-determination as lege ferenda.
C. The Division of Czechoslovakia
On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic voted to dissolve the Czechoslovakian Federa-
tion as of December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1993, the former Republic
of Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. In its place emerged two new states,
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. On January 19, 1993,
both states were admitted to the U.N. The issue of the disintegration
of the former state of Czechoslovakia and the validity of the creation of
the two new states were never brought into question. The logical pre-
sumption is that the creation of the states was consistent with self-
determination.
1. The Division of Czechoslovakia Distinguished from Post-
Colonial Cases.
International law does not prohibit the voluntary disintegration of
a state. Neither does it prohibit the creation of new states out of the
disintegrating state. Allowing an existing state to determine its politi-
cal destiny through unification or integration with other states is con-
sistent with the principle of self-determination. But it is equally con-
sistent with the principle for a state to choose to dissolve itself and
enable the creation of one or more new states out of its territory. The
voluntary disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the formation of the
two new states are thus consistent with existing norms for the creation
of states and with self-determination. The significant difference be-
tween the Czechoslovakia disintegration and the post-colonial cases
that threaten disintegration is that in the latter cases, the disintegra-
tion is never voluntary. In all the cases, the demands for self-determi-
nation are resisted, and secessionist conflicts arise precisely because of
the prospects of disintegration of the parent state. Where the parent
state itself opts for disintegration, the potential for conflict is obviously
removed subject to the amicable and equitable distribution of the as-
sets of the state. Where the parent state ceases to exist because of a
dissolution, recognition of the newly formed states poses no legal prob-
lems if the new entities fulfill all the remaining conditions for state-
hood. On the other hand, as noted earlier, if the disintegration and the
demand for self-determination are opposed by the central authority or
the parent state, the rules on non-recognition apply to make the new
entities inadmissible. Unlike Czechoslovakia, the post-colonial cases
fall in this latter category.
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D. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
Of the post-communist cases of self-determination, the disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent bloody crisis that has
continued until this day is easily the most tragic. The former republic
of Yugoslavia was a federation comprising Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. It also included the
two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The dominant na-
tionalities are the Serbs, Slovens, and Croatians. Since the post-WWI
era, separatist agitations have been a significant aspect of Yugoslavian
politics, with Croatians in the forefront of the separatist demands. In
the post-WWI political organization of the State, the Serbs dominated.
This arrangement provided acute ethnic antagonism with the
Croatians demanding autonomy. By 1928, the political system had
degenerated and polarized around two main forces: the Centralists,
comprising the Serbs, and Federalists, headed by the Croatian political
parties. In the series of political disturbances that followed, three sig-
nificant changes occurred: all ethnic based organizations were banned;
all federalists' agitations were outlawed; and the State's name was
changed to Yugoslavia.
These attempts to create a unified state system and forge new
bonds for nationhood met with considerable Croatian opposition mani-
fested in a new wave of autonomist protests. The tensions in the State
continued until 1939. To harmonize divergent interests in order to
ensure a concerted national effort for the impending war, the central
government made considerable concessions for Croatian autonomy
under what came to be called the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement.' En-
couraged by this development, Croatian nationalism took on a new
zeal with the emergence of the radical Ustashi group, which demanded
complete independence.
Croatian separatism was generally opposed by the Serbs, who
considered it anti-Yugoslavian. Thus, in 1941, when the government
was dismissed in a military coup 0 for its pro-Axis policies, the
Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement was annulled. The Croatians subsequent-
ly became allied with Germany, which promised to establish a sover-
eign state of Croatia with the defeat of Yugoslavia. In April 1941, on
the eve of the German invasion, the Croatians proclaimed the indepen-
dent State of Croatia. As part of their war effort, they organized the
quisling forces and fought on the side of the Axis against the partisan
forces of the Serbs and the forces of the Communist Party of Yugosla-
via. This helped to accentuate Croatian-Serb antagonism. With the
defeat of the Axis, the State of Croatia fell, and it was once again in-
69. Jozo TOMASEVICH ET AL., CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA 29-32, 60-61 (Wayne S.
Vucinich ed., 1969).
70. This is usually described as the (military) Putsch of March 1941. Id. at 67.
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corporated into the State of Yugoslavia.
After WWII, President Tito began unifying Yugoslavia. He created
six federated republics along the old historic and basically ethnic lines.
These efforts, and later constitutional reforms, did not resolve the
separatist agitations, but the centralist role of the communist party
helped to keep the nationalist sentiments in check. The end of commu-
nist rule provided the opportunity for the resurgence of the separatist
demands.
The current crisis began with the demands by Croatia and
Slovenia for sovereignty within a loose Yugoslav confederation. When
these demands were rejected, they sought complete independence from
the Yugoslav Republic. Similar demands were later made by Bosnia-
Herzogovina and Macedonia. To date, the crisis has gone through two
significant phases. The first phase comprised the initial Croatian and
Slovenian demands for independence and the responses from the cen-
tral authority to the demands. The second phase comprised the stage
of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent strife by the oppos-
ing factions to gain territory. For the purposes of this work, we are
concerned with the first phase and the responses of the international
community to it.
1. An Analysis of the Push for Independence.
Hostilities in Yugoslavia began on June 27, 1991 when the federal
troops moved against secessionists in Slovenia. At this stage, there was
no doubt that the parent state in Yugoslavia was opposed to the seces-
sionist attempts, let alone the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia.
Phase one of the Yugoslavian crisis thus did not fit into the classi-
cal framework of the post-communist cases we have already consid-
ered. The demand for independence and the subsequent refusal by a
central administration that was capable of exerting control were typ-
ical of a classical post-colonial self-determination conflict. Nevertheless,
the responses by members of the international community, and by the
EC in particular, were not typical of those normally observed in post-
colonial cases. The initial responses expressed support for the territori-
al integrity of Yugoslavia."1 This resulted from the desire to maintain
the unity of the Federation and to an implicit rejection of the seces-
sionist claims. This policy was consistent with the practice in relation
to other post-colonial cases sharing similar characteristics. However,
this policy was not maintained.
71. In statements made at the Security Council, many of the Members made
references to the territorial integrity and unity of the state. See, e.g., SECURITY
COUNCIL, PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3009TH MEETING, at 27-28, 36-37,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (Prov. ed. 1991) (mimeographed document, statements by Ec-
uador, Zimbabwe, Yemen, and Cuba).
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It has already been noted that hostilities broke out in June 1991
with the assault by Federal troops against secessionists in Slovenia.
The use of force to suppress secessionists in a post-colonial type con-
flict is not only common, but it is also not prohibited by international
law and is arguably a domestic issue subject to human rights require-
ments. The past cases of Eritrea, Southern Sudan, Biafra, and Bangla-
desh easily prove this point. In the case of Yugoslavia however, the use
of force by the central authority met with a different response. As
early as September 1, 1990, the EC called on the Croatian militia to
demobilize and on the Federal army to "return to barracks.' There
were further calls from the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) for the suspension of hostilities, the withdrawal of
combatants and a moratorium on independence declarations. In July
1991, the EC banned the export of arms to Yugoslavia and to the re-
gional factions engaged in the conflict. In September 1991, the Securi-
ty Council took a much more serious view of the situation and passed
a unanimous resolution expressing concern that the "continuation of
[the] situation constitutes a threat to international peace and securi-
ty."7' The Council's resolution was very significant since such a deter-
mination in pursuance of Article 39 of the UN Charter opened the way
for further action under chapter VII. The Security Council subsequent-
ly decided that "all States shall for the purposes of establishing peace
and security in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and
complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment
to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following
consultation between the Secretary General and the Government of
Yugoslavia. 4 In October 1991, the EC went further and prepared its
own stringent set of sanctions against Yugoslavia."' In November, the
Security Council authorized the deployment of 15,000 peace keeping
troops to Yugoslavia after securing agreement for a cease fire. 6 A
unique aspect of the conflict thus far was that despite its similarity to
previous cases in the post-colonial context, and notwithstanding the
depth of practice among members of the EC and the U.N., the issue
was dealt with as if it were an international conflict. The parent state
resisting disintegration was subject to sanctions and admonitions. The
situation left the impression that the international system was willing
to look on the secessionists favorably, in spite of the resistance of the
parent state. Later developments confirmed this impression.
72. Franck, supra note 6, at 21.
73. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., Supp. for Jul.-Sept.
1991, U.N. Doc. S/713 (1991).
74. Id. See also S.C. Res 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023rd mtg., Supp. for
Oct.-Dec. 1991, U.N. Doc. S/724 (1991) (establishing a committee to monitor compli-
ance with the sanctions).
75. Franck, supra note 6, at 23.
76. S.C. Res 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018 mtg., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1991,
U.N. Doc. S/721 (1991).
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Throughout the initial stages of the conflict, Germany indicated a
willingness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Germany delayed recog-
nition because of pressure from the EC for a coordinated, common
approach to the crisis. However, it became obvious that the slow devel-
opment of a common EC policy could precipitate unilateral actions by
its members and, in particular, Germany. Thus, on October 4, 1991,
the EC produced a formula for the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The formula, developed by
Lord Carrington, included the requirement that each of the "states"
make adequate arrangements for the "protection of minorities, includ-
ing human rights guarantees and possibly special status for certain ar-
eas."7' The Carrington formula was later modified to include the re-
quirement to respect the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the
Charter of Paris. The acceptance of the conditions in the formula
paved the way for the recognition of the new states by the EC. Bosnia-
Herzogovina, Slovenia, and Croatia were admitted into the U.N. on
May 26, 1992.78
Notwithstanding the admission of the new states, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzogovina were still subject to attacks from Yugoslavia. How-
ever, that fact neither deterred their admission nor brought into ques-
tion its validity. In fact, the President of the General Assembly was
careful to note that the continued attacks against the states constitut-
ed attacks against UN members and were illegal under the UN char-
ter.79 The United States' representative was even more forthright in
his assessment of the situation, stating that
[tjhe changes that have taken place in Yugoslavia have fundamen-
tally altered the previous structures. If Serbia and Montenegro de-
sire to sit in the U.N., they should be required to apply for mem-
bership and be held to the same standards as all other applicants.
Specifically, they must prove to the Members of the U.N. that the
so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a peace-loving State.'
For all intents and purposes, neither the U.N. nor the EC took the
view that Yugoslavia constituted a post-colonial case. What factors
could have justified a different approach to the new states from the
former Yugoslavia?
77. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 713, at Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/23169 (1991) (mimeographed
document). In November, a more detailed formula was produced by the European
Community Peace Conference meeting in the Hague. See Franck, supra note 6, at
24, n.52
78. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PROVISIONAL VERBATIM REcoRD OF THE 86TH MEETING,
46TH SESS., U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.86 (Prov. ed. 1992) (mimeographed document).
79. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 12.
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2. The Differences Between the Yugoslavian Case and the Post-
Colonial Cases
Unlike the other post-communist situations, the secessionists in
Yugoslavia had to contend with the forceful resistance of the parent
state. The Yugoslavian cases therefore have the appearance and the
substance of the post-colonial types. Even upon closer examination, one
finds it hard to identify any substantive factor that differentiates the
Yugoslav cases from the post-colonial ones. The Security Council reso-
lution concluding that the crisis constituted a threat to international
peace and security relied, inter alia, on the hundreds of thousands of
refugees that had been generated by the war, the heavy loss of human
life, and the adverse consequences of the war on countries in the re-
gion. These are hardly distinguishing factors. These same factors were
present, but were virtually taken for granted, in the secessionist con-
flicts in Biafra, Eritrea, and currently in the southern Sudan, all of
which are typical post-colonial cases.
At the risk of seeming cynical, it may be noted that the one signif-
icant difference between the Yugoslav cases and the other post-colonial
cases is geography. The Yugoslav cases constituted the first test of
post-colonial type secessionist conflict in Europe. Faced with the pros-
pect of instability and the threat to regional security that has charac-
terized similar conflicts outside Europe and was likely to flow from
this crisis, the EC reacted by recognizing the new states. Presumably,
the acceptance of the legitimacy of the secessions was part of the
strategy of managing the crisis by minimizing threats to peace and
security in the region. This strategy was not dictated by any legal
principle or the desire to develop a basis for dealing with similar situa-
tions in the future. Indeed, it is unlikely that the EC will react similar-
ly to situations outside Europe even if the conditions appear similar
unless its strategic or other interests are at stake. This view under-
scores the preponderance of strategic, economic, and political interests
as well as the limited relevance of legal principles in determining the
responses to cases of secession.
The problem with this cynical assessment is that it overlooks the
possibility of a genuine commitment by the international system to de-
velop new rules for dealing with post-colonial type secessions in the
post-cold war period. This possibility could be a very significant devel-
opment in post-cold war international law and deserves a close exami-
nation.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME FOR
POST-COLONIAL SECESSION
The responses of the international system to the Yugoslavian
crisis are significant because they could well indicate the direction of
international law on questions of secession in the future. Thomas
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Franck has identified the following responses to the crisis:
1. The international system does not recognize a general right of
secession but may assist the government of a state that is of good
standing to find constructive alternatives to secessionist claim.
2. The international system regards egregious and protracted
violence by and against the secessionist forces as likely to give rise to a
threat to international peace by endangering flows of refugees, tempt-
ing potential external intervention, and disrupting international trade
in essential goods and services. This is sufficient to transform a civil
war from a domestic to an international dispute, validating systematic
intervention in the form of debate, recommendations for settlement,
demands for cease fire, and an embargo on supplies used in combat
imposed equally on government and secessionists. The international
, system in such a situation will no longer presumptively side with gov-
ernments against secessionists except, perhaps, where the secession is
being fomented or supported by an external intervening party.
3. With the prior consent of the government and the secessionists,
the international system may provide peacekeepers charged to secure
the combatants' disengagement from an agreed neutralized and demili-
tarized zone.
4. The international system does not prohibit secession. It will
extend recognition to a secessionist territory government if (a) that
government has demonstrated effective continuous control over its
territory; (b) the government has made provision for accepting relevant
international obligations by, inter alia, making provision in its consti-
tution and by ratifying relevant international legal instruments for the
protection of the nationality, cultural, linguistic, and religious rights of
its minorities; and (c) where it has taken constitutional steps to ensure
the political autonomy for its postmodern tribal minorities if they de-
sire it.
5. A new state created by secession is entitled to those boundaries
that were administratively applicable to it prior to independence when
it was a unit of a parent state.81
There is no doubt that this assessment correctly reflects the re-
sponses of the international system to the crisis in Yugoslavia. The
first three responses, however, are not exclusive to the Yugoslavian
crisis. The responses of the international system to the Congo crisis in
the 1960s' and the problems in Cyprus over the creation of the Turk-
81. Franck, supra note 6, at 19-27.
82. The secession of Katanga from the Congo Republic in 1960 was the first test
of the U.N. position on post-colonial self-determination. See generally E.M. Miller,
Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 66 AM. J. INTL L. 1
(1961). Soon after the Katanga Province declared its independence, Belgium sent
troops to assist the rebel province. In response, the Security Council called on Bel-
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ish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) were similar."
The progression from the initial response of neutrality to the ac-
ceptance and support for the secessionists is unique to the Yugoslavian
crisis. There is no evidence that this is the result of a conscious effort
to develop a regime to deal with the crisis and similar situations in the
future. They seem like ad hoc reactions to the crisis as it developed.
This does not, of course, rule out the potential of these responses as
indications of the probable normative and systematic development of a
new regime on post-colonial self-determination. However, any such
potential is undermined by a number of factors. First, for the regime to
be developed, the conduct of the international community in relation to
the structures created from the crisis and in respect of which the re-
gime is developed will need to be supportive and consistent. The raison
d'etre in developing the regime is the preservation of international
peace and security and the maintenance of order generally. To be effec-
tive, the regime must also be backed up by the willingness to protect
the entities that are created as a result of the operation of the regime.
These features have been absent in relation to the Yugoslavian crisis.
The admission of the new states into the U.N. was an obvious indica-
tion of their acceptance as sovereign states entitled to rights and pro-
tection under the UN Charter. In the case of Bosnia, for instance, the
territory has been subject to Serbian attacks since its creation, but a
Kuwait type intervention to protect Bosnia as a member of the U.N.
under aggression has never been an issue in the efforts to stop the war
in the former Yugoslavia. If the operation of the regime permits the
creation of a new state that nonetheless remains subject to the forceful
aggression of its former parent state, then the regime looses its credi-
gium to withdraw its forces and authorized the dispatch of UN troops in response to
a request from the Congo Republic. However, the UN action was stated to be limit-
ed as a response to the involvement of Belgian troops and the Secretary General
and the Security Council both declared that the UN forces would not intervene to
influence the outcome of any internal conflict, By implication, the initial UN re-
sponse was to remain neutral beyond the Belgian intervention and treat both the
secessionists and the central government equally. In late 1961, this position of neu-
trality changed when the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the
secession of Katanga and affirming the territorial integrity of the Congo Republic as
a whole. This resolution led to the active intervention by the U.N. in the conflict
itself and subsequently influenced a settlement in favor of the central government.
See S.C. Res. 5002, supra note 15. See also Questions Concerning the Situation in
the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), supra note 15.
83. In the case of Cyprus, U.N. efforts to seek a negotiated solution between the
secessionists and the parent state are still continuing after a decade of the unilater-
al declaration of the TRNC. It is worth noting that in its initial response to the
crisis, the Security Council condemned the secession and declared it void, calling on
states not to recognize the TRNC. See S.C. Res 541, supra note 16. It must be
stressed, however, that the Security Council resolution was not meant as a state-
ment on the validity of the secession as such in international law. It condemned the
particular act of secession on the basis that it violated treaty arrangements in force
relating to the territory. See generally Blay, supra note 4, at 100.
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bility and essence.
Whatever the motivation for its development may be, the regime
does not appear to be intended to operate outside the Yugoslavian con-
text. Despite the many similarities, including the religious dimension,
between the secessionist claims in Yugoslavia and in the Southern
Sudan, there has been no indication from either the EC or the U.N.
that the regime may be worth applying in that context. The explana-
tion for this may be that the responses to the crisis in Yugoslavia were
not intended to develop any regime as such for secessionist cases.
While they may have the potential to be developed into such a regime,
the failure to respond to similar cases in the same manner removes
any degree of consistency that may be associated with the regime and
undermines its potential as an indication of the normative develop-
ment of international law on secessionist self-determination.
Claims of post-colonial self-determination will continue so long as
ethnicity and nationalist parochial sentiments remain a part of the
culture of human nature. In the post-cold war era when the democratic
governance is gradually being accepted as a possible right and a neces-
sary standard to be expected from all nations," the events of Yugosla-
via and the responses being developed provide the international sys-
tem with a good opportunity to develop a regime on post-colonial self-
determination. The failure to use the opportunity to develop prescrip-
tions on the subject will only exacerbate the uncertainty of the law on
the issue and the ambivalence towards secessionist conflicts.
84. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. IN7L L. 46 (1992).
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Bringing the Perpetrators of Rape in the
Balkans to Justice: Time for an
International Criminal Court
CAROLINE D. RASS
The Security Council... appalled by reports of massive, organized
and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim
women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina... strongly condemns these
acts of unspeakable brutality.'
On December 18, 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations
expressed the abhorrence of the world community regarding the ongo-
ing rape of women and girls in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.2 According to a report by a team of experts from the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the rape of women and
minors in Bosnia and Herzegovina has occurred on a large scale, and
evidence indicates that women and girls have been detained for ex-
tended periods of time and raped repeatedly.' In a ten day visit to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the U.N. experts identified 119 pregnancies
resulting from rape and determined that the abortion rate at a clinic
in Sarajevo between September and November 1992 had reached four
times its pre-war level.5 The experts found no sign of any attempt by
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit 1993-1994. BA. Stanford University 1989;
J.D. Yale Law School 1993. The author would like to thank Professor Harold H. Koh
for his invaluable assistance.
1. Sec. C. Res. 798, U.N. Doc. S/RES/798 (1992).
2. Although rape has occurred throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia
and has been perpetrated on all sides of the conflict, this article focuses on the rape
of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it is part of the systematic
policy of "ethnic cleansing."
3. Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
ESCOR, 49th Ses., Agenda item 27, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.450 (1993) [hereinafter
U.N. Human Rights Report]. The team of four medical and psychiatric experts visit-
ed Bosnia and Herzegovina between January 12 and 23, 1993. Id. at 4. See also
Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures it Wants Charged with War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1992, at Al (government and human rights organizations have documented
gang rape, the incarceration of women and girls impregnated by rape, the forcing of
women into brothels, and murder of rape victims).
4. The U.N. Human Rights Report noted that this number should be seen as a
minimum because pregnancies resulting from rape are under-reported due to the
emotional pain and stigma associated with rape. U.N. Human Rights Report, supra
note 3, at 67.
5. Id.
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those in power to stop the sexual violence.6
A more recent statement by the U.N. War Crimes Commission
indicates that the International Human Rights Law Institute at
DePaul University has collected evidence of approximately 3,000 rapes
and has identified approximately 800 victims by name.7 Although the
reports of mass rape would suffice to shock the world's conscience, its
incidence in the current conflict has taken on a new twist: rape as a
tool of genocide.8
While nothing will erase the physical and mental scars inflicted
on the victims of rape, they could take legal action against the perpe-
trators of the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, although
several fora exist to bring the perpetrators of rape to justice, all are
ineffective. To provide relief effectively, a forum must be able to pro-
vide the following protections: (1) allow individual access to the prose-
cution; (2) be impartial; (3) make decisions based on law; (4) avoid
politicization; (5) issue judgments with precedential value; (6) resolve
cases on the merits; (7) have an enforcement mechanism; (8) reach
decisions in a timely manner; and (9) have flexible procedures.
This article argues that due to the defects of the fora currently
available to the victims of rape, the world community should create an
international adjudicatory body with jurisdiction over certain interna-
tional crimes. The adjudicatory body could take the form of an ad hoc
tribunal for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Or, pref-
erably, it could become a permanent international criminal court. Sec-
tion I of this article briefly describes the current juridical situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Section II outlines the various fora currently
available to arraign the perpetrators of rape and identifies the prob-
lems with these fora. Section III describes the mechanics of the pro-
posed war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia and then evaluates the tribunal. Finally, Sec-
tion IV surveys the debate over the creation of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court, analyzes the proposals for such a forum, and
concludes by calling for its establishment. Because the peculiar and
unique legal status of the conflict in Bosnia has placed many tradition-
al legal doctrines in limbo, it is useful to begin by briefly describing
the current juridical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. Id. at 72.
7. Rape was Weapon of Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
8. Although the current conflict represents the first time rape has been used
with a genocidal objective, this is not the first time rape has been used as a weapon
of war. Throughout the ages, armed forces have relied on rape as a tactic to demor-
alize, intimidate, and retaliate against the enemy. See generally SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-133 (1975).
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I. THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA: JURIDICAL STATUS
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials provide the sole examples of
criminal prosecutions of individuals before an international war crimes
tribunal. Under the Nuremberg paradigm, an ad hoc tribunal enter-
tains prosecutions for genocide committed in the course of an interna-
tional armed conflict between recognized states." The mass rape of
women and children in Bosnia, however, deviates from this paradigm:
the international community does not recognize the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as a state; no court has classified rape as genocide; and
the Bosnian conflict can be characterized as either civil or internation-
al. Therefore, the Bosnian situation presents several new and difficult
legal issues.
The international community recognized the independence of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia ("former Yugoslavia") in early April 1992.0 On April
27, 1992, the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro formed a new Yugo-
slav state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("Federal Republic"),
which holds a yet uncertain international status. In September 1992,
the General Assembly decided that the Federal Republic could not
automatically succeed to the seat of former Yugoslavia in the United
Nations1' - it would have to reapply for membership under Article 4
of the U.N. Charter. The UN has not yet granted it membership.'
However, the UN has permitted the Federal Republic to maintain a
mission at the United Nations and to participate in the work of some
non-Assembly bodies."3
The international community has not yet addressed whether the
rape of women and children in Bosnia and Herzegovina qualifies as
genocide. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a party to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide ("Geno-
cide Convention") since March 6, 1992, the date it seceded from the
former Yugoslavia.1' The Federal Republic is also a party to the Geno-
cide Convention, because on April 27, 1992 it formally declared that it
would "strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal
9. See generally ROBERT K. WoETzEL, THE NUIEMERG TRIALS IN INTERNATION-
AL LAw (1962).
10. HELsINm WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERcEGOVINA [sic] 30 (1992).
11. John M. Gosho, U.N. Declares Yugoslav Seat to be Vacant, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1992, at A27.
12. Order in Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia
and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 13 [hereinafter I.C.J. Order].
13. Id.
14. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)),
I.C.J. Pleadings 32 (Mar. 20, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bosnian I.C.J.
Application].
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Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally. "' The Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Genocide Convention without
reservation on August 29, 1950.
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention:
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such: ... causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; [or] imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group. 
1 7
The systematic rape and forced pregnancy of Muslim women and girls
qualifies as genocide under all parts of this definition. The Bosnian
Serb soldiers employ rape as an instrument of "ethnic cleansing," the
euphemism used to describe the Serbian policy of forcing non-Serbs out
of certain regions of the former Yugoslavia." According to the
Bosnian government, "mass rapes are being used to intentionally de-
stroy the national, religious, and cultural identity of the Muslim people
in Bosnia."" A European Community investigative mission into the
treatment of women in the former Yugoslavia found that the Serbs
commit rape with the "conscious intention of demoralizing and terror-
izing communities, driving them from their home regions, and demon-
strating the power of the armed forces."'
To inflict the maximum amount of humiliation on the victims,
their families, and the community, the Bosnian-Serbs commit some of
the rapes in particularly sadistic ways."1 Rape victims have reported
that their assailants shouted "you will have a Serbian child.' Some
were also told that if they became pregnant they would be forcibly de-
tained to prevent termination of the pregnancy." Even when repeated
15. LC.J. Order, supra note 12, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, GA Res. 260(A) (MII), 78 U.N.T.S. 278, 280 (entered into force
Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
18. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia: the Rape and
Abuse of Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.21 (1993) (expressing outrage of United Nations
Commission on Human Rights that the systematic practice of rape is being used as
a weapon of war against Muslim women and children and as an instrument of the
policy of ethnic cleansing).
19. Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14 at 17.
20. European Community Investigative Mission Into the Treatment of Muslim
Women in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR at 6, U.N. Doc. S/25240 (1993) [here-
inafter European Investigative Report].
21. Id. at 5.
22. U.N. Human Rights Report, supra note 3, at 69; see also European Investiga-
tive Report, supra note 20, at 5.
23. Id.
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rape fails to produce "Serbian" babies, it still furthers the policy of
"ethnic cleansing" by eliminating the child-bearing capacity of the
Muslim victims directly, through physical abuse, or indirectly, by vir-
tue of the societal stigma attached to victims of rape. This stigma
proves especially severe in Muslim communities, where the religion
emphasizes virginity and chastity before marriage." Because the per-
petrators intend the elimination of the child-bearing capability of Mus-
lim women and girls as a consequence of rape, "ethnic cleansing" actu-
ally qualifies as genocide.
Whether the ongoing war in Bosnia and Herzegovina qualifies as
an international, rather than an internal, armed conflict poses another
important juridical question. Although at first most of the fighting in
Bosnia occurred between Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, Croatian forces
have joined the melee. Paramilitary groups from the Federal Republic
and reserve forces of the Yugoslav People's Army have aided the
Bosnian Serbs by participating in the conflict,' and Croatia has
troops fighting on behalf of the Bosnian Croats." As both the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic have declared
their independence from the former Yugoslavia, those two states ap-
pear to be engaged in an international conflict." According to the
United Nations Commission of Experts,
the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned,
combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the
parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach
whereby it applies the law applicable in international armed con-
flicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia."
In sum, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to an
international armed conflict involving the genocidal use of rape.
Though not an internationally recognized state, the terms of the Geno-
cide Convention bind the Federal Republic. Characterizing both the
24. Feryal Gharabi, Equality Now, Address at Smith College (Apr. 15, 1993).
25. HELSINIU WATCH, supra note 10, at 35.
26. 15 Killed in a Barrage of Shelling Across Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994,
at A4.
27. HELSnqi WATCH. supra note 10, at 199-200.
28. Letter Dated 9 February 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR at 14, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993) [here-
inafter U.N. Experts Report]; see also Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, Representa-
tive of the United States of America to the United Nations, to Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations 6 (Apr. 5, 1993) (on file with author)
(for jurisdictional purposes, the conflict shall be deemed to be of an international
character). But see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 16 (1993) [hereinafter
S.G. Report] (the selection of January 1, 1993 as the starting date for temporal
jurisdiction of war crimes tribunal is not intended to convey any judgment as to the
international or internal character of the conflict).
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war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an international armed conflict and
the mass rape of Muslim women and children as genocide has impor-
tant legal ramifications.
II. INHERENT DEFECTS IN FORA AVAILABLE TO BRING PERPETRATORS
OF RAPE TO JUSTICE
Two types of fora may have jurisdiction over perpetrators of rape
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: national courts, including Bosnian and
United States courts, and international tribunals.' However, the
available tribunals have inherent defects that diminish their power to
compensate victims and deter perpetrators. While domestic initiations
of criminal prosecutions and domestic court adjudications of civil
claims will elicit charges of nationalistic prejudice or political influ-
ence, the only available international forum - the International Court
of Justice - cannot prosecute individual perpetrators. As a result,
many obstacles prevent the victims of rape from obtaining relief in the
currently available fora.
A. Bosnian Courts
At first glance, the Bosnian court system provides the most obvi-
ous forum for the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under
the territoriality"' and passive personality" principles of internation-
al jurisdiction, a state has jurisdiction to define and punish crimes
committed on its territory or against its nationals. In fact, according to
Article VI of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the
only state required to try those who have perpetrated genocide within
its territory. 2 Similarly, Article 5(1) of the U.N. Convention Against
Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
29. Another potential forum would be a regional tribunal, but the former Yugo-
slavia was not a party to any of the regional tribunals. If Bosnia and Herzegovina
were to become a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1959, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953), Article 25(1) provides that the European Human Rights
Commission "may receive petitions .. . from any person ... or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in this Convention" as long as the allegedly offending Party
recognizes the competence of the European Human Rights Commission to receive
such petitions. Id. at 236-237. Thus, through this mechanism, the Bosnian victims of
rape could bring a claim only against the Federal Republic rather than against indi-
vidual perpetrators. Moreover, their claims would only be entertained if the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had accepted the jurisdiction of the European Human Rights
Commission.
30. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §402 (1Xa)-(b) (1987).
31. Id. § 402 cmt. g.
32. See Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at 280-82 (persons charged with
genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which
the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as shall have jurisdic-
tion).
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ishment ("Convention Against Torture") obligates a state party to take
the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over an offense com-
mitted in any territory subject to that state party's jurisdiction.'
As a party to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion"),8 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has an obligation to
prosecute any offense that qualifies as a grave breach of that Conven-
tion.' Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires each
High Contracting Party "to search for persons alleged to have commit-
ted, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and [to]
bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts." ' Bosnia and Herzegovina can thus prosecute grave offenses
committed by Serbian forces, for as a High Contracting Party, the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention bind the Federal Repub-
lic."1
Attempts to use the Bosnian court system to prosecute the perpe-
trators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina would encounter many prac-
tical problems, however. In the occupied regions, legal institutions
generally do not function, and "the situation of all-out or avowed war
prevailing in the... territories [of the former Yugoslavia] rules out
any possibility of effective prosecution."' Even if the Bosnian legal
system operated effectively, the international community would doubt
the legitimacy of Bosnian trials of Serbian prisoners.' As with the
trial of Adolf Eichmann, despite the horrific nature of the allegations
33. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 177, 178 (1988). Article
14 goes even further, requiring that each state party ensure in its legal system that
the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation. Id. at 181. Although the Socialist Federal Republic was
a party to the Torture Convention, it is not clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina has
succeeded to its obligations.
34. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its succession to the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977 on December 12, 1992. See Euro-
pean Investigative Report, supra note 20, at 17.
35. For an explanation of why rape qualifies as a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, see infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
36. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, at 386.
37. See HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 10, at 201 (The desire of the Federal Re-
public to be recognized as a successor state to the former Yugoslavia and thus re-
tain membership in international organizations implies a willingness to succeed to
the international agreements to which former Yugoslavia was a party. The former
Yugoslavia ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1950.).
38. Letter Dated 10 February 1993 From the Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, at 12, U.N.
Doc. S/25266 (1993) [hereinafter French Proposal].
39. Interview with Mijan Damaska, Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale
University, New Haven, May 4, 1993 [hereinafter Damaska Interview].
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and the desire to believe the accused guilty, suspicion would remain as
to the impartiality of the proceedings.'
For example, some have already raised questions about the fair-
ness of the much-publicized trial of two Serbian soldiers in Bosnia and
Herzegovina." Bosnian army forces arrested the two soldiers in
Sarajevo in November 1991, and one of the soldiers, Borislav Herak,
confessed immediately.' However, other than Herak's detailed confes-
sion, it remains unclear why the Bosnians singled these two soldiers
out from the vast pool of potential defendants. ' At trial, the defense
claimed inducement of the soldiers' confessions by beatings and point-
ed to the lack of independent verification for most of the crimes.' Af-
ter a twelve-day trial on charges of murder, rape, and genocide, the
soldiers were found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.'
B. United States Courts
Victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina can pursue civil reme-
dies in the courts of the United States under two statutes.' The Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act of 1991 provides victims of torture or extra-
judicial killing with a private cause of action for damages."7 Victims
of any nationality have standing if the alleged offender acted under
"actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."
Moreover, the statute's definition of torture, which includes "any act,
directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical con-
trol, by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purpose as ... in-
40. For a discussion of the criticisms of the Eichmann trial, see infra text ac-
companying notes 244-48.
41. See John F. Burns, 2 Serbs to Be Shot for Killings and Rapes, N.Y. TIoEs,
Mar. 31, 1993, at A6.
42. Bosnia War Crimes (COURT TV television broadcast, May 5, 1993)(Video-tape
on file with author).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Burns, supra note 41.
46. At least two suits against Radovan Karadzic, President of the internationally
unrecognized Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are currently pending in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See, e.g., Kadic
v. Karadzic, No. 93-1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 2, 1993); Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93-
0878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993). In response to each complaint, the defendant
filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Dismiss on
May 10, 1993.
47. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992). The Act defines "extrajudicial killing" as 'a deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.' Id. §
3(a).
48. Id. § 2(a).
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timidating or coercing that individual,"' would include rape.
The Alien Tort Statute grants United States district courts juris-
diction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' As
the Ninth Circuit succinctly explained in Tcjano v. Marcos, the Alien
Tort Statute "requires a claim by an alien, a tort, and a violation of
international law." 1 In Trajano, for example, the court found that the
Alien Tort Statute provided the district court with subject matter juris-
diction over a claim by a Philippine national that her son had been
tortured to death in the Philippines by military intelligence personnel
acting under the authority of then-president Ferdinand Marcos, the
defendant. Since both official torture and genocide violate international
law,"2 the Alien Tort Statute would allow the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to bring a civil action in the district courts of
the United States.
United States courts have awarded damages under the Alien Tort
Statute to foreign plaintiffs,' but many hurdles impede the path to
relief. The obstacles to obtaining a favorable judgment fall into the
following ten doctrinal categories: (1) personal and subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) service of process; (3) forum non conveniena, (4) failure
to state a claim; (5) standing; (6) diplomatic or foreign sovereign immu-
49. Id. § 3(bX1).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
51. 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. The circuits are in agreement that official torture is a violation of interna-
tional law. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official tor-
ture violate customary international law); Committee of United States Citizens Liv-
ing in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (torture consti-
tutes violation of jus cogens); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) ("for purposes of civil liability, thi torturer has become - like the pirate and
slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind*); see
also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(d) (state violates interna-
tional law if as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones torture
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment).
Genocide is also a violation of customary international law. See id. § 702(a)
(state violates international law if as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourag-
es, or condones genocide). In addition, since 1987, the United States has been a
party to the Genocide Convention. Article I of the Convention states that The Con-
tracting Parties confirm that genocide .. . is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and punish.' See Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at
280.
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding plaintiffs
$10,364,000 in damages); 7Tcjano, 978 F.2d at 496 (upholding award to plaintiffs of
$4.16 million in damages); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(awarding $8 million in damages); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No.
CV 82-1772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (awarding $2.7 million in damages), rev'd and
remanded Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Argentina may have implicitly waived immunity), cert. denied, Republic of Argentina
v. Siderman de Blake, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
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nity; (7) nonjusticiability under the Act of State or the political ques-
tion doctrines; (8) discovery; (9) attachment of assets; and (10) enforce-
ment of judgments." The Torture Victim Protection Act removes only
one of these hurdles, subject matter jurisdiction,' while adding two
more, exhaustion of remedies and a ten-year statute of limitations.'
Moreover, the Torture Victim Protection Act has yet to be tested in
U.S. courts.8 7
Several Bosnian victims of rape have brought suits in federal
district court against the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan
Karadzic. These suits raise numerous questions regarding the avail-
ability of U.S. courts to Bosnian victims: Do U.S. courts have personal
jurisdiction over someone who comes to the United States only for
short periods of time to negotiate a peace settlement?' As an invitee
of the United Nations for peace negotiations," can Karadzic be served
with process?' Is service on his bodyguards sufficient?"' Is there an
54. See generally Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting
Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX INT'L L.J. 169, 181-
83 (1987).
55. An individual who subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing
"shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages." Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, §
2(a) (2) (1992).
56. Id. § 2(b) & (c).
57. Although no one has litigated the Torture Victim Protection Act, it has been
briefed. However, the arguments primarily revolve around questions of retroactivity
and the availability of punitive damages. See Supplemental Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Default Judgment at 16-30,
Xuncax v. Gramajo, - F. Supp. - (Mass. 1994) (No. 91-11564 WD).
58. The due process clause prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction unless a
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant
lacked continuous and systematic contacts with forum and contacts were unrelated
to cause of action). Even if minimum contacts are present, the court will not "un-
reasonably" exercise jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480
U.S. 102, 144 (1987) ('The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonable-
ness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.").
59. See Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary of Legislative
Affairs, Dep't of State, to Senator Dole, Mar. 1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Bradtke Letter] (Karadzic in U.S. solely as an invitee of U.N.).
60. Within the U.N. headquarters district, Karadzic can only be served "with the
consent of and under conditions approved by the Secretary-General." United Nations
Headquarters Agreement, 22 U.S.C. § 287, art. I, § 9 (1988). Such consent has not
been given for service of process on Karadzic. In addition, Karadzic might be able to
argue that his presence in New York is similar to that of a witnesses entering a
state from another jurisdiction to testify at a trial. Under such circumstances, wit-
nesses are immune from service of process. 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1076 (1987); see also Stewart v.
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916) (suitors and witnesses coming from another state
or jurisdiction cannot be served with civil process while in court and "during a rea-
sonable time coming and going").
61. Reportedly, Karadzic's bodyguards have prevented direct service of process in
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adequate alternative forum?' Have the plaintiffs exhausted their
available, alternative remedies?. Can the suit be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6) for lack of a cause of action?"
Will Karadzic be immune under a theory of official immunity?" Un-
Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93-1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 2, 1993). Damaska Interview,
supra note 39.
62. In determining whether to dismiss a suit on the basis of forum non conveni-
ens, the district court enjoys a high level of discretion in considering whether an
alternative forum exists; whether the plaintiffs choice of forum deserves deference;
and the private and public interests involved. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 255-61 (1982); see also In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). There is no presumption in favor of the choice of forum of
an alien plaintiff. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256. However, "if the remedy pro-
vided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is
no remedy at all . .. the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in
the interests of justice." Id. at 254 (emphasis added); see also Jeffrey M. Blum &
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims:
The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT. L.J. 53, 104
(1981) (issue of forum non conveniens will consistently arise in § 1350 cases due to
expense of obtaining witnesses and evidence, unavailability of compulsory process,
and involvement of law of foreign state).
63. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 requires the claimant to exhaust
his or her "adequate and available" remedies in the place where the alleged acts
occurred. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, § 2(b) (1992). The court may be per-
suaded that no adequate remedies are available to victims of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina because their country is currently engaged in war.
64. In Trajano v. Marcos, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the Alien Tort Statute confers jurisdiction but provides no cause of action. 978
F.2d 493, 503 n.22 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (§ 1350 does not supply a cause
of action). Although the Trajano court also confirmed the theory that a private right
of action cannot be implied from a non-self-executing treaty, it found a cause of
action under municipal tort law for torture. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 503; see
also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) (non-self-executing treaties do
not create privately enforceable rights). But see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Trea-
ties, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 760 (1988) (distinction between non-self-executing and self-
executing treaties patently inconsistent with express language of Constitution).
To sustain a claim for torture, plaintiffs must show that Karadzic acted under
official authority or under color of such authority. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95
(Edwards, J., concurring). Paradoxically, if Karadzic can demonstrate that he was
acting in his official capacity as an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state, he
may be immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Chuidian v. Phil-
ippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1991); infra notes 65 and 69.
65. Although the executive branch has stated that it will not accord Karadzic
immunity on a discretionary basis, it has not ruled out the possibility that either a
treaty or customary international law will confer immunity on Karadzic. Bradtke
Letter, supra note 59; cf Lafontante v. Aristide, Civ. No. 93-4268 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(defendant absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts because U.S.
government recognizes him as official head-of-state of Haiti and immunity has not
been waived by statute or by Haiti). In Chuidian v. Phillipine National Bank, the
government expressed the view that an individual acting in his official capacity as
an employee of a foreign sovereign would be entitled to immunity under general
principles of sovereign immunity. 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990).
According to the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, privileges and immunities
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der the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' ("FSIA"), do the Federal
Republic and Serbian Bosnia constitute foreign states?" Can
Karadzic claim that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply to Serbian
Bosnia? Can Karadzic claim to be an "agent or instrumentality" of
the Federal Republic? Can a waiver of immunity for Karadzic be im-
plied if the Federal Republic is silent?" Under the Act of State Doc-
must be extended to representatives of U.N. members not recognized by the U.S. if
they are within the headquarters district or in transit between the district and their
residences or offices. 22 U.S.C. § 287, art. V, § 15(4) (1992). The question is whether
Karadzic qualifies as a representative of a U.N. member.
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988). The FSIA provides foreign states with
blanket immunity subject to specified exceptions. Id. § 1604. The FSIA is the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts. Argentine Repub-
lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
67. Under international law, qualification as a nation-state requires a people, a
definite territorial unit, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with
other states. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). Karadzic is currently negotiating in the United
Nations as the representative of the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs have an 82-
member parliament composed of 'ardent nationalists, militia leaders and local politi-
cal bosses." Stephen Kinzer, Bosnia's Serbs Weigh a Familiar Choice, N.Y TIMES,
May 5, 1993, at A17.
68. As the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic may be able to claim that he
is implementing the policies of a non-state organization and thus does not fall with-
in the jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (alien tort statute does not cover torture by non-state actors such as the
PLO); see generally Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute
and a Recommendation, N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL 473, 503-507 (1986) (analyzing
PLO's legal personality).
69. Agents or instrumentalities of foreign states are immune under the FSIA. 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1993). The Ninth Circuit has held that individuals acting in their
official capacity may qualify as "agents or instrumentalities.* See Chuidian v. Philip-
pine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); see also First National Citibank
v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (presumption
that foreign sovereign is distinct from its instrumentalities may be overcome either
by principal/agent relationship or if allowing distinction would work fraud or injus-
tice).
70. If a foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity, the FSIA
does not bar prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1) (1993). In cases involving a crime like
systematic rape, when states have an interest in denying that an actor was acting
as an agent of their government, an explicit waiver is less likely. See Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 62, at 106. The Federal Republic has publicly attempted to
distance itself from the conflict in Bosnia. See Stephen Kinzer, Belgrade Denounces
Sanctions; Calls for Meeting, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at A7 (statement by
Yugoslavia's deputy U.N. representative that 'Yugoslavia is not a party to the con-
flict in Bosnia-Herzegovina'). However, unless the Federal Republic explicitly waives
immunity, it may be difficult for the court to find an implied waiver. Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 722 (9th Cir. 1992) (direct connection
between sovereign's activities in U.S. courts and plaintiffs' claims for relief necessary
to support finding of implied waiver), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3682 (1993). But see
Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA. A Proposed Ex-
ception to Immunity for Violations of Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV.
365 (1989) (violation of international law by foreign state should be viewed as im-
plied waiver).
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trine, should the Federal Republic and Serbian Bosnia be considered
as recognized foreign sovereigns?"1 Will the Federal Republic claim
immunity for Karadzic on the basis of the Act of State Doctrine?'
Does Karadzic have any assets in the United States? Can the court at-
tach the assets of the Federal Republic?" And finally, if judgment
were entered against Karadzic, would it be enforceable?7'
Even if the victims of rape successfully clear all these hurdles - a
remote prospect, at best - they would still be unlikely to actually
receive monetary compensation. Few defendants have substantial mon-
etary assets in the United States, and even fewer would come to the
United States and deposit funds in American banks knowing the at-
tachment power of a court order. Thus, the victims are unlikely to re-
ceive restitution."'
A monetary judgment entered against the perpetrators of rape
would have the positive effects of affirmatively enunciating a legal
norm and would dramatically restrict the ability of the defendants to
71. The Act of State Doctrine allows courts to declare a case nonjusticiable if it
involves an examination of the validity of an action taken by a foreign sovereign,
recognized by the United States, in the absence of a treaty or other controlling legal
principle. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see
also W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)
('Act of State Doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies
that may embarrass foreign' governments, but merely requires that, in the process of
deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns within their own jurisdictions shall be
deemed valid.*). The intricacies surrounding the question whether the Federal Re-
public is a recognized foreign sovereign are reflected in its current United Nations
status. See Section I, supra.
72. Karadzic may be able to rely on the Act of State Doctrine by claiming that
the rapes that occurred under his orders were part of the Serbian policy of "ethnic
cleansing." See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (unlawful detention
and torture by Saudi government are sovereign activities and thus immune from
jurisdiction); Andrew M. Scoble, Comment, Enforcing the Customary International
Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 CAL. L REV. 127, 174 (1986) (police
chief who follows express governmental policy of torturing prisoners may be able to
plead Act of State defense if his nation is willing to claim it for him); see also
Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 461, 492 (1989) (Act of State Doctrine applies if defen-
dant official can establish direct chain of command authorizing his acts).
73. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1988) (property of foreign state in United States
immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, unless state has
waived immunity from attachment or certain commercial exceptions to immunity
apply).
74. In order to enforce a judgment, a separate proceeding must be brought to
obtain a writ of execution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). Such a proceeding would give the
court an opportunity to grant Karadzic relief from judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(bX4) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
75. But see Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ.
2347, 2368 (1991) (many plaintiffs have expressed satisfaction simply to have won
default judgments announcing that defendant transgressed universally recognized
norms of international law).
1994
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
visit the United States."5 However, the attenuated possibility of such
a judgment, even with its accompanying restrictions on residence in
the United States, would not provide a sufficient deterrent to potential
perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, perpetra-
tors of genocidal rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot face criminal
prosecution in the United States." Finally, even if the U.S. courts
created a legal norm qualifying rape as genocide, legal fora in other
nations would not necessarily follow the U.S. precedent.
C. The Courts of Other States
According to the principle of universal jurisdiction, a state may
assert jurisdiction over a person within the state's territorial jurisdic-
tion if he is accused of certain violations of the law of nations." These
violations include genocide and war crimes."' Furthermore, the Con-
vention Against Torture requires any state party to either extradite
such alleged offenders to a state party that has jurisdiction under the
territoriality, nationality, or passive personality principles, or to itself
76. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, CRY OF THE OPPRESSED: THE HISTORY AND HOPE OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION 56 (1987) (those charged as torturers or their ac-
complices would be reluctant to travel or acquire personal assets because of damages
assessed against them).
77. To implement the Genocide Convention, the U.S. enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1091,
which makes genocide criminal when committed within the United States or by a
United States national. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1988). As a result, the statute would
not reach aliens accused of committing genocide outside the United States.
78. See Bernhard Graefarth, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an Internation-
al Criminal Court, 1 EUM J. INTL L. 67, 72 (1990) (noting increased international
recognition that offenses against peace and security of mankind are punishable even
when not treated as crimes under national law).
79. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987). Even if the
state is not a party to the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice
has declared in an advisory opinion that "the principles underlying the Convention
are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even
without any conventional obligation.' Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28). But see WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 264 (little basis in customary interna-
tional law for extension of universal principle to crimes of genocide).
Any party to the Fourth Geneva Convention has an obligation to prosecute
any offense that qualifies as a grave breach of that Convention. See supra text ac-
companying notes 34-36; see also WOETMEL, supra note 9, at 262 (Geneva Convention
of 1949 established universal principle of jurisdiction for ordinary war crimes); Ken-
neth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX L. REV.
785, 817 (1988). The 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states that
grave breaches shall be regarded as war crimes. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 85(5), reprinted in 72 Am. J. INTL L. 457,
496 (1978).
For a discussion of why rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a grave
breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and thus a war crime, see infra notes 168-
70 and accompanying text.
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take jurisdiction over the alleged offender.' The Convention Against
Torture, which would cover many of the rapes in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, defines torture as
[any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as... intimidating or coercing him or a third person... inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."1
Therefore, any state may prosecute perpetrators of rape who venture
within its borders when the rape qualifies as either genocide, a war
crime, or official torture. Indeed, if the rape constitutes official torture,
the state must either extradite or prosecute the alleged perpetrator.
The general unwillingness to exercise universal jurisdiction re-
mains the primary problem with relying on other states to prosecute
the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' States rarely
intercede on behalf of individuals absent a link such as nationality.'
Furthermore, a judgment reached under the principle of universal ju-
risdiction elicits two criticisms: (1) national bias and (2) imposition of a
different degree of punishment than another state might have admin-
istered." For example, whereas an individual convicted by a United
States jury of rape resulting in murder might receive a sentence of
death by lethal injection, many countries have refused to institute the
death penalty in similar situations.
D. International Court of Justice
Currently, the International Court of Justice ("I.C.J." or "World
Court") provides the only international tribunal open to the victims of
rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' According to Article 36 of the I.C.J.
Statute, the Court's jurisdiction extends to all cases the parties refer to
it and to "all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.' The I.C.J., how-
80. Convention Against Torture, supra note 33, at art. 5(1) & art. 8.
81. Id. art. 2.
82. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 reporter's note 1
(1987) (genocide and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, but apparently
no state has ever exercised such jurisdiction); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Ac-
counts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE
L.J. 2537, 2560 (1991) (The willingness of states to prosecute human rights viola-
tions committed outside their territory has dissipated.).
83. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703(a) reporters' note
4 (1987).
84. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 85.
85. Although the Security Council has passed a resolution mandating the cre-
ation of an international war crimes tribunal, and has approved its statute, the
establishment of such a tribunal is in the germinative stage. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 104-107.
86. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1) reprinted in 39 AM.
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ever, "has failed to provide a meaningful forum... for enunciating
international human rights norms or curbing national misconduct." 7
For the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the I.C.J.'s primary
defects stem from its jurisdictional limitations. Because only states
may bring claims before the I.C.J.,M rape victims must persuade
Bosnia and Herzegovina to espouse their claims as an essential prereq-
uisite to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. Even more important, the
I.C.J. can only hold states, and not individual defendants, accountable
for crimes within its jurisdiction.
On March 20, 1993, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed
an application with the World Court instituting proceedings against
the Federal Republic. The application alleged violations of the Geno-
cide Convention and specifically refered to rape as "part of a calculated
plan of destruction of the Muslim people in Bosnia.' The I.C.J. re-
sponded on April 8, 1993 with provisional measures ordering the Fed-
eral Republic to "immediately... take all measures within its power
to prevent commission of the crime of genocide."' The Court based its
prima facie jurisdiction on Article IX of the Genocide Convention '
and will render a judgment on the merits after the parties fully brief
and argue the case.
The victims of rape overcame the first obstacle to relief in the
World Court when Bosnia and Herzegovina espoused their claims.'
However, Bosnia based its application to the I.C.J. solely on the Geno-
cide Convention. Thus, if the rapes constitute war crimes, but not
genocide, the victims will not receive compensation. ' In any event,
the Court may dismiss the case for lack of standing. Two key uncer-
tainties plague the legal position of the Republic of Bosnia and
J. INTL L. 215, 222 (1945 Supp.) [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. In addition, any nation
that has accepted the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. can make a claim for a violation of
customary international law provided that the opposing party has also submitted to
the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. with respect to that conduct. Id. art. 36(2), at 222-23.
87. Koh, supra note 75, at 2360; see generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Human
Rights in the World Court, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 945 (1991) (discussing cases
in which I.C.J. has treated human rights questions).
88. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 86, at 222.
89. Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14, at 14.
90. I.C.J. Order, supra note 12, at 24.
91. Id. at 13. Article IX provides that "[dlisputes between the Contracting Par-
ties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Conven-
tion, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide .. . shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the state
parties to the dispute.' Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at 282.
92. See Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14.
93. Telephone Interview with Keith Hyatt, Attorney, May 6, 1993 (noting terrible
problems associated with proving a policy of genocide); see generally Herst Hannum,
International Law and Cambodian Genocide: the Sound of Silence, 11 HUM. RTS. Q.
82, 94-112 (1989) (explaining why deliberate killings and destruction by Khmer
Rouge constitute genocide within meaning of Genocide Convention).
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Herzegovina and the Federal Republic as successor states to the for-
mer Yugoslavia. First, have the republics succeeded to the obligations
of the Genocide Convention?" Second, do both republics qualify as
states?
Only states can stand as parties to cases before the I.C.J.' In
addition, states that are not parties to the Statute usually may not
avail upon the Court." Even if the case goes to the merits, however,
the I.C.J. tends to deliver its judgments very slowly. All briefs are read
aloud, word-for-word, in the different languages of the parties. Then,
the judges take an extremely long time to write their opinions. Fur-
ther, the World Court does not rely on precedent, so it must approach
each case completely afresh. Finally, even if the Court enters a judg-
ment, it will not target the particular perpetrators of rape but will
instead sanction the Federal Republic as a whole. Any compensation
will, at least initially, go to the national coffers of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, rather than to the individual victims.
The negligible effect of the I.C.J.'s provisional measures in the
Bosnia case demonstrates another problem with the I.C.J.: noncompli-
ance.' If a state objects to the World Court's exercise of jurisdiction,
it will usually refuse to appear or to comply with the judgment ren-
dered," and though the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council
to enforce I.C.J. judgments, the Council has never done so." Security
Council action is especially unlikely with respect to proceedings arising
out of the conflict in Bosnia due to Russia's ties to the Federal Repub-
lic."°  Given these impediments to enforcement, Bosnia and
Herzegovina will likely never obtain monetary reparations from the
Federal Republic, and the victims may never receive restitution.
94. For an explanation of why this question should be answered in the affirma-
tive, see Section I, supra.
95. 1.C.J. Statute, supra note 86, at 222.
96. But see id. at 223 (noting the conditions under which states that are not
parties may access the I.C.J.).
97. No change in the policy of "ethnic cleansing" has been reported since the
I.C.J. ordered the Federal Republic to take all necessary measures to prevent geno-
cide. Similarly, Iran ignored the I.C.J.'s order to release immediately the American
hostages held in Tehran. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Tehran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
98. Richard B. Bilder, Lecture: The United States and the World Court in the
Post-'Cold War" Era, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 251, 258 (1991).
99. Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, art. 94(2), reprinted in
39 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 210 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter] (if a party to a
case fails to perform obligations required by a judgment rendered by the I.C.J., the
other party may have recourse to Security Council). The United States vetoed a
Security Council resolution calling it to comply with the judgment in the Nicaragua
case. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See Bilder, supra note 98, at 255.
100. I.C.J. Order, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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In sum, the domestic fora currently available to victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffer from either nationalistic prejudice or
various procedural obstacles making judgment on the merits unlikely.
Of the nine characteristics necessary for an effective forum,"1
Bosnian courts suffer especially in terms of partiality. While more im-
partial, U.S. courts are unlikely to reach judgment on the merits, and
their judgments are not enforceable. Monetary judgments may restrict
perpetrators' opportunities to live in the United States but will not
restrain the personal liberty of the perpetrators. Moreover, norms
issued by domestic fora do not bind other countries; a decision issued
by a U.S. court, for example, has no precedential value in Bosnia.
The inadequacies of the domestic fora leave the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina with an international tribunal, the I.C.J.
However, the I.C.J. does not allow individual access to prosecution,
and its judgments are not timely or enforceable. Therefore, the time
has come for a new international tribunal, which can better fulfill the
nine criteria for an effective forum. The only remaining question is
whether the new forum should take the form of an ad hoc or a perma-
nent international court. Section III discusses the merits of an ad hoc
war crimes tribunal, and Section IV evaluates the proposals for a per-
manent international criminal court.
III. ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC WAR CRIMES TRrBUNAL
A war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia has many advantages over the fora currently
available to the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prosecut-
ing the perpetrators of rape in an international arena increases the
likelihood of impartial trials and potentially provides the victims with
a forum able to respond to their claims. Establishment of a war crimes
tribunal must occur as soon as possible. If a tribunal quickly prose-
cutes those responsible, it may deter future atrocities.' In addition,
it will reassure victims that the international community will hear
them and not forget them."°
Progress toward the establishment of a war crimes tribunal has
already begun. On February 22, 1993, the Security Council unani-
mously adopted Resolution 808, stating "that an international tribunal
shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
101. The following nine criteria were enumerated at the beginning of this article:
(1) individual access to prosecution; (2) impartiality; (3) decisions based on law; (4)
depoliticization; (5) precedential value of judgments; (6) likelihood of resolution on
the merits; (7) enforceability of judgments; (8) timeliness; and (9) flexibility of proce-
dures.
102. See French Proposal, supra note 38, at 5.
103. Id.
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ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."'°4 In accordance with
Resolution 808, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the me-
chanics and implementation of such a tribunal to the Security Council
("S.G.'s Report"). ° On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unani-
mously voted in favor of Resolution 827, which approves the S.G.'s
Report and adopts its annex, the "Statute of the International Tribu-
nal.""° Although the vote was unanimous, several members of the
Security Council expressed "understandings" of specific articles of the
Statute."°7 These understandings affect any interpretation of the
Statute.
The S.G.'s Report concludes that, because of time pressure, the
Security Council and not an international treaty should establish the
war crimes tribunal."° In accordance with the Secretary-General's
recommendations, Resolution 827 acts under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations ("U.N. Charter")' to formally create the
tribunal. By establishing the tribunal under Chapter VII, the Security
Council can take enforcement measures against member states that
hinder the tribunal's work.
Previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council will facilitate
the investigative work of the war crimes tribunal. In August 1992,
Resolution 771 called for an end to the breaches of international hu-
manitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and requested states, inter-
national humanitarian organizations, and the Secretary-General to
collate substantiated information on such violations." Two months
later, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to estab-
lish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the
information gathered."' Based on the first interim report of the Com-
mission of Experts, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali concluded that
"grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law
have been committed, including ... rape." 2 The Secretary-General's
explicit reference to rape as a grave breach provides hope of prosecu-
tion of the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the
104. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) (emphasis added).
105. See S.G. Report, supra note 28.
106. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res.
827].
107. See generally Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hun-
dred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. SCOR S/PV.3217, at 16-17 (May 25, 1933) here-
inafter Meeting 3217].
108. S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 7-8.
109. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, at 199-202. Chapter VII gives the Security
Council the power to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security once it has determined the existence of any threat of the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression.
110. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
111. S.C. Res. 789, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/789 (1992).
112. S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 1.
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war crimes tribunal."'
This section begins with a discussion of the Report of the Secre-
tary-General, which covers three principal topics: (1) the mechanics of
the tribunal, including procedural protections for defendants; (2) the
theory of individual liability for defendants brought before the tribu-
nal; and (3) the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction. The manner in
which the S.G.'s Report addresses these three topics has important
ramifications on the effectiveness of the tribunal with regard to the
victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, lessons lie in
the only precedents for an international war crimes tribunal, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. This section concludes, however, that
while the war crimes tribunal takes a step in the right direction, as an
ad hoc body it possesses inherent defects that a permanent interna-
tional criminal court would ameliorate.
A. The Mechanics of the War Crimes Tribunal
According to the Statute of the International Tribunal (the "Stat-
ute"), the war crimes tribunal will sit at the Hague"" and will consist
of eleven independent judges, six of whom will sit in two Trial Cham-
bers with three members each, and five of whom will serve in the Ap-
peals Chamber.1 5 In September, 1993, the General Assembly select-
ed the eleven judges from a list prepared by the Security Council.1
No two of the judges may be nationals of the same state,"' and the
list must take account of the adequate representation of the major
legal systems of the world.'18 The Secretary-General invited both
U.N. member states and non-member states maintaining permanent
observer missions at U.N. headquarters"1 to nominate two candi-
dates, but the nominees could not be of the same nationality.' The
judges will serve renewable four-year terms"l and will elect a Presi-
dent, who will be a member of the Appeals Chamber.' The eleven
judges began drafting the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence in
November 1993.'
113. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
114. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 31, at 47; cf. S.C. Res. 827, supra
note 106, at 2 (determination of seat of war crimes tribunal subject to conclusion of
appropriate arrangements between the United Nations and the Netherlands).
115. See id., supra note 28, Annex, art. 12, at 40.
116. Id. art. 13(2Xd), at 41. The judges are nationals of Costa Rica, Canada, Ita-
ly, Egypt, China, France, Malaysia, Pakistan, Australia, Nigeria, and the United
States. See Julia Preston, U.N. Elects 11 Judges for War Crimes Court, WASH. POsT,
Sept. 18, 1993, at A15.
117. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 12, at 40.
118. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xc), at 41.
119. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xa), at 41.
120. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xb), at 41.
121. Id. Annex, art. 13(4), at 41.
122. Id. Annex, art. 14(1) & (2), at 41.
123. Paul Lewis, Somalia and Bosnia; Justice U.N.-Style Moves Onward, Half.
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The Security Council will appoint an independent Prosecutor to
perform the investigatory and prosecutorial tasks of the tribunal.'
The Prosecutor can recommend necessary subordinates for appoint-
ment by the Secretary-General.'2 Victims of rape may bring their
claims to the attention of the Prosecutor, whose powers include inves-
tigating allegations, questioning suspects and victims, examining wit-
nesses, requesting arrest warrants, issuing indictments, and prosecut-
ing individuals.'
According to the Statute, the Prosecutor may issue an indictment
once he or she determines that a prima facie case exists." One of
the judges of the Trial Chamber reviews and confirms the indictment
before the Trial Chamber can issue orders for the arrest, detention,
surrender, or transfer of the accused.us The Statute obligates states
to attempt to arrest, detain, and transfer the accused to the custody of
the tribunal.'2 Because orders for the surrender or transfer of an ac-
cused are "considered to be the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,"' the Secu-
rity Council may take appropriate action, whether in the form of pro-
visional measures, economic sanctions, or armed force, to ensure coop-
eration in the extradition of suspects to the tribunal. States must also
provide assistance to the Prosecutor and Trial Chamber with respect
to, inter alia, the identification and location of persons, the production
of evidence, and service of court documents. 1
Once arrested and taken into custody, the accused has the right to
immediate information, in a language he understands, of the nature
and cause of the charge against him.' As soon as the accused is be-
fore the Trial Chamber,' the Trial Chamber must read the indict-
ment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are being respected,
confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and instruct the
Heartedly, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1993, § 4, at 2.
124. The Security Council unanimously appointed Venezuela's Attorney General,
Ramon Escovar-Salom, to be the Chief Prosecutor on October 21, 1993, but he re-
signed in early February 1994, to take a post as minister of justice in his own coun-
try. Chief Prosecutor for War-Crimes Tribunal Abandons His Post, THE GAZETTE
(MONTREAL), Feb. 4, 1994, at A7. A new Chief Prosecutor has yet to be appointed.
125. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 16(4) & 16(5), at 42.
126. Id. Annex, art. 16(1), at 42; Annex, art. 18(2), at 43.
127. Id. Annex, art. 18(4), at 43. According to the U.S. Representative to the
U.N., the existence of a prima facie case means a "reasonable basis to believe" that
a crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal has been committed by the person
named in the indictment. See Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 16-17.
128. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 19, at 43.
129. Id. Annex, art. 29, at 47.
130. Id. Annex, art. 28, at 31.
131. Id. Annex, art. 18(2), at 43; Annex, art. 29, at 47.
132. Id. Annex, art. 20(2), at 44.
133. Trials in absentia are prohibited. Id. Annex, art. 21(4Xd), at 44.
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accused to enter a plea.' Although the Statute presumes the ac-
cused innocent until proven guilty and may not compel him to testify
against himself or to confess,' it does not provide any standard of
proof at trial. The accused has a right to the services of an interpreter,
to have enough time to prepare a defense, to examine the witnesses
against him, and to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf.' An in-
digent defendant must be provided with legal assistance."7 When a
national court has already tried an individual, the Trial Chamber can
exercise jurisdiction provided that either the national court character-
ized the act as an ordinary crime, or the crime was not diligently pros-
ecuted before an impartial tribunal."M
Judgment of the accused requires a majority vote of the Trial
Chamber,8 and opinions must be in writing."4 If the Trial Cham-
ber convicts the accused and orders incarceration, it chooses the place
of imprisonment from a list of states that have volunteered .to imprison
those convicted."" In determining the length of imprisonment, the
Trial Chamber must consider the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia."' The Trial Cham-
ber must also take into account the extent to which any penalty im-
posed on the convicted individual by a national court for the same act
has already been served." The Statute opposes the use of the death
penalty.' "
Once convicted, an individual can appeal on the following
grounds: "(a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or
(b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.""
In addition, if a new fact comes to light that would have been a deci-
sive factor in reaching the judgment, but was not discovered at the
time of the proceedings before either the Trial or Appeals Chamber,
the convicted person may submit an application for review of the judg-
ment to the tribunal.'" If, pursuant to the law of the state of incar-
ceration of the convicted person, he is eligible for pardon or commuta-
tion of sentence, the state concerned shall notify the tribunal, and the
President of the tribunal will "decide the matter on the basis of the
134. Id. Annex, art. 20(3), at 44.
135. Id. Annex, art. 21, at 44.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Annex, art. 10(2), at 40.
139. Id. Annex, art. 23(2), at 45.
140. Id.
141. Id. Annex, art. 27, at 46.
142. Id. Annex, art. 24(1), at 45.
143. Id. Annex, art. 10(3), at 40.
144. Id. Annex, art. 24(1), at 45.
145. Id. Annex, art. 25(1), at 46.
146. Id. Annex, art. 26, at 46.
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interests of justice and the general principles of law."" '
B. Theories of Individual Liability
Mirroring the charter that established the Nuremberg Tribunal
(the "Nuremberg Charter"), the Statute of the International Tribunal
states that an individual acting under orders from his superiors is not
thereby free of responsibility for a crime; rather, acting under orders
can be a mitigating factor in sentencing.'8 However, the U.S. under-
standing of the Statute provides an additional defense to prosecution,
allowing the offender to claim that "he or she did not know the orders
were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding
would not have known the orders to be unlawful.""" The Statute sub-
jects a military or political superior to individual liability if the illegal
acts were committed pursuant to his plan, instigation, or order."W
The superior also faces individual liability if he knew or should have
known of the violations and did not take necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent them or to punish the offenders.' Individual liabili-
ty for superiors extends up to and includes heads of state. 2 Finally,
those who aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution
of any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal are individually
responsible for such crimes.'"
Thus, if Karadzic issues a policy of systematic rape of Muslim
women and girls, the actual rapist, the commanders discharging the
order, and Karadzic himself are all subject to prosecution before the
war crimes tribunal. The Nuremberg Tribunal tried the Nazi
defendents on a similar basis. Although none of the eighteen convicted
at Nuremberg of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity person-
ally committed any crimes against individuals, the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal determined them guilty either of ordering the crimes or of being
aware of their commission and doing nothing to stop the offenders.'
Several defendants asserted a superior orders defense, but the
Nuremberg Tribunal generally did not consider the superior orders
defense a mitigating factor."6
147. See id. Annex, art. 28, at 46.
148. Compare 82 U.N.T.S. 284, art. 8, at 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]
with S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 7(4), at 39.
149. Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 16.
150. S.G. Report, aupra note 28, Annex, art. 7(1) at 38.
151. Id. Annex, art. 7(3), at 39.
152. Id. Annex, art. 7(2), at 39.
153. Id. Annex, art. 7(1), at 38.
154. See generally The Nuremberg Trial: 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 147-187 (1947) (de-
scribing charges and verdicts against Nuremberg defendants).
155. Id.
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C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the War Crimes Tribunal
The threshold issue for the victims of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is whether rape qualifies as a crime within the tribunal's
jurisdiction. The Statute of the International Tribunal provides the
tribunal with jurisdiction over individuals accused of the following
crimes: (1) crimes against humanity (defined as acts of murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, per-
secutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhu-
mane acts directed against any civilian population during an armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character); (2) genocide;
(3) violations of the laws and customs of war; and (4) grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 19 49 .'M The Statute limits jurisdiction to
crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.57
Therefore, the Statute explicitly states that when directed against
any civilian population during an armed conflict, rape qualifies as a
crime against humanity falling within the tribunal's jurisdiction.
France, the United States, and Russia expressed the understanding
that to constitute crimes against humanity, acts must be committed
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civil-
ian population for national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious rea-
sons." Most of the rapes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina meet
these conditions. The women and girls held in "rape camps" or de-
tained until they could no longer have abortions also have claims of
enslavement and imprisonment. In addition, any of the rapes commit-
ted against Bosnian Muslims that were part of a systematic ethnic or
religious attack qualify as genocide.'
Furthermore, rape is a violation of the laws and customs of war.
In modern times, the prohibition of rape in connection with war stems
from the "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field" ("Lieber's Code"), promulgated in 1863."w The
1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War and the
1907 Hague Regulations, while not specifically mentioning women,
require that "family honour and rights.., must be protected."''
156. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, arts. 2-5, at 36-38 (emphasis added).
157. Id. Annex, art. 1, at 36.
158. See Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 11, 16, 45.
159. See Section I, supra.
160. See Theodore Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86
AM. J. INTL L. 1, 30 (1992); see also YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANi, DIGNrrY AND HONOuR
OF WOMEN AS BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982) (Lieber's Code
declared all rape by American soldiers to be prohibited under penalty of death or
other severe punishment).
161. Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague 11), July 29, 1899, art. 46, re-
printed in 1 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 247, 260 (1968); 1907 Regulations
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Surely rape qualifies as a violation of "family honour."'" After World
War I, the commission created by the Paris Peace Conference to report
on breaches of the laws and customs of war prepared a list of war
crimes that included both rape and the "abduction of girls and women
for the purpose of enforced prostitution."'" At Nuremberg, although
rape was not specifically charged in the indictment of the major war
criminals,' the prosecutors used captured German documents evi-
dencing the routine use of rape as part of the case against some defen-
dants." By the end of World War II, rape was already established as
a violation of the laws and customs of war.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Fourth Geneva Convention
codified the law on the treatment of civilians in war, including women.
Instead of confining itself to a declaration of customary international
law, it "laid down new principles which [we]re to become part of that
law."'" The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to any
international armed conflict,"8 7 and the jurisdiction of the war crimes
tribunal extends specifically to "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. The offenses that qualify as grave breaches include: "wil-
ful killing, torture or inhuman treatment... wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health... [or] unlawful confine-
ment." '" In the official commentary on the Fourth Geneva Conven-
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, reprinted
in BEVANS, supra at 651.
162. See KHUSHALANI, supra note 160, at 10 (Article 46 of Hague Regulations is a
mandatory provision guaranteeing women protection against rape).
163. Id. at 12; see also Remigiusz Beirzenek, War Crimes: History and Definition,
in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 563 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved
P. Nanda eds., 1973) (rape is number five on commission's list of thirty-two offens-
es).
164. See N.F. Chistiakov, The Question of War Crimes at the Nuremberg Tribunal,
in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (George Ginsburgs & V.N.
Kudriavtaev eds., 1990) (count one of indictment included "killing and cruel treat-
ment of the civilian population on occupied territory").
165. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 53; see also id. at 58-61 (General Iwane
Matsui was sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East for ordering the 1937 Rape of Nanking, during which approximately 20,000
cases of rape occurred in first month of occupation); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 24
(1946) (upholding decision by an American Military Court in Manilla to detain a
Japanese World War H military commander upon finding him responsible for wide-
spread acts of rape and other war crimes by his troops).
166. Joyce A. C. Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INTL
L. 294, 318-19 (1949).
167. Although Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that its provi-
sions apply to war between two or more of the contracting parties, the Convention is
considered to be declaratory of customary international law and thus binding on all
states, regardless of whether they are parties to it. See KHUSHALANI, supra note 160,
at 45, 60; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
168. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 147, at 388. Presumably,
those who claim that rape is not a grave breach would base their argument on the
absence of any explicit reference to rape in Article 147.
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tion, the International Committee of the Red Cross elaborated on the
meaning of the phrase "inhuman treatment," stating that the "sort of
treatment covered by [Article 27] would be one which ceased to be hu-
mane." 1 Article 27 declares that "[wiomen shall be especially pro-
tected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.""' 0 Therefore,
any rape that takes place in an international armed conflict is a "grave
breach" of the Geneva Convention.
Although this article argues that the war in the former Yugosla-
via qualifies as an international armed conflict,"' even if the war in
the former Yugoslavia is characterized as an internal conflict, Article 3
of the Fourth Geneva Convention prescribes a baseline code of conduct.
Article 3 requires that, even during internal armed conflicts, civilians
must be treated humanely and prohibits "cruel treatment and torture"
and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment.""' Thus, because Article 3 of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention, which qualifies as one of the international instruments
setting forth the "law of war,""' prohibits rape by soldiers in time of
an internal conflict, rape falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the war crimes tribunal.
D. Protecting the Victims of Rape: An Evaluation of the Statute
An evaluation of the Statute for the International Tribunal from
the perspective of the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina must
169. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: rV GENEVA
CONVENTION 598 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). The I.C.R.C. Commentary also explains
that "wilfully causing great suffering" can legitimately include moral suffering, and
that "unlawful confinement" is internment that is not absolutely necessary for the
belligerent's security. Id. at 599. Therefore, rapes of women and girls in Bosnia and
Herzegovina qualify as several different grave breaches.
170. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 27, at 306; see also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 76, reprinted in 72 AM. J. INTL L. 457, 492 (1978).
171. See Section I, supra.
172. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 3, at 288-89; see also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for sig-
nature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4(e), reprinted in 72 Am. J. Intl L. 457, 503-04 ("outrages
on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, en-
forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault" are prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever).
173. KHUSHALANI, supra note 160, at 40 citing J. PICTET, 3 COMMENTARY, GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960) (Article
3 binds insurgent forces not even in existence at time of signing by the contracting
parties). But see Raymond T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 396 (1952) (doubting legal efficacy of Article
3).
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examine the Statute's effectiveness at monetarily compensating the
victims and in punishing, and thus deterring, the perpetrators of rape.
As Catherine MacKinnon pointed out at the March 1993 Vancouver
Conference on the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, "the goal of
the tribunal is individual justice and holding perpetrators responsible,
and not the ends of states as such or of any state."'7 The tribunal is
likely to be effective only if it is accessible to individual victims, if
charges can be brought against the actual rapists as well as those who
ordered the rapes, and if there are adequate procedural protections
available to ameliorate the effects of resurrecting the victims' emotion-
al trauma.
For victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the most
important features of a war crimes tribunal is accessibility. To receive
compensation, victims must have access to the tribunal, which must be
equipped to calculate and distribute economic restitution. By requiring
the Prosecutor to initiate investigations on the "basis of information
obtained from any source,""" the Statute appears to allow individuals
to bring their claims to the tribunal. However, although the Statute
specifically refers to governments, U.N. organs, and intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations, it does not explicitly mention
individual rape victims, or their representatives, as a potential source
of information. Indeed, Resolution 827 specifies that the work of the
war crimes tribunal shall be "carried out without prejudice to the right
of victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for dam-
ages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian
law,"'7 thus implying an intent to exclude civil suits from the juris-
diction of the tribunal. For example, the Statute limits the penalties
available to the tribunal to imprisonment or to requiring the return of
"any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct."7
Due to its apparent preclusion of individual civil claims, the Stat-
ute should be amended to provide for victim compensation. Resolution
827 allows victims to seek compensation "through appropriate
means." 7 However, no fora are available to adequately compensate
victims. To conserve judicial resources, the Trial Chamber should adju-
dicate the appropriate level of compensation as well as guilt and in-
174. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rapporteur, Notes on Session on Victims, Expert's
Meeting, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 1.
175. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 18(1), at 43 (emphasis added).
176. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 106, at 2.
177. S.G. Report, asupra note 28, Annex, art. 24, at 46. But see Meeting 3217,
supra note 107, at 17 (expressing view of U.S. 'that compensation to victims by a
convicted person may be an appropriate part of decisions on sentencing, reduction of
sentences, parole or commutation*); i& at 28 (expressing view of Morocco that tribu-
nal "should not ignore appropriate compensation for victims and their families').
178. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 106, at 2.
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nocence. To enforce monetary judgments, the tribunal should call on
all participating states to assist in measures such as the attachment
and seizure of assets belonging to the defendant. If a state successfully
seizes assets in satisfaction of the judgment, the tribunal should facili-
tate the transfer and distribution of the money to the victims. Alterna-
tively, the United Nations could set up a compensation commission
similar to the one established for claims arising out of the Iraqi con-
flict.179
Moreover, the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence need to
guarantee the victims access to the tribunal."W The rules of proce-
dure should specifically state that the Prosecutor shall investigate
claims brought by individual victims where the crimes charged are
within the tribunal's jurisdiction. If the Prosecutor and the Trial
Chamber judge reviewing the indictment determine that the claims
have enough merit to warrant a trial, the victims and their legal coun-
sel should be permitted to assist in the prosecution and to suggest wit-
nesses of their own.
The theory of individual liability adopted by the war crimes tribu-
nal is crucial to the tribunal's deterrent effect. The Statute furnishes
the victims of rape with an arsenal adequate to bring charges against
individual offenders, the rapists' co-conspirators and superiors, and
through the chain of command to the person acting as head of state.
Because rape is illegal in the domestic laws of civilized nations, defen-
dants cannot rely on any exception for those who could not have rea-
sonably been expected to know that their act was unlawful. Holding
individuals criminally liable for their acts will help to deter potential
perpetrators at every level in the chain of command.
Finally, the victims of rape need special procedural
protections."8 ' The Statute requires that the tribunal provide for the
protection of victims and witnesses in its rules of procedure and evi-
dence"82 and specifies that the protections should include in camera
proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity.' In addition,
the Trial Chamber must ensure that trial proceedings are conducted
with an eye toward protecting victims and witnesses.1" The S.G.'s
179. For a discussion of the Iraqi claims mechanism, see infra note 359.
180. The Statute provides that the judges will adopt rules of procedure and evi-
dence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials, and appeals.
See S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 15, at 42.
181. The Vancouver Session on Victims suggested the following- protecting the
identities of the victims in the press; the option of in camera testimony; anonymous
witness testimony; victim impact statements taking into account at sentencing; and
allowing the victims to have their own lawyers participate in the proceedings.
MacKinnon, supra note 174, at 2-3.
182. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 15, at 42.
183. Id. Annex, art. 22, at 45.
184. Id. Annex, art. 20(1), at 44.
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Report emphasizes that "[gliven the nature of the crimes committed
and the sensitivities of the victims of rape and sexual assault, due
consideration should be given in the appointment of [prosecutorial]
staff to the employment of qualified women."' The statement of the
U.S. Representative regarding Resolution 827 goes even further, rec-
ommending that "women jurists sit on the Tribunal and that women
prosecutors bring war criminals to justice."'
E. Lessons from Nuremberg and Tokyo
As the only operational international war crimes tribunals in
history, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals provide valuable lessons
for the proposed war crimes tribunal. The Nuremberg Charter over-
came the disparities between the Continental and Anglo-American sys-
tems of criminal procedure, demonstrating that technical problems are
not insurmountable. m7 Although they are not without their critics,
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are generally regarded as a posi-
tive step forward in the enforcement of human rights.1 Neverthe-
less, the main criticisms of Nuremberg must be addressed.' Critics
of the Nuremberg trials label them as an egregious case of the victors
trying the vanquished in violation of the maxim nulla poena sine lege,
nullum crimen sine lege.1" Critics also attack the Nuremberg trials
for holding individuals criminally liable and failing to adequately pro-
tect defendants' rights. The first criticism does not apply to the pro-
posed war crimes tribunal in the former Yugoslavia, and, as proposed,
the war crimes tribunal would avoid the second and third criticisms.
The four "victorious powers" of World War II 5 established the
Nuremberg tribunal by a treaty with jurisdiction over individuals from
185. Id. at 22.
186. Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 14. Two of the eleven judges, those repre-
senting Costa Rica and the United States, are women.
187. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSON-
AL MEMOIR 63-64 (1992) (outlining compromises reached in the Nuremberg Charter);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 19-
20 (Summer 1992) [hereinafter AB.A Report].
188. In addition to granting the Nuremberg Tribunal jurisdiction over the human
rights violations embodied in "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," the
Nuremberg Charter allowed the prosecutors to charge the defendants with "crimes
against the peace," which were defined as instigating a war of aggression.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 148, art. 6, at 288. Because this article is concerned
with protecting the human rights of Bosnian women and girls, the questions sur-
rounding "crimes against the peace" are not analyzed here.
189. See generally WOErLEL, supra note 9, at 40-121; RICHARD H. MINEAR,
VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971); THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
190. This Latin phrase stands for the principle that neither punishments nor laws
should be applied retroactively; individuals should not be penalized for actions not
criminal at the time they were committed.
191. The United States, The Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom.
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the European Axis countries. Critics contend that the tribunal erred by
imposing judgments on individuals whose state, Germany, was not a
party to the treaty. Even Justice Jackson, the Chief American Prosecu-
tor, admitted in his opening statement before the Nuremberg tribunal
that "[ulnfortunately, the nature of the crimes is such that both prose-
cution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished
foes."' The process was particularly unfair because some Allied na-
tionals, who were equally guilty of war crimes, were never prosecut-
ed.19
The proposed war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can
be distinguished from the Nuremberg tribunal in two important ways.
First, it has the prior endorsement of the international community.'"
Second, the tribunal is an impartial body seeking to impose justice on
the victors as well as the vanquished. Serbian rapists of Muslim wom-
en and girls and Muslim rapists of Serbian women and girls would be
equally liable for their crimes, though it would be more difficult to
convict Muslim rapists of genocide than their Serbian counter-
parts.'
Selection of the defendents was one of the first tasks of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.'" An adamant critic of the Tokyo
trials argues that, for political reasons, the prosecutors conspicuously
omitted Emperor Hirohito, who was Japan's de jure sovereign and an
active decision-maker during the war.1' In addition, Telford Taylor
admits that the selection of defendants at Nuremberg was "hastily and
negligently discharged.""' Others claim that the procedural
protections outlined in the Nuremberg Charter were willfully violated
and that procedural irregularities were particularly egregious due to
the unavailability of appeal.1 "
Because choosing defendants will be a problem faced by the pro-
posed war crimes tribunal, the Prosecutor should decide the criteria for
192. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 168.
193. See WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 46.
194. Although nineteen members of the United Nations adhered to the Nuremberg
Charter, it was not until after the judgments were handed down that the interna-
tional community affirmed the principles of international law contained in the Char-
ter. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, GA. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sees., at 188, U.N. Doc.
A/236 (1947) [hereinafter Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles]; TAYLOR, supra note
187, at 628.
195. See Section I, supra.
196. For example, approximately 250 high Japanese officials were in custody be-
fore the Tokyo trial began, and the prosecution chose twenty-six. See MINEAR, supra
note 189, at 102.
197. Id. at 110-13.
198. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 90.
199. See Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 135 DUKE J. INVL & CoMP. L. 136, 138 & n.22 (1991).
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their selection in advance. Allowing the Prosecutor to formulate guide-
lines regarding who will be prosecuted will guard against the risk that
potential defendants might be granted amnesty as part of a peace set-
tlement. Political factors should not interfere with the impartial ad-
ministration of justice. However, the war crimes tribunal faces an even
greater problem: unlike the scenario after World War II, none of the
potential defendants is in custody. The potential difficulties involved in
obtaining custody of defendants creates a serious risk of violating the
rights of the defendants - namely, by physical abduction. The infa-
*mous kidnappings of Adolf Eichmann and Humberto Alvarez-
Machain by Israel and the United States, respectively, demon-
strate the potential for abuse. To prevent such abductions, the rules of
procedure adopted by the judges of the war crimes tribunal should
specify that jurisdiction extends only to individuals voluntarily trans-
ferred to the tribunal by the state in which they were located.
Once defendants are brought before the tribunal, the Prosecutor
and judges must ensure adherence to the procedural guarantees speci-
fied in the Statute. The Statute diligently safeguards the procedural
rights of defendants, guaranteeing counsel, an interpreter, a speedy
trial, enough time to prepare a defense, protection against self-in-
crimination, and a presumption of innocence. According to the Statute,
an individual cannot be arrested unless there is a prima facie basis to
believe that he committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the tribu-
nal. Thus, the Statute seeks to protect defendants against the
reputational effect of being tried erroneously. In addition, unlike the
Nuremberg Charter, the Statute of the tribunal provides an appeal
mechanism before judges uninvolved in the original trial.
One possible criticism of the Statute, however, is that it allows for
double jeopardy; the tribunal has jurisdiction over a defendant for
serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as war
crimes or genocide, even if he has already been tried by a national
court for an "ordinary" crime, such as rape, premised on the same
facts."1 Nevertheless, the tribunal can only try a defendant for the
same crime if the national trial was not diligently prosecuted before an
impartial tribunal. Moreover, even in the United States, where there is
a constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy,' a defendant
can be prosecuted by two different sovereigns if the laws of each sover-
eign allegedly have been broken.' Systematic rape during armed
200. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 251-52
and accompanying text.
201. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. (1OX2Xa), at 40 (person tried by
national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian
law may be tried by international tribunal only if act for which he was tried was
characterized as an ordinary crime).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.').
203. For example, the four Los Angeles police officers accused in the beating of
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conflict violates both national and international law.
Another criticism of the Nuremberg tribunal is that only states
bear responsibility under international law, and thus individual defen-
dants should never have been tried.' However, as eloquently ex-
pressed by Justice Jackson, "[cirimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced.' 0 Furthermore, since the principle of individual lia-
bility is now well established in international law,' the proposed
war crimes tribunal is free to try individual perpetrators of rape.
The Nuremberg Charter has been appropriately criticized for
failing to exempt an individual from liability if he followed orders and
did not know and had no basis for knowing that the act ordered was
unlawful.' This problem will be avoided if the tribunal adheres to
the U.S. understanding of the Statute allowing the defense of igno-
rance of unlawfulness. In any event, it will be more difficult to estab-
lish a chain of command for the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina than it was for the Nazis."
Finally, critics of the Nuremberg tribunal charge that it violated
the principle of nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege by
charging the defendants with crimes that were not clearly established
and therefore lacked precise definitions and penalties.' s In allowing
Rodney King, an African-American motorist, were brought to trial twice: once in Los
Angeles Superior Court on charges of assault, see Powell v. Superior Court of L.A.
County, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (Cal. 1991), and once in federal district court on
charges of deprivation of rights on the basis of race under color of law. See United
States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
204. WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 100.
205. Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, quoted in D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INTL & CoMr. L.Q.
445, 460-61 (1955).
206. See Elizabeth Zoller, Grounds for Responsibility in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 102, 106 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)
("Whether as a customary rule or as a general principle of law, the norm on individ-
ual criminal responsibility for international crimes is now unquestionably part of
substantive international law.').
207. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 630.
208. See Jeri Laber, Executive Director, Helsinki Watch, Address Before the New
York Bar Association (Apr. 7, 1993) (no hard evidence that order to rape comes from
above but clear that commanders do not discourage it); see also John F. Burns,
Balkan War Trial in Serious Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A9 (unlikely that
investigators will find paper trail linking leaders to actions taken by local command-
ers).
209. See M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND
DRAFt STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (1987). But see
WOEVLEL, supra note 9, at 116 (nulla poena principle intended to protect against
abuse of justice through retroactive law but without injustice there is no violation of
the principle).
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the prosecution of crimes against humanity, which included Nazi of-
fenses against German nationals, the Nuremberg trials "represented a
radical innovation in international law."1° Previously, international
law had not imposed criminal penalties on a state's treatment of its
own citizens. " Nevertheless, the magnitude of the acts alleged put
the defendants on notice that they violated "principles common to the
major legal systems of the world.""' In any case, it is now indisput-
able that crimes against humanity violate international law.
The primary source for the definition of crimes against humanity
is the Nuremberg Charter.s" The expansive definition in Article 6(c)
includes
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhu-
man acts committed against any civilian population, before or dur-
ing the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.2 .'
On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly fortified the definition
by unanimously approving Resolution 95(I), which affirmed "the princi-
ples of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."15 Resolution 95(I) re-
quested the International Law Commission to formulate these prin-
ciples, and the resulting "Nuremberg Principles" declared that crimes
against humanity are punishable as crimes under international law,
regardless of whether committed "before or during the war.""" Ac-
cording to Telford Taylor, one of the United States prosecutors at the
Nuremberg war crimes trials, "as a moral and legal statement, clothed
with judicial precedent and United Nations recognition, the
Nuremberg principles are an international legal force to be reckoned
with." " Since crimes against humanity are now part of the general
principles of international law recognized by civilized nations," the
210. Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 2555.
211. Id.
212. Report to the President from Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the Unit-
ed States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT% L.
178, 186 (Supp. 1945).
213. 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
214. Id. at 288.
215. Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, aupra note 194.
216. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 11,
U.N. Doc A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in WOETZEL,
supra note 9, at 233-34.
217. TAYLoR, supra note 187, at 4; see also WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 54-55
(U.N. endorsement of Nuremberg Principles constitutes tangible evidence that majori-
ty of nations at that time regarded them as valid principles of international law).
218. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 27; see also Quincy Wright, Proposal for an
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proposed war crimes tribunal does not run the risk of applying ex post
facto law.
F. The War Crimes Tribunal: A Step in the Right Direction
The proposed war crimes tribunal represents a positive step to-
ward bringing the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
justice, and it is not susceptible to the criticisms of Nuremberg and
Tokyo. Although skeptics focus on the difficulties in reaching a consen-
sus on the mechanical details of the tribunal, the problems with ob-
taining custody of the defendants, the difficulties with establishing a
chain of command, and the tribunal's potential interference with the
peace process, they underestimate the genuine intellectual and politi-
cal progress already made toward the tribunal. Moreover, because the
Statute requires states to arrest, detain, and transfer the accused to
the custody of the tribunal, those offenders who are indicted but not
transferred to the tribunal would be virtual prisoners within the few
states refusing to extradite them. Furthermore, the Security Council
may take enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
against those states refusing to relinquish custody over the accused.
Even in the worst-case scenario, assuming that the links in the chain
of command are too tenuous to support the prosecution of powerful
officials, the actual rapists would still be brought to justice.
With respect to the nine characteristics essential for an effective
forum,"'9 the war crimes tribunal represents a substantial improve-
ment over domestic fora. The tribunal will not be open to charges of
nationalistic prejudice, and it will provide a sense of regularity that
will help with the enunciation of legal norms. Provided that the tribu-
nal relies on its early judgments for precedential value, there is no
reason to assume it will suffer from the time delays associated with
the International Court of Justice. Because the tribunal's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is clearly delineated, its determinations of guilt or
innocence will be guided by the existing international laws, such as the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention.' Although
judicial opinions interpreting these laws are scarce at best, the
tribunal's opinions will develop such precedent. Once a defendant is in
custody, criminal judgments are more easily enforceable by any state
that has agreed to perform this task. Through the Security Council,
International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INL L 60, 71 (1952) (crimes against hu-
manity are subject to universal jurisdiction); 1 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATION-
AL CRI4NAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 77 (1980) (subsequent war
crimes trials reconfirmed that massive abuse by a state of its own citizens is a
matter of legitimate legal concern to all mankind).
219. See supra note 101.
220. See S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 8 (The Security Council will not legislate
international humanitarian law; the tribunal will apply existing international human-
itarian law).
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the international community could pressure states into assisting in the
collection of monetary judgments by seizing assets within a particular
state's jurisdiction. If properly amended, the Statute for the war crimes
tribunal would allow individual access to prosecution and would have
flexible procedures to allow victims of rape to testify or be deposed
anonymously in an intimate setting, rather than in public proceedings.
Nevertheless, the war crimes tribunal is susceptible to criticism
for being politicized and dominated by states whose nationals are not
subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction - none of the judges are from
either the Federal Republic or Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the.
tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991."8 A truly impartial court requires perma-
nence and prior establishment.' According to John Bridge,
[h]owever impartial and incorruptible members of an ad hoc tribu-
nal might in fact be, the mere fact that the tribunal had been set
up expressly to try crimes arising out of particular circumstances
would suggest, however unjustly, that the tribunal is not impartial,
that the matters to be tried have been prejudged and that the tri-
bunal has been set up to give a false impression that justice is
being done.'
As an ad hoc body, the war crimes tribunal could be accused of partial-
ity because it would dispense case-specific justice - ad hoc tribunals
are always vulnerable to the question "why now?" It is estimated that
between two and four hundred thousand women were raped in Bangla-
desh in 1971,224 yet no tribunal was established to try the Pakistani
soldiers who committed the rapes. Recently, it has been reported that
Peruvian soldiers routinely rape women and girls in the course of their
struggle with the Shining Path guerrillas, yet the war crimes tribunal
would not hear the claims of these victims.z
Finally, due to the combination of the inherent difficulties in ob-
taining custody over the defendants and the Statute's prohibition of
trials in absentia, the war crimes tribunal will suffer from one of the
defects of U.S. courts - it will not be likely to resolve cases on the
merits.2 However, the war crimes tribunal is more likely to reach
221. Alfred P. Rubin, Nothing's Less Simple than a War Crimes Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992, at A32.
222. See Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J.
INT'L L. 37, 58 (1950).
223. John W. Bridge, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and
the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 13 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 1255, 1271
(1964).
224. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 78; 2 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 65-66 (1980).
226. James Brooke, Rapists in Uniform: Peru Looks the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1993, at A4.
226. Karadzic has already declared that the Bosnian Serbs will not cooperate with
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the merits of a case than a U.S. court for two reasons. First, prosecu-
tion before the tribunal would not face the procedural obstacles block-
ing the path of plaintiffs in the United States. Second, there is a high-
er chance that defendants will eventually surrender to the jurisdiction
of the war crimes tribunal because they would be imprisoned in those
few states refusing to extradite them.
In sum, as an ad hoc body, the war crimes tribunal meets six of
the nine criteria for an effective forum: (1) individual access to
prosecution; (2) decisions based on law; (3) norm enunciation; (4) en-
forcement; (5) timeliness; and (6) flexible procedures. Therefore, an ad
hoc war crimes tribunal is better than none at all. However, it is not
the optimum. A permanent international criminal court would possess
all of the positive features of a war crimes tribunal, and it would also
be free of partiality and politicization and would be more likely to
resolve cases on the merits.
IV. THE TIME HAS COME FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
The international community should take advantage of the mo-
mentum generated by the proposed war crimes tribunal and seriously
consider creating a permanent international criminal court. The con-
sensus on the need to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia presents a unique opportunity for progress.
Although proposals for an international criminal court have languished
for years due to a lack of political will, support for the war crimes
tribunal in the former Yugoslavia should function as the catalyst for
an expanded mandate, and the tribunal should be structured in a way
that maximizes its translatable generic qualities so as to lay the foun-
dation for a more permanent body.
As a permanent body, the international court would be truly im-
partial.' In addition, its establishment would relieve the world com-
munity of criticism for selective adjudication. Moreover, an internation-
al criminal court is less open to reproach for politicization because its
statute would only allow states that have submitted to its jurisdiction
to appoint judges and prosecutors. Finally, a permanent international
court would be more likely to reach the merits of a particular case
because states should be more willing to extradite individuals to an
impartial permanent body than to a politicized ad hoc tribunal.
Whereas the war crimes tribunal meets six of the criteria for an effec-
tive forum, an international criminal court would fulfill all nine.
the war crimes tribunal. See MacNeil/Lehrer Newahour (PBS television broadcast,
May 26, 1993).
227. See Quincy Wright, The Scope of an International Criminal Law: A Concep-
tual Framework, 15 VA. J. INTL L 561, 574 (1975).
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A. Evaluating the Merits of an International Criminal Court
Recent support for a war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia breathes new life into the
fifty year-old debate over the merits of an international criminal court.
Historically, the political climate was the most receptive to the idea of
an international criminal court in the first few years following the
Nuremberg trials, during which the international community affirmed
that an international tribunal could try individual state officials for
violations of the human rights of their own subjects." In the decades
since Nuremberg, however, states have generally refrained from press-
ing human rights concerns with other nations for fear of jeopardizing
international relations.' Nevertheless, even before the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia, the problems of increasing worldwide terrorist
and drug-trafficking activity had rekindled interest in an international
criminal court."
1. Arguments in favor of an international criminal court
An international criminal court could consistently and uniformly
interpret and apply international criminal law," thus avoiding the
uncertainty of the present system. Currently, each state is obligated to
incorporate international criminal law norms into its domestic law.
The result has been "different normative proscriptions whose applica-
tions in the various legal systems are not always harmonious, let alone
identical."23 2 Furthermore, many state parties to international con-
ventions have not yet incorporated their international obligations into
domestic law.' By providing a centralized forum, the international
court could develop a body of precedent in international criminal law.
Primarily, however, an international court will "assure the punishment
of individuals for acts which world opinion regard[s] as peculiarly
destructive of international peace and order, peculiarly shocking to the
conscience of mankind, and peculiarly likely to escape punishment by
national authority.'
228. See generally Nuremberg Principles, supra note 216.
229. See Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 2558-59.
230. See H. Con. Res. 66, 101st Cong., lot Sess. (1989) (calling for creation of an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over terrorism, illicit international nar-
cotics trafficking, genocide, and torture); American Bar Association Section of Interna.
tional Law and Practice Report to the House of Delegates, August 3, 1990, reprinted
in 6 INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 284 (August 1990) (adopting resolution supporting
establishment of international criminal court with jurisdiction limited to violations of
U.N. Narcotics Convention); see also Scharf, supra note 199, at 140-44 (describing
events leading to growing sense of optimism about creation of international criminal
court).
231. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1264.
232. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 70.
233. Id.
234. Wright, supra note 218, at 63; see also Pella, supra note 222, at 44 (Without
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An international criminal court is especially necessary when (1)
government officials allegedly violate the human rights of their own
subjects; (2) a state with custody of a suspect accused of an interna-
tional crime is either unable or unwilling to prosecute the suspect
domestically or to extradite the individual to another state with juris-
diction; or (3) national courts cannot effectively deal with the interna-
tional crime charged. The systematic rape of women and girls by
Bosnian Serbs falls into all three of these categories.
The need for an international court to prosecute international
crimes committed by members of the government of a state against its
own citizens is demonstrated by the fact that, despite notorious cases
of genocide in the past fifty years, none has ever been prosecuted un-
der the Genocide Convention.' In effect, the Genocide Convention is
itself responsible for the dearth of adjudication because it leaves pri-
mary enforcement to municipal courts.' Such a solution is illusory;
states are either unwilling to indict their own leaders for carrying out
state policy"' or unable to prosecute them impartially.' Even
when the government accused of the crimes is no longer in power, the
successor government may either be unwilling to try former officials or
may need the legitimacy of an international trial. 9 Since the current
system of combatting genocide fails to deter state officials from com-
mitting acts of genocide against their own citizens, the threat of prose-
cution by an international court is necessary.
There are many circumstances in which a state with custody of a
suspect is unable or unwilling to prosecute or extradite the individual
but might be willing to cede jurisdiction to an international criminal
court.8 0 For example, the criminal justice system of a small state
might be overwhelmed by the magnitude of a particular offense, in
an international criminal court, the Nuremberg Principles "would be perverted for
purposes of disguising the mien of vengeance as the mask of justice").
235. Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal
Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.471 at 11 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Working
Group Report]; see also Robert-Louis Perret, Doctrinal Basis for International Penal
Jurisdiction, in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT 142, 143 (Julius Stone
& Robert K. Woetzel eds. 1970) [hereinafter TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL
COURT] (citing acts of genocide committed after adoption of Genocide Convention).
236. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. VI, at 280-81.
237. See Julius Stone, Range of Crimes for a Feasible International Jurisdiction,
in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at 315, 335.
238. See ANTOINE SoTTILE, THE PROBLEM OF THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL COURT 60 (1951) (National courts cannot be independent and impar-
tial when judging a head of state.).
239. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 11.
240. See State Department Programs and Policies: Hearings Before the Foreign
Operations Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (testimony of Secretary of State Warren Christopher) (international criminal
court attractive in situations where no country has authority or determination to go
ahead with prosecution).
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terms of the number of crimes committed." States with custody of a
national of another state are often reluctant to prosecute domestically
because of the potential diplomatic repercussions and the risk of alle-
gations of an unfair trial. " The state with custody hampers pros-
ecution when it does not have enough of an interest in the alleged
crime to try the offender and lacks an extradition treaty with a state
that does have enough interest to pursue a vigorous prosecution.
2 "
Currently, if a state fails to prosecute an alleged international criminal
either who lives within its boundaries or who is one of its nationals,
another state with an interest in the case may resort to self-help to
obtain jurisdiction over the alleged offender. The classic case of self-
help is Israel's 1960 abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentine terri-
tory for trial before the Israeli Supreme Court. The Security Council
condemned the abduction as potentially endangering international
peace and security," and critics have labelled the trial an act of ven-
geance.' Eichmann was tried by a court of a country that did not
even exist at the time the alleged acts were committed, outside the
territory where they took place, and was sentenced to death according
to the application of retroactive law.2' Even though the judges may
have performed their duties conscientiously, Eichmann's death may
have been a foregone conclusion without a fair trial. 7 An interna-
tional criminal court as an alternative forum might have prevented the
abduction and would have "provided a setting free from taint and prej-
udice."2'
The international criminal court provides a more impartial alter-
native for those states hesitating to extradite a suspect because of a
judicial bias in the courts of the requesting state. 9 For instance, an
international criminal court is sorely needed for the trial of the two
Libyan intelligence agents accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 and
a French airliner.' " Also, in light of the United States abductions of
241. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 11.
242. See John J. Parker, An International Criminal Court: the Case for its Adop-
tion, 38 A.BA J. 642 (1952).
243. See A.B.A Report, supra note 187, at 8.
244. Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 868th Meeting on June 23,
1960, U.N. SCOR, 868 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4349.
245. See WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 256.
246. Id. at 258.
247. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1270.
248. WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 256.
249. Michael J. Glennon, Agora: International Kidnapping: State-Sponsored Abduc-
tion: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L, 746, 755
(1992); see also A.B. Report, supra note 187, at 6 (noting argument that an inter-
national criminal court would facilitate prosecution of criminals in accordance with
fundamental principles of human rights).
250. A U.S. grand jury has indicted the two suspects, but Libya refuses to ex-
tradite them to either the United States, Britain, or France. In April 1992, the In-
ternational Court of Justice refused Libya's request to enjoin the United States and
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General Manuel Noriega and Humberto Alvarez-Machain," 1 some
Caribbean and Latin American countries fear that if they refuse to ex-
tradite alleged drug traffickers, the United States will engage in mil-
itary operations or abductions to obtain custody. 2 Surrendering the
alleged drug traffickers to an international criminal court would help
to dissuade the United States from future international kidnapping
activities.
In some cases, a fear of terrorist reprisals discourages a request-
ing state from extraditing fugitives.M Generally, the option of trans-
ferring the accused to an international criminal court would be more
palatable to the threatening state than subjecting their national to the
judicial system of an antagonistic state. Fortunately, this may make
terrorist retaliation less likely. Agreeing to transfer the suspect to an
international criminal court would mitigate the strain on the relations
between the state with custody, the suspect's home state, and the state
requesting extradition.' By providing an additional alternative fo-
rum, an international criminal court would show potential perpetrators
of international crimes that their actions will be punished.
For some crimes, like those charged at Nuremberg, an interna-
tional criminal court is the only competent adjudicatory organ avail-
able. Although the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates prosecution or
extradition of those who have committed "grave breaches of interna-
tional law,' the Convention suffers from "the fundamental defect of
Britain from taking action to compel it to surrender the accused. See Allan Gerson,
Compensate Libya's Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A23; Paul Lewis, Sanctions
on Libya Begin to Take Hold as Deadline Passes, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1992, at Al.
251. On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded Panama and captured
General Manuel Noriega, who was sentenced by a federal district court to a forty
year prison term for drug-trafficking charges. Larry Rohter, Noriega Sentenced to 40
Years in Jail on Drug Charges, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1992, §1 at 1. On April 2,
1990, Drug Enforcement Agency officials kidnapped Humberto Alvarez-Machain from
Mexico so that he could stand trial in U.S. court. The Supreme Court ruled that al-
though the abduction may have been contrary to international law, it did not divest
the district court of jurisdiction. United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
252. AB.A. Report, supra note 187, at 7-8.
253. For example, in two recent cases, countries have bowed to pressure and
refused to extradite terrorists to the United States for prosecution. In the first case,
the former West Germany refused to extradite the Palestinian terrorists who alleged-
ly hijacked Transworld Airlines Flight 847 in 1985 because members of a Palestinian
terrorist organization took two West German businessmen hostage in Beirut. The
second case involved a refusal by Greece to extradite a Palestinian terrorist accused
of planting a bomb on a Pan American airliner in 1982; the Palestine Liberation
Organization had warned the Greek government that extradition would harm their
relations. See generally Scharf, supra note 199, at 150-51.
254. See id. at 152-53 (noting that although support for extradition of Columbian
drug smuggling suspects is waning, Columbian President Trujillo has publicly en-
dorsed the creation of an international court to fight narco-trafficking).
255. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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not being enforceable by an independent power superior to the states
which have adopted [it]."' Also, for crimes against humanity, an in-
ternational court would serve the important function of forcing states
to publicly accept responsibility for their actions: "For adequate retri-
bution and deterrence, the guilty should be prosecuted before all man-
kind."s 7 A state refusing to transfer its nationals to the international
court would have to assume moral and political responsibility for their
actions in front of the entire international community.' As a result,
the establishment of the court would help to deter war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
2. Arguments against an international criminal court
Concerns about sovereignty lie at the heart of most objections to
the establishment of an international criminal court. Skeptics of the
court argue that states will not be willing to extradite their nationals
to the international court for crimes committed within the state's own
territory,29 especially if the actions are not crimes under national
law.' The reluctance to surrender individuals for prosecution by an
international body derives from the Act of State Doctrine, which pre-
cludes one state from reviewing the acts of another state."' It is im-
portant to note, however, that the Act of State Doctrine has never been
a fully accepted rule of international law." Customary international
law does permit an intrusion on state sovereignty for the prosecution
of certain crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction.'
Some proponents of an international criminal court argue that a state
best proves its sovereignty by voluntarily limiting it and accepting the
jurisdiction of an international criminal court.'
States are also concerned that both the court and its prosecutorial
arm could be politicized bodies exploited by hostile states.' The
United States is concerned that the court will develop an unacceptable
interpretation of crimes and that risk of double jeopardy problems will
preclude national courts from prosecuting individuals acquitted by a
256. Perret, supra note 235, at 154.
257. Stone, supra note 237, at 335.
258. Id. at 336.
259. See Graefarth, supra note 78, at 75 (under present international conditions,
most states are neither ready to abandon criminal jurisdiction on important ques-
tions nor to take on general extradition obligations); Albert Gastmann, The Act of
State Doctrine in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at
242, 256.
260. George A. Finch, An International Court: the Case Against Its Adoption, 38
A.BA J. 644, 646 (1952).
261. Gastmann, supra note 259, at 242.
262. Id. at 249 (pirates can be tried by any nation holding them in custody).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
264. See SOrrILE, supra note 238, at 58; Bridge, supra note 223, at 1273.
265. Stone, supra note 237, at 325.
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politicized international court.' Regardless of these uncertainties,
an international criminal court must be given a chance. There is no
reason to assume that the court will be susceptible to political influ-
ences if the judges and prosecutorial staff of the court are chosen care-
fully and the court's finances are drawn from a fixed fund. As for po-
tential double jeopardy problems, very few of the individuals likely to
be tried by the international criminal court would have been prose-
cuted at all in its absence, due to the general reluctance of states to
prosecute or extradite certain nationals.
In some cases involving the prosecution of high level officials or
even heads of state, prosecution by an international court might exac-
erbate international tensions and interfere with diplomatic processes of
conciliation." 7 Nevertheless, if the court is a truly independent and
impartial body, its adjudication of codified crimes is less likely to be
portrayed as a political act. Furthermore, cooperation in diplomatic
negotiations should not be rewarded with amnesty from prosecution for
war crimes and crimes against humanity, lest the deterrent value of
international criminal law not be felt by those in powerful negotiating
positions.
Opponents of an international criminal court contend that its
creation is not feasible because of technical difficulties.' States ei-
ther will initially decline to become party to the court, 20 or, having
consented to jurisdiction, will refuse to respond to specific requests for
extradition and assistance in the collection of evidence. However, the
difficulties in setting up an international court are no greater than
those attendant to the current attempt to implement a uniform inter-
national criminal law in more than 175 distinct states.' In addition,
the international community is not powerless to respond to a state's
noncompliance with the court's jurisdiction, as demonstrated by the
U.N. sanctions against Libya for its refusal to extradite alleged terror-
ists. Additionally, the U.N. can impose trade and economic sanctions,
limit the travel of the state's officials and citizens, and even go so far
as to deprive the state of its U.N. privileges."'
American critics of establishing an international criminal court
266. See Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to The Honorable Dan Quayle, President of the Senate 1 (Oct.
2, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mullins Letter].
267. See Wright, supra note 218, at 64.
268. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 13.
269. See Scharf, supra note 199, at 138 (The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were
unique because they were created by a small circle of nations able to exercise sover-
eignty in defeated countries.).
270. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-fourth
Session, 47 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10,at 15, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 ILC Report].
271. See Lewis, supra note 250.
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argue that it would violate the U.S. Constitution because it would not
guarantee the "trial of all crimes... by jury.., in the state where the
said crimes shall have been committed.' 72 In a report to the Senate,
the Judicial Conference of the United States questioned whether Con-
gress can constitutionally authorize U.S. participation in a non-Article
III court under its powers in Article I, section 8."' However, accord-
ing to Louis Henkin, a noted international law expert, there is no con-
stitutional bar to the establishment of a court:
If an international court sat outside the United States and imposed
punishment outside the United States, it would not be exercising
judicial power or other governmental authority of the United
States. The United States could adhere to such tribunals, agree
that American nationals might be tried by them, and even extradite
persons for such trials."'
The American Bar Association is concerned that if a request by the
United States for the extradition of an American national was met
with the suggestion of extradition to an international criminal court
instead, it might be unconstitutional for the United States to relin-
quish jurisdiction."' However, it might be within the president's for-
eign affairs power to choose prosecution by an international court
rather than no prosecution at all. 6 Nor would there be grounds for
constitutional objection if the United States agreed to prosecution
before an international criminal court of an American national who is
in another state's custody and accused of committing a crime
abroadY
On balance, the advantages of an international criminal court
significantly outweigh any negative consequences. Its existence would
facilitate the unbiased trial of individuals accused of violations of in-
ternational criminal law who otherwise would not be brought to justice
or who would be adversely affected by national prejudices. The prima-
ry objection to the court is that states may not agree to its establish-
ment or abide by its terms. A decision on the court's feasibility, howev-
er, cannot be reached without first evaluating the existing proposals
for an international criminal court.
272. U.S. CONST. art. IHI, § 6. See Finch, supra note 260, at 646-47.
273. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 (stating that Congress shall have
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations) with U.S. CONST.
art. M, § 2 (stating that judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under trea-
ties of the United States). See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States
on the Feasibility of and the Relationship to the Federal Judiciary of an Internation-
al Criminal Court 12 (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Judicial Report].
274. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITTION 198-99 (1972).
275. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 187, at 13.
276. See id.
277. Id.
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B. History of Proposals for an International Criminal Court
The United Nations first expressed its interest in the idea of an
international criminal court in 1948, when the General Assembly
asked the International Law Commission ("I.L.C.") "to study the desir-
ability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over
which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international
conventions.' 78 In 1950, the I.L.C. responded that it thought the es-
tablishment of such an organ would be both possible and desirable, but
it would not recommend that the court be in the form of a criminal
chamber of the International Court of Justice."9 The General Assem-
bly then established a committee composed of representatives from
seventeen states. This committee completed a draft statute for an
international criminal court ("Draft Statute") in August 1951.2w A
second committee was convened in 1952, and by August 1953 it had
prepared two alternative Draft Statutes, one for a court closely linked
to the U.N. and the other for a court operating independently."1
Meanwhile, the I.L.C. was hard at work drafting a Code of Offens-
es Against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("Draft Code") pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 95(I).' s It prepared two drafts, one
in 1951 and one in 1954, both stumbling over the definition of aggres-
sion. Since the Draft Code and Draft Statute were closely linked, in
1954 and again in 1957, the General Assembly voted to postpone con-
sideration of the Draft Statute until the parties agreed upon a defini-
tion of aggression. Such an agreement was not reached until 1974. In
1978, the General Assembly asked the I.L.C. to proceed with the for-
mulation of the Draft Code, but no mention was made of the 1953
Draft Statute. It was not until 1988 that, when the I.L.C. envisioned
the use of the principle of universal jurisdiction to enforce the Draft
Code, the General Assembly encouraged the I.L.C. to explore all alter-
natives to that approach.'
278. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its forty-sec-
ond Session, 45 U.N. GAOR, 45th Seas., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 at 40
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 ILC Report].
279. Id. at 40. In order to establish a criminal chamber of the I.C.J., its statute
would have to be amended because, according to Article 34, only states can be par-
ties in cases before the court. To amend the I.C.J. Statute, the United Nations must
follow the same procedure as is necessary to amend the U.N. Charter. See infra
note 346. Therefore, the I.L.C. was concerned that one of the members of the Securi-
ty Council would veto the amendment, and the international court would never be
established. Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, supra
note 224 at 267.
280. 2 FERENCZ, supra note 224, at 34-35.
281. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 41.
282. See Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, supra note 194.
283. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 38 (the General Assembly repeated this
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On December 4, 1989, the General Assembly specifically asked the
I.L.C. to "address the question of establishing an international
criminal court... with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have com-
mitted crimes which may be covered under the [Draft Code].' In
1990, the I.L.C. responded with a report discussing the general issues
involved in establishing an international criminal court and examining
the alternatives. The 1990 report concluded that the principle of an
international criminal court was desirable.' For the next two years,
the General Assembly invited the I.L.C. to continue its work.' Fi-
nally, on November 25, 1992, in response to the I.L.C.'s 1992 detailed
report on the establishment of an international criminal court, the
General Assembly requested it to undertake a "project for the elabora-
tion of a draft statute for an international criminal court as a matter
of priority ...... At its forty-fifth session in early summer 1993,
the I.L.C. working group on an international criminal court reported a
first draft statute to the General Assembly for comment.' It has
taken over four decades to come full circle.
C. Academic Proposals for an International Criminal Court
In addition to the work of the I.L.C., several legal scholars have
devised their own proposals for an international criminal court. As
with the proposed war crimes tribunal, there is general agreement on
the basic structure and operation of the court. For example, state par-
ties would nominate judges who represent the principal types of legal
systems in the world and are qualified in criminal law and interna-
tional law.' An independent prosecutor's department would conduct
the tasks of investigation and prosecution after an initial screening
procedure had eliminated cases outside of the jurisdiction of the
court.2w The statute of the court would outline the procedural guar-
request in 1989); see also Graefarth, supra note 78, at 72.
284. Steven C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Forty-Second Session of the
International Law Commission, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 930 (1990).
285. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 52. The report has been criticized for
its minimal substantive discussion of any of the issues. See Scharf, supra note 199,
at 144-46.
286. See 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 11.
287. GA Res. 47/33, 44th Sess., 73d mtg. (1992) (on file with author).
288. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
fifth session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Seas. Supp. No. 10, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993);
James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88
AM. J. INL L. 140 (1994).
289. See French Proposal, supra note 38, at 43; SoTrILE, supra note 238, at 84.
290. Bridge suggests that the preliminary screening should be undertaken by
judges of the international criminal court chosen periodically for that purpose. For
prosecution to proceed, the allegations must be substantiated by a prima facie case.
Bridge, supra note 223, at 1275; see also Revised Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess. Supp. No. 12, Annex, art. 33, U.N. Doc.
A/2645 (1954), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, supra note 224, at 454-456 [hereinafter 1953
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antees necessary to protect the rights of the accused,"1 and there
would be provisions for appeals of convictions.' Penalties would be
prescribed in advance or in conjunction with national codes.' Final-
ly, sentences would be executed under international supervision by
states willing to do so.2 '
As might be expected, however, agreement is limited. The central
dilemma in establishing an international criminal court is formulating
a court with meaningful powers and jurisdiction acceptable to states
jealous of their national sovereignty. This is a delicate balancing act.
The three areas causing the greatest divergence of ideas are the juris-
diction of the court, the initiation of suits, and the best method for
implementing the proposals for an international criminal court.
1. Jurisdiction
Various jurisdictional issues surround the creation of a permanent
international criminal court. Debate centers around the following ques-
tions: When could the court exercise jurisdiction? Which crimes would
fall within the court's competence? What should be the nature of the
court's jurisdiction?
a. Prerequisites to exercising jurisdiction
The first question is the scope of the personal jurisdiction of the
international criminal court. The most expansive view utilizes the
principle of universal jurisdiction, which would allow all states to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over individuals within their custody who are
charged with offenses against the law of nations. This principle would
assure that an international criminal court would be able to assert ju-
risdiction over such individuals without obtaining consent from any
state. ' All states would be obligated to assist the court by extradit-
ing persons indicted for offenses against the law of nations and by
Draft Statute] (provides for Committing Chamber composed of five judges appointed
annually to examine whether evidence is sufficient to support the complaint).
291. See Harlington Wood, International Criminal Procedure in TOWARDS A F2ASI-
BLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at 223, 269 (append document to draft
statute with basic principles of procedure and rules of evidence).
292. See 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 30; BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at
234.
293. See Pella, supra note 222, at 49-50; BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 225.
294. See Bridge, supra note 223, at 1270 (But neither the state initiating prose-
cution nor the state of which the criminal is a national should execute the sen-
tence.); see also So'rILE, supra note 238, at 89.
295. Wright, supra note 227, at 565; see also William B. Simons, The Jurisdiction-
al Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 45 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds.,
1990) (A group of states can exercise jurisdiction whenever the states could do so
individually.).
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assisting with the location of witnesses.' If a state refuses to extra-
dite an individual, a trial in absentia might be required.'
Although the simplicity of this approach is attractive, few states
would endorse the establishment of an international court with such
expansive jurisdiction, and it is difficult to see how the system would
work in practice. Trials in absentia would be required every time a
state with custody of an alleged offender refused to transfer the ac-
cused to the jurisdiction of the court. States not party to the statute of
the court could not be forced against their will to transfer indicted
individuals to the court for prosecution.'
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 1953 Draft Statute allows
the court to exercise its jurisdiction over an individual only when both
the state of which he is a national and the state where the crime was
allegedly committed have conferred jurisdiction on the court.' In ad-
dition, the state of which the alleged offender is a national must have
consented, in an agreement separate from that creating the court, to
grant the court jurisdiction over the specific offense charged.'s The
I.L.C.'s 1992 report discusses one danger of such an approach: requir-
ing the consent of the state on whose territory the crimes were com-
mitted may allow the government to exempt from punishment officials
or other individuals who were responsible for atrocities in their own
country. 301 It also contravenes the Nuremberg principles by holding
national law above international criminal law.' In addition, al-
though pragmatists might argue that states would be unwilling to give
an international court jurisdiction to try their nationals without prior
consent,' demanding such consent as a prerequisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction conflicts with the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Others have offered various intermediate approaches. For exam-
ple, the state with custody over the alleged offender could be given the
option of unilaterally conferring jurisdiction on the international crimi-
nal court. This process would be fair because all states would be able
to deliver one another's nationals to the court.' Or, there could be
296. Wright, supra note 227, at 567-568.
297. Id. at 575.
298. The Allies were able to establish the Nuremberg tribunal without Germany's
consent because as victors they had sovereignty over Germany. See Quincy Wright,
The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INfl L. 38, 50-51 (1947).
299. 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, art. 27, at 456; see also ABA. Report,
supra note 187, at 12 (Most states would still demand the consent of both the state
where the crime was committed and the state of nationality of accused.).
300. See Parker, supra note 242, at 641.
301. 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 23.
302. See Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, supra note 194, at 233 ("fact that
internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under
international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsi-
bility under international law").
303. ABA. Report, supra note 187, at 12.
304. Robert K. Woetzel, Correspondence: Professor John F Murphy's Letter on
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compulsory jurisdiction if the state on whose territory the crime was
allegedly committed had accepted the international court's jurisdic-
tion.' A third alternative would have jurisdiction depend only on
whether the accused is a national of a state recognizing the compe-
tence of the international criminal court." A fourth proposal would
give the court jurisdiction over nationals of a state that had not con-
ferred jurisdiction on the court as long as the state made no written
objection to the particular exercise of jurisdiction. 7 In practice, the
key player, for purposes of exercising jurisdiction, would be the state
with custody of the accused. Consequently, its consent to the interna-
tional court's jurisdiction would be the most critical.
Most proponents of an international criminal court would initially
limit its jurisdiction to individuals, as opposed to states.m Some
would confine jurisdiction to individuals acting on behalf of states,
claiming it an irregular exercise of state sovereignty.' However, for
purposes of punishment, the distinction between state-sponsored and
non-state-sponsored international crimes is not relevant because, "ulti-
mately, only individuals can be punished and thus deterred."" '
b. Crimes within the court's competence
The broadest definition of crimes against international law in-
cludes all acts that "violate a fundamental interest protected by in-
ternational law committed with conscious or presumptive knowledge
that such act or omission is criminal."' Such a definition encom-
passes the three crimes within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribu-
nal - crimes against the peace, crimes against the laws and customs
of war, and crimes against humanity - as well as any other crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction."' Some believe that for the interna-
tional criminal court to operate effectively, these crimes must be codi-
fied in a single international convention.1 ' For an international crim-
Professor Gross's Comments on International Terrorism and International Criminal
Jurisdiction, 68 AM. J. IVL L. 717 (1974).
305. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 20.
306. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 84.
307. Stone, supra note 237, at 339.
308. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 2; see also 1953 Draft Stat-
ute, supra note 290, at 456; Wright, supra note 218, at 67. But see BASSIOUNI, supra
note 209, at 224 (international court should exercise jurisdiction over natural per-
sons, organizations, and states).
309. Pella, supra note 222, at 55-56. An individual is a state actor when acting
with the "abetment" of a state. Id. at 56. A non-state actor, therefore, would be an
individual acting independently of state law or state support.
310. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 52.
311. Wright, supra note 227, at 567.
312. Id. at 567-69.
313. Wright, supra note 218, at 71; cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 73, 92 (im-
perative to codify all international crimes into a single international criminal code,
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inal code to have any meaning, it must be universally accepted that
"[a] piecemeal acceptance of such a code subject to a variety of reserva-
tions would damn it before it became operative."' Nevertheless,
linking the establishment of an international criminal court to the
international acceptance of a convention, such as the Draft Code, risks
dooming the creation of the court.
A more narrow view of the crimes within the court's jurisdiction
would limit jurisdiction to those crimes that prejudice international
relations by disrupting peace or perpetuating a national policy repug-
nant to the international community."' 5 To avoid overburdening the
court, crimes of a generally international character that do not infringe
upon international relations should be prosecuted nationally under the
principle of universal jurisdiction."' 6 The main problem with this ap-
proach is determing which crimes encroach upon the peace and securi-
ty of the world community and fall within the court's jurisdiction.
One way to delineate the international crimes punishable by the
international criminal court is to draw up international conventions on
particular crimes and require the signatories of the conventions to
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the international criminal court
over these crimes."1 ' Eventually, the series of conventions could be
regarded as an international criminal code."1 8 Alternatively, the stat-
ute setting up the criminal court could limit its jurisdiction to specified
international conventions already in force that define crimes of an in-
ternational character."9 According to one of the strongest advocates
of an international criminal court,
[r]eliance on conventional international law as the primary source
of international criminal law is... justifiable for the following
reasons: (1) conventions are a source of binding legal obligations
qua with respect to their state-parties; (2) they frequently embody
but international crimes should also include all crimes outlawed by future multilater-
al conventions).
314. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1264.
315. Pella, supra note 222, at 54 (such crimes include crimes within jurisdiction
of Nuremberg tribunal); see also Stone, supra note 237, at 336 (choose offenses that
stir deep universal concern and condemnation but that do not usually involve states'
military, political, or economic self-preservation).
316. Pella, supra note 222, at 54.
317. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1265.
318. Id
319. See 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 2; Scharf, supra note
199, at 158 (rely on offenses already outlawed by international conventions and
extend court's jurisdiction to cover additional offenses in Draft Code if it is ever
completed); see also Roger S. Clark, Codification of the Principles of the Nuremberg
Trial and the Subsequent Development of International Law, in THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 253-54 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990) (listing treaties generally agreed upon as examples of international crimi-
nal law).
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or reflect customary rules and general principles of international
law; (3) conventional obligations frequently ripen into customary
rules; (4) conventions frequently codifyjus cogens rules.'
A more restrictive approach would allow states to make declara-
tions limiting the court's competence to particular conventions or to
specific offenses defined within a convention."l However, while such
an option would increase the number of states willing to set up an
international criminal court, "it would from the outset limit its central
function and effectiveness in such a way that would largely condemn it
to insignificance.'
Conferring jurisdiction on the international criminal court on a
treaty-by-treaty basis would generate the least resistance. By ratifying
the convention establishing the court, states would not be relinquish-
ing any jurisdiction. Relying on conventions already in force to delin-
eate the court's jurisdiction, however, might be quicker because the
only hurdle would be setting up the court. The most efficient approach
would be to create an international court that would obtain jurisdiction
on a treaty-by-treaty basis and then to amend existing conventions de-
fining international crimes to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the
court. The signatories to such conventions have already completed the
time-consuming process of reaching an agreement on the substantive
provisions. Regardless of which crimes were determined to be within
the court's jurisdiction, statute of limitations questions and retroactivi-
ty issues would have to be addressed up front.
c. Nature of the court's jurisdiction
The 1990 I.L.C. Report outlines the three options regarding the
nature of the court's jurisdiction: exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
falling within the court's competence; concurrent jurisdiction between
the court and national courts; and restricting the court to only review-
ing competence.'
Those who argue in favor of exclusive jurisdiction for the interna-
tional criminal court state that it should have sole jurisdiction over
certain international crimes."2 Exclusive jurisdiction would lead to
the development of a coherent and consistent body of law with regard
to the crimes within the court's jurisdiction. It would also circumvent
conflicts of jurisdiction between different states with an interest in the
case.' However, completely relinquishing jurisdiction over certain
320. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 24.
321. See Graefarth, supra note 78, at 84 (discussing 1984 International Law Asso-
ciation proposal).
322. Id.
323. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 48.
324. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1265.
325. Scharf, supra note 199, at 160.
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crimes would constitute a significant infringement on state sovereign-
ty.' According to Bernhard Graefarth, uthe notion that states would
be prepared to delegate their sovereignty over crimes committed on
their territory, against them, or by their citizens to an international
criminal court is so far from reality that it has hardly been seriously
defended."'
Most advocates of an international criminal court agree that it
should have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts. However,
while no national court could try an individual for an offense already
adjudicated by the international criminal court," adjudication by a
national court would not preclude the international criminal court
from exercising jurisdiction.' Some scholars suggest that an indict-
ment by the international criminal court would terminate any local
proceeding,'m but others recommend that a request for extradition to
the international court be refused if a national court had initiated
prosecution."
Some support exists for the use of the international criminal court
as a supplemental review body. According to this proposal, at the re-
quest of a state involved in a case, the court would review a national
court's decision of an offense contained in the Draft Code. 2 To capi-
talize on the work already completed by the national court, the inter-
national court would adopt a "clearly erroneous" standard with respect
to the review of facts, an "abuse of discretion" standard for issues in-
volving discretionary balancing, and a de novo standard for questions
of international criminal law. The court would also be able to issue
advisory opinions in cases involving the application of the Draft
Code.' - This system is attractive because it could encourage national
courts to adjudicate more conscientiously.'m
Establishing a court with only review competence, however, fails
to solve many of the problems that call for the creation of an interna-
tional court. For example, a state would not have the option of an
326. Id.
327. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 81. When granting its advice and consent to tlie
Genocide Convention, the U.S. attached an understanding construing Article VI,
which allows for trial before an international penal tribunal if one is established, to
mean that "nothing ... shall affect the right of any state to bring to trial before its
own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the state.' Internation-
al Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, S. Rep.
No. 94-23, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1976).
328. 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, art. 50, at 457.
329. Wright, supra note 218, at 69. But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 193-95
(prosecution by an international court can be barred by double jeopardy).
330. Wright, supra note 218, at 70.
331. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 193-95.
332. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 86.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 87.
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international prosecution in a case where domestic prosecution is not
politically viable. It might also be difficult for an "involved state" to
contest a national judgment because of the potential political repercus-
sions. Furthermore, granting an international court final review com-
petence over national courts' decisions represents a greater relinquish-
ment of sovereignty than agreeing to concurrent jurisdiction.'
2. Initiation of suits
In its 1990 report, the I.L.C. considered six possible initiators of
suits: (1) all states; (2) states party to the court's statute; (3) any state
with an interest in the case; (4) intergovernmental organizations of
universal or regional character; (5) nongovernmental organizations;
and (6) individuals.' Although most proponents of an international
criminal court would allow only states or organs of the United Nations
to initiate suits,"7 it is crucial that individuals and nongovernmental
organizations be allowed to bring claims to the attention of the prose-
cuting body.' One of the most important purposes of an internation-
al criminal court is to provide a forum for adjudicating crimes that
disrupt international peace and security when no state possesses the
political will to bring the perpetrators of such offenses to justice. How-
ever, to limit frivolous claims, "adequate and available" domestic rem-
edies should be exhausted before an individual can bring a claim be-
fore the court.
3. Method of implementation
There are four possible ways to establish an international crimi-
nal court: (1) create the court as an additional organ of the United
Nations; (2) set it up by General Assembly resolution; (3) encourage
states to sign an international convention establishing the court; or (4)
focus on the creation of a committing chamber that would issue public
indictments after formal proceedings. Interestingly, there is almost
universal agreement that the best course of action is to initially take a
minimalist approach, so as to reduce resistance, and then to later
335. See 1992 ILC Report, aupra note 270, at 18.
336. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 273, at 49.
337. See Pella, supra note 222, at 62-63 (suits could be brought by states or an
organ of the U.N. upon referral by states); Graefarth, supra note 78, at 88 (states
would bring suits before court sitting as reviewing body); ABA. Report, supra note
187, at 18 (only states should have the right to institute proceedings); 1990 ILC
Report, supra note 278, at 49 (considering option of requiring authorization by either
General Assembly or Security Council before case could be submitted); 1953 Draft
Statute, supra note 290, art. 29, at 456 (only state parties can initiate prosecutions);
Wright, supra note 218, at 68 (only allow General Assembly to bring claims).
338. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 226-27 (allowing state-parties, organs of
the U.N., intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to
file complaints with Procuracy).
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expand the court's jurisdiction and membership. " Extensive propos-
als should wait until a flexible body has been set up and engendered
confidence.' " Some argue that the court should be an available judi-
cial forum that only meets when needed."'
An international criminal court could be established by amending
Article 7 of the United Nations Charter.' Although some argue that
amendment of the Charter is unnecessary because Article 7(2) already
allows for the establishment of subsidiary organs,' others contend
that there is no support in the present United Nations Charter for the
establishment of an international criminal court.'" One advantage of
establishing the court as an organ of the United Nations would be the
Security Council's ability to take necessary measures to ensure the
assistance of states and to effectuate the court's judgments.' " How-
ever, given the difficulty of amending the Charter, this option may not
be practical.' Also, involvement with the U.N. may increase allega-
tions of politicization.
It has been argued that the international criminal court could be
set up pursuant to a General Assembly resolution under Article 22 of
the U.N. Charter." Article 22 allows the General Assembly to estab-
lish subsidiary organs necessary for the performance of its func-
tions.' Since the functions of the General Assembly include main-
taining international peace and security and developing international
law, the court would qualify as a necessary subsidiary organ."' The
problem with this approach would be that the court might lose its
independence if its finances are debated annually in the General As-
339. See Julius Stone, Introduction, in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL COURT xii; Parker, supra note 242, at 642.
340. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 15.
341. See 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, at 43; 1992 Working Group Report,
supra note 235, at 2; A.BA Report, supra note 187, at 17.
342. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, at 192 (Article 7 names the six principle organs
of the U.N.).
343. SorrILE, supra note 238, at 83.
344. French Proposal, supra note 38, at 11; see also WOETLRL, supra note 9, at
51-52 (Specific consent of states would be required before the U.N. could establish
an international court and would probably require an amendment of the U.N. Char-
ter.).
345. Provided that one purpose of the court is the maintenance of international
peace and security, the Security Council may use any means necessary to facilitate
its effective operation. See U.N Charter, supra note 99, arts. 3942, at 199-200.
346. See Bridge, supra note 223, at 1277-78. Amendments to the U.N. Charter
come into force when adopted by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly
and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the U.N., including all the permanent
members of the Security Council. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, art. 108, at 214.
347. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1278.
348. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, art. 22, at 195.
349. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1278.
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sembly. ° This need not happen, however, since precedent exists for
legislative bodies to establish judicial organs and later refrain from
interfering in their activities.M To avoid influence by the General
Assembly, a fixed fund for the court could be established.
The third alternative - creating a permanent international court
by means of an international convention - would be advantageous
because it would only include states that favor the creation of an inter-
national criminal court.S Genuine progress at the negotiating table
might outweigh the time delay caused by the domestic ratification
procedures of the state parties. The main problem with this approach
would be a lack of the prestige typically associated with a United Na-
tions organ.m
Gerhard Mueller proposes a fourth alternative: establishing a
committing chamber as an independent institution apart from the
international criminal court.' The committing chamber would have
ex parte jurisdiction and would receive facts regarding international
crimes. It would hold an inquiry and make a public accusation if neces-
sary after formal proceedings. Although the committing chamber could
not compel the presence of an individual if the state with custody re-
fused to surrender him, it could thrust the uncooperative state into the
spotlight of world opinion.' Moreover, the committing chamber
could indict the head of the uncooperative state and issue an arrest
warrant to be executed by any signatory nation.sw
The idea of using world public opinion to shame a state into ac-
cepting jurisdiction of the international court is appealing and has few
legal disadvantages. However, unless the head of a recalcitrant state
himself is accused of a crime falling under universal jurisdiction, it
would be contrary to international law for another state to arrest and
transfer him to the international court.
D. The Time is Ripe: Using the Prosecution of Rape in the Balkans as
a Test Case for the International Criminal Court
The international community must pursue two goals in tandem:
the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and the creation of a permanent international criminal court. Lack of
350. See id. at 1279.
351. Wright, supra note 218, at 66 (citing example of United States Congress,
which established and maintains federal judicial system, with exception of Supreme
Court, but is constitutionally prohibited from exercising judicial power).
352. See Perret, supra note 235, at 155.
353. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1279; Wright, supra note 218, at 67.
354. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Two Enforcement Models for International Criminal
Justice in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN GRAVEN 107 (1969).
355. Id. at 113-14.
356. Id. at 115.
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progress in one area should not be allowed to stymie the other. If a
war crimes tribunal becomes operational, the world community should
build upon its success and establish a permanent international court
ready to cope with future instances of crimes against international
law. On the other hand, if progress on the war crimes tribunal stag-
nates, the prosecution of the perpetrators of rape in the Balkans would
be a good test case for an international criminal court. Few states
would disfavor prosecution of the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia in front of an international criminal court.
To capitalize on current United Nations support for bringing war
criminals to justice, 7 the United States should initiate efforts to
amend Article 7 to include an international criminal court as an organ
of the United Nations. To improve chances for U.N. ratification of the
amendment, states should confer jurisdiction on the court on a treaty-
by-treaty basis. Even if setting up the international criminal court as
an organ of the United Nations is not viable, the court could be estab-
lished by means of an international treaty. Although several powerful
states might resist, the court must start somewhere to demonstrate
credibility.' The statute of the international court could draw on the
Statute for the war crimes tribunal and provide for a Mueller-style
committing chamber. Other than a domestic exhaustion requirement,
no limits should be placed on the initiation of proceedings; any risk of
frivolous claims would be circumvented by the screening procedure of
the prosecuting body. It would also be important to create a mecha-
nism for compensating the victims of international crimes.'
357. Support is not confined to the Security Council. See Madeleine K Albright,
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement to the
Security Council 1 (Feb. 22, 1993) (on file with author) (noting that General Assem-
bly has urged creation of war crimes tribunal).
358. The United States would face domestic pressure to be party to a convention
establishing a permanent international criminal court. A joint resolution introduced
on January 28, 1993 expresses the intent of Congress that the U.S. should make
every effort to advance proposals for the establishment of an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character. S.J. Res. 32, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (resolution favorably reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 20, 1993); see also Foreign Operations Appropriation Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2066-67, §599E (1990) (U.S. should explore need for
establishment of an International Criminal Court to assist international community
in dealing more effectively with criminal acts defined in international conventions);
ABA. Report, supra note 187, at 1 (resolved that U.S. Government should have
view toward establishment of an international criminal court). Although the execu-
tive branch is skeptical about the possibility of reaching a consensus on the issues
surrounding the establishment of an international court, it has also stated that it
would be "willing to consider the establishment of an international tribunal in the
event that high ranking Iraqi officials fall into the custody of the United States."
Mullins Letter, supra note 266, at 5. In 1991, the judicial branch concluded that
more work needs to be done before it can be said whether an international criminal
court would be feasible and whether United States participation would be desirable.
Judicial Report, supra note 273, at 16.
359. Such a mechanism could follow the model of the United Nations Compensa-
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The next step in the establishment of a permanent court would be
to amend the Genocide and the Fourth Geneva Conventions to explicit-
ly confer concurrent jurisdiction on the international criminal
court.' Since these two conventions outlaw particularly heinous
crimes, opposition to the amendment process is likely to be limited.
Any state party to the amended conventions and the statute of the
international court would be obligated to transfer alleged offenders
within their custody to the international criminal court. No additional
consent would be required. Once the Mueller-style committing chamber
indicted an individual, the spotlight of world opinion would focus on
those states refusing to transfer him to the international court. Al-
though there are no guarantees, there is reason to hope that the pres-
sure of world opinion would result in alleged offenders being surren-
dered for trial.
To gain legitimacy, the international criminal court might begin
its life by considering the following four cases. The prosecutor's depart-
ment could first investigate allegations against Indonesian authorities
for the treatment of Roman Catholic Timorese in East Timor. Human
rights groups charge that between one and two hundred thousand
Roman Catholic Timorese have died of starvation, disease, or execution
since Indonesia annexed the area.'Z Second, the prosecutor might
respond to the right-wing and neo-Nazi attacks on asylum-seekers in
Germany. According to German authorities, more than two thousand
attacks were carried out last year, resulting in seventeen deaths and
almost six hundred injuries.' Third, recent claims that Peruvian
soldiers routinely rape women and girls in the course of their struggle
against the Shining Path guerrillas could.be investigated and soldiers
tion Commission, which was established by Security Council Resolution 687. The
U.N. Compensation Commission was set up to provide compensation for claims
against Iraq stemming from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Funding for the
claims is to be gleaned from Iraq's next oil sale. The Security Council has allowed
Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil, with thirty percent of the proceeds to go to the
compensation fund. John R. Crook, Current Development: the United Nations Com-
pensation Commission - A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 Am. J.
INTL L. 144 (1993). Individuals submit claims that require minimal documentation
to the state in which they reside, and the state then files consolidated claims. Id. at
149, 152. If an individual is stateless, the Commission can empower "an appropriate
person, authority or body" to submit claims on their behalf. Id. at 150 (quoting Unit-
ed Compensation Commission, Guidelines Relating to Paragraph 19 of the Criteria
for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/5, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1031).
360. Although Article VI of the Genocide Convention already provides for trial by
an international penal tribunal, it specifies that the Contracting Parties to the Geno-
cide Convention must also have accepted the jurisdiction of the international tribu-
nal. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. VI, at 280-82.
361. David Binder & Barbara Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for
a Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1, at 1.
362. Id.
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could be tried.' Fourth, the international criminal court could exam-
ine the "campaign of terror" which has been waged against the Kurds
in Northern Iraq, capitalizing on the hundreds of Iraqi files, captured
by Kurdish rebels immediately following the Persian Gulf war, which
document many officially-sponsored atrocities.' Finally, an investi-
gation into the current slaughter taking place in Rwanda may be war-
ranted.
This short list of cases represents international crimes committed
in both the industrialized and developing world and includes crimes
committed with and without government approval. Even if the perma-
nent international criminal court decided that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over some of these crimes, such a determination would serve the
purpose of demonstrating its ability to make reasoned judgments.
V. CONCLUSION
The defects of the fora currently available to the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina signal the pressing need for an international
criminal adjudicatory body. At the moment, victims have little hope of
actually recovering monetary relief. In addition, perpetrators of rape
will not be deterred by the remote possibility of either an adverse judg-
ment for civil damages or criminal prosecution.
The proposed war crimes tribunal is a step in the right direction.
It will have jurisdiction over the systematic rapes committed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and its theory of individual liability will allow all
levels in the chain of command to be prosecuted if evidentiary barriers
can be overcome. Although it may be difficult to bring the accused
before the tribunal, their freedom of movement will be severely con-
stricted. The Security Council will be able to sanction any states har-
boring the alleged perpetrators of rape. However, the Statute of the
war crimes tribunal and the tribunal's rules of procedure need to be
fine-tuned to provide clear access to individual claimants and mecha-
nisms for victim compensation.
The time has come, however, for the international community to
go one step further. The uncertainty surrounding the establishment of
the war crimes tribunal diminishes its deterrent effect. A permanent
international criminal court would provide an impartial forum less
likely to be influenced by political considerations. The rules of proce-
dure could be designed to allow for individual access to the prosecution
and victim protection. The court could prosecute international crimes
committed within national boundaries, and its decisions would have
precedential value for purposes of norm enunciation. The use of prece-
363. See Brooke, supra note 225.
364. Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1993, §
6 at 12.
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dent would also facilitate the rendering of judgments without undue
delay. Because both the assets and the persons of international offend-
ers would be subject to seizure in all states adhering to the court's
jurisdiction, offenders would be more likely to appear before the court,
thus increasing the number of cases heard on the merits. The court's
judgments would also become easier to enforce as more states join the
international court.
An international criminal court is especially important now due to
the increased likelihood of ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era.
For deterrence purposes, perpetrators of international crimes must
understand that they will be held personally liable. Although the path
to the creation of a permanent international court will be arduous,
"has not experience taught us that the utopias of today are the reali-
ties of tomorrow?"
365. SOrTILE, supra note 238, at 93.
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The Kurds' Right to Secede Under
International Law: Self-Determination
Prevails Over Political Manipulation
GREGORY J. EWALD*
We are a people who faced genocide and managed to survive'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is unsettling to witness the rapid proliferation of secessionist
movements around the world! absent any criteria, procedure, or insti-
tution capable of determining legitimate claims and monitoring the
process. In fact, Western political philosophy noticeably lacks a theory
of secession.8 Establishing criteria by which to judge secessionist
* 1994 Graduate of the University of Denver College of Law. Law clerk to the
Hon. George E. Lohr, Justice, Colorado Supreme Court, 1994-1995. Law clerk to the
Hon. C. Arlen Beam, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
1995-1996. The author wishes to thank Judge Sutton - former Chief Justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court and former Chairman of the U.S. Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission - for his generosity in funding this scholarship, which sends a
University of Denver law student to the Hague Academy of International Law each
summer.
1. Statement by Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, quoted in, John Darnton,
Salahaddin Journal; A Son's Promise: That Kurds' Dream Doesn't Die, Jan. 28, 1994,
N.Y. TIMES, at A4.
2. See generally Arnold Beichman, An Immunity that Sets U.S. Apart, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at G4. Cries for separatism, secession, and independence are
heard around the world. Furthermore, ethnic minorities seek independence. It would
seem that only a few countries are currently not involved in a secessionist struggle,
namely the U.S. and Japan. Id. Many of these conflicts result from a heightened
sense of ethnic awareness, or even a feeling of tribalism. Robin Wright, The New
Tribalism: Defending Human Rights in an Age of Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Strife Owes
More to Present than to History, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at 1.
3. ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION - THE MoRALrry OF POLITICAL DIvoEcE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 1 (1991); Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theo-
ry of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322, 323 n.1 (1991) (stating that major political philoso-
phers like Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Mill failed to
address the issue of secession in a meaningful manner). Secession has been justified
on the theoretical basis that governments rule by consent of the people, which can
be withdrawn at any time. See RIO SUREDA, THE EVOLUIriON OF THE RIGHT OF
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claims has become a pragmatic necessity, in addition to being theoreti-
cally challenging.4 The United Nations (U.N.) is the logical institution
to bear the burden of regulating secessionist claims, but it must be
willing to include secession as a legitimate possibility under self-deter-
mination without limiting its application to narrowly defined colonial
situations.5 Furthermore, the trend towards making individual human
rights, rather than traditional state rights, the basis for international
law must continue, reducing the opportunity for a state to use seces-
sion as a political tool to further its own self-interest!
The issue of secession requires consideration of a number of seem-
ingly incompatible international law principles. Territorial integrity,
non-intervention and the prohibition against the use of force must be
reconciled with the broad principle of self-determination.' Additional-
SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules
for a New Era, 14 HOUS. J. INL L 521, 547-54 (1992) (discussing criteria for seces-
sion). See generally Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and Interna-
tional Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 299 (1993) (summarizing various theoretical positions on secession).
But see Michael Eisner, A Procedural Model for the Resolution of Secessionist Dis-
putes, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 407, 418-19 (1992) (arguing that establishing a procedure
to resolve secessionist disputes is more important than formulating criteria because
criteria fail to keep pace with changes in international law and politics).
5. Many people have criticized the U.N. for either failing to involve itself in
secessionist struggles, or for limiting the legitimacy of secessionist claims to colonial
situations. See, eg., MICHIA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
1-76 (1982) (criticizing the U.N. for creating a double standard that limits secession
to colonial situations where the dominant country is a Western power); Ved P.
Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INTL Y. 257, 278 (1981) (recognizing the necessity for existing
institutional structures within the U.N. to regulate secessionist claims, thereby add-
ing predictability and avoiding violence). The international community must demon-
strate a willingness to involve itself in secessionist struggles in order to resolve the
dispute peacefully. Frankel, supra note 4, at 543-48.
6. Nations have typically used principles of international law, such as territorial
integrity, to justify harsh treatment of secessionist movements within their borders.
These same nations, however, have relied on other international law principles, i.e.
self-determination, to justify aiding a secessionist group in another country. See LEE
C. BucHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DrERMINATION 141-53 (1978)
(after Belgium lost its colony of the Congo, it supported a secessionist movement in
the Katanga region of the same country); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and
Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INTL LAW 321 (1972) (after failing to keep Paki-
stan a part of India, India supported the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan).
7. E.g., POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 73; Debra A. Valentine, Note, The Logic
of Secession, 89 YALE L. J. 802, 809 (1980); but see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and
Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INTL L. 177, 178 (1991)
(arguing that difficult normative issues arising out of secessionist claims are not
incompatible with territorial integrity). In fact, the tension between territorial integ-
rity and self-determination has severely hindered the international community's will-
ingness and ability to intervene into secessionist struggles. Eisner, supra note 4, at
408. Interestingly, this tension may be broken if Canada were to allow Quebec to se-
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ly, extending self-determination to include secession under certain sit-
uations must be consistent with the modern trend in international law
of emphasizing human rights.8
-This article briefly traces the development of self-determination
and its relationship to secession. Next, it highlights several instances
when states manipulated self-determination by using secession as a
political tool to further their own self-interests. The article then ad-
dresses the difficult, but necessary, task of defining criteria and stan-
dards by which to evaluate secessionist claims. These criteria are then
applied to the Kurds, concluding that they should be allowed to secede
given, inter alia, the gross violation of human rights that has taken
place in Turkey and Iraq. Finally, the article concludes with the rec-
ommendation that the international community should recognize seces-
sion as a legitimate right under certain circumstances and empower
the U.N. to regulate secessionist claims by applying consistent criteria,
thus promoting stability and reducing violence in the international
community.
H. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DETERWNATION
President Woodrow Wilson first articulated the idea of self-deter-
mination at the beginning of the twentieth century. "'Self-
determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.' The
Wilsonian principle of self-determination arose out of the notion that
all people had the right to self-government, including the freedom to
select leaders and to consent to be governed.0 Wilson's idealism, a
positive step towards furthering human rights under international law,
cede without opposition, thereby accepting self-determination as an overriding prin-
ciple to territorial integrity. Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right
of Secession under Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INTL L. 583 (1992).
8. See UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DET'MIUNATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
191 (1972) (recognizing a shift in emphasis away from state rights and toward a
greater respect for individuals). Self-determination developed as an aspect of human
rights belonging to a group, rather than an individual. Id& at 271. "International
prescriptions based on authoritative human rights policies are penetrating the cloak
of State sovereignty and are increasingly being implemented and enforced by world
organizations." Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Communi-
ty Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INVL L. 779, 833 (1976).
9. WOODROW WILSON, REPLY OF PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON TO THE ADDRESS-
ES OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELOR, AND THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AusTRo-
HUNGARIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1918), reprinted in OFFICIAL STATE-
MENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS, DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918,
265, 268 (James B. Scott ed. 1921). See generally Deborah Z. Case, Re-Thinking Self-
Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRA-
CUSE J. IN7TL L & COM. 21 (1992) (providing a history of self-determination and
criticizing the traditional application of self-determination as merely theoretical,
thereby failing to regulate the conduct of states in practice).
10. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
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did not address the pragmatic difficulty of defining who constitutes a
group capable of exercising self-determination,"
The League of Nations recognized self-determination but strictly
circumscribed its application, making the territorial integrity and
political independence of existing sovereign units the primary norm.'
In the Aaland Islands case, a committee of jurists appointed by the
Council of the League to investigate a claim by islanders under Finn-
ish jurisdiction who wanted to join Sweden under the new principle of
self-determination held that positive international law does not recog-
nize the right of a group to separate themselves from a state.' The
committee's decision had a direct bearing on the early development of
self-determination by holding that self-determination had not yet be-
come positive international law and no attempt should be made to
legitimatize secession. 4
The U.N. Charter expressly incorporated self-determination into
Article 1(2) and Article 55.' Although self-determination was initially
considered an international legal principle rather than a right or bind-
ing law,'6 the U.N. General Assembly passed several highly influen-
tial resolutions promoting the principle. 7 This reinforced the belief
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id at 8.
13. LEAGUE Op NATIONS O4., Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920). See also UMozuR=nE,
supra note 8, at 180 (quoting from the Aaland Islands case).
14. UMOzURIKM, supra note 8, at 181. "The grant or refusal of the right to a
section of the population to decide the sovereignty over a piece of territory by plebi-
scite or other means, the committee held, was an act of sovereignty and a matter
within that state's internal jurisdiction." Id.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 2. The purposes of the U.N. are to "develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen uni-
versal peace." Id. 'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ...
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
16. See BUCHHErT, supra note 3, at 76 (recognizing the debate as to whether
self-determination is a legal right or merely a political principle); POMERANCE, supra
note 5, at 9.
17. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes the will of the people the
basis of government authority. GA. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, at 71, 75, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Res. 217]. The U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples reafrms fundamental human rights
based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples and the
desire to end colonialism in all its manifestations. GA. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Seas., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Res. 1514]. A second
resolution passed in the same year states that self-government could be obtained by
any of three means, including independence, association or integration. G.A. Res.
1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16., at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [herein-
after Res. 1541]. The U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nationy declares that subjugating peoples to alien domination is an ob-
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that self-determination had evolved into a right under customary in-
ternational law18 that is binding on all nations regardless of their con-
sent-." Furthermore, states are bound by the U.N. Charter to respect
the principle of self-determination.' The definition of self-determina-
tion has evolved from "a personal freedom to make decisions... [into
a] broader right to realize one's full potentialities as a human be-
ing." The principle also has become increasingly accepted in state
practice and has appeared frequently in international treaties, U.N.
documents, and International Court of Justice opinions.'m Although
self-determination has attained the status of customary international
law, some disagreement remains as to what, if any, limitations might
apply. Acceptance has not necessarily brought agreement on the scope
and content of self-determination.'
An active debate currently exists as to whether self-determination
has become a preemptory norm (jus cogens)." The strongest argument
stacle to international peace and the principle of self-determination of peoples is a
significant contribution to international law. GA. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25 Sess.,
Supp. No. 28 at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Res. 2625]. The U.N.
Declaration on the Right to Development declares that the right to development im-
plies the right of peoples to self-determination. GA Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/41/925 (1986).
18. Self-determination meets the objective test (extent and uniformity of applica-
tion) and the subjective test (opinio juria), both of which are required for a principle
to become customary international law. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.
& Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 44 (Feb. 20); UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 189. Self-de-
termination has an extremely long history, creating a pedigree with a unique claim
to legitimacy. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (arguing that self-determination provides a solid basis on
which to build other rights including free expression and participation in an electoral
process).
19. See UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 196.
20. Id.
21. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 834, quoting in part W. WAGAR, BUILDING THE CITY
OF MAN 94-96 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (recognizing
the right of self-determination and holding that its application outweighs any past
legal and historical ties between the people of the Western Sahara and Morocco or
Mauritania) [hereinafter Western Sahara Case]; Advisory Opinion on Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16
[hereinafter Namibia Case].
23. This is no different, however, than other international law principles like
non-intervention and self-defense. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DE-
TERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150, 178 (1977); Nanda, supra note 5, at 259
(stating that self-determination in the specific context of colonialism has reached the
status of customary international law, but the content and scope of any further
application is without consensus). Self-determination has developed, in theory, a
broad normative role under international law but due to its ambiguity, self-determi-
nation has proven difficult to implement in practice. Eisner, supra note 4, at 410.
24. The hyperbole used by both proponents and opponents of self-determination
as jus cogen. tends to be little more than conclusory. Gross Espiell claims that "to-
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against self-determination as jus cogens is the fact that it is not uni-
versally applicable in practice. The relative importance of self-determi-
nation compared to other normative principles, namely territorial in-
tegrity and nonintervention, is also debated, but the emerging majority
opinion is that self-determination should outweigh inconsistent
norms.' However, several of the same U.N. documents recognizing
self-determination also limit its application when it conflicts with other
principles." Therefore, although self-determination has reached the
status of customary international law, it probably fails to meet the re-
quirements ofjus cogens.
The primary theoretical foundation for justifying secession has
been that (1) the consent of the people to be governed can be with-
drawn; and (2) no self-determination actually occurred in colonial situ-
ations.' The U.N. and state practice first extended the right of self-
determination to a right of secession in a colonial context.u Any legit-
imization of secession is somewhat remarkable given the strong histor-
ic bias against expanding the scope of self-determination. Former Sec-
day no one can challenge the fact that . .. the principle of self-determination neces-
sarily possesses the character of jus cogens8. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 70. Oppo-
nents claim that to suggest self-determination is a principle of jus cogens is without
any firm legal foundation because granting it to one group means denying it to
another. Id. at 71.
25. 'The denial of fundamental human rights for the sake of preserving the
territorial integrity of a body politic is incompatible with the newly emerging princi-
ple of jus cogens." Suzuki, supra note 6, at 841. 'If the principle of territorial integ-
rity [sic] is clearly incompatible with that of self-determination, the former must,
under present international law, give way to the latter." UMOZURIKE, supra note 8,
at 187. But see BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 38 (stating that one response has been
to establish a hierarchy of the norms of nonintervention, prohibition against the use
of force, and self-determination, giving preference to the former two principles); R. J.
VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 236 (1974) (arguing that the
U.N. Charter was made with the primary concern of building order between states,
thus emphasizing the established norm of nonintervention).
26. "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with -the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter of the United Nations." Res. 1514, supra note 17. "Recalling the
duty of States to refrain in their interjnational relations from military, political, eco-
nomic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any State." Res. 2625, supra note 17.
27. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 221 (when the tyranny is universal a revolu-
tion is justified, but when it is discriminatory secession is justified); SUREDA, supra
note 3, at 17.
28. Self-determination appears in U.N. documents in order to overcome colonial-
ism, not to legitimize secession. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 84. However, the num-
ber of non-colonial claims to self-determination is likely to increase in number and
intensity and it would be unwise for the international community to reject these
claims as it has in the past. Nanda, supra note 6, at 322. In practice, international
law evaluated the legitimacy of independence struggles by applying the norm of
decolonization, which mandates that self-determination outweighs territorial integrity.
In a non-colonial context, however, territorial integrity historically outweighed self-de-
termination. Eisner, supra note 4, at 412.
Vol. 22:2,3
KURDS' RIGHT TO SECESSION
retary of the U.N., General U Thant, unequivocally stated that the
U.N. "has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will
ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State.""
By including independence as one of the three methods by which self-
government may be obtained, however, the U.N. at least implicitly
legitimatized secession under certain circumstances.' Furthermore,
U.N. Resolution 2625 can be interpreted as authorizing secession if a
group (people) can show they are governed by a non-representative
government or are subject to unequal treatment.81 Virtually everyone
agrees that secession is not a universal right.' The debate arises in
attempting to define when secession should be allowed. For example,
international law does not give minorities dispersed throughout a
country the right to secede.' At the other end of the spectrum, no
rule of international law condemns secession under all circumstanc-
es.4
The reluctance of states to fully accept a right of secession has
slowed the trend towards a limited acceptance of the legitimacy of
secession in international law.' It is understandable that states are
reluctant to recognize a right of secession that could be used to justify
29. 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 36 (Feb. 1970) (qugte taken from Nanda, supra
note 5, at 263). See also HURST HANNUm, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DE-
TERMINATION: THE AcCOMMODATION OF CONFICTINo RIGHT 49 (1990).
30. Res. 1541, supra note 17 (including independence, association, or integration).
31. Res. 2625, supra note 17. See also Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis
in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and
Croatia's Right to Secede, 1992 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (1992).
32. To apply secession as a truly universal right would extend it to each individ-
ual, legitimatizing the frequently cited fear that a right of secession would lead to
anarchy. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 337-39. But see Robert W. McGee & Danny
Kin-Kong Lam, Hong Kong's Option to Secede, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 431-32
(1992) (arguing an absolutist position that individuals have the right to form the
government of their choice regardless of their motives or timing).
33. Res. 1514 & Res. 1541, supra note 17 (limiting the right of self-determina-
tion to 'peoples,' which is interpreted as the people of a whole territory). PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 18 (1990). Cri-
teria for secession are discussed infra, at section WV of this article.
34. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 199. The various justifications for opposing
secession are neither singularly nor cumulatively sufficient to deny secession under
all circumstances. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 332. But see Iglar, supra note 31, at
239 (concluding that Slovenia and Croatia have a right to self-determination under
international law, but they do not have a right to secede because secession is not
recognized under international law).
35. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 96-97 ('Thus, an historical survey ... of the
status of secessionist self-determination within the confines of positive international
law confirms the evolution of a limited acceptance of its legitimacy.*). Although his-
torically secession found only limited legal authority, recent state practice in the
Baltic states and Yugoslavia, to name only a few examples, demonstrates an emerg-
ing acceptance of secession under international law. See generally Eastwood, supra
note 4, at 299. If Canada were to allow Quebec to secede, state practice would fur-
ther support an emerging right of secession. Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at
583.
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secessionist claims by groups within their own borders." However,
several peaceful secessions" and the incorporation of a right to secede
into several constitutions' demonstrate that states have accepted se-
cession to some degree. World-wide decolonization' and recognition of
independent nations that seceded from the former Soviet Union' are
further evidence that states have recognized the legitimacy of some
secessionist claims through state practice. The reluctance, or willing-
ness, of a state to recognize a right of secession, however, derives from
the self-interest of that state.
III. STATE MANIPULATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
States have traditionally used self-determination, and its most
extreme manifestation of secession, to justify actions in furtherance of
their own self-interest, while often denying it to other states,4' at-
tempting to legitimatize political actions using international law. In
the Vietnam conflict, for example, "all sides claimed to be struggling in
support of the right of 'self-determination."' This manipulation of
international law to justify politically self-serving use of force has a
destabilizing effect on the world community. Clearly, what is one
group's war of national liberation is also another group's war of nation-
al disintegration."
Historically, both the United States and the Soviet Union have
manipulated the principle of self-determination to achieve a political
36. Id.
37. For example, the government of Senegal peacefully seceded from the Mali
Federation in 1960 and Singapore seceded from the Malaysian Federation in August
of 1965 under amicable conditions. Id. at 99.
38. The constitution of the former Soviet Union prophetically contained a provi-
sion in article 17 that 'the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to
every Union Republic.* Id. at 100. See also Cass K Sunstein, Constitutionalism and
Secession, 58 U. CHa. L REv. 633 (1991). Including a right to secede in a constitu-
tion may in fact endanger the democratic process, rather than protect it. Sunstein
recognizes a right to secede under certain circumstances, but it should be considered
a natural part of constitutionalism and need not be expressly granted in the consti-
tution. Id. at 670. At least one commentator argues that the Confederate states
acted legally in seceding from the Union because the U.S. Constitution did not for-
bid secession. H. Newcomb Morse, The Foundations and Meaning of Secession, 15
STETSON L REV. 419 (1986). See also BUCHANAN, 8upra note 3, at 127-49 (discussing
constitutional provisions for secession).
39. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 100-01.
40. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Bush Baltic Move Seeks to Weep Pressure' On, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at Al (listing the countries that immediately established diplo-
matic ties with the Baltic states).
41. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 61. Political manipulation, along with the in-
herent inconsistency between self-determination and territorial integrity, removed the
international community and international law from playing a meaningful role in
resolving secessionist disputes. Eisner, supra note 4, at 416.
42. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 59.
43. Id. at 54.
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agenda. The Soviet Union disapproved of the dissolution of the Mali
Federation, where their influence was increasing, but supported the
secessionist movement in Bangladesh." The Soviet decision "was ap-
parently dictated by political expediency and not a principled judgment
regarding the legitimacy of the particular claim. ' The United States
recognized the legitimacy of secessionist movements in the former
Soviet Union but failed to recognize the legitimacy of other secessionist
struggles less favorable to U.S. interests. ' Even in recognizing the
independent Baltic nations, President Bush could not avoid phrasing
his support in self-serving nationalistic terms. "The Soviet Union is no
more... [and] this is a victory for democracy and freedom. The United
States applauds and supports the historic choice for freedom of the
new states... [and] these events clearly serve our national inter-
ests."'
Developing nations also have manipulated the principle of self-
determination, making its abuse a reality of international politics."
In fact, countries that recently gained independence - many times
through secession - from a colonial power under the auspices of self-
determination immediately deny the same right to groups within their
borders." The Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, summed up the
general feeling of African leaders when he said "that the national uni-
ty of individual African states was an 'essential ingredient for the
realization of the greater objective of African unity."" This attitude
contradicts the prevailing trend in international law of protecting hu-
44. BUCHHEMT, supra note 6, at 127.
46. Id.
46. The Kurds' struggle, for example, continues to be used as a political tool by
the United States and other countries to further their own self-interests in the re-
gion. Discussed infra at section V of this article.
47. Doyle McManus, Bush Praises Gorbachev, Recognizes 6 Republics, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1991, at Al (quoting a nationally televised address made by President Bush
on Dec. 25, 1991).
48. "The credo of the Third World has been aptly epitomized by Emerson to
read: 'My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is obviously un-
impeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is wholly inadmissi-
ble." PoMERANcE, supra note 5, at 61 (quoting in part Rupert Emerson, Self-Deter-
mination Revisited in the Era of Decolonialization (Occasional Papers in International
Affairs, no. 9; Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Dec., 1964)).
49. "Leaders of newly independent states have been consistently vocal in assert-
ing that the right to self-determination does not include the right of secession."
Nanda, supra note 5, at 271. African countries that obtained independence from
European countries by exercising their right to self-determination have been notori-
ously hypocritical in denying that right to groups within their artificially created
borders. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986, reprinted in 21 LL.M. 58 (1982) (Article 20 restricts self-
determination to colonial situations, while Article 29(5) requires the individual to
preserve the nation's territorial integrity). See generally POMERANCE, supra note 5, at
1-76.
50. Report of the OAU. Consultative Mission to Nigeria, cited in Nanda, supra
note 5, at 272.
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man rights, even over state rights, when the two conflict."
Although it would be difficult to assert that the United Nations
also has acted out of self-interest in its treatment of secessionist
claims, it is not unfair to conclude the U.N. has been ineffective at
best.52 In failing to regulate secessionist claims, the U.N. has allowed
states to freely pursue their own self-interests. When Biafra attempted
to secede from Nigeria, the U.N. somehow managed to ignore a thirty-
month, bloody civil war." In fact, the U.N. never even discussed the
conflict, even though Biafra took an appeal before the U.N. in Decem-
ber of 1967 charging Nigeria with human rights violations such as
genocide." In the absence of a collective international judgement re-
garding the legitimacy of Biafra's secessionist claim, states freely inter-
vened on behalf of the side most likely to further their own self-inter-
ests.' The U.N. was also conspicuously inactive in the subsequent
secessionist struggle between Bangladesh and Pakistan.' Once again,
the U.N. failed to even discuss the matter until India and Pakistan
were involved in a full-scale war." Bangladesh successfully seceded
from Pakistan primarily due to India's self-serving military interven-
tion." The one instance when the U.N. did intervene was in opposi-
tion to Katanga's effort to secede from the Congo, and even then the
U.N. waited until Belgium had intervened on behalf of Katanga.59
The U.N. justified this as preventing Belgium from recolonizing its
previous colony, refusing to intervene until there was a Western colo-
nial power involved, and applying self-determination to a narrowly
defined colonial context.'
The only certain lesson to be learned from examining state prac-
tice regarding self-determination and secession is that a state's re-
sponse to a given situation will usually be determined solely by its own
political interest." Thus, most states will be critical of secessionist
51. See Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandary, 71 FOREIGN AF. 79 (Winter
1992/1993).
52. The U.N. has been criticized for creating two standards regarding the legiti-
macy of secession, allowing it when a colony secedes from a Western country but
denying it to any group within an existing state. See POMERANCE, supra note 5, at
17 (stating that an arbitrary requirement of colonial status is racist and subjective).
53. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 162-76.
54. See generally Documents: Biafra/Nigeria, 2 N.Y.U. J. INn L. & POL. 398
(1969), cited in Nanda, supra note 3, at 273 n.106.
55. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 170.
56. Nanda, supra note 5, at 274. See generally BUCHHErT, supra note 6, at 198-
215.
57. Nanda, supra note 5, at 274.
58. India stopped the massive flow of refugees from Bangladesh and weakened a
regional adversary, while gaining a potential ally. See generally Nanda, supra note 6.
59. Nanda, supra note 5, at 273-74. See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at
141-53.
60. See generally BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 141-53.
61. Id. at 105.
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movements in other countries not affecting their own interests because
it creates a precedent, possibly legitimatizing secessionist struggles
that someday may occur within their own territory.m A state is al-
most certain, however, to intervene on behalf of one side in a seces-
sionist struggle if it will secure a new ally or defeat an old enemy.'
In light of the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War Era, states are likely to continue
promoting their own self-interests unless the U.N. actively evaluates
the legitimacy of secessionist claims by consistently applying agreed
upon criteria. States will still have the political tool of formal recog-
nition of statehood, but it should be restricted and in compliance
with U.N. standards.6
IV. STANDARDS AND CRITERIA FOR SECESSION
A group seeking to secede must first satisfy the requirements of
self-determination before accessing the extreme remedy of secession.
Attaining independence constitutes one of the methods by which the
ultimate goal of self-government may be obtained.' The right of self-
determination distinguishes legitimate claims of secession from illegiti-
mate claims." Although self-determination has reached the status of
customary international law, individuals can only exercise this right in
the context of a group.w Thus, the existence of an identifiable group
constitutes the first, and perhaps most ambiguous, criterion.0
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Arthur M. Cox, In a National Tailspin, the Soviet Union Must Fill the
Power Vacuum, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at M2.
65. "Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory
and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such enti-
ties." RESTATEMENT (THItD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
66. A state is not required to formally recognize another state but is required to
treat it as a state if the requirements for statehood are met, except when statehood
was attained by the use of armed conflict in violation of the U.N. Charter. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 202 (1987). Refusing to treat an entity
attempting to secede as a state may be required because premature acceptance
would violate the territorial integrity of the dominant state and military support
may violate the U.N. Charter. Id., § 202 cmt. f (1987).
67. Res. 1541, supra note 17. See Robert W. McGee, 77e Theory of Secession and
Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional Solution, 28 STAN. J. INT L. 451 (1992)
(summarizing the basic arguments for and against secession).
68. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 162.
69. Although potentially arbitrary in nature, this limitation is sensible because
individuals are generally more likely to consent to be governed by people similar to
themselves and governments have historically tended to oppress distinct groups with-
in the population. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 228. But see Dov RONEN, THE QUEST
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 8 (1979); McGee, supra note 67, at 451 (stating that indi-
viduals have the unilateral right to secede but are inhibited in their exercise of that
right by practical and logistical restraints).
70. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 275. See also Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 192-93
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Group identity is determined through the application of both sub-
jective and objective standards.71 The subjective self-identity of a
group can be judged on the basis of a variety of common, objective
characteristics, including religion, language, ethnicity, and race.72
Group identity can also be based on "subjective expectations shared by
a significant number of people that their condition will be improved by
membership in that particular association.' A common claim to spe-
cific territory, rather than a common culture, also may define a
'group."" In addition to the problem of quantifying the subjective
mental state of group members, difficulties arise in evaluating the
objective criteria.7 Although the standards used to evaluate the exis-
tence of an identifiable group are somewhat ambiguous, refusing to
recognize a 'group' under all circumstances is unwarranted.76
. The relationship between group members and their leaders mea-
sures the cohesiveness of a group and the extent to which individual
members share common perceptions and values." The purported lead-
ers of a group should represent the opinions of the group as a whole.78
When the interests of the leaders are different from those of the group
in general, the claim will fail for lack of a legitimate identifiable
group."
A plebiscite clearly determines the general interests and choice of
the community' but requires an impartial third party like the U.N.,
established procedures, and parties willing to submit to the authority
of the procedure.8 The plebiscite itself is not the exercise of self-de-
(defining the group as people with a common claim to territory wrongly taken from
them, rather than in ethnic or cultural terms).
71. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 276; Iglar, supra note 31, at 214, 225.
72. See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 156-57; Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
73. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 786.
74. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 177-202 (defining a group based on
a common territorial claim seems less arbitrary and more objective than ethnicity
and culture).
75. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329. For example, to what extent should linguis-
tic dialects be considered as the same language or distinct languages? If 'culture' is
broadly defined, a group may be in effect penalized for exhibiting cultural pluralism.
Id.
76. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 200. International law should protect the right
to secede but prevent its abuse. The possibility that such abuses may occur, howev-
er, does not invalidate the law. Id.
77. See Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
78. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 816.
79. Id. An example of an illegitimate claim where the interests of the group and
its purported leaders were in conflict is the Southern Rhodesian unilateral declara-
tion of separation from Great Britain in 1965, where minority white leaders would
have continued to deny the black majority fundamental human rights. I&
80. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 163. But see PoMERANcE, supra note 5,
at 27 (arguing that a free and fair election is not a panacea but rather raises addi-
tional questions regarding who constitutes the real population of a territory).
81. Valentine, supra note 7, at 813. The U.N. has carried out several successful
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termination but merely a tool to determine whether an identifiable
group exists and how that group would exercise its self-determina-
tion.' Two other considerations must be resolved in order to carry out
an effective plebiscite: (1) establishing the percentage of the group re-
quired to authorize action; and (2) protecting those who are opposed.'
Furthermore, there are many more potentially legitimate groups than
possible viable states." Even though establishing the existence of an
identifiable group may be difficult enough to reduce some claims, addi-
tional criteria are needed in order to further limit the scope of seces-
sion as an option under self-determination."
In addition to satisfying the requirement of a 'group' as defined
above, a legitimate claim of self-determination and a right to secede
require some type of subjugation," which provides the most impor-
tant basis for authorizing self-determination and extending it to in-
dude secession. 7 The basis for declaring a status of subjugation de-
rives from the relationship between the ruling group and the group*
claiming a right to self-determination.' The relationship between a
ruling colonial power and its colony has most easily satisfied this crite-
rion. "Colonialism came to be branded not only as a 'permanent
aggression' but as a 'crime', and an evil so paramount [it] deserved...
to be eradicated by all possible means.' s 'Colonialism' eventually
came to include "social institutions which systematically and deliber-
plebiscites, including those in the British Cameroons, Rwanda, Sabah, and Sarawak.
See UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 183. However, the U.N. failed to apply internation-
ally accepted standards to the election in West Irian, instead allowing traditional
Indonesian practices to virtually guarantee that the state would join the Indonesian
Republic regardless of the people's genuine preference. POMERANCE, aupra note 5, at
33. For a general discussion on election monitoring, see YVES BEIGEEDER, INTERNA-
TIONAL MoNrToRING OF PLEBISCrEs, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTONS - SELF-
DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994).
82. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 163.
83. Nanda, supra note 5, at 276.
84. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329.
85. A pure Parochialist Model only requires an identifiable group seeking control
of their political future, but the disruptive nature of allowing any identifiable group
to claim a right of self-determination as the basis for secession makes this view
almost entirely unaccepted. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 223-24.
86. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 157. -The beneficiary of the right of self-
determination is a self-conscious politically coherent community that is under the
political subjugation of another community." Id. at 156. But see Buchanan, supra
note 3, at 325 (arguing that since there is currently no theory of secession, it would
be inappropriate to reject secessionist claims based on grievances other than an
injustice, even though this might become the standard in the future).
87. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 157. The U.N. has evaluated virtually all
claims in light of this criteria. See, e.g., Res. 1514, supra note 17 ('The subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental human rights.").
88. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 157.
89. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 49.
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ately deprive particular groups of their human rights.'
A violation of fundamental human rights emerged as a substitute
criterion for subjugation, while colonialism became a per se violation of
fundamental human rights." Determining the degree and nature of
oppression against the group becomes the threshold test.' If members
in the group are exercising the rights of citizens, enjoying fundamental
human rights, and enhancing their political, cultural, and economic
development, no basis exists for claiming a right to self-determina-
tion." This appears to be the lex lata, with the degree of oppression
dictating the available remedy, which would range from protection of
minority rights to the ultimate remedy of secession."
An identifiable group suffering some type of human rights viola-
tion or subjugation satisfies the two criteria necessary for claiming a
right to self-determination but not necessarily the requirements for
claiming a right to secede. The international community tends to disfa-
vor outright secession, treating it is as a remedy of last resort.9
There is an implicit criterion that in order to completely legitimatize a
secessionist claim, the group first must make an effort to remedy the
problem through a less extreme alternative method." The disgruntled
group can add a degree of legitimacy to their secessionist claim if they
first attempt to remedy the problem through other channels.' This
criterion also requires a neutral third party, preferably the U.N., to
encourage negotiations between the disgruntled group and the govern-
ment and to determine if and when the group may legitimately claim a
right to secede. Requiring a disgruntled group to first attempt a reme-
dy short of secession eases some of the fears in the international com-
munity, making a liberal application of self-determination acceptable
to more states and increasing the likelihood truly legitimate secession-
ist claims outside the scope of decolonization will be recognized."
90. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 838.
91. See generally POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1-76.
92. See BuCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 220-23 (referring to this as Remedial Seces-
sion in contrast to the Parochial Model discussed supra in note 85).
93. UMOZURIKE, supra note 8, at 268-69. It is argued that a truly democratic
government based on fair representation presumably fulfills the goal of self-deter-
mination, namely self-government, and weakens any claim of subjugation or human
rights violations. See id. at 185.
94. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 222.
95. See id. at 214. Remedies other than outright independence, such as autono-
my or association, may be adequate and more acceptable to the international com-
munity. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 189.
96. One suggested alternative is to let the subgroup retain its common personali-
ty, while encompassing their identification with the broader political body. Suzuki,
supra note 8, at 859.
97. By first attempting political and constitutional innovations through existing
constitutional channels before resorting to secession, the Tbos of Nigeria and Bengalis
of Bangladesh added legitimacy to their claim. Id. at 805.
98. See OFUATEY-KoDJOE, supra note 23, at 189.
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Whether a group must have a territorial claim in order to legiti-
mately secede is currently under debate." Semantically, to secede
merely means to withdraw from a larger organization, implying that
the group must have somewhere to go. A group may secede and join
another state through association or integration, requiring no territori-
al claim of its own./" Furthermore, no territorial claim has been re-
quired for secessionist claims in a colonial context."1 It is logical,
however, to require a territorial claim when a group secedes from a
sovereign country and does not join another state, since the group
must take territory from an existing state.1 "2
A strict territorial interpretation requires a valid claim to territo-
ry, usually based on an historical grievance, in order to access seces-
sion as a legitimate remedy.1" A minority group without a territorial
claim suffering human rights violations still has a grievance, but it
cannot legitimately claim secession as a remedy. 0 ' An historical
grievance arises from a wrongful acquisition of territory. The remedy,
including possibly secession, is proportionate to the responsibility of
the dominant party in power in wrongfully acquiring that territory. "
Furthermore, under a modified territorial interpretation, a valid ter-
ritorial claim may automatically satisfy the subjugation criterion if the
territory was unjustly incorporated into the larger state.'" Recently,
this was a significant justification for secessionist movements within
99. See Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 177-202 (arguing that a territorial claim
based on an historical grievance is the only legitimate claim to secede). See also
BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 229-30 (requiring a territorial claim for groups to actual-
ly secede but not to politically remove themselves); Suzuki, supra note 8, at 782 (the
group demanding separation must have an appropriate territorial base); Valentine,
supra note 7, at 818-19 (stating that an identifiable land base is an indicium of a
secessionist claim). But see OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164 (a territorial
claim is only relevant when the boundaries are in dispute); Buchanan, supra note 3,
at 332 (arguing discriminatory redistribution justifies secession absent any territorial
claim).
100. OFuATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164. See also Res. 1541, supra note 17.
But see Nanda, supra note 6, at 277 (legitimatizing secession based on such princi-
ples would undermine international stability).
101. See OPUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 23, at 164; Buchanan, supra note 3, at
332.
102. Without a valid territorial claim, the group would in effect take on the sta-
tus of refugees or emigrants. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 326-27 (stating that seces-
sionists only deny the authority of the state over the group and the territory they
occupy, not the state's authority in general).
103. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 192.
104. Id. at 193. But see Buchanan, supra note 3, at 328 (agreeing with Brilmayer
in part but denying that a territorial claim based on an historical grievance is the
only justification for secession).
105. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 197 (claiming colonialism is an automatic justifi-
cation for an historical grievance and thus a right to secede).
106. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 329-30. This theory is most plausible when the
group seeking to secede is the same group that held legitimate title to the territory
when it was unjustly annexed. Id
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the former Soviet Union.1°7
A state created by secession must be politically and economically
viable, so as not to burden the international community."u This crite-
rion is easier to meet today than in the past, given the emergence of
many small, but successful, nation-states.' The U.N. codified a re-
laxed standard in Resolution 1514, which declares "inadequacy of polit-
ical, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve
as a pretext for delaying independence."1 Technological advances
and the development of international economic and military alliances
have reduced the necessity for a large land base."1 The U.N. would
evaluate the state's viability by considering the population, size, natu-
ral resources, and infrastructure. Unlike other criteria, the U.N. might
consider the willingness of existing states to recognize the new state,
since viability is largely dependent upon economic and political allies.
Although viability may not be determinative alone, it should be consid-
ered along with other factors in evaluating the strengths of the seces-
sionist claim.
The overall method for evaluating a secessionist claim is a balanc-
ing test, primarily weighing the benefits of allowing secession against
the burdens." A seceding group has at least three tools at its dispos-
al to achieve its goal of secession: (1) international pressure; (2) moral
persuasion; and (3) brute force. " 8 The ultimate goal is to maximize
world harmony by striking a balance between individual human rights
and state sovereignty.1 ' The level of disruption in the international
community is the determinative factor. "' This disruption includes
the effect of secession on the remaining state. For example, would the
loss of land, people, or resources critically impair the viability of the
remaining state?1 . The disruptive factor is also measured by the ef-
fect of the secession on other nations. Additional considerations include
the precedent of allowing a successful secession and the impact of
107. Id. at 329. See also Now the U.S. Should Help the Baltics Join the UN,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1991, at 58 (stating that the Baltic states were forcibly and ille-
gally incorporated into the Soviet Union in a secret deal between Stalin and Hitler
in 1940).
108. See BUCHHErT, supra note 6, at 29.
109. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 834-35.
110. Res. 1514, supra note 17.
111. See Valentine, supra note 7, at 811 nn. 48-49.
112. See BucHHErr, supra note 6, at 238-45.
113. Frankel, supra note 4, at 530.
114. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 238-45 (referring to this as the Utilitarian Ap-
proach, in contrast to the Parochial Model, supra note 85, and Remedial Secession,
supra note 92).
115. Id. The fundamental goal is optimum public order. Suzuki, supra note 8, at
793.
116. The amount of disruption is high if secession threatens to remove a key
economic base of the country, as was the case when Katanga attempted to secede
from Nigeria. BUcHHErr, supra note 6, at 232.
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armed conflict or an influx of refugees on surrounding nations. The
ability of the seceding entity to survive independently and to abide by
international law are also important factors.'17 Finally, the current
disruption and potential future disruption likely to occur if the group
is not allowed to secede must be evaluated." Continuing violations
of jus cogens may be so repulsive to the international community that
its disruptiveness outweighs that of a secessionist struggle."9 The
use of force and violence will also be a key element in determining the
degree of disruptiveness.' °
It is a difficult task to reconcile the idealistic goal of prohibiting
the use of force under international law as a method of achieving goals
and the pragmatic reality that some degree of force will inevitably be
used. The use of force or violence by either the secessionist group or
the dominant state will draw the attention of the international com-
munity. ' The use of power is closely related to the issue of re-
spect. ' "Coercive operations without the support of the world com-
munity will deprive the coercers of respect."' The willingness of a
secessionist group to enter into an armed struggle, however, demon-
strates group identity and resolve.' It may also shift world opinion
in their favor if the dominant state resorts to an overwhelming use of
force to repress the secessionist movement, as was the case when Paki-
stan began fighting Bangladesh ' and when the Yugoslavian army
harshly responded to secessionist movements.' On the other hand,
if the secessionist group appears to be nothing more than a terrorist
organization, they will lose any chance for legitimacy in the interna-
tional community. Unfortunately, nations within the world community
historically have responded to secessionist struggles when their politi-
cal self-interests required such action."
117. If international charity will likely become the method for maintaining eco-
nomic viability, the international community has a legitimate concern. Id.
118. Id. at 235.
119. Namibia Case, supra note 22, at 72. The internal conditions of human rights
within a country and the level of international order are interrelated, thereby mak-
ing gross violations of human rights a concern of the international community.
Suzuki, supra note 8, at 836-37.
120. See Valentine, supra note 7, at 819-20.
121. Id. at 819.
122. Suzuki, supra note 8, at 855.
123. Id.
124. See Namibia Case, supra note 22 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.) (stating
that the Namibian people asserted their international personality through violent
struggle), cited in Valentine, supra note 7, at 819.
125. See generally, Nanda, supra note 6, at 321-36.
126. See Jill Smolowe, Yugoslavia: Out of Control, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 26. At
first, European and U.S. officials reacted negatively to secessionist movements, call-
ing for the preservation of territorial integrity. They changed their position after the
Yugoslavian army acted violently, calling for self-determination. Id.
127. Frankel, supra note 4, at 531.
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The effect of violence on the legitimacy of a secessionist claim
must be evaluated using the twin criteria of necessity and proportion-
ality.' When the secessionist group resorts to the use of force unnec-
essarily and without provocation, the state may use a proportionate
amount of force in response.' If the state uses unnecessary and dis-
proportionate force to suppress a peaceful effort to secede, however,
this may constitute a human rights violation or subjugation, adding
legitimacy to the secessionist claim.' Thus, the use of force cannot
be completely prohibited, but it also should not be rewarded.
Legal and political issues also should be considered in evaluating
the burdens of allowing secession. The legal considerations .would in-
clude pacta sunt servanda, territorial integrity, prohibition against the
use of force, recognition, and nonintervention."'1 Political consider-
ations would include the fear of balkanization, fragmentation, and
destabilization of the international community.' The dominant state
may justifiably invoke self-defense as a basis for denying secession if a
successful secession would end the existence of the remaining
state." The secessionist group must be willing and able to protect
the individual rights of its members after attaining independence. This
argument can be extended to deny secession on the grounds that the
new state would not only deny its current members fundamental
rights but also future members their fundamental rights.' 4 The po-
tential abuse of using the threat of secession as a bargaining tool to
obtain disproportionate political power, contrary to a theory of majority
rule, also causes concern." Finally, the most frequently cited burden
of allowing secession is that there would be no way of limiting it once
the process began, resulting in complete anarchy.'
In order to overcome an inherent bias against secession,"3 7 the
benefits must clearly outweigh the perceived burdens. Furthermore,
the seceding entity must demonstrate viability through de facto con-
trol.' Since the state suffers a burden to some extent in any seces-
sionist claim, the group and the international community must demon-
128. These are the same two criteria used to justify self-defense claims under
international law. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of
United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 AM. J. INVL L.
494 (1990).
129. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 237.
130. Id.
131. Nanda, supra note 5, at 263.
132. Id. at 264.
133. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 332-35 (stating that self-defense will only justify
denying secession under stringently confined circumstances).
134. Id. at 335-36 (referring to this as the 'soft paternalist argument').
135. Id. at 336-37 (calling this the 'strategic bargaining argument').
136. See, e.g., id. at 337-39.
137. Frankel, supra note 4, at 535-38.
138. Id. at 534.
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strate a significant benefit. The primary consideration in determining
the benefits of secession is the degree of subjugation or violation of hu-
man rights suffered by the secessionist group and the extent to which
secession would eliminate the problem.' The benefit of returning
territory wrongfully taken from the seceding group is another consider-
ation."0 A secessionist claim that truly advances fundamental human
rights is consistent with the recent willingness of the international
community to emphasize individual human rights over state
rights. ' The international community, as well as the parties in-
volved, may benefit from allowing secession rather than requiring a
disgruntled group to remain in the existing state through the use of
force. In addressing the Yugoslavian situation, German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl stated that "countries cannot be held together by tanks
and force."14
A somewhat obscure argument made by Leopold Kohr, an Austri-
an-born economist, is worth noting as the international community
undergoes significant change. He believed that the spirit among people
who regain national independence would lead to many positive results,
including "peace, economic revival, a flowering of the arts and true
participation by all citizens in democratic government."1 '" Further-
more, secession does not necessarily mean permanent disunion and
anarchy as once thought. The newly independent states will freely
reorganize themselves in order to prosper in the international mar-
ket.' Lastly, the widespread acceptance of self-determination as
customary international law demonstrates the principle's strong appeal
and benefits."'4 These inherent benefits in allowing people to freely
determine their government should reduce the traditional bias against
secession, making it easier to satisfy the balancing test in favor of
secession.
V. THE KURDS
In examining the effect of self-determination on the Kurds and
applying the above criteria to their situation, several startling conclu-
sions may be drawn. First, few groups (peoples) can make a stronger
139. See generally id.
140. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 802-24; Buchanan, supra note 3, at
322-42.
141. See Suzuki, supra note 8, at 862 (concluding that a choice should be made
that establishes the enjoyment of all human rights as the fundamental basis).
142. Smolowe, supra note 126, at 26.
143. John McClaughry, A Visionary of Disunion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, § 1,
at 19.
144. See New Slant on Union, CHRISTIAN ScIENcE MoNMITR, Dec. 11, 1991, at 20.
145. For some members of the U.N., self-determination "has become the preemp-
tory norm of international law, capable of overriding all other international legal
norms and even such other possible preemptory (sic] norms as the prohibition of the
threat or use of force." POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
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case for self-determination than the Kurds.' Second, the Kurds have
a strong, although not infallible, claim to a right of secession under the
above criteria. Third, the international manipulation of the Kurds
exemplifies the historical use of self-determination and secession as
tools for selfishly furthering state interests at the expense of human
rights. Lastly, the Kurds have suffered greatly from the lack of an
international institution capable of regulating secessionist claims.
In order to claim a right to self-determination, the Kurds must
demonstrate that they (1) constitute an identifiable group; and (2) are
suffering some type of significant grievance. Substantial objective evi-
dence supports the conclusion that the Kurds are a distinct and identi-
fiable group.14 They are the descendants of the biblical Medes'
thus giving them a common ethnicity. Furthermore, the Kurds have
strikingly different physical features from other peoples living in the
region. " The Kurds are Aryan, making them racially different from
many other regional groups.' The Kurds speak a distinct language
of the Indo-European group, in contrast to the Semitic-speaking Arabs
in Iraq and Turkic speakers in Turkey."l The Kurds are generally
Sunni Muslims, whereas the state religion in Iran is Shiism.152 Last-
ly, the Kurds have a long nomadic tradition and a distinct culture.'
The Kurds also subjectively consider themselves a distinct people,
further strengthening the proposition that they are an identifiable
group. In addition to the numerous objective criteria listed above, the
strongest evidence supporting the Kurds subjective group identity is
that they have managed to retain their distinct culture and ethnicity
even though they are a minority population in several different coun-
tries.' The largest Kurd populations are in Turkey (up to 10 mil-
146. Turkey's Kurds, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 3, 1992, at 20. See gen-
erally YOSEF GOTrLIEB, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 72-105 (1982);
Sarah E. Whitesell, The Kurdish Crisis: An International Incident Study, 21 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POLV 455 (1993).
147. See generally MARTIN VAN BRUINESSEN, AGHA, SHAIKH AND STATE: THE SO-
CIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF KURnDISTAN (1992) (discussing Kurd loyalties);
DAVID McDOwAu., THE KURDS - A NATION DENIED (1992) (discussing internal and
external barriers to establishing a Kurdish nation); NADER ENTESSAR, KURDISH
ETHNONATIONALISM (1992) (using the Kurds to illustrate how an ethnic group can
refuse to integrate into contemporary nation-states).
148. See STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE, THE KURDS: AN UNSTABLE ELEMENT IN THE
GULF 20-23 (1984).
149. See id. at 16 (stating that the Kurds are renowned for their striking physical
features, which have been largely preserved by not interacting with other peoples).
150. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 158-62 (discussing the Kurds); PELLETIERE,
supra note 148, at 19.
151. PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 19.
152. See id.
153. See Turkey's Kurds, supra note 146, at 20.
154. Kurds: The State that Never Was, ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), June 24, 1989, at
38 [hereinafter Kurds]. See also Stephen Fay, Born Losers?, INDEPENDENT (London),
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lion), Iran (up to 5 million), and Iraq (up to 4 million).IM The poor
treatment received by the Kurds in different countries throughout
history caused one Kurdish leader to refer to his people as the "or-
phans of the universe."' It is no wonder that Kurds identify more
closely with other Kurds than with the people of the state in which
they reside.
The Kurds' nomadic nature and their traditional allegiance to
tribal leaders somewhat weakens their group identity." This faction-
alism is still apparent in modem Kurdish politics, where at least three
different leaders lead three different parties and each demands a dif-
ferent degree of autonomy for the Kurds.' In Iraq, the Kurdish Par-
liament is split evenly between Mr. Barzani's Kurdish Democratic
Party and Mr. Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 5 In Turkey,
the radicle Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) continues to fight a gorilla
war in an effort to secede from Turkey. With more than 10,500
deaths" and indiscriminate terrorist attacks in Europe, the PKK
has lost a great deal of credibility in the world community.1 61 Al-
though factionalism and terrorism may weaken the cohesiveness of the
Kurds, the fact that leaders are using free elections to determine the
opinion of the majority of Kurds regarding independence strengthens
their group identity." Furthermore, only a small minority of the
reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., June, 1991, at 17 (stating that the Kurds have
retained their identity for 2,500 years as a subject people).
155. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
156. Id.
157. PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 18. Graham E. Fuller, The Fate of the Kurds,
72 FOR. AFF. 108 (1993) (stating that the Kurds have not yet obtained statehood
because (1) it has not been convenient for the international community and (2) the
Kurds own factionalism has kept them from fully uniting).
158. See Ayse Sarioglu, Turkey's Rebel Kurds Go Separate Way From Iraqi Kurds,
The Reuter Library Report, Apr. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
File (discussing the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan,
who wants independence for the Kurds); Kurt Schork, Kurdish Leader Barzani Takes
His Autonomy Deal to the People, The Reuter Library Report, Oct. 18, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (contrasting Massoud Barzani, leader of
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), who wants to discuss Kurdish autonomy with
Iraq, and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who is
less willing to negotiate with Iraq).
159. John Darnton, Almost a Nation: The Kurds in Iraq - A Special Report;
Kurds Rebuilding Shattered Land, Winning a Precarious Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1994, at Al.
160. See, e.g., Bloodiest Year for Kurd Separatists, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993, at 2
[hereinafter Bloodiest Year].
161. See, e.g., Steve Vogel, Kurdish Separatist Party Outlawed by Germany; Group
Blamed for Attacks on Turkish Targets, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at A22; Steve
Crawshaw, Trial Tests Munich's Policy on Kurds, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 13, 1994, at 9.
But see Kevin McKiernan, Turkey Terrorizes its Kurds: Another U.S. Ally Deploys
Death Squads, 57 THE PROGREsswE 28 (1993).
162. See Kurds Want Self-Determination, Not Independence, Agence France Presse,
May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File [here-
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overall Kurdish population engages in terrorist activity' and in re-
sponse to egregious violations of their fundamental human rights.'"
If a territorial standard is applied to define the group,'" Kurds
would still constitute an identifiable group because they have a com-
mon claim to the same territory, known as Kurdistan. Nearly seven-
teen to twenty million Kurds inhabit the Taurus and Zagros moun-
tains where they have lived for centuries." Therefore, the Kurds are
an identifiable group applying any of the three standards - objective,
subjective, or territorial.'"
In addition to proving they are an identifiable group, the Kurds
must prove that they are suffering some type of substantial grievance
in order to claim a right to self-determination. This could be in the
form of subjugation, a violation of human rights, or deprivation of a
legitimate territorial claim. The Kurds can more than adequately satis-
fy this criterion, given the numerous atrocities committed against
them, including a violation of the international jus cogens prohibiting
genocide.' In the past twenty-two years, more than 200,000 Kurds
have been slaughtered in Iraq alone.'" More than four thousand
Kurds were murdered by Saddam Hussein in Halabja in a single cloud
of deadly poison gas,7 while eight thousand men from the Barzani
tribe disappeared without a trace.""
In addition to outright genocide, the Kurds have been systemati-
inafter Self-Determination].
163. See Tom Hundly, Rough Road for Mainstream Kurds; War on Minority
Makes it Hard to Think like a Turk', CiH. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1994, at N7.
164. See, e.g., Robert R. Koenig, Groups Alleging Turkish Hypocrisy in Helping
Kurds, ST. LOIS PoST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 1994, at 5C (stating that a recent report
by Amnesty International found increasingly widespread, systematic human rights
violations targeted primarily at the Kurds in Turkey); Bob Hepburn, Paper Champi-
ons Kurdish Autonomy, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 17, 1994, at C5 (reporting that at least
sixteen employees of a Kurdish newspaper in Turkey have been killed since the
paper first appeared in early 1992).
165. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
166. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
•167. See MAXIME RODINSON, Preface to A.R. GHASSEMLOU ET AL., PEOPLE WITH-
OUT A COUNTRY: THE KuRDS AND KURDISTAN 1-7 (Gerard Chaliand ed. & Michael
Pailis trans., 1980). "The rights of the Kurdish people should be obvious to every-
body. We have here a specifically defined people with a language and a culture all
their own . . . living in a geographically coherent area, and refusing en masse the
cultural assimilation which others seek to impose upon them." Id. at 4.
168. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
GA Res. 96, Dec. 11, 1946, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1946). See Betraying the Kurds Again,
JERusALEM POST, Apr. 7, 1991, at Op-Ed, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [herein-
after Betraying the Kurds].
169. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168, at Op-Ed (statistics from the Commit-
tee for the Study of Genocide in Gottingen, Sweden).
170. See Wretched Kurds, ECONOMIST, June 24, 1989, at 16 available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wire File.
171. Id.
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cally discriminated against in Turkey and Iraq on the basis of racial,
linguistic, and religious differences.172 In Turkey, Kurds are referred
to as "Mountain Turks," denying their existence even in name."'
Turkey banned the Kurds from wearing traditional Kurdish clothing
and from using the Kurdish language. 17 ' In addition to violating the
basic human rights of the Kurds, Turkey has followed a policy of forc-
ible assimilation.7 In Iraq, demolition squads leveled entire Kurd
villages, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless."' This oppression
coupled with acts of genocide are more than sufficient to establish a
legitimate grievance based on human rights violations. It would be
absurd to claim that the Kurds are exercising the rights of citizens,
enjoying fundamental human rights, and enhancing their political,
cultural, and economic development under such oppressive condi-
tions.7 The Kurds, an identifiable group suffering a substantial
grievance, satisfy the two criteria necessary to establish a right to
exercise self-determination and possibly access the extreme remedy of
secession.
The Kurds also have a legitimate claim to territory based on an
historical grievance. 8 If the Kurds obtain their freedom in the form
of an autonomous region within the borders of an existing state - as
in the case of Iraqi Kurds - a territorial claim is only useful in defin-
ing boundaries. If, however, the Kurds secede and establish an inde-
pendent Kurdistan, they will need a valid territorial claim, since they
will be taking territory from at least one existing state. The Kurds
have occupied the same territorial region for four thousand years.'79
The Kurds fought various opponents throughout history but managed
172. See PELLETIERE, supra note 148, at 19. See generally. MICHAEL M. GUNTER,
THE KURDS IN TURKEY: A POLITCAL DILEMMA (1990); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DE-
STROYING ETHNIC IDENTITY - THE KURDS OF TURKEY (Updated Sept., 1990) (A Hel-
sinki Watch Report).
173. Andrew Borowiec, Kurds' Dreams Shatter Again, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991,
at A8 (the word "Kurd" was completely banned until recently); Kurds, supra note
154, at 38. "No where else in the world is a group of people as large as the Kurds
deprived not only of national rights, but of their identity as people, different racially
and linguistically." Kurds Existence Denied in Turkey, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 25, 1994,
at A26.
174. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
175. Turkey's Kurds, supra 146 at 20.
176. Unsolved Kurdistan, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 44 available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wire File.
177. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
178. See Kurdish Leader Talabani Warns of New "War of Extermination," Voice of
the People of Kurdistan, Nov. 10 1991, translated by the BBC, Nov. 12, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File. At the time Iraqi Kurdistan was annexed
to the newly established Iraqi state in 1924, Britain and Iraq promised to respect
the Kurdish people's right to live on their land. The current Iraqi government is
now violating these obligations. Id.
179. Fay, supra note 154, at 17.
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to stay on their historic homeland and retain their distinct culture.'
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) provided for an independent country of
Kurdistan but was rejected by the Turkish hero Ataturk."' The Trea-
ty of Lausanne (1923) replaced the former treaty but failed to include
an independent Kurdish nation."18 Subsequently the Kurds fought
the British in Iraq and then the Iraqis themselves, attempting to ob-
tain an independent or autonomous homeland." In 1946, the Irani-
an Kurds established an independent republic in Mahabad, but it
lasted less than one year.' " The fact that the Kurds have inhabited
the same territory for thousands of years, despite efforts to annihilate
or assimilate them, establishes a legitimate claim to the territory. An
argument can be made to satisfy the historical grievance requirement
of a strict territorial interpretation, since any prior incorporation of
Kurd territory was a wrongful acquisition.' The current govern-
ments in Iraq and Turkey are directly responsible for the continued
violation of human rights and denial of Kurd autonomy.'
Kurd leaders have recently attempted to resolve their desire for
freedom with remedies that stop short of outright secession,"7 fur-
ther legitimatizing their claim in the eyes of the international commu-
nity.' Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party,
articulated his goals when he said "now we are looking for autono-
my... [and] no one can deny us as Kurds our right to self-determina-
tion. Just as European peoples have that right, so do we."' Peace-
fully achieving autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for Iraq are
Barzani's expressed political goals.' ' He recognized, however, that
the Kurds have the right to be completely free but current realities of
the international community limit the Kurds to seeking autonomy. 9'
The existence of several Kurdish political parties with different plat-
180. See generally id.
181. See Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
182. See id.
183. See Fay, supra note 154, at 17 (giving a concise history of the Kurds' territo-
rial struggle).
184. Kurds, supra note 154, at 38.
185. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 105 and accompanying text describing the dominant parties'
wrongful acquisition of territory and the Kurds' right to secession.
187. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168 (stating the declared goal of the Kurds
is autonomy, not secession); Nick B. Williams, Kurds - Iraq Begin Peace Negotia-
tions, LA TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al (Kurdish Democratic Party leaders do not
advocate secession, but rather autonomy). But see Sarioglu, supra note 158 (stating
the PKK leader wants independence, not autonomy).
188. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
189. Schork, supra note 158.
190. Id.
191. Iraqi Kurdish Leader Says Elections Important for International Credibility,
Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, Apr. 13, 1992, translated by BBC, Apr. 15, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File.
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forms evidences a functioning democracy. In fact, the Kurds elected a
parliament and cabinet to manage Kurdistan's affairs, including the
preparation for autonomy under a federal system." This should
strengthen the Kurds' claim, rather than weaken it, since it demon-
strates political viability and international credibility.'
Iraqi Kurds inherited a de facto independent state as a result of
the power vacuum created after the Gulf War.'" The U.N. sanctions
have provided the Iraqi Kurds protection under a "no-fly zone" from
further military attacks by Iraq.' The U.N. sanctions, however, also
hurt the Iraqi Kurds because the embargo against Iraq, coupled with
Iraq's embargo against the Kurds, creates a "double embargo" that
prevents desperately needed food and medicine from reaching- the
Kurds.' Leaders of the Iraqi Kurds continue to declare that their
goal is a unified federation of Iraq, containing an autonomous
Kurdistan.' Average Kurdish citizens in Iraq, however, are less
diplomatic, voicing their support for an independent Kurdistan.'
For now, Iraqi Kurds continue to face grave hardships but at least live
in an autonomous state under the leadership of their own elected offi-
cials, free from discrimination and genocide. Therefore, Iraqi Kurds
have obtained, at least for now, an autonomous state in which they
exercise political independence. This should be viewed as a positive
development under international law. The international community in
general, and the U.S. specifically, should not allow further political
manipulation of the Iraqi Kurds, but rather support and recognize
their autonomy. The U.S. should be willing to allow the Kurds to freely
exercise their right of self-determination, which may include full inde-
pendence through secession if, and when, the Kurds decide that is
192. See, e.g., Kurdistan Local Government Official on Restructuring Economy,
Secession, Voice of the People of Kurdistan, June 8, 1992, translated by BBC, June
10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC File; PUK Radio Says Opposition
Must Clarify its Stance on Federalism, Voice of the People of Kurdistan, Sept. 24,
1992, translated by the BBC, Sept. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBC File. In 1992, Iraqs 4 million Kurds held "their first free and fair elections -
internationally observed and perhaps the freest elections ever held in any Arab
country." The Kurds New Democracy, June 1, 1992, WASH. POST, at A18.
193. The Kurds' New Democracy, WASH. POST, June 1, 1992, at A18.
194. See, e.g., James O'Shea, Kurds Make Democracy Amid Iraq Dictatorship;
Neighboring States Fear any Notion of Autonomy, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1994, at Cl;
Scott Steele & Michael Georgy, Gulf War Orphans; Iraq's Kurds Face Hunger and
War this Winter, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 4, 1993, at 54.
195. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.LM. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 688].
196. See, eg., Kurdistan Trapped Between Twin Embargoes, NPR SHOW: ALL
THiNGs CONSIDERED, Feb. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
197. See, e.g., Iraq's Kurds; Surviving, with Difficulty, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at
48; Fuller, supra note 157, at n.3.
198. Observers report that while Kurdish leaders espouse the official position of
advocating an autonomous Kurdish state within an Iraqi federation, individual Kurds
desire full independence. See, eg., Darnton, supra note 159 at, Al.
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prudent.
The fact remains, however, that while the Kurds have obtained an
autonomous region - if not a de facto Kurdistan - in Iraq, they re-
main subjected to government control in other countries. Even the
future autonomy of Iraqi Kurds remains uncertain because it results
solely from protection provided by foreign military forces.' The radi-
cal PKK Party continues to fight a vicous gorilla war in Turkey. Addi-
tionally, the PKK openly demands full secession from Turkey. While
fighting the Kurds within Turkey, the Turkish Government has ex-
pressed a willingness to recognize and even protect Iraqi Kurds from
attack. In fact, Turkey remains vehemently opposed to Kurd activities
within its borders and continues to violate fundamental human rights
including banning Kurd participation in the political process. Although
the Kurds in Turkey and Iran have not inherited a de facto indepen-
dent state, they continue to seek independence or autonomy in order to
escape from the never ending violations of their fundamental human
rights.
The primary difference between the Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish
Kurds results from the political environment in which they live. While
Iraqi Kurds inherited their own state after the Gulf War, Turkish
Kurds have been forced to fight for their very existence against a coun-
try with strong ties to Europe and the United States. While Iraqi
Kurds were murdered by the arch enemy of the developed world, Turk-
ish Kurds used terrorist tactics in Europe. As perceived by the U.S.,
Iraqi Kurds are good, innocent victims and Turkish Kurds are bad
terrorists. Certainly the PKK Party in Turkey utilizes extreme mea-
sures and verges on outright terrorism, while the Iraqi Kurds receive
protection from the U.N., thereby directly affecting the credibility of
both Kurdish struggles. Regardless, all Kurds deserve the opportunity
to exercise their right of self-determination, which may include return-
ing a portion of existing countries to establish an independent
Kurdistan.
In order to establish a strong case for an autonomous region or
independence, the Kurds must demonstrate political and economic via-
bility.' The Iraqis themselves have acknowledged the potential eco-
nomic viability of an independent Kurdistan by not including certain
oil-producing towns like Kirkuk in the proposed autonomous re-
gion."' The Kurds should not be barred from establishing an autono-
199. The resolve of the United States faces uncertainty in the aftermath of a
tragic military accident on April 14, 1994 that killed twenty-six people when two
U.S. warlanes shot-down two U.S. helicopters over northern Iraq. See, e.g., Rethink
the Job in Iraq, INVL HERALD TRaB., Apr. 18, 1994, at Opinion. But see Caryle Mur-
phy, 'It's Important Work; U.S. Still Committed to Protecting Kurds, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 1994, at Al.
200. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
201. Mouna Naim, Iraqi Kurdish Leader Pessimistic [sic] on Baghdad Talks,
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mous or independent state, given the relaxed standard of viability set
forth in U.N. Resolution 1514' and the proven success of nations
with a much smaller land and resource base. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurds
have demonstrated political and economic viability, even under ex-
tremely adverse conditions.
The level of disruptiveness is a key element in weighing the bene-
fits of allowing secession' with the burdens. This balancing test is
the final standard by which to evaluate the Kurds' situation.' Iraq
and Turkey would be hypocritical to claim that the loss of Kurdistan
would overly burden them, given the hostile treatment of the Kurds
and destruction of their territory. The current level of disruption to the
international community is extremely high. In 1991, for example, some
250,000 Kurds became refugees in Turkey, 100,000 in Iran, and anoth-
er 150,000 were bombed by Iraqi forces while trying to reach the bor-
der.' The repugnant acts of genocide suffered by the Kurds are also
disruptive to the international community. Creating an independent
Kurdistan would eliminate the refugee problem faced by neighboring
countries and the financial burden on the West in funding relief pro-
grams. The Kurds would greatly benefit from an independent home-
land, where they would at least be free from state sponsored genocide
and have their basic human rights protected.
The amount of violence involved in the struggle is a factor in
determining overall disruptiveness. In light of the massive force, in-
cluding chemical weapons, used against the Kurds, their response
generally has met the twin criteria of necessity and proportionali-
ty.' However, the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), an ex-
tremist faction engaged in terrorist attacks, has killed more than
10,500 people since 1984, including civilians.' This same faction is
also the most outspoken proponent of secession, thus negatively af-
fecting the international community's perception of the broader
Kurdish struggle. The members of this extremist faction involved in
terrorist activities represents a small proportion of the total number of
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence
France Presse File (stating that Kirkuk "could constitute the economic basis for
secession').
202. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
203. Although the majority of Kurd leaders are not yet demanding a right to
secession, the minority leaders who are may gain influence as secessionist struggles
in other countries succeed.
204. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
205. Betraying the Kurds, supra note 168.
206. Martin Woollacott, The Tragic Collapse of a Revolution, GUARDIAN (London),
reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., June 1991, at 16, 17 (the Kurds cannot be blamed
for trying to rebel against Iraq); Wretched Kurds, supra note 170, at 16 (stating that
the Kurds may seem troublesome, but they have been continually abused and ex-
cluded).
207. Bloodiest Year, supra note 160, at 2.
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Kurds affected by Iraqi and Turkish aggression. Even Turkish leaders
who continue to fight the PKK faction have declared that "[i]t is imper-
ative that the international community and the media recognize the
clear distinction between the Kurdish issue and international terror-
ism, of which PKK is a part.' ° The massive force used against mil-
lions of displaced Kurds, including the annihilation of hundreds of
thousands, outweighs the force used by one extremist faction, thus
justifying the Kurds' overall use of force.
Other legal and political considerations also lead to the conclusion
that the balance is in favor of allowing the Kurds a right to secede.
Nonintervention and territorial integrity are hollow principles if they
allow a state to systematically exterminate an entire sub-culture of its
population. Self-determination outweighs any incompatible princi-
ples," especially when there is a violation of an established jus
cogens, i.e. genocide, which is inherently unjustifiable.21 The plight
of the Kurds is so wretched that intervening in Iraq's affairs is the
least risky course available to the West and the one most likely to save
lives.2" In weighing the human rights of individuals against the
rights of a state, the enjoyment of all human rights emerges as the
fundamental goal." If the international community plans to actually
implement their declared preference for emphasizing human rights
over state rights, there is no better opportunity than in the context of
the Kurds. The Kurds provide an opportunity for the U.N., U.S., and
other nations to recognize the need for structural changes in order to
protect fundamental human rights, "even at the cost of inevitable in-
stability. n1
VI. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Kurds are certainly entitled to the right of self-determination
and would have an extremely strong case for secession. The reluctance
of the international community to intervene in an effective manner
largely results from states acting solely in their own self-interests.
Various countries have manipulated the Kurds in order to maintain a
balance of power in the region. The Kurdish Independence movement
of the 1960s and 1970s failed largely due to Cold War politics, when
both the United States and the Soviet Union had an overriding inter-
208. PKK Terrorists, LA TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at B7 (printing a letter from the
Consul General of Turkey).
209. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
210. See THORNBERRY, supra note 33, at 57-100 (discussing the prohibition of
genocide under international law).
211. Intervention and Responsibility, WORLD PRESS REV., June 1991, at 19 (ex-
cerpt taken from the ECONOMIST).
212. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
213. Fuller, supra note 157.
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est in stabilizing the region. " The United States and Iran supported
the Kurds as they fought against Iraq, but the only goal was to weak-
en Iraq, not to give the Kurds independence.21 In March of 1975,
hostilities between Iran and Iraq terminated and so did military sup-
port for the Kurds."'6 The ultimate aim of the United States in sup-
porting the Kurds was to weaken Iraq, which was an ally of the Soviet
Union.217
It was a great betrayal which has burned itself into the memory of
the Kurdish people; an oppressed minority in all the states where
they are dispersed, the Kurds have all too frequently linked their
struggles to the realpolitik of the powerful, serving as useful but
always dispensable tools in the perennial Middle Eastern game of
nations.1
Western nations also refused to confront Turkey over its repression of
the Kurds, due to Turkey's importance as a NATO ally and secular
balance to extremist Muslim factions in the region.1 ' In the recent
Gulf War, the United States used the Kurds to destabilize Iraq in
order to secure the oil and freedom of Kuwait, but left the Kurds to
fend for themselves after Kuwait was liberated.' The U.S. position
of supporting the unity of Iraq for self-serving political reasons is on
record.
We support the unity of Iraq. But there's a very practical reason -
not that we think Saddam Hussein should repress the Kurds and
the Shiites .... But there is a political balance of power in the
region among states that historically have been at least not friends,
or they've been antagonistic .... If you change the balance signifi-
cantly, you could induce enormous instabilities."
This political manipulation of the Kurds has been the rule, not the
214. See PELETIRE, supra note 148, at 23-29.
215. BUCHHErr, supra note 6, at 158. "The United States, Iran and Turkey have
always used Iraqi Kurds to harass Iraq's central government, but they have never
desired the creation of an independent Kurdish state that would bring about insta-
bility in Turkey and Iran." Masoud Kazemzadeh, How George Bush Lost Iraq, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1992, at 3B.
216. BUCHHEIT, supra note 6, at 158-59. See David Hirst, Kurdish Pawns Struggle
to Break Regional Stalemate, Nov. 7, 1992, GUARDIAN, at 10.
217. GERARD CHALIAND, Introduction to A.R. GHASSEMLOU ET AL., PEOPLE WITH-
OUT A CoUNTRY: THE KURDs AND KURDIsTAN 8-17 (Gerard Chaliand ed. & Michael
Pallis trans., 1980).
218. David Hirst, Kurdish Pawns Struggle to Break Regional Stalemate, GuARD-
IAN, Nov. 7, 1992, at 10.
219. Kurdish State; Turn up the Volume to Turkey, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 12,
1992, at A12.
220. See generally Betraying the Kurds, supra note 155.
221. Doyle McManus, Nations Splitting Up? U.S. Prefers Stability of Current Bor-
ders, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1991, at A10 (quoting Brent Scowcroft, National Security
Advisor to President Bush).
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exception, throughout history. Outside powers have been more con-
cerned with keeping Iraqi leaders off balance than providing the Kurds
with humanitarian assistance.=
The plight of the Kurds, especially after the Gulf War, demon-
strates the indifference the international community has shown to-
wards the principle of self-determination when it seemingly conflicts
with self-serving political considerations.' Once the United States
decided that weakening Iraq was in its own interest, a double standard
was created regarding the Kurds: "Those in Iraq are the pitiable, per-
secuted victims of arch-villain Saddam Hussein, whereas Turkish
Kurds are deemed troublemakers and terrorists who need to be con-
trolled.' 2 Realpolitik, rather than justice, governs self-determination
for violently oppressed groups in the 'new world order' just as it did in
the old world order.'
Any unilateral effort by Turkey or Iraq to improve the situation of
their respective Kurdish populations also must be viewed with skepti-
cism. Not only have both countries violated past agreements with the
Kurds,' but each country has reasons to at least appear accommo-
dating. Turkey must correct its human rights record before being al-
lowed to join the European Union (E.U.).227 Iraq must improve its im-
age in the international community if it expects to secure any economic
or political allies.
Following the Gulf War, the United Nations again looked on help-
lessly as states alternately intervened and ignored the Kurds as their
own self-interests dictated. Without the U.N. willing to take the lead,
states were also free to ignore the atrocities, creating an international
'conspiracy of silence.' The other possibility was that states would
intervene and promote their own self-interests under the guise of hu-
manitarian intervention.2 The intervention of the United States and
other Western nations on behalf of the Kurds after the Gulf War was
certainly necessary, but it was nonetheless disconcerting for the inter-
222. Joost R. Hiltman, Still Pawns in the Great Game; Iraqi Kurds, 254 THE
NATION 620 (1992).
223. Craig R. Whitney, The World: When Empires Fall Not Everyone Emerges with
a State of His Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, § 4, at 2.
224. Turkey's Kurds, supra note 146, at 20.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Nick B. Williams Jr., Kurds - Iraq Begin Peace Negotiations, LA
TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al (discussing a 1970 deal between Iraq and the Kurds
that would give them full autonomy of their territory).
227. See, e.g., Martin Bright, Turkey: Looking Towards Europe; Before Joining the
EU, Turkey has to Overcome Twin Hurdles of Rampant Inflation and a Poor Human
Rights Record, GUARDLAN, Apr. 11, 1994, at Ell.
228. See Marc Weller, Threat to Peace Allows World Body to Override Charter,
TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 1991, at Overseas News, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wire File.
229. Id.
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national community. "The presence of the coalition forces on Iraqi
territory due to the revolts of the Kurdish people is unjustifiable. The
coalition should hand over policy regarding the Kurdish people to the
UN, which has no territorial ambition.'m The U.N. is the only insti-
tution capable of intervening on behalf of an oppressed people, without
the appearance of acting out of political self-interest.
After initial inaction, however, the U.N. Security Council took a
significant step by passing Resolution 688, which expressly condemns
Iraq's severe repressive of the Kurds. 1 Although the U.N. Charter
prohibits interference in matters essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of a member state, a situation threatening international peace
and security authorizes the Security Council to act. 2 The U.N. Sec-
retary General also may take any matter to the Security Council that
threatens the maintenance of international peace and security.' The
United Nations has recognized that state sponsored genocide, the use
of chemical weapons, the mass migration of displaced refugees, and
violations of human rights constitute a threat to international peace;
and more importantly, the U.N. finally has acted.
The Kurds in Iraq demonstrate that they are capable of function-
ing as an independent state, even under harsh circumstances. Given
the degree of oppression and discrimination against the Kurds in Tur-
key, Iran, and Iraq, the international community should at least sup-
port the Kurds efforts to obtain an autonomous state in each of these
countries. Of course, the decision should be left to the Kurds as to
whether they want a fully independent Kurdistan. But if the Kurds do
opt for secession, the international community, under the leadership of
the U.N., should evaluate their claim by applying criteria, such as
those suggested above, and should not allow countries to manipulate
the Kurds in order to further their own objectives. The time has come
for the international community to recognize secession as a legitimate
possibility under self-determination and to stabilize international rela-
tions through active U.N. involvement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Self-determination has become customary international law, thus
applicable to all nations. It also has emerged as an overriding principle
when in conflict with other principles of international law. Self-deter-
mination has not, however, obtained the status ofjus cogens, primarily
because it applies only to groups, not universally.
230. Intervention and Responsibility, supra note 192, at 19 (excerpt and quote
taken from the Indonesian periodical SERAMBI INDONESIA).
231. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 195.
232. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
233. U.N. CHARTER art. 99.
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Only an impartial institution representing the entire international
community can regulate claims of self-determination and secession.
Any type of state involvement, other than perhaps formal recognition,
risks appearing as a cloak for implementing a political agenda. States
will continue to act in their own self-interest, not to protect human
rights. Rather than allowing states to unilaterally determine the valid-
ity of claims of self-determination and secession, standards and criteria
must be formulated and consistently applied by the United Nations.
In order to claim a right to self-determination there must be (1)
an identifiable group, determined by applying objective, subjective, and
territorial standards; and (2) a substantial grievance in the form of
subjugation, a violation of fundamental human rights, or territorial
deprivation. Although defining group identity and what constitutes a
substantial grievance are subject to interpretation, so are many other
accepted legal standards (i.e. reasonableness).
After establishing a right to self-determination, additional criteria
must be satisfied before a legitimate right to secede exists. These crite-
ria require that (1) less extreme remedies be exhausted; (2) the leaders
of the group represent the majority and account for opposing views; (3)
the group demonstrate some level of political and economic viability;
(4) a valid territorial claim exist if the group is seceding from an exist-
ing state, but not in a colonial context or if the seceding group joins an
existing nation; (5) the use of force be necessary and proportionate;
and (6) the overall benefits of allowing secession outweigh the burdens.
The ultimate goal is to maximize world harmony by striking a balance
between individual human rights and state rights. The threshold ques-
tion becomes whether the benefit to the seceding group and interna-
tional community outweighs the burden to the dominant state and
international community. If the answer is yes, the secessionist claim is
legitimate.
In applying these standards and criteria to the Kurds, it is appar-
ent that they have satisfied the requirements for claiming a right to
self-determination and have an extremely strong claim for secession.
The Kurds are an identifiable people with a distinct culture and lan-
guage who have lived in the same territorial region for thousands of
years. They have suffered such atrocities as state sponsored genocide,
cultural extermination, and gross violations of fundamental human
rights. To say that the Kurds have a substantial grievance is a ridicu-
lous understatement.
The Kurds are still attempting to achieve their goal of freedom
through methods short of secession. Their leaders are willing to poll
the opinion of the group before acting and advocate remedies short of
outright secession. Although there is some factionalism amongst the
Kurdish leadership, this is a healthy foundation for a politically viable
democracy. The Kurds are also capable of economic viability, especially
if they obtain their legitimate territorial claim that includes rich oil-
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producing regions. The Kurds do not need a territorial claim in order
to achieve autonomy, except as an aid in defining the borders. Regard-
less, the Kurds do have a legitimate claim to the territory they have
inhabited for centuries. International agreements, including the Treaty
of Sevres, have recognized the Kurds' territorial claim. The Kurds use
of force has been both necessary and proportionate. In addition to
potential factionalism, the use of terrorist tactics by the Kurds is a
weakness in their claim. However, it is remarkable that a people faced
with genocidal extermination has not resorted to all-out warfare or
unrestricted terrorism in order to preserve their race. Finally, the
disruptiveness of allowing a people to be exterminated, oppressed, and
forced out of their own territory outweighs the disruptiveness of allow-
ing them an autonomous or independent state. The benefit of allowing
millions of people to live without the constant fear of complete annihi-
lation surely outweighs the burden to Iraq and Turkey of losing people
and territory that they treat with total disregard.
Individuals create states in order to protect their fundamental
rights, therefore it makes sense to continue promoting human rights
over state rights when they are incompatible. Rather than viewing
secessionist struggles as a dangerous step towards anarchy, they
should be viewed as a natural process of allowing groups of individuals
who were forced into political units against their will to freely exercise
their right of self-determination. It is probably more than coincidental
that as secessionist claims increase, creating smaller nation-states, so
does the number of large international organizations like the European
Union. Perhaps these two seemingly incompatible trends are actually a
preview of the future world order, where regional multinational organi-
zations interact in a true international community. To prohibit all
secessionist claims would be to stifle the positive development of hu-
man rights and the continual evolution of a viable world order.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the rapid development of the Israeli economy, Is-
raeli securities markets have been particularly active recently. There
have been numerous public offerings, both initial and subsequent, of a
wide variety of companies, including the increasing use of public offer-
ings as a mode of privatizating major government companies. Foreign
investment activity, both international and private, has also increased,
coupled with sometimes frenetic stock exchange trading. Consequently,
there is increasing importance in the regulation of the securities mar-
kets. These regulations are contained in the Securities Law of 1968
(the "Law"), securities regulations promulgated under the Law (the
"Regulations"), and the internal rules of the country's only public mar-
ket for the trading of securities, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (the
"TASE"). Related issues concerning the regulation of publicly traded
companies are dealt with in the Companies Ordinance [New Version]
1983, an amended version of the 1929 English Companies Act.
Israeli securities regulation, as reflected in the Law, is in turn
based in major respects on the pattern established by the U.S. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The study that
led to an enactment of the Law was conducted by a committee headed
by Dr. A. Yadin, then serving in the Ministry of Justice. The commit-
tee, appointed in 1962, rendered its report in 1963. Among the distin-
guished witnesses who testified before the committee were Professor
* Copyright 1994 by Clark Boardman Callaghan (1-800-323-1336). All rights
reserved. Reprinted by permission of Clark Boardman Callaghan from International
Capital Markets and Securities Regulation by Harold S. Bloomenthal and Samuel
Wolff.
** Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; Professor of Law, Bar
Ilan University, Ramat Gan. I acknowledge the valuable assistance of my associate
Daniel Wolf in the preparation of this paper.
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Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School and Emanuel Cohen, then a
member of the Securities Exchange Commission and subsequently its
chairman. Mr. Cohen's testimony before the Yadin committee, the only
testimony quoted in detail in the committee report, included the follow-
ing suggestions:
[While there are no serious abuses as yet, it is better to have the
law and anticipate the abuses than to wait for abuses and then
adopt a law. You should provide against such abuses in the future
by making appropriate laws in advance.... To the extent that you
are in a position to tell the public that you have erected a structure
and adopted a law designed for their protection, you will have a
better chance of encouraging local investment. Finally, Israel is
interested in encouraging portfolio investment from abroad. In the
U.S. and England you will instill confidence if people know that
you have erected a structure of control which provides a real mea-
sure of protection. Consideration should be given to a law rather
more sophisticated than present conditions alone would warrant
but one which will serve the above purposes.1
In response to the committee report, and closely following Com-
missioner Cohen's suggestions, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) adopt-
ed a broad scheme of regulation, far more sophisticated than was
called for in the early 1960s when the Israeli securities markets were
in their infancy, only fifteen years after the establishment of the State.
Although there have been some major changes in the Law since its
adoption, the initial Law has remained the basic structure of securities
regulation and has certainly fulfilled Commissioner Cohen's vision.
II. THE SECURrrs AUTHORITY
The Law established a statutory Securities Authority (the "Au-
thority"), modeled generally after the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. The responsibilities and powers of the Authority are
broad and include the approval of prospectuses for public offerings, the
supervision of the TASE, and the review of periodic reports submitted
by all companies that have issued securities that are publicly traded.
The purpose of the Authority, as expressed in the Law, is to pro-
tect the interests of the general public who invest in securities.' The
Authority is today composed of no more than thirteen members (an
increase from the original limit), appointed by the Minister of Finance
(the "Minister"). The only stipulations regarding the appointment of
the members of the Authority is that some should be members of the
public, some should be employees of the State, and one should be an
employee of the Bank of Israel. In addition, the Minister is charged
with appointing a chairman and deputy chairman from among the
1. YADIN COMM. REP. 4 (1963) [hereinafter YADIN].
2. Securities Law 5728-1968 § 2 (1968) (Isr.) [hereinafter Securities Law].
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members of the Authority.' In contrast with the SEC's employment of
full time commissioners, the Law does not require that any member of
the Authority be a full-time employee. In practice, the chairman is the
only full-time employee of the Authority.
There are a number of disqualifications for service as a member of
the Authority, such as (1) individuals who are members of the TASE,
(2) persons who engage in the business of the trading securities for
their own or others' accounts, and (3) employees of those who do one of
the above.' Further, individuals who are not employees of the State or
the Bank of Israel and who, in the opinion of the Minister, carry on
business activities that may lead to conflicts of interest with the posi-
tion on the Authority are similarly disqualified.5
A member is initially appointed. for a period of three years and
may thereafter be reappointed for additional terms of similar length.6
The chairman serves for a term of five years, with the possible renewal
of his appointment for further terms of three years each.' The Minis-
ter is empowered, however, to cancel the appointment of any member
who exceeds certain boundaries of reasonable absences from meetings
without cause.8
For the obvious reason of avoiding conflicts of interest, members
of the Authority must report all securities held by them or their spous-
es to the Minister and the Authority within seven days of their ap-
pointment. Subsequently, members must notify the Minister and the
Authority within seven days of the relevant transaction of any acqui-
sition or sale of shares by them of their spouses.' Furthermore, a
member of the Authority is forbidden to acquire any securities except
as authorized under a special permit (whose form may be specific to a
certain category of securities or general) from the Minister.0 The Law
also includes a provision regarding notice to the Minister and required
permits for the acquisition of securities by any employee of the Minis-
try of Finance who undertakes administrative or professional tasks
regarding securities."
3. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
4. Id. § 3(cXl)-(3).
5. Id. § 3(cX4).
6. Id. § 4(a), (c).
7. Id. § 4(b).
8. Id. § 4(d). The Minister is authorized to act in this manner if a member of
the Authority, without a reason satisfactory to the Ministry, misses four consecutive
meetings or six meetings in a year. A parallel provision for removal of a director of
a government company who misses board meetings of that company appears in the
Government Companies Law § 22(aX2) (1975) (Isr.). In that instance, however, the
removal is automatic unless the Ministers responsible for that company excuse the
absence after consultation with the Government Companies Authority.
9. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 5(b).
10. Id. § 5(a).
11. Id. § 5(c).
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The Minister is required to remove a member of the Authority if
he becomes a member of the TASE, violates one of the holding or ac-
quisition of securities provisions mentioned above, is convicted of a
crime that involves ignominy, is declared bankrupt, or has a receiver
appointed for him by the court.' Similarly, members of the Authority
who are employees of the State or of the Bank of Israel are automati-
cally removed from their positions as members of the Authority upon
the termination of their employment in any such position.1" Upon res-
ignation, removal from office, death, or determination of a lack of fit-
ness to perform a member's functions, the Minister is charged with
appointing a successor for the remainder of the term of the member
who has been so removed.1"
Despite its statutory nature, the Authority is treated as a corpo-
rate entity, competent with regard to any right, legal action, or du-
ty. 5 However, concomitantly, the Authority is deemed subject to gov-
ernment audit under Section 9(2) of the State Comptroller Law
[Consolidated Version] 1958.6
The Authority is granted a free hand in determining the proce-
dures to be followed in its meetings and discussions, so far as they are
not established by the Law. Notably, the Authority is charged with
preparing rules for the consideration of permit applications for the
issuance of prospectuses, but the Authority does not adopt such rules.
The rules are instead adopted by the Minister and must be published
in Reshumot, the official register."
A number of significant changes were made in the Law in 1988
(Amendment No. 9 to the Law). Among them was a provision granting
the absolute right to any party injured by a decision of the Authority
to appeal such a decision directly to the District Court.' Previously,
injured parties could petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High
Court of Justice (the so called "Bagatz" action), a very familiar Israeli
judicial technique, patterned on that of the English court system, for
challenges to administrative and other government actions. The
Knesset wisely chose to amend this procedure since the District Court,
Israel's senior trial court of general jurisdiction, can effectively take
testimony and rule on matters of fact and law and is better equipped
to deal with testimony than the Supreme Court. Moreover, the District
Court considers significant business transactions and has the greatest
12. Id. § 6(a).
13. Id. § 6(b).
14. Id. § 6(c).
15. Id. § 8(a).
16. Id. § 9.
17. Id. § 12 (providing that the Minister can take the initiative with respect to
the rules, needing only to consult with the Authority).
18. Id. § 14A.
VOL. 22:2,3
ISRAELI SECURITIs LAW
background for dealing with securities law matters in the first in-
stance.
A similar right of appeal may be granted under Section 47 of the
Law (discussed below). The District Court recently considered the
fundamental difference between the two possible paths of appeal.
While recognizing the Supreme Court's time limitations, the District
Court judge also noted that the lower courts possessed the requisite
ability and authority to carry out a review of the facts of a case con-
cerning administrative decisions of governmental authorities. The
Court quoted Professor Yitzhak Zamir's9 book, Judgment of Adminis-
trative Issues, as stating that the investigation of the District Court
will very often be more thorough than that available in a correspond-
ing appeal to the Supreme Court.'
III. PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE PLACEMENTS; PROSPECTUS
DISCLosuRE
A. In General
The cornerstone of the Law is the requirement, parallel to that of
the Securities Act of 1933, that any offer of securities to the public
must be in accordance with a prospectus that has been published pur-
suant to a permit granted by the Authority.2" The term "securities" is
broadly defined to include any serial certificates issued by a compa-
ny,2 a cooperative entity, or any other corporate body that grants
participatory or membership rights in, or a basis of claim against, such
an entity, including certificates of participation in a trust fund for joint
investments and any certificate that carries the right for the bearer to
acquire any such securities.' In all of these cases, the fact that the
securities are registered or in bearer form is immaterial.
However, the definition of securities, for purposes of the prospec-
tus requirement, significantly excludes any securities issued by the
Government or under the authority of any special law.2' The Knesset
considered prospectus disclosure unnecessary when the Government
issues securities, as it has regularly done over the years. If, however,
the sale of securities are those of a government company, as is the case
in privatization by public offering, then the Law requires prospectus
19. Israel's former Attorney General who was appointed to the Supreme Court in
December 1993.
20. Katz v. Securities Exchange Ltd., (2) P.M. 296 (Dist. Ct., Tel Aviv/Jaffa
1991) (Isr.).
21. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 15(a).
22. Israeli corporate law, following the lead of the English Companies Act, which
was its source, describes a corporation as a "company.* In general, the same termi-
nology is used herein.
23. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1.
24. Id.
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disclosure, since such a sale is not of securities issued by the Govern-
ment. The Law focuses on the offer of securities rather than on their
actual sale. Finally, it is clear that the only prospectus that counts for
purposes of a public offering is one that has been reviewed by the
Authority and for which an Authority permit has been issued; the most
complete and accurate offering memorandum, cast in the form of a pro-
spectus, will not suffice for these purposes.
The distinction between private placements and public offerings
has been an interesting one. The first case to interpret the Law, in
1977, dealt with an offer of securities by an Israeli real estate company
to private investors in Turkey and Iran.' Evron and two companies
under his control had sought financing for the construction of a hotel
in the Metropolitan Tel-Aviv area. Agents acting for Evron and the
companies travelled to Turkey and Iran and met with investors in
those countries who were interested in investments in Israel. A crimi-
nal proceeding was brought in Israel with respect to the alleged offer-
ing of securities to the public without a prospectus approved by the
Authority as required by the Law and, at the same time, claiming that
the offering material used was fraudulent. Prior to the hearing, the
two companies, which by then had been acquired by other sharehold-
ers, pleaded guilty and Evron was the only defendant left in the case.
The District Court held that there had been a violation of the Law on
both issues and discussed at length and in detail the history of the
Law and its underlying purposes. The Court, reviewing the legislative
history of the Law, concluded that the definition of a public offering
was based on the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 pattern and was designed
to prohibit a public offering where offers were made to those who did
not have access to the kind of information that registration would
disclose. Citing the leading Supreme Court case of SEC v. Ralston
Purina,' the Court concluded that in the case at hand the investors
should have been provided with a prospectus approved by the Authori-
ty and held that there had been a violation of the Law. Interestingly,
the Court specifically referred to the development by the SEC of simi-
lar rules, citing Professor Louis Loss' treatise and the early opinion of
the SEC General Counsel that an offer to not more than twenty five
investors would not require a prospectus. The District Court, however,
rejected the position that any rigid standard should be adopted. The
Evron case was subsequently appealed and affirmed in this respect by
the Israeli Supreme Court. Evron's appeal from the portion of the
District Court decision holding the offering material to be deceptive
was accepted, and he withdrew his appeal from the conviction of affect-
ing an offering without a prospectus. No real conclusion can be reached
from the withdrawal of the appeal. Since the penalty imposed on
25. State v. Evron, (1) P.M. 329 (Dist. Ct., Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1977) (Isr.).
26. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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Evron with respect to the prospectus violation was a modest one, it
was clear that the Supreme Court was not interested in hearing argu-
ment on that issue. Once Evron's counsel saw that the Supreme Court
was inclined to rule in Evron's favor on the more serious count, with
respect to the quality of the offering materials, he withdrew the ap-
peal.
27
Very recently, again following the lead of U.S. securities regula-
tion and the safe harbor of Rules 502-506 under the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Authority has informally adopted a similar ap-
proach, without all of the protections offered by the U.S. Rules, and
today the Authority will, in effect, take no action with respect to a
private placement to not more than thirty five investors.' Regula-
tions have recently been adopted providing for certain procedures and
public notifications to be followed for a private placement by a com-
pany whose shares are publicly traded.'
The Law also provides for certain instances where the Authority
may waive the requirement of offer by prospectus for reasons of conve-
nience or sensible business practice. Thus, offers for sale of securities
that are registered on the TASE in the course of trading on the market
merit a statutory exemption.' Consequently, transactions by a con-
trolling person, no matter what the extent of his holdings, do not re-
quire an Israeli prospectus so long as the transactions are effected on
the TASE, a significant change from the U.S. pattern. Similarly, the
Authority is authorized to exempt offers by receivers, trustees in bank-
ruptcy, or other cases where the offeror is not the issuer, in accordance
with regulations made by the Minister and approved by the Knesset
Finance Committee (the "Finance Committee"). 1 In addition, the Au-
thority may exempt from the obligation to offer by prospectus securi-
ties that will not be traded on the TASE and will only be offered to
insurers, benefit funds, or banking corporations.'
B. Disclosure Requirements
The Law establishes two guiding principles that govern the con-
tent of materials that are to be included in the prospectus to be pub-
27. Evron, 32(2) P.D. at 189 (1978).
28. This is true although there is no "formal no action letter" procedure in effect
in Israel.
29. Securities Regulations, Private Placement of Securities by a Registered Com-
pany (1992).
30. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 15(b). The Minister and the Knesset Finance
Committee have very important roles under the Law, in contrast to the provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and other U.S. securi-
ties legislation. As a result, the SEC is much more independent in issuing regula-
tions and performing other functions than the Authority.
31. Id. § 15(c).
32. Id. § 15(d).
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lished under the permit from the Authority. First, the prospectus must
include every particular that a reasonable investor would regard as
material when considering investment in the securities described in
the prospectus. ' A non-exhaustive list of particulars that are deemed
to fall into this category is to be provided by the Minister in regula-
tions to be approved by the Finance Committee. Second, no misleading
particular may be included in the prospectus." With these two gov-
erning principles as a background, it is possible to commence an exam-
ination of the sections of the Law, including regulations promulgated
thereunder, governing the particulars that should be included in the
prospectus.
Section 17 of the Law provides the basic framework for the regu-
lations that the Minister, after consultation with and recommendation
of the Authority, may present to the Finance Committee for approval.
This task was discharged almost immediately with the adoption of the
Securities Regulations, Particulars of a Prospectus, Its Structure and
Form (1969) (the "Prospectus Regulations"). Amendments 9 and 11 to
the Law, passed in 1988 and 1990 respectively, greatly increased the
type and nature of particulars accompanying professional opinions that
the Minister could require, by regulations, to be included in the pro-
spectus.
Regulations, according to Section 17(b) of the Law, may, among
other things, refer to the following particulars: (1) financial reports of
the issuer, its subsidiaries, and affiliated companies and the opinions
of the accountants on such reports; ' (2) an opinion from an attorney
referring to certain specified legal matters as prescribed by the regula-
tions; ' (3) confirmation from an attorney that all necessary permits
for the offering have been obtained;" and (4) details as to interested
parties of the issuer and the nature of such interests, particulars of
which the interested party is obligated to deliver in order to enable the
issuer to meet this requirement. '
1. Regulations Regarding Prospectuses
The prospectus must be in a printed form that is easily read-
able. ' The cover must include the word "prospectus," the name of the
issuer (and the offeror, if he is a different person), the date of the pro-
spectus, and a description of certain details regarding the securities
33. Id. § 16.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 17(bXl)-(2).
36. Id. § 17(bX3).
37. Id. § 17(bX4).
38. Id. § 17(bX5), (c).
39. Securities Regulations, Particulars of a Prospectus, Its Structure and Form,
5729-1969, § 2 (1969) (Isr.) [hereinafter Prospectus Regulations].
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offered.' The prospectus must include all details required under
these regulations, as well as any particular of which the issuer notified
the Authority as being potentially of interest to a reasonable investor
and that the Authority requested be included in the prospectus." Fi-
nally, unlike the U.S. prospectus, which must meet certain re-
quirements but does not need to follow a specific order, the structure of
the prospectus must follow the order established under the regula-
tions. 2 The discussion set forth below follows the order required by
the regulation, which prescribes the structure and content of the vari-
ous sections of the prospectus.
2. Introduction to Prospectus
The introduction must include a notice that all relevant permits
for the offering have been obtained, a statement regarding the status
of an application (or lack thereof) for the registration of the offered
securities for trading on the TASE, a description of the issuer that
includes details of its outstanding share capital and existing reserves,
and a list of any outstanding debenture series previously issued.'
From this starting point, the regulations move into a prescription of
the details that must be included within the body of the prospectus
itself.
3. Particulars on the Offering of Securities
The rules first require inclusion of details regarding the securities
to be offered under the prospectus." In addition to the expected re-
quirements to disclose information regarding the price and payment
terms, the manner of ordering the securities, the date of allocation, the
manner of refunding refused orders, and the details of any underwrit-
ing agreement, the regulations also include a number of prescribed
disclosures that are rooted in concern for the protection of the unwary
investor." Examples of such rules include the disclosure of the under-
taking by any party to acquire securities of the same category as those
being offered which have not as yet been issued and the specification
of any rights to acquire the offered securities that have been extended
to any specific category of persons (e.g. the previous shareholders).'
40. Id. § 3.
41. Id. § 6.
42. Id. § 5.
43. Id. §§ 7, 9, 11-15.
44. Id. § 16.
45. Id. §§ 21-23, 25.
46. Id. §§ 19-20; see also State v. Rubinstein, (1) P.M. 89 (1992) (Isr.) (providing
a judicial application of these regulations).
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4. Issuer's Securities and Capital
The regulations continue by enumerating various rules surround-
ing particulars regarding the issuer's securities and capital. The first
such requirement regards the disclosure of certain rights and restric-
tions that are attached to the offered securities and any other catego-
ries of outstanding securities.47 The prospectus must also disclose var-
ious details, depending on whether the offered securities are shares or
debentures, regarding the capital of the issuer. These include particu-
lars of changes in the capital of the issuer in the three years prior to
the date of the prospectus, the terms of any underwriting agreement
during that period, and the general details of any offering by pro-
spectus in the relevant years.' Further facts that also require disclo-
sure include the nature of the holdings of any interested parties in the
issuer, any undertaking by the issuer to issue or to abstain from issu-
ing securities or to abstain from taking loans under certain conditions
for a specified period, and the particulars of any exemptions or reduc-
tions from the provisions of tax or foreign currency control regulations
available to holders of the offered securities." Additionally, the pro-
spectus must contain the highest and lowest quotation prices in trad-
ing on the TASE for the two years preceding the prospectus for all
categories, if any, of the issuer's shares that are registered for trading
thereon.' Lastly, in connection with the offering of debentures, the
prospectus must disclose various material facts regarding the parties
to and the terms of the trust indenture that is used in accordance with
Section 35B of the Law (discussed below).5'
5. Use of Proceeds
The regulations require that the issuer clearly state the anticipat-
ed use of the proceeds of the offering. More specifically, the company
must disclose all of the intended objectives to be achieved with the
funds, the amount necessary for each objective, the timetable under
which the issuer intends to operate with the funds, and how any addi-
tional money required for the achievement of these objectives will be
raised. 2
An insurer, a banking corporation, or a company whose main pur-
pose is the investment in other companies may give notice that the
consideration of the offering is not intended for any specific objective
47. See Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 26 (providing details of the
types of restrictions and rights that require disclosure).
48. Id. § 27.
49. Id. §§ 28, 30-31. Israel has broad foreign currency control rules under the
Currency Control Law of 1978.
50. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 29,
51. Id. §§ 32-33.
52. Id. § 39(a)-b).
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but rather is earmarked for use in the expansion of the business. Nev-
ertheless, even in these exceptional cases, if twenty-five percent or
more of the funds are intended for a specified objective, the nature of
such an intended use must be disclosed." Similarly, the regulations
set rules governing disclosure of certain essential particulars and de-
tails of any asset or enterprise that is to be acquired, of any contem-
plated expansion or building in relation to the concern of the issuer, or
of any company in which the issuer plans to invest, all with the pro-
ceeds of the offering.'
Along the same lines, if the issuer reserves the right to alter thi
stated objectives or any details related thereto, it must disclose the
conditions under which such a right of adjustment might be exercised,
the type of decision that must be taken on the part of the company to
authorize such changes, and the means by which notice of such a deci-
sion will be publicized.' Finally, if no minimum amount that the is-
suer expects to raise through the public offering is set, then this fact
must be included in the prospectus."
6. Particulars of the Issuer
The prospectus must include a detailed description of the issuer
for a period of at least five years prior to the prospectus, focusing in
greater detail on the last two years prior to the offering.67 In the same
section, the prospectus must include disclosure of certain vital details
of its directors. These include personal details, such as age, address,
and citizenship, as well as business facts, such as the director's posi-
tion in the company, his service on board of directors' committees, and
his being a relative of any interested party in the issuer.' Further,
the prospectus should include the provisions of the Memorandum and
Articles of Association, the Israeli statutory names for charter docu-
ments, of the issuer as they relate to the appointment, service, and
powers of the directors."
In addition, the issuer must list personal details and certain pro-
fessional facts regarding the remaining senior officers in the issuer for
whom details were not included in the section regarding directors.'
53. Id. § 39(c).
54. Id. §§ 41-43 (providing details of the required disclosure in each of these
cases).
55. Id. § 39A.
56. Id. § 40; see also Securities Law, supra note 2, § 27(a) (providing the back-
ground rules regarding minimum amounts and refunds).
57. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, §§ 44-44A.
58. Id. § 45(a).
59. Id. § 45(b).
60. Id. § 45A; Section 1 of the Prospectus Regulations defines "ranking officers"
of a company to include the directors, the general manager, the deputy general
manager, the vice general manager, the accountant, the internal auditor, and any
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Furthermore, the prospectus must contain a list of the number of em-
ployees, by profession, who work for the issuer at the date of the pro-
spectus."1 Lastly, the issuer is required to disclose the nature of any
undertaking, agreement, or practice under which the company is liable
to make payments, calculated as a percentage of its profits, income,
assets, or turnover, to anyone.6
7. Subsidiaries and Associated Companies
For obvious reasons, the prospectus must include a list of all the
subsidiaries and affiliated companies of the issuer, including details of
the nature of the issuer's holdings in the companies and the essential
terms of any loans or other transactions between them.' A descrip-
tion of the main business of each such company and basic financial in-
formation must be disclosed.' In addition, following the line of disclo-
sure regarding interested parties in the issuer that is discussed below,
the prospectus must specify the names and the holdings of any persons
who, to the best knowledge of the issuer and its directors, hold twenty-
five or more percent of the outstanding share capital, of the voting
rights, or of the power to appoint directors in any of the subsidiaries or
affiliate companies.6
The regulations contain even stricter disclosure requirements if
the issuer has invested, or is about to invest, at least fifty percent of
its total assets, including the proceeds of the current offering, in anoth-
er company, whether by way of shares, loans, or other means. In such
a case, the issuer must include particulars of the entity as if it were
the issuer, with all the attendant requirements discussed above.'
However, the regulations do provide an exemption from such a dis-
closure in the case of an issuer that offers debentures, all the consider-
ation of which is intended for deposit in a "bank" that undertakes to
fulfill all of the payment terms under the debentures qualifying as a
"recognized investment" according to the Income Tax Regulations
(Rules for the Approval and Management of Benefit Funds) 1964. 87
other individual who performs those functions regardless of title. In addition, any
employee of the issuer who holds at least five percent of the outstanding nominal
share capital or of the voting power in the issuer is, for the purposes of these regu-
lations, considered a "ranking officer."
61. Id. § 46.
62. Id. § 47.
63. Id. §§ 48, 50.
64. Id. § 50.
65. Id. § 49.
66. Id. § 51(a).
67. Id. § 51(b)-(c). In this context the regulation defines a "bank' as a company
that deals with the receipt of money on current account from which, by check, pay-
ments can be made on demand.
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8. Interested Parties in the Issuer
The definition of "an interested party" in a company includes the
following: (1) a person who holds five percent or more of the out-
standing share capital or voting power of the company;" (2) a person
who can appoint one or more of the directors, or the general manager
of the company or an individual who serves in such a position; (3) a
company in which a person meeting the requirements of (1) or (2)
holds twenty five percent or more of the outstanding share capital or of
the voting power or in which such a person is entitled to appoint one
quarter or more of its directors; and (4) a subsidiary of the company,
except for a bank registration company.'
For the purposes of this definition, the director of a trust fund for
joint investments is to be considered as the individual who holds the
securities included among the fund's assets. Similarly, a trustee, as
opposed to a registration company, who holds securities in trust for
another is to be considered as the holder of those securities. °
With these definitions in mind, the regulations provide that the
issuer must disclose the holdings of shares and options of any interest-
ed party or of any ranking officer in the issuer, its subsidiaries, and its
affiliated companies, at a date as near as possible to the prospectus
and at a date twelve months prior to such a date. 1 Additionally, the
nature of any benefits that any interested party has received or is due
to receive, directly or indirectly, from the issuer, its subsidiaries, or its
affiliated companies in the two years prior to the offering, must be
detailed. However, the salaries and related expenses paid to the direc-
tors and the general manager, as long as they do not deviate from
expected norms, do not need to be individually specified; rather, they
are to be included in a total sum figure for all the employees.72 The
interest that any such interested party had in any transaction not
executed in the ordinary course of business, involving the same compa-
68. Amendment 11 to the Law, enacted in December 1990, reduced the previous
figure of 10% of the outstanding shares in the corporate entity to the current figure
of 5%. This change brings the Israeli law into line with the corresponding United
States law on the issue of interested parties. See Section 13(d) of the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. A special set of regulations has just been adopted to exempt
the Government from certain regulatory provisions, in connection with privatization
of the banks in order to avoid the nightmarish disclosures of all affiliations of Gov-
ernment companies with the bank. See Securities Law, Interested Persons Emergen-
cy Order (1993).
69. Share certificates of securities traded on the TASE are generally held by
banks for their customers through subsidiaries of the banks called registration (or
nominee) companies. Such companies are defined by the Law as "registration com-
panies." See Securities Law, supra note 2, § l(f).
70. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1(m).
71. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 55.
72. Id. § 53.
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nies in the two years prior to the date of the prospectus, must be de-
tailed in this section, to the best of the knowledge of the issuer and of
its directors."
9. Financial Information
Audited annual financial reports of the issuer, dated no more than
fourteen months prior to the date of the prospectus, must be presented
as part of the prospectus. The regulations also provide for a presenta-
tion of interim reports (including the profit/loss report, the change in
financial status report, and the change in capital report), to be includ-
ed for the interim period. 4 In addition, there are specific provisions
for the disclosure of comparative reports; in general, this incorporates
the comparison of figures in the latest profit/loss report with the corre-
sponding figures for the prior three annual reports.75
Lastly, the regulations establish that all financial reports required
under this heading in the prospectus must be drawn up in accordance
with the provisions of Securities Regulations (Preparation of Financial
Reports) 1969."" However, with the recent publication of the new Se-
curities Regulations (Preparation of Annual Financial Reports) 1993
("1993 Regulations"), which repeal the 1969 regulations on financial
reports, changes were made in this regard." Except for certain in-
terim provisions regarding applications to publish a prospectus that
were made before March 31, 1993, allowing in certain circumstances
the inclusion of reports based on the now-repealed format, the finan-
cial reports to be included in a prospectus must be modeled on the
format provided in the new Annual Report Regulations.78
10. Miscellaneous Particulars
The regulations require the inclusion of an opinion of an attorney
certifying the following: (1) the accuracy of the description of the rights
related to the offered securities and of the rights related to the other
shares of the issuer if the offered securities are shares; (2) the authori-
73.. Id. § 54.
74. Id. § 56. The system works as follows: (i) if the date of the annual report
predates the prospectus by more than five months, then the interim reports must be
presented up to a date three months after the annual report; (ii) if it predates by
more than eight months, then the interim reports must cover up to a date six
months after the annual report; and (iii) if it predates by more than eleven months,
then the interim reports must cover up to a date nine months after the annual re-
port. All of the interim reports must conform to the format of the annual report.
75. See Id. § 59 (providing further details on the presentation of such informa-
tion).
76. Id. § 60.
77. Securities Regulations, Preparation of Annual Financial Reports, 5753-1993, §
65 (1993) (Isr.) [hereinafter 1993 Regulations].
78. See Id. § 67 (providing details of these interim provisions).
VOL. 22:2,3
ISRAELI SECURITES LAW
ty of the issuer to offer the securities in the form in which they are
offered; (3) the lawful appointment of and the full disclosure of the
directors of the issuer; and (4) the agreement of the attorney to the
inclusion of the opinion in the prospectus."
Similarly, the regulations stipulate that the issuer must include
the opinion of its accountants regarding the audited financial reports
that are included in the prospectus. The opinion must include certifica-
tion that the reports were prepared in accordance with Securities Reg-
ulations (Preparation of Financial Reports) 1969 and that the accoun-
tant has agreed to the inclusion of his opinion in the prospectus.'
In addition to the opinions described above, this section of the pro-
spectus must describe the rate of the underwriting commissions that
the issuer has agreed to pay in connection with the offering of the
securities, as well as an estimate of the total expenses connected with
the offering.81 Further, the issuer must detail any commissions that it
undertook to pay in connection with the subscription of the various
categories of securities offered by the issuer in the two years leading
up to the date of the prospectus." The issuer must also include the
names of the parties to, and a short description of the substance of,
every material agreement signed by the issuer in the two years prior
to the offering and of every material agreement that still obligates the
issuer, unless in either case the agreement was made in the ordinary
course of business.'
Similarly, this section must include a disclosure of all liens creat-
ed by the issuer in respect of any of its obligations along with the out-
standing balance of such underlying obligations." Finally, the issuer
must describe any guaranty, effective at the date of the prospectus,
79. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 61. In the published adopted reg-
ulations, not all areas suggested in the corresponding list in the Securities Law, §
17(bX3) (1968) (Isr.) (as amended), have been mentioned. These omissions include the
references in the attorney's opinion to such issues as the certification of the accuracy
of the descriptions, if any, mentioned in the prospectus of the agreements to which
the issuer is party, and of the details of any liens or sureties that are still effective
and that were created by the issuer, and the particulars of any legal proceedings to
which the issuer is party at the date of the prospectus. Even though updated regu-
lations have not yet been published, in practice the Authority has required the
attorney's opinion to conform to the revised provision in the Law. An argument
could be made that this should not be required until the regulations are amended.
80. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 62; see also Securities Law, supra
note 2, § 17(bX2) (containing the background provision regarding this opinion). Pre-
sumably, with the repeal of the 1969 regulations on financial reports and the intro-
duction of the 1993 Annual Reports Regulations, this section is amended mutatis
mutandis to reflect this change.
81. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, § 63.
82. Id. § 64.
83. Id. § 66.
84. Id. § 67.
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that it has given to any company other than a subsidiary in which it
holds more than fifty percent of the voting power, if such a guaranty is
not limited in amount or represents a sum larger than one-quarter of
its adjusted equity; further, any guaranty in any amount that is given
to any company otherwise than in the ordinary course of business
must be described. '
11. Prospectus for Commercial Securities
The regulations provide for a special form of prospectus in the
case of an offering of "commercial securities," which are defined to
include securities issued by a company that grant the right to claim
monies from the company at a date that is not less than ninety days
following the offering and not later than nine months after the offer
date." As a part of the cover which discloses the vital information
regarding the offering, the description of the securities offered by the
prospectus must include the following: (1) the total value of the series;
(2) the nominal value of each commercial security; (3) the interest rate
carried by the securities; (4) the maturity date of the securities; and (5)
the name of the guarantor, if any.87 Apart from this change, the con-
tent of the prospectus is governed by the regulations described above
applying to any other prospectus."
C. Other Requirements
After drafting a prospectus, the offeror must submit the draft to
the Authority for review. If the offeror wishes to take advantage of
certain exemptions that the Authority may grant concerning the inclu-
sion of specified particulars in the prospectus, it should omit the rele-
vant particular and attach an application to the Authority requesting
that such an omission be authorized under the powers granted to the
Authority to issue exemptions.' Furthermore, the Authority, at its
discretion, is empowered to request further details or clarification
regarding any information surrounding the offering and the prospec-
tus.90
The Law then proceeds to explain the procedure and grounds
under which an exemption from the publication of a certain particular
may be obtained. Amendment 9, passed in 1988, was a major step
forward in the clarification of these matters. Grounds under which an
exemption may be granted include the protection of trade secrets of the
offeror, provided that the excluded particular is not of a type that
85. Id. § 67A.
86. Id. § 70.
87. Id. §§ 71-72.
88. Id. § 73.
89. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 18(a)-(b).
90. Id. § 18(c).
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would likely deter a reasonable investor from considering acquisition of
the offered securities.91 In addition, the Authority may grant an ex-
emption on the grounds that publication is liable to cause damage to
the State's economy, to the national security, or to an ongoing police or
Authority investigation.' However, in the latter cases, if the Authori-
ty believes that the omitted particular would be important to the rea-
sonable investor, then the Authority is not authorized to permit the
publication of the prospectus.' In all cases where an exemption has
been granted, notice of that fact must be disclosed in the prospectus.'
After specifying the particulars that are generally to be included
in every prospectus pursuant to Section 17 of the Law and the related
regulations, the Law proceeds to establish a wide-ranging residual
power of the Authority to demand the inclusion of any particulars
beyond those listed in the regulations that, in the Authority's opinion,
would be important to the reasonable investor, regarding the issuer
and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies." In addition, the Au-
thority may request the inclusion of further matters that in the opin-
ion of the attorney should be attached to the prospectus; it may also
request additional opinions or reports, especially in relation to finan-
cial matters." Finally, presumably to protect the interests of an un-
wary or careless investor, the Authority may require that the offeror
emphasize any detail to be included in the prospectus in a particular
matter.97
Once the Authority has reviewed the prospectus and insured its
compliance with the Law and regulations and the receipt of all neces-
sary permits for the publication of the prospectus, the Authority is to
grant a permit allowing the publication of the prospectus.9 The Law
stresses that such a permit does not constitute any opinion on the part
of the Authority regarding the reliability or completeness of any partic-
ulars in the prospectus, and the permit is not meant as an expression
of any belief regarding the quality of the offered securities." That
91. Id. § 19(aXl).
92. Id. § 19(aX2). In each case such a claim of potential damage must be con-
firmed by a signed document from the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Defense,
the Minster of Police, or the Chairman of the Authority (or a person authorized to
act in his stead) sanctioning the claim of the offeror.
93. Id. § 19(b). In the case of confidential trade secrets, which are governed by
the test of being "likely to deter the reasonable investor," it would seem that the
test is wider and less favorable to the offeror, than the proposed test. The opposite
would be expected, with greater emphasis on encouraging offerors to apply for ex-
emptions in the so-called "security" cases without fear of being refused permission to
publish the prospectus.
94. Id. § 19(c).
95. Id. § 20(a1)-(2).
96. Id. § 20(aX3)-(6).
97. Id. § 20(b).
98. Id. § 21(a).
99. Id. § 21(b); see also id. § 21(c) and the resulting regulation in Prospectus
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statement is, of course, parallel to the one that SEC regulations re-
quire to be included on the cover page of a U.S. prospectus. There is,
however, one major difference in prospectus procedure between the two
countries. Whereas SEC regulations generally require that the prelim-
inary prospectus (the so-called "red herring prospectus") be distributed
widely prior to the distribution of the final prospectus, no such proce-
dure exists in Israel; instead, the contents of the Israeli draft prospec-
tus are deemed confidential prior to the granting of the permit in the
actual public offering. The assumption that the public reads prospec-
tuses in detail is not a very well founded one, however, despite the
efforts of the Authority by requiring summary statements and cover
emphases to highlight important points. One of the problems is that
prospectuses are not distributed to every potential purchaser. Rather,
they are made available at branches of banks, brokerage firms, and at
the Authority and TASE. On the other hand, there is a very active and
competitive financial press that generally provides summaries of pro-
spectuses and general evaluations of companies going public.
Another difference between Israeli and U.S. procedures is that the
Authority has not yet developed any rules with respect to so-called
"gun-jumping." When a public offering is pending in Israel, articles
frequently appear in the press that partake of obvious promotion by
the company and its interested parties. It would not be surprising if
this issue is dealt with by legislation or regulation in the years to
come.
Both the draft submitted to the Authority and the final prospectus
to be published by permit from the Authority must be approved by the
board of directors of the issuer."° Once the final draft is approved,
the prospectus must be signed by the issuer and by a majority of its
directors, including at least one public director; in the case of an initial
public offering, at which point public directors will not yet have been
appointed, the majority of the directors must include at least one direc-
tor who is only considered an interested party as a result of his serving
as a director.'
The concept of a "public director" was provided for in 1987 by
amendment to the Companies Ordinance. The concept is that any
Regulations, supra note 39, § 8 (regarding the language used to emphasize the lim-
its on the Authority's permit to be included in the "Introduction" section of the pro-
spectus).
100. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(a). The requirement that the draft, as
well as the final prospectus, be signed, was added by Amendment 9 in 1988 and
was designed to overcome the problem created by companies filing inadequate and
incomplete draft prospectuses, in periods of substantial prospectus activity, just to
get on line at the Authority.
101. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(b); see also Companies Ordinance (New
Version) 5724-1983, § 96B(c) (1983) (Iar.) [hereinafter Companies Ordinance] (provid-
ing the definition of "public director").
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company that has effected a public offering is required by law to have
two public directors appointed. These must be Israeli residents who
have no economic connection or familial relationship with the company
or its controlling shareholders and whose appointment has been ap-
proved by a special committee established under the Ordinance for
that purpose."° In addition, if an underwriter has undertaken to ac-
quire securities that are not purchased by the public, the underwriter
must also sign the prospectus." s Further, if the securities are offered
otherwise than by the issuer, the offeror must also sign.'" It must be
noted that as in U.S. and other securities laws, signatories to the pro-
spectus are not merely for show; rather, the Law, as discussed below,
attaches varying degrees of civil liability to those who have signed a
prospectus that contains misleading particulars or omits material de-
tails. '0
As a result of the potential liability even of directors who do not
sign the prospectus, the Law adopted a procedure by which a dis-
senting director may cause the Authority to consider staying the publi-
cation of the prospectus for a period of twenty days (unless otherwise
instructed by a court of law). This power may be exercised after a
director brings to the notice of the Authority, in written form, any
detail which, if brought before a court, would be considered sufficient
grounds to warrant the court's intervention."° The Authority should
receive notice of and may appear as a party to any proceedings in the
courts that result from any action undertaken under this proce-
dure.1
07
Assuming that all the preceding requirements have been fulfilled,
the issuer may proceed to publish the prospectus and distribute it to
the public. The prospectus is to be dated no more than seven days
after the permit from the Authority has been granted, unless such a
date has been extended by the Authority."° Within one business day
of the date of the prospectus, the issuer must submit a copy thereof to
the Registrar of Companies, a government office which deals with all
matters affecting company charter documents and also keeps records
102. Companies Ordinance, supra note 101, § 96B(a). It had been generally as-
sumed that public directors need not be appointed for Israeli companies whose only
shares are traded in the U.S. However, the District Court of Tel Aviv/Jaffa ruled
otherwise in an unreported decision, Ido Ben-Yehuda, Adv. v. Interpharm Indus.,
decided on June 6, 1993. That case is on appeal to the Supreme Court, which en-
tered a stay with respect to implementation of the District Court decision.
103. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 22(c).
104. Id. § 22(d).
105. See Id. § 31.
106. Id. § 22(e).
107. Id. § 22(f.
108. Id. § 23(a).
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on all Israeli companies, along with a copy of the permit from the
Authority.'09 Within the same time period, the issuer must publish,
in two Israeli, widely-circulated, Hebrew language, daily newspapers, a
notice that includes details of the submission of the documents to the
Registrar, advice of the place where copies of the prospectus may be
obtained and where orders for securities may be submitted, and of any
other particulars that the Authority may require to be included in the
notices.1 Lastly, the Authority may require the distribution of pro-
spectuses within a certain time period, in certain locations, and in
certain numbers, all according to its discretion.'
The Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court dealt with these prospectus
related matters in the case of Israel v. Rubinstein & Partners, Con-
tracting Co. Ltd. et. al. ("Rubinstein")."' While this is a decision of
the District Court, which therefore bears less precedental authority
than a Supreme Court decision, it is one of the rare recent occasions in
which any of the higher courts in Israel has undertaken an exploration
of the issues involved in the criminal side of the securities law in a
published opinion. Almost all of the criminal cases brought under the
Law are heard in the Magistrates Court, and those decisions are al-
most never officially reported. The defendant company undertook a
public offering of its securities in 1984. The pronounced intention was
to sell a certain percentage of the shares in the company to the public;
all of the shares were previously owned by two rival factions of the
Rubinstein family. It was against a background of disagreements be-
tween the two groups that the offering was finally affected. Through a
number of transactions, each involving participation by some or all of
the ten named defendants, a significant majority of the shares which
were offered eventually came back under the control of members of the
family or parties close to them.
While the accused all claimed that their actions had been carried
out in good faith and according to the Law and/or the prevailing prac-
tice in the securities markets, the Authority and the prosecution
viewed these transactions differently. A number of different charges
were brought against each defendant. The prosecution claimed that the
accused, as a group, had been involved in a form of overall conspiracy
with an intention to commit fraudulent or deceitful behavior. While
some of the charges were brought under the Criminal Law of 1977, a
portion of the charges were also brought under the Law, which pro-
vides for criminal sanctions in certain situations, as discussed below.
The Court began by making some general observations regarding
109. Id. § 23(cX1).
110. Id. § 23(cX2).
111. Id. § 23(d).
112. Rubinstein, 192 (1) P.M. at 89 (1972). An appeal to the Supreme Court has
been argued, but no decision has been rendered.
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various sections of the Law and securities law in general. The judge
stated that despite its suspicious appearance, the purchase of securi-
ties through strawmen and the splitting of purchases through various
accounts or persons are not unlawful in and of themselves. Because
such activity was accepted practice at the time of the alleged offenses,
such actions would only run afoul of the law if they were connected to
some form of unlawful activity. He then went on to establish Sections
16 and 18(a), the tests of the reasonable investor, as the sources for
the requirements of disclosure in the prospectus. He added that oral,
as well as written, contracts and agreements needed to be tested for
disclosure. With this in mind, the judge moved on to describe certain
fundamental points about the overall approach adopted by the Law.
The judge pointed out that the Law clearly provides a framework
that focuses on civil obligations and remedies. The focus on civil reme-
dies and the relegation of criminal sanctions to a position of secondary
importance show that the lawmakers hoped that securities law ques-
tions would center around civil rather than criminal litigation."1 ' He
added that, except for the provisions of Section 25 that deal with
amendments to the prospectus after its publication, all transgressions
of the provisions of the Law relating to prospectus liability that are
relevant in creating liability must occur before the date of the signing
of the prospectus by the relevant parties. Any events that occur after
that date are not to be relied upon in establishing prospectus related
liability under the Law. 4 Before proceeding to an examination of the
particular facts of the case, the judge explicitly noted the enormity of
the task before him as he realized that he was entering an area of the
law, namely the criminal penalties, that had been little touched in
previous decisions of the higher courts.
With this background established, the judge began to attack the
legal and factual issues raised in the charges against each of the de-
fendants. The overall claim of the prosecution was that the so-called
public offering was not meant to be for the public at all. Rather, it was
alleged that, under a wide-ranging conspiracy, the defendants had
colluded in a plan that would allow the family to purchase the offered
shares in an attempt to tighten their control over the company. While
the judge recognized that the imposition of control by a group of share-
113. The judge pointed to the continuing reluctance of the lawmakers to amend
problematic areas of the criminal sections of the Law, for example, the difficulty of
meeting the requirements of "fraud" in order to convict the defendants of manipula-
tive actions with regard to the value of securities in Section 54(aX2). At the same
time they have amended civil areas of the Law on eleven separate occasions since it
was enacted. This demonstrates the lack of importance attached to the criminal pen-
alties offered therein. This theme is discussed further in the section dealing with the
criminal provisions of the Law.
114. The judge did comment that, although this was the current state of the law,
it could hardly be considered ideal.
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holders was by itself a legal action, the transactions involved had to be
tested in their circumstances and surroundings. While numerous tech-
nical issues were involved with the verdicts passed on the individual
parties, often revolving around fine distinctions in questions of crimi-
nal law that are not particularly relevant for present purposes, the
judge did enunciate certain principles regarding securities law that
bear mention here.
First, .the judge, on the available evidence, was unable to find a
basis for claiming that the various parties were involved in some sort
of overall criminal conspiracy to defraud the Authority and the public.
Thus, the court was left to consider the charges against each accused
independently. With regard to the family and the related investors, the
judge found that they had tried to disguise the purchase of shares by
current shareholders (members of the family) and thus, taking account
of the wide definition of acquisition, violated provisions of the prospec-
tus, which stated that no current shareholders would purchase shares
in the offering.
The meaning of "holding" or "acquisition" in relation to securities
and voting power and similar issues was amended in July 1988 as part
of the wide-ranging Amendment 9 to the Law. It now includes holding
or acquisition by an individual alone or in conjunction with others,
directly or indirectly, through the medium of a trustee, a trust compa-
ny, a registration company, or by any other means." 5 So, a subsid-
iary or an affiliated company may be held liable for holding or making
acquisitions on behalf a company. Similarly, trading by an individual
includes all trades made by the individual, family members who live
with him or whose livelihoods depend on one another." As a result,
they could be found guilty of deceit under Section 415 of the Criminal
Law in their false representations and actions that lacked good faith
when they procured the permit from the Authority and the right to
register the shares for trading on the TASE. Further, these defendants
had run afoul of the disclosure requirements in Section 16 of the Law.
Their plan to purchase shares, in addition to directly contradicting to
explicit statements in the prospectus, also should have been disclosed
to the public, perhaps in an emphasized form, for the parties to fulfill
their legal requirements of disclosure.
The judge went on to consider the criminal liability of the compa-
ny itself. The judge stressed that a company, through its agents, could
be guilty of criminal activity. On examination of the facts, the judge
held that Abraham Rubinstein, in view of his exercise of significant
control over the affairs of the company, represented the alter-ego of the
company for the purposes of liability. Thus, once charges were proved
115. See Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 89 (providing an example of the application of
the wide definition of acquisition).
116. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 1(G).
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against this individual, the company, for the purposes of criminal law,
could also be considered guilty.
With these issues settled, the judge proceeded to the question of
criminal liability as to the underwriters of the offering. While he felt
confident in stating that the underwriters had some form of responsi-
bility in regard to proper disclosure in the prospectus, the extent of
such responsibility was an issue that raised great doubts. While the
United States securities law establishes a test for underwriters based
on whether a reasonable investigation would reveal facts that would be
of interest to a prudent investor,"7 the Israeli law in this matter was
subject to great debate among legal scholars.118 However, the judge
did say that it is clear that no comparison or assumptions about the
underwriters' criminal liability may be made from the extent of the
underwriters' civil liability as regards issues of disclosure, clearly
spelled out in the Law. It is only based on the words of the statute
that criminal liability could be established; as a result of the prevailing
uncertainty in this area, any doubts had to be decided in favor of the
defendants, following a cardinal principle of the criminal law. The
remaining issues decided by the judge regarding these defendants and
the others tend to turn on technical issues of interpretation of certain
criminal and securities offenses. As a result, they will, where relevant,
be discussed elsewhere in this article.
IV. SALES BY PROSPECTUS: PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A separate chapter of the Law sets out the rules and procedures
that must be followed in the placement and filling of orders for secu-
rities offered by prospectus. Amendment 9 changed a number of these
provisions in a significant fashion. First and foremost, the Law was
amended to provide for a shorter maximum duration in which orders
may be received for an offering under a particular prospectus.
The lawmakers were obviously concerned to ensure that the infor-
mation provided to potential investors by a prospectus remain as cur-
rent as possible. As a result, the Law, as it stands today, provides that
the period for receiving orders must not commence less than seven
days, and must not terminate more than one month, after the date of
the prospectus."" Further, the Authority is empowered to shorten the
seven day period or to extend the one month deadline (provided that
the date does not extend past six months, or twelve months in the case
117. See Section 11 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933; Escott v. Bar Chris
Constr., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
118. See, e.g., MEIR CHET, THE UNDERWRITING OF SECURITIES IN ISRAEL-THE CUR-
RENT STATUS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDMENTS (Hamishpat A, 1993) (arguing in
favor of expanding the Israeli law in this area); see also Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 122.
119. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 24(a).
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of a mutual fund, described as a "joint trust investment fund" in the
Law), under such conditions as they might establish.'
The Law does not require circulation of preliminary prospectuses.
Therefore, the Law requires that there be a specified waiting period
between the date of publication of the prospectus and the actual com-
pletion of sales under that prospectus, thereby at least theoretically
providing investors with an opportunity to study the prospectus and to
make their investment decisions.
In addition, the Law provides for a broad area of discretion and
responsibility for the Authority with respect to the post-publication
amendment of the prospectus. Thus, the offeror, issuer, or any person
who gave a report, permit, or opinion in the prospectus must inform
the Authority of any material facts that have arisen or come to light
and that are omitted from the prospectus as soon as they become
aware of those facts."l If through this obligation of reporting, or by
other means, between the time that the publication permit was grant-
ed and the expiration of the period for the placing of orders, the Au-
thority learns of a fact that would have prevented the granting of the
permit or caused the Authority to require that the draft prospectus be
amended in a material fashion, then the Authority may demand, in a
form or manner that it sees fit, that the offeror, after being granted an
opportunity to present its case, print and distribute an amendment to
the prospectus or an amended prospectus including the relevant chang-
es or additions.'
The Law provides for the postponement of the period for the
placement of orders if such an amendment is ordered. As a result of
these postponement provisions, unless the Authority sets alternative
dates, the offeror is precluded from accepting orders for securities from
the date on which the Authority issues an order to amend the prospec-
tus until the end of seven days following the publication of the re-
quired amendment.'
One of the other Amendment 9 changes was in the improved
mechanism providing for the amendment of the prospectus, after its
publication, on the initiative of the offeror. The new provision allows
the offeror, before the expiration of the offer period, to apply to the
Authority for permission to amend any particular in the prospectus; if
that permission is granted, the prospectus is to be amended in accor-
dance with the request.
The criteria established by the Law for the Authority to consider
in the case of such an application are two-fold. The Authority may
120. Id. § 24(b).
121. Id. § 25(d).
122. Id. § 25(a).
123. Id. § 25(c).
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certify such a request if, in its opinion, such a change is "necessary" or
if the granting of such permission will in no way adversely affect the
rights of any party who submitted an order for or acquired the securi-
ties before the amendment is published.2 Similarly, the Authority is
required to order the publication of an amended prospectus or an
amendment to the prospectus if the financial reports of the offeror,
issuer, or any other corporate entity whose reports are included in the
prospectus are submitted to the Authority, presumably, although not
specifically mentioned, pursuant to the periodic reporting requirements
of the Law (Sections 36 through 38B) before the order period termi-
nates.'
The Law also provides for an amending procedure in cases of
technical, linguistic, printing, or similar errors. The offeror is to report
on such an error to the Authority, publish notification of such in at
least two wide-circulation, Hebrew language, daily newspapers in Isra-
el, and include a copy of such a correction in each copy of the prospec-
tus.M
The Law also provides a mechanism to protect investors who may
have placed orders for securities before the publication of any of the
amendments described above. Thus, any such investor may, without
penalty, cancel his order within ten days of the publication of those
amendments.' Hence, no unwitting investor is left to the discretion
of the offeror, or the Authority for that matter, in deciding whether the
amended prospectus contains provisions that may have caused him not
to place his order. Upon receipt of a cancellation notice, the offeror
must, within seven days, refund all funds paid by such an investor."2
If the Authority orders the publication of an amendment, and the offer-
or decides not to undertake such a publication, then the offeror must,
within seven days of the date set by the Authority as a deadline for
the publication of the amendment, refund all monies paid by any in-
vestors for the securities.'
Attention is also paid to cases where refunds must be made for
other reasons. For example, the offeror is obligated, within seven days
of the termination date for orders to be placed, to refund to investors
all payments if the total amount of orders placed does not reach the
124. Id. § 25A(a).
125. Id. § 25A(b); note that Section 25A(c) of the Securities Law provides that the
same postponement provisions, described above as applying in the case of Authority-
initiated amendments, also apply in the case of these procedures.
126. Id. § 25C; the public notification by way of newspaper advertisement is simi-
lar to that required in Section 23(cX2) of the Securities Law with respect to an-
nouncing the submission of the documents to the Registrar and the locations where
copies of the prospectus may be obtained.
127. Id. § 26(a).
128. Id. § 26(b).
129. Id. § 26(c).
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minimum amount, if any, stated in the prospectus as being the expect-
ed minimum consideration to be obtained through the offering.1' In
the converse case, where orders received exceed the total offered, pres-
ently a fairly common although not inevitable occurrence, the 1988
amendment to the Law established that the available securities be dis-
tributed in the manner provided in the prospectus rather than on a
purely discretionary basis."1 The allocation of securities under such a
plan specified in the prospectus must be announced, within seven days
of the end of the order period, in at least two Hebrew daily newspapers
of general broad circulation appearing in Israel."'2 In this case, how-
ever, the offeror must refund the monies within two business days of
the distribution of the securities to any investors whose orders were
wholly or partly rejected.'
A further provision of the 1988 amendments to the Law, intended
to protect and enhance the position of those who have placed orders for
securities, mandates the steps to be taken by the offeror with the mon-
ies paid in consideration of offers. The Law establishes, notwithstand-
ing a power granted to the Minister and the Finance Committee to
provide otherwise by regulation, that the subscription payments be
maintained in a separate trust account in a banking institution, until
the status of the offeror's obligation to refund payments to investors
under the above provisions is clarified.' Thereafter, the offeror, if
required, must refund the funds and the accrued interest to the date of
repayment to any investors whose orders were not flled.'
In addition to providing such mechanisms for the protection of
investors, the Law also establishes an enforcement clause to give teeth
to these provisions. If the offeror fails to fulfill any of its obligations re-
garding the refund of canceled orders or the maintenance of a separate
trust account and repayments, and the offeror is a company, then the
directors are to be jointly and severally liable, except for any director
who has taken the appropriate steps to ensure the repayment of funds
130. Id. § 27(a).
131. Id. § 27(bX1). In the recent Bank Hapoalim partial privatization public offer-
ing, the Finance Committee insisted that there be no maximum price fixed; the
offering was, as a result, almost a total failure, so much so that a subsequently
scheduled offering for Bank Leumi has been postponed indefinitely. The secret seems
to have been that the institutional investors were not prepared to invest on an un-
certain basis.
132. Id. § 27(bX2). The various publication requirements of the Law have led
recently to a proliferation of notices in the Israeli Hebrew language economic press.
As a result of the substantial volume of public offerings, much more material ap-
pears than in a typical U.S. "tombstone" notice.
133. Id. § 27(bX3).
134. Id. § 28(a), (c).
135. Id. § 28(b). This provision obviously secures the investors from the dangers
of the arbitrary use of their funds while they await the results of the offering.
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to any investors who do not receive the proper payments.'
The final area covered in this section concerns the notification of
the results of a public offering. The Law provides that the offeror must
inform the Authority of the results of the offering within seven days
after the end of the order period or the date of allocation in cases of
over-subscription. ' Further, the Law provides authority for regu-
lations to be issued with respect to these issues; that authority was
exercised almost immediately with the passing of the Securities Regu-
lations (Announcement of the Results of an Offer by Prospectus) in
1969. These regulations, adopted by the Minister after consultations
with the Authority, provide the framework and content required in the
report to the Authority on the results of an offering. First, the report
must include the nominal value, by category, of the securities ordered,
of orders that were canceled under Section 26(a) of the Law (described
above), and of orders rejected, as well as the details of the provisions
made for the refunding of payments for orders that were not filled."s
Further, the report must detail the total consideration received for
orders that were filled and the total nominal value of the securities, if
any, acquired by underwriters.' In addition, in cases of over-sub-
scription, the manner of allocating the securities among those who
have ordered them must be included."4 Lastly, all of the above de-
tails must be arranged according to the categories of the investors if
all or part of the offering consisted of securities offered to specific cate-
gories of investors.""
A recent amendment to the Law created special arrangements for
the processing by the Authority of public offerings by government com-
panies being privatized or by the sale of controlling shares by the gov-
ernment in its banks. 4 2 The commentary to the proposal of the new
law states that
[bIringing a government company to the position where it is feasi-
ble to privatize it [by a public offering] involves considerable prepa-
ration, including structural changes in the company and in the
business branch in which it operates. In order to prevent a situ-
ation in which after the investment of great efforts in these sub-
jects the privatization would be delayed, it is proposed that special
procedures be adopted as to companies being so privatized.
The commentary points out the possibility that prospectuses
136. Id. § 29.
137. Id. § 30.
138. Prospectus Regulations, supra note 39, §§ 1-4.
139. Id. §§ 5-6.
140. Id. § 7.
141. Id. § 8.
142. Government Proposed Law, No. 2226 (1993), adopted as Amendment 13 to
the Law on Feb. 13, 1994.
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might be used in such a situation with financial statements which
would otherwise be stale under current regulations. The commentary
continues by stating that, "sale of controlling share interests in banks
is also a very important challenge" and should be subject to these
special proposed rules. In adopting the amendment, the Knesset ex-
tended its scope to public offerings of substantial companies and con-
glomerates based on criteria to be established administratively.
V. PROSPECTUS LIABILITY
The 1988 amendments had a sweeping effect on the civil liability
of various parties connected to the offering. Prior to the amendments,
a number of limitations on the extent and scope of the liability severe-
ly hampered potential plaintiffs. First, the liability extended only to
those individuals who purchased the securities as part of the original
offering by prospectus. In a market where securities rapidly and fre-
quently change hands, such a provision was unsatisfactory. In addi-
tion, the scope of the liability of experts whose opinions or reports were
included in the prospectus was not sufficiently defined. Further, the
provisions regarding the signing of the prospectus by the directors of
the company and the resulting liability were viewed as unsatisfactory.
The amendments strengthened the system of civil liability for
defective prospectuses. As a starting point, the amended Law extends
liability to any party who signed the prospectus as required under
Section 22 (described above). These parties are liable to any party who
acquired the securities from the offeror, and to any party who pur-
chased or sold such securities in trading on or off the TASE, for any
damages caused to that party as a result of the inclusion of any mis-
leading particular in the prospectus."
The signatories under Section 22 must include the company, a
majority of its directors, any underwriter, and the offeror, when the
offeror is not also the issuer. The change in requirements under Sec-
tion 22 for signatures is noteworthy. Previously, this section required
that all directors of a company sign the prospectus. A case arose in
which a distinct minority group within a board of directors refused to
sign. Although the majority of the directors had approved a public
offering, that public offering never took place due to the objection of
the minority and their ability to frustrate the offering by a failure to
143. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 31(a). Section one of the Securities Law
defines "misleading particular' as including a fact, matter, or omission that would be
likely to mislead a reasonable investor. Although there is some theoretical, academic
debate as to whether there is an implied requirement of materiality, it would appear
that since a reasonable investor would only be likely to be affected by material
matters, materiality is implied. See, e.g., E. KINDERMAN, LIABILITY OF AcCOUNTANTs,
LAWYERS AND DmwcRs AS TO A PROSPECTUS, ROEH HESHBON 402 (1972/1973) (in
Hebrew) (supporting the notion of implied materiality).
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sign. A request for exemptive relief from the Authority was rejected on
the grounds that there was no available statutory authority for the
granting of an exemption in such a case. The amendment to Section 22
was the Knesset's response to this dilemma. However, to negate any
view that a non-signing director could escape liability arising out of
the prospectus, the Law was also amended to provide that all directors
of the company serving on the date that the final prospectus received
approval by the board are deemed, for purposes of liability, to have
signed the prospectus unless they can prove that they either (1) did
not know about the prospectus and ought not to have known about it
or (2) that they submitted a written statement to the Authority imme-
diately upon becoming aware of the presence of a misleading particular
in the prospectus.'" The statute of limitations on such claims is the
earlier of two years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff or seven
years from the date of the prospectus.1"
The Law, as amended in both 1988 and 1990, also overhauled the
provisions surrounding the liability of experts whose opinions, permits,
or reports were included in the prospectus. Despite initial confusion as
to the scope of liability, it now is clear that the liability of such experts
is limited to the information included in the prospectus, permission for
the inclusion of which was received by the offeror prior to their publi-
cation.1" The extent of the liability, the available defenses, and the
limitation period on such claims is identical to those that are estab-
lished for the other signatories.
The Law provides for a number of defenses to potentially liable
parties for including misleading particulars. First, liability will not be
incurred by any party who can prove that he took all necessary steps
to insure that no misleading particulars were included in the area
covered by his liability, that he believed in good faith that no such
particulars were present, and that he fulfilled his obligation to imme-
diately report any particular that might lead the Authority to require
the amendment of the prospectus. 47 A similar complete defense is
available against any plaintiff who knew or ought to have known
about the presence of the misleading particular at the date of his pur-
chase of the securities.1" Third, a defense is available in any case
where the issuer has submitted an immediate report to the Authority
correcting any misleading particular, notification of such correction
was publicized in a fashion similar to the publicity requirement deriv-
ing from the original offering, and the purchaser bought the securities
144. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 31(b)-(c); see also id. § 22 (regarding provi-
sions concerning board approval and signature by the directors).
145. Id. § 31(b).
146. Id. § 32.
147. Id. § 33(1); see also Id. § 25(d) (concerning the report obligation discussed
above).
148. Id. § 33(2).
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after the date of the publication of that notice."" Finally, any individ-
ual who incurs liability as a result of being a signatory, of being
viewed as a signatory for the purposes of liability, or due to his opinion
or report being included in the prospectus, can escape liability if he
submits to the issuer, in writing, notice regarding the correction of any
misleading particular in the document; such a defense is only effective
against a purchaser who acquired the securities more than twenty-four
hours after the submission of such a notice."W If more than one party
is liable to a purchaser under these provisions, the responsible parties
are jointly and severally liable to each injured party. The distribution
of liability among the defendants is governed by the same principles
that control contributions between tortfeasors under the laws of
tort.
15 1
Even in cases where damages may not have been incurred, the
purchaser from the issuer may cancel any purchase made in reliance
on any misleading particular in the prospectus. However, to receive
full refund of the consideration paid, the purchaser must cancel within
a reasonable time after becoming aware of the misleading particular or
after publication of an immediate report regarding the correction of
that misleading particular. The Law limits the right to cancel to two
years following the acquisition. 2 The right to cancel the purchase is
available against an issuer even if the issuer is in the midst of liquida-
tion proceedings.'
Two other areas of civil liability bear mention in this context. The
first concerns the liability of interested parties. In certain circumstanc-
es described below, an interested party, the company, or other entity in
which he holds an interest may be required to submit to the Authority,
the Registrar, the TASE, or to include in the prospectus, certain re-
ports or notices." In such a case, the provisions regarding liability of
signatories and experts for misleading particulars in notices or reports
will also apply to interested parties .'
The second area is the surprisingly wide liability of the issuer to
holders of its securities for any damages suffered as result of the
issuer's violation of any provision of the Law or any regulations made
thereunder, of the Joint Investments Trust Law 1961 or regulations
made thereunder, or of the trust indenture under which the issuer
incurs an obligation towards the trustee in favor of holders of obliga-
149. Id. § 33(3) (1968); see also id. § 23(cX2) (describing the notice procedures
discussed above).
150. Id. § 33(4).
151. Id. § 34(5).
152. Id. § 35(a) (providing for this specially short limitation period).
153. Id. § 35(b).
154. See Id. §§ 36-37 (describing the conditions regarding such reports or notices).
155. Id. § 38B; see also id. § 1 (defining an 'interested party," as described
above).
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tion certificates issued by him.' This liability applies to directors of
the issuer, its general manager, 57 and its controlling parties." It
is not clear how the latter liability will combine with or augment the
other liabilities of the parties in cases where they happen to intersect.
For instance, where a prospectus contains misleading particulars, it is
unclear whether liability would extend to the general manager and
controlling persons. It would be anomalous if the Knesset intended this
result, considering its detailed description of the signing requirements
under Section 22 and the cross-reference in the prospectus liability sec-
tions to those requirements. Yet, the result is hard to avoid under
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.
It should be noted at this point that the Israeli securities markets
were founded and have for years been controlled by Israel's commercial
banks. Despite major problems involving the banking system and a
government appointed investigatory commission that suggested reform,
Israeli securities markets continue to be dominated by commercial
banks, which have various functions (commercial banking, brokerage,
investment companies and the like). Israel has never had the equiva-
lent of the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act,5 ' although interestingly enough
just as Glass-Steagall is being liberalized and relaxed in the United
States, Israel is considering ways of separating the banking and bro-
kerage functions.
Another important question is the degree of liability extending to
an underwriter that signs a prospectus, and the level of diligence re-
quired by underwriters examining the prospectus. The 1985 case of
Kaufmann v. First Int'l Bank of Israel, decided in the District Court of
Jerusalem, raised some pertinent questions concerning the role of the
underwriter in the case as a secondary issue."e The case dealt with a
claim for damages against the defendant bank, which had originally
planned to serve as underwriter of the plaintiff company's public offer-
ing. After making numerous demands and receiving subsequent partial
concessions regarding the contents of the prospectus, the bank, at the
last moment, decided not to proceed with the underwriting. The bank
claimed that the company and its principals had withheld vital facts
and misrepresented certain circumstances throughout the relevant
period. The bank's withdrawal gave the defendants short notice before
the deadline set by the TASE for the offering expired. As a result, the
public offering was abandoned. The plaintiffs demanded damages for
156. Id. § 52K(a).
157. In other words, using the terminology prevalent in English companies law, a
senior executive officer of the company who is not a director.
158. Id. § 52K(b).
159. This was formally known as the Banking Act of 1933. It forced commercial
banks out of the investment banking business.
160. Kaufmann v. First Int'l Bank of Israel, (1) P.M. 265 (Dist. Ct., Jerusalem
1988).
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losses incurred by the company and its principals in the abortive pub-
lic offering.
The court ruled that the bank had acted in good faith in its nego-
tiations with the company and in its sudden last-minute withdrawal,
despite suspicions that were obviously aroused by the timing of its
actions. The court based its decision on a wide understanding of the
underwriter's civil (Section 31 of the Law) and criminal (Section 53 of
the Law) liability for the contents of the prospectus. Since the under-
writer accepts this wide liability, it must undertake a continuing, dili-
gent examination of the company that encompasses, among other
things, the contents of the prospectus itself, the company's financial
situation, and the suitability of its officers.
Further, the court decided that the general understanding be-
tween an underwriter and a company prior to the offering is just that
and no more. Only upon the signing of the underwriting agreement,
immediately prior to the offering, does the general understanding con-
vert into a legal contractual obligation. As a result, the underwriter
reserves the right to withdraw from the process at any point that it
feels it lacks the requisite confidence of the veracity and accuracy of
the information in the prospectus. The question of good faith in these
situations is of a subjective nature. Due to the suspicious circumstanc-
es encountered throughout the process, the court felt that the under-
writer in this case was justified in its withdrawal, even at a late stage.
Thus, the extent of the underwriter's potential liability required its
due diligence in investigating the company and the prospectus, and it
could subsequently justify its withdrawal if unsatisfied with the re-
sults of such inquiries."
VI. TRUST INDENTURES
The 1988 Amendment added a new chapter providing for the
appointment of a trustee, including the execution of a trust indenture,
before any corporate entity may offer any ordinary or convertible de-
bentures to the investing public."8 2 While certain of these provisions
161. For an interesting comparison of the issues regarding the extent of the
underwriter's civil and criminal liability, see Rubinstein, (1) P.M. at 89, where the
District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, a few short years later, was much less settled and
much less clear on the extent of the underwriter's liability, both civil and criminal,
for contents of the prospectus. The Rubinstein court did not refer to the Kaufmann
case in its proceedings. It did decide, however, that regardless of the extent of the
civil liability of the underwriter - thus requiring underwriters to undertake a wide
investigation - no such conclusions could be reached regarding the scope of its crim-
inal liability.
162. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 35A (establishing that the trust indenture
provisions apply to "certificates of obligation"). This term, in turn, is defined as se-
rial certificates issued by any company or other similar entity that grant to the
holders the right to claim cash payments from the company or entity at a given
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have proved controversial, overall they have been viewed as a positive
step towards increasing the protection of the rights of the investors
with respect to this type of security, where the absence of voting rights
and participation in the affairs of the corporate entity often render the
investors vulnerable.
The Law establishes as an absolute precondition the appointment
of a trustee by a trust indenture in accordance with the terms of the
Trust Law 1979 (the "Trust Law"). ' The Law also provides that the
trustee must be a company registered in Israel and whose main occu-
pation is trusteeship.1' In addition, the trustee must have certain
minimum levels of paid-in capital before it can engage in its business.
It must hold equity in an amount at least equal to the total amount, or
a proportion thereof, of the value of the debentures for which it acts as
trustee, according to such regulations as the Minister, with the approv-
al of the Finance Committee, shall determine.'l Requiring a measure
of paid-in capital, rather than possible alternatives such as the
trustee's total capital or net worth, has proved less than satisfactory.
Establishing one of the suggested alternatives as a minimum standard
could more effectively serve the primary purpose of this particular
provision, insuring the financial stability of the trustee company. Fur-
ther, the Minster, after consulting the Authority and on the approval
of the Finance Committee, is empowered to enact additional regula-
tions regarding the permitted manner of investment of the equity of
the trustee company and the submission of reports to the Authority
regarding such investments and changes thereto."'
The chapter proceeds to detail certain circumstances that serve to
disqualify a company from serving as a trustee; a company is deemed
ineligible if any of the following hold true: (1) a director or officer of
the company is also a director or officer of the issuer, its parent compa-
ny, or of an affiliated company; (2) circumstances exist that suggest
the possibility that conflicts between the interests of the trust compa-
ny, its parent company, or of an affiliated company, and those of the
owners of the debentures may arise; (3) the company has begun wind-
ing-up proceedings or receivership; or (4) the company or a director or
officer thereof have been convicted of an offense that would call their
date or on the occurrence of a specified condition but do not grant a right of mem-
bership or participation in the company or other entity. In addition, the definition
includes certificates that are convertible into shares or other securities that grant
the right to purchase such certificates, to the exclusion of certificates that are issued
by the State or issued under the provisions of a special law. An interesting parallel
to these new provisions is the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
163. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 35B(a).
164. Id. § 35C.
165. Id. § 35D(a).
166. Id. § 35D(b).
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credibility into question."6 7
The trust indenture signed by the issuer and the trustee is one of
the central features of the trust mechanism. For the benefit and pro-
tection of the holders, the Law requires the trust indenture to contain
certain terms regarding the activity of the trustee: (1) the total amount
of liability assumed by the issuer in relation to the debentures, includ-
ing a description of and the enforcement capability attached to any
guarantees, liens, or other undertakings that are meant to secure the
liability; (2) the means for the release or exchange of any such guaran-
tees or similar undertakings; (3) the conditions and circumstances
under which the trustee company will be able to demand the immedi-
ate redemption of the debentures or the realization of any guarantees
or similar undertakings which the issuer used to secure its liability; (4)
the obligation of the trustee to call meetings of the debenture holders
and the procedures to be followed in those meetings; (5) the fees to be
paid to the trustee, either as a set sum or as a percentage of the total
of the obligation under the debentures; and (6) any other matter re-
quired in regulations that the Minister may enact, after consultation
with the Authority and with the approval of the Finance Commit-
tee." ' The Law further protects holders by stating that changes to
the trust indenture may only be made if either the trustee is convinced
that the change does not adversely affect the interests of the holders,
or the holders, at a general meeting, approve of the proposed change
by special resolution.'"
The Law provides a detailed description of the obligations of the
trustee with respect to the debenture holders. As a general principle,
the trustee must act in the best interests of all of the holders. 7 ' Fur-
ther, the trustee is assigned wide responsibility with regard to taking
all necessary steps to insure, before the payment of any monies in
consideration of the debentures, the validity of any guarantees or simi-
lar undertakings from the issuer or any third party in favor of the
holders; in addition, the trustee must ascertain and is responsible to
the holders for the accuracy of the description of these matters in the
prospectus by which the debentures are offered to the public. 1 ' If the
trustee becomes aware of any material violation of the terms of the
trust indenture on the part of the issuer, it must notify the holders of
the violation and of the steps taken by it to prevent such violation or
167. Id. § 35E.
168. Id. § 35F.
169. Id. § 35G. The meeting must be attended by holders representing at least
fifty percent of the outstanding balance of face value of the relevant series of deben-
tures. Alternatively, an adjourned meeting must include the representation of at
least ten percent of that balance.
170. Id. § 35H(a).
171. Id. § 35H(b).
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to insure that the issuer fulfills its obligations." Although not grant-
ed the right to vote, the trustee must attend and participate in the
general meetings of the issuer in order to assure the representation of
the interests of the holders."' Also, specific provisions are made for
the preparation of the annual trusteeship report and the availability
for inspection thereof by the holders of the debentures. 7' Lastly, the
trustee company is obligated to represent the holders in any matters
arising from the obligations that the issuer has assumed towards
them. 175
The trustee is granted the legal right to receive such reports as
the issuer may be required to submit to the Authority, in addition to
receiving copies of any documents that the issuer may send to its share
or debenture holders. Further, the issuer is obligated to turn over any
information reasonably requested by the trustee." In addition, the
Minister is authorized to adopt regulations regarding special reports
that the issuer may be required to submit to the trustee regarding the
guarantees and similar undertakings that the issuer has given to se-
cure its liability to the holders.'77 As is clear, the lawmakers have re-
quired the issuer to cooperate with the trustee, in a number of re-
spects, in order to insure that the protection of the investors is not
sacrificed due to a scarcity of information flowing between the two
parties to the trust indenture.
In order to avoid the possibility of conflicts of interest, the Law
provides that the trustee is not permitted to acquire or hold, for its
own account, any of the debentures of the series for which it is acting
as trustee. In addition, the trustee is disqualified from holding for its
own account any securities of the issuer, its parent company, its sub-
sidiary, or of an affiliated company."' For similar reasons, the trust-
ee is excluded from executing any transactions on behalf of another
party, by way of a power of attorney that grants freedom of discretion,
in relation to any securities for which it is serving as trustee.'
In order .to insure that the interests of the holders are not compro-
mised, the Law provides that the actions of the trustee are valid re-
gardless of any defects discovered in regard to its appointment or qual-
ifications."w In addition, the Law sets specific conditions regarding
the termination of the service or the resignation of the trustee. A trust-
ee may resign by written notification to the party who appointed him;
172. Id. § 35H(c).
173. Id. § 35H(d).
174. Id. § 35H(e).
175. Id. § 351.
176. Id. § 35J(a).
177. Id. § 35J(b).
178. Id. § 35K.
179. Id. § 35L.
180. Id. § 35M.
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however, the resignation is only effective if approved by the court and
only from the date of such approval. 81 Further, the term of the trust-
ee is automatically concluded if the trustee fails to continue to meet
any of the qualifications set out above, including those related to min-
imum equity.182 The Law also grants power to the court to dismiss a
trustee if it fails to fulfill its duties properly, or if the court sees fit to
do so for other reasons.' s Finally, the holders of ten percent of the
outstanding balance of the face value of a particular series of deben-
tures may call a general meeting to initiate an action to dismiss the
trustee. At the general meeting, the holders may remove a trustee by a
vote of fifty-percent of the outstanding balance.' On the expiration
of the term of the trustee, the court may appoint a replacement for a
term and under such conditions as it sees fit; in the interim period, the
trustee whose term has expired continues to serve as trustee.""
The Authority is also granted a role as to these matters. The Au-
thority is authorized to apply to the court with regard to any of the
provisions described in the preceding paragraph." However, the
Authority's role, as protector of the holders in court proceedings, is not
limited to the period surrounding the expiration of the trustee's term.
The Authority and the TASE must be informed, in writing, of the com-
mencement of any court proceedings to which the trustee is a par-
ty.187 When the chairman of the Authority believes that the interests
of the holders are liable to be affected or involved in such civil proceed-
ings before the court, he may appear in those proceedings and have his
say regarding the matter.1' This is a rare instance, but not the only
one, in which the Law specifically assigns a responsibility to the chair-
man of the Authority and not to the Authority as such.
In short, 'the Law requires an effective mechanism by which the
trustee arrangements are implemented in order to protect the interests
of the investing public. Through the provisions outlining the obliga-
tions of the various parties, including the provision of information to
the trustee by the issuer and the trustee's participation in the issuer's
general meetings, the holder of a debenture is offered a level of protec-
tion heretofore unavailable under Israeli law.
181. Id. § 35N(b).
182. Id. § 35N(a). The disqualifications are enumerated in Sections 35C, 35D(a), &
35E of the Securities Law.
183. Id. § 35N(c).
184. Id. § 35N(d).
185. Id. § 35N(e).
186. Id. § 35N(g).
187. Id. § 350(a).
188. Id. § 350(b).
444 VOL. 22:2,3
ISRAEI SECURITIES LAW
VII. CoNTiNuous DISCLOSURE
A. In General
The Authority's responsibilities do not end after a public offering
is effected. Instead, the Authority has a continuing responsibility to
insure fair practice on the part of companies whose securities are held
by the public. As a result, the Law and the related regulations provide
for a system of reports to the Authority and the TASE on a periodic
basis and on the occurrence of certain events, in order to facilitate
continuing supervision by the Authority and the TASE and to furnish
vital information to the investing public. These reports in a broad
sense follow the pattern of periodic reporting called for by the U.S. Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.
Any entity whose securities have been offered to the public by
prospectus and are still held by public investors must submit reports
to the Authority and to the Registrar of Companies. If the securities
concerned are also traded or registered to be traded on the Stock Ex-
change, such documentation must also be sent to the TASE."9 Be-
cause of the special structure of Israeli tax law, which provides for
total exemption from capital gains tax where securities are listed on
the TASE, essentially all publicly traded securities are listed and, as a
practical matter, essentially all reports are rendered to the TASE as
well."9
The underlying purpose of these provisions is to facilitate a regu-
lar flow of information about public companies to investors and poten-
tial investors, based on the overriding doctrine of disclosure of any
information that the reasonable investor who is considering the pur-
chase or sale of securities would consider important.'91 This doctrine,
like the principle behind disclosure of information in the prospectus,
reflects the Law's goal to protect the interests of the investing public
by furnishing it with a continuous flow of information about companies
extending beyond the issuance of a prospectus. As a result, the Law
adopts the same general guidelines for the regulations concerning
current reports as for those concerning prospectuses." The Authority
is also empowered to demand further particulars from the company
regarding information contained in the reports or to require additions
or amendments to the reports where the Authority deems it neces-
sary.
193
189. Id. § 36(a).
190. In August 1994, the Government announced its intention to tax TASE gains
as of January 1995; that action will require legislation.
191. Id. § 36(b)-(c).
192. Id. § 36(c); see also id. § 17(b) (providing the guidelines concerning the pro-
spectus regulations, as discussed above).
193. Id. § 36(d)-(g).
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The 1988 Amendments to the Law established a framework en-
abling the Authority to issue temporary directives to specific compa-
nies whose shares are traded publicly. The Authority may also issue
directives of general application regarding the inclusion of certain par-
ticulars in the reports. The Authority may, if necessary to protect the
investing public, issue a directive to a company specifying the manner
of presentation of a certain particular in the company's annual finan-
cial, current, or immediate reports, as long as instructions regarding
this issue are not already in force by power of regulations made under
Sections 17 and 36 or by accepted reporting or accounting princi-
ples.1" If the Authority believes that the interests of the public thus
require, it may issue such instructions as temporary directives for all
reporting bodies, made public in accordance with a method established
by the Authority's Chairman.'"
Directives issued by the Authority are effective for one year and
may be renewed, on the approval of the Minister, for another year.'
Presumably to ensure the fair and uniform application of these provi-
sions, the Authority is required, within sixty days, to issue such a
general directive if it has issued individual instructions with respect to
a specific matter to more than one company.19 Finally, as represen-
tative of an interested party in these directives, the President of the
Israeli Chamber of Accountants is granted a statutory right to state
his opinion to the Authority on the relevant provisions, both before the
general directives are issued and before they can be extended. In re-
turn, the Chamber of Accountants may publicize an opinion regarding
the directives while they are in effect only with the permission of the
Authority. 1
B. Regulations Regarding Reports
The principal regulations that have been promulgated under the
authority of Sections 17 and 36 of the Law are the Securities Regula-
tions (Periodic and Immediate Reports) 1970 (the "1970 Regulations)
and the newly issued Securities Regulations (Preparation of Annual
Financial Reports) 1993 (the "Annual Report Regulations"). While each
of these sets of regulations will be examined in turn, it is clearly be-
yond the scope of this article to engage in a discussion of the minute
technical details of the regulations. A discussion of general principles,
with a focus on legal, as opposed to technical, aspects, follows.
The 1970 Regulations establish the timing, manner, and content
of the various periodic and immediate reports that are required to be
194. Id. § 36A(a).
195. Id. § 36A(b).
196. Id. § 36A(c).
197. Id. § 36A(d).
198. Id. § 36A(e).
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submitted to the authorities. In general, the reports must be legible
and constructed in a manner prescribed in these regulations and must
be signed by the company before their submission to the Authority and
the Registrar.'"
C. Periodic Reports
Chapter two of the 1970 Regulations establishes the framework
for the submission of annual reports on the part of companies whose
securities have been offered to the public by prospectus or are traded
on the TASE.' The date for the submission of the annual reports is
fixed as within four months of the end of the company's accounting
year, provided that the report is presented by the date of the earlier of
at least fourteen days before the date set for the general meeting at
which the financial report of the company will be presented or within
fourteen days of the date of signing of the accountant's opinion and of
the audited reports of the company."1 The particulars that are de-
tailed below as requiring inclusion in these reports should be divided
into separate statements regarding the accounting year which they
cover and regarding the remainder of the report period.'
The first area covered by the regulations is the inclusion of finan-
cial reports of the company.' The regulations require the presenta-
tion of properly audited annual financial reports as of the date when
the accounting year of the company ended, drawn up in accordance
with the 1993 Regulations.' In addition, the company must include
199. Securities Regulations (Periodic and Immediate Reports) 5730-1970, §§ 2, 3, 5
(1970) (Isr.) [hereinafter 1970 Regulations].
200. Id. § 2.
201. Id. § 7.
202. Id. § 8. Section 6 of the 1970 Regulations defines "report period" as the
period beginning and ending with the respective start and final dates of the
company's fiscal year, as long as the report is submitted within three months of the
end of that year. If, however, the report is not submitted until after that three
month period, then the report period includes the time period until the date of the
report. This is, in turn, defined as the date of the signing of the periodic report,
provided that it is within fourteen days of its being sent to the Registrar and the
Authority.
203. Section one of the 1970 Regulations defines "financial reports" as including
the balance sheet, profittloss statement, report on changes in the company's equity,
report on changes to its financial situation, and explanatory notes.
204. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 9(a). Section 65 of the 1993 Regulations
repealed previous Securities Regulations, Preparation of Financial Reports (1969). As
a result, Section 67 of the 1993 Regulations provided an interim measure by which
corporate entities could submit annual financial reports drawn in accordance with
the repealed regulations as part of their periodic reports. These reports are submit-
ted before February 28, 1993, and contain financial reports for the accounting year
ending December 31, 1992. Obviously, the interim measures are no longer effective
and all references to annual financial reports made in the Law and the Regulations
now refer to the 1993 Regulations, discussed below.
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a dated and signed opinion of the accountant for the company regard-
ing the audited financial statements of the company and its consoli-
dated financial statements, including confirmation of their confor-
mance with the provisions of the 1993 Regulations.' A similar opin-
ion of an accountant must be included regarding the financial report of
any subsidiaries whose reports were attached to the reports of the
company.'
Another area that must be covered by the periodic report is the
use made of the funds raised by the sale of the securities offered by the
last prospectus published before the date of the report. In general, the
report must provide a breakdown of the various objectives specified in
the prospectus and the status of progress made towards achieving
these objectives.' Such a breakdown must be included in the period-
ic report of the company until all of the funds received pursuant to the
offering have been expended and until a report that specifies the final
breakdown of the application of the consideration has been submit-
ted.u
Furthermore, the report must include an itemized description of
the investments of the company in any of its subsidiaries or affiliated
companies, with particular attention paid to the changes in these in-
vestments over the report period and the essential terms of the trans-
actions that brought about such changes.' In addition, the report
must include the profit/loss statement of each of the relevant subsid-
iaries and affiliated companies, adjusted as to the date of the
company's annual financial statement, particularly specifying the divi-
dend payments, management fees, and interest payments that the
company has received or is due to receive from these other compa-
nies.210
If the granting of loans is one of the main business pursuits of the
company, then the report must include a detailed list outlining the
categories of loans and the outstanding balances owed to the compa-
ny. 2 1 Also, details surrounding the occurrence of any special event
that occurred during the report period that, in the opinion of the direc-
tors of the company, has had or is likely to have a material effect on
the profits, assets, or liabilities of the company, must be divulged.212
205. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 9(b).
206. Id. § 9(c).
207. Id. § 10A(a)-(c).
208. Id. § 1OA(d).
209. Id. §§ 11-12.
210. Id. § 13. Section 1 of the 1970 Regulations defines the term "adjusted" as
referring to a multiplication to give effect to changes in the Consumer Price Index
(including fruits and vegetables) as published by the Central Bureau of Statistics or
to changes in the foreign currency exchange rate.
211. Id. § 14.
212. Id. § 15.
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Along the same lines, the company must report on any changes in its
registered, issued, or paid-up capital during the report period." Fur-
ther details that must be included regarding the outstanding capital of
the company include the terms of any issues of shares for which full
consideration in cash was not received and the particulars of any op-
tions for the purchase of securities of the company which were grant-
ed.' Lastly, details of the registration of the company's securities for
trading on the TASE or the termination of such trading during the
report period must be explained..1 5
The report must also include certain information regarding some
of the internal transactions of the company. The report must detail
any salaries and benefits, received or due to be received, by any inter-
ested party in the company, either directly or indirectly, from the com-
pany, any subsidiary, or any affiliated company. However, the overall
payments made to the directors and to the general manager, as long as
they do not deviate from accepted standards, can be reported as a total
sum rather than in an itemized form for each individual.1 The na-
ture of any interest that an interested party in the company has or
had in any transaction during the report period in which the company,
its subsidiary, or affiliated company was a party thereto, unless such
transaction was undertaken in the ordinary course of business of the
company, must also be included.1 7 Similarly, the report must de-
scribe the parties and substantive content of any material agreement
made during the report period, unless the agreement can be described
as being in the company's ordinary course of business. This includes,
but is not limited to, any agreement under which a party consents to
serve as underwriter to a public offering or as a trustee for an offering
of corporate debentures."1
The last general area covered by the regulations regards the dis-
closure of information regarding various individuals who are involved
213. Id. § 16.
214. Id. §§ 17-18.
215. Id. § 20.
216. Id. § 22. Section one of the 1970 Regulations establishes that the definition
of "interested party" is the same as that given in Section one of the Securities Law.
The Companies Ordinance, Amendment 6 (1983) (New Version), however, made a
change by expanding the reporting of payments made to the five officers with the
highest salaries in the company. The amended provision requires that the company
includes in its periodic reports the total payments and benefits, including any cash
or cash equivalent, loans, securities or any credit or benefits, made to these five
individuals during the report period, that are not a result of the officer's capacity as
a shareholder alone. The report must specify all payments made during that period,
including any termination benefits. These details must be included regardless of
whether the payment was made by the company itself or by one of its subsidiaries,
affiliated companies or parent, and whether the payment was made to the officer
himself or to another person on his behalf.
217. Id. § 23.
218. Id. § 25.
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as shareholders or officers of the company. The required list of share-
holders must include only the nature and quantity of the holdings of
interested parties in the reporting entity and in its subsidiaries and af-
filiated companies."' For the purposes of this section, the regulations
establish that the manager of any investment fund be considered as
the holder of the securities in the fund's assets and that a subsidiary
be automatically considered an interested party.' In addition, the
report must list the directors of the company along with a variety of
personal and professional information regarding each of them. Perhaps
the most significant item, from the investor's viewpoint, is the disclo-
sure, to the best of the company's and its directors' knowledge, of any
familial relation between the listed directors and any interested party
in the company.2"' A slightly less detailed description of the re-
maining ranking officers in the company must also be included along
with a disclosure of the accountants of the company and any interest
or office of rank held by the auditor or his partner or by a relative of
one of those in the company.'
Interest has been expressed in regulating the benefits granted to
interested parties. On January 13, 1994, Dan Tichon, a senior member
of the Knesset, advised the press that he is preparing a proposed pri-
vate law that would restrict the attractiveness of options that could be
granted by a company to interested parties in a public offering context
by requiring that the exercise price of such options be at least at a
price equal to 95% of the public offering price of the underlying
shares.'
The regulations concerning periodic reports conclude with the
listing of certain miscellaneous information that must be included.
Examples include the address and telephone number of the relevant
entity and description of any changes made to the Memorandum or
Articles of Association of the company during the report period.'
Lastly, both the recommendations of the board of directors before the
general meeting and decisions of the directors that do not require the
219. Id. § 24(a)-(b).
220. Id. § 24(c).
221. Id. § 26. Section one of the 1970 Regulations defines the term "Relative" in
the same way as does Section 52A of the Securities Law. However, no definition of
the term is given there. It is likely that the regulations intend to refer to Section
one of the Securities Law, which defines "relative* as "a spouse or a sibling, parent,
grandparent, offspring, or spouse's offspring or a spouse of any of these."
222. Id. §§ 26A, 27. The term "ranking officer' is defined in Section one of the
1970. Regulations as including "the directors, general manager, vice- and deputy-
general manager, accountant, internal auditor, and any person who fulfills such
duties under a different title; also, any other employee of the entity who holds five
percent or more of either the outstanding nominal share value or of the voting pow-
er of the body."
223. HA'ARETL, Jan. 14, 1994, at IC.
224. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, §§ 25A, 28.
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approval of the general meeting regarding the following matters must
be included in the report: (i) the distribution of any dividends or bonus
shares; (ii) changes in the registered or issued capital of the entity; (iii)
changes in the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the company;
(iv) the redemption of shares; (v) the early redemption of debentures;
and (vi) any transaction between the company and an interested party
in it if the transaction does not conform to market conditions.' In
addition, decisions of the general meeting that do not accord with the
recommendations of the directors about the above-listed matters must
be stated, along with a disclosure of any decisions taken at extraordi-
nary general meetings and any decisions, copies of which must, under
law, be sent to the Registrar.2
D. Immediate Reports
In addition to the regular periodic reports, companies are required
to submit immediate reports to the Authority and to the Registrar
under certain circumstances. Generally, the report must be furnished
to the relevant authorities as near as possible to the date of the perti-
nent event occurring or the company's becoming aware of such an
occurrence; in all cases, the report must be made within seven days of
the occurrence of the event and must be submitted before the germane
information is made public by the company or its directors.' For the
sake of clarification, the regulations state that publicizing the infor-
mation on the TASE does not exempt the company from its obligations
under this Law.' The regulations continue by establishing a residu-
al discretion for the Authority to request that an immediate report be
submitted regarding any event that the Authority considers to be im-
portant to the reasonable investor, despite the absence of a particular
provision in these regulations requiring a report on such an occa-
sion.'
The regulations proceed to identify a long list of events that trig-
ger an obligation under this section. The first such event is a change in
the issued share capital of the company, otherwise than by a public
offering pursuant to a prospectus. When a change occurs, the company
must describe it and identify the consideration paid or to be paid for
such an issue of securities.' Similar information must be reported
in cases where the company grants options or rights to purchase any of
225. Id. § 29(a).
226. Id. § 29(b)-(c).
227. Id. § 30(a)-(b). Section 30(c) of the 1970 Regulations creates an exception for
reports under Section 37(a), which refers to decisions or recommendations of the
board of directors to the general meeting, that must be submitted within two days
of the decision or recommendation being adopted.
228. Id. § 30(b).
229. Id. § 30A.
230. Id. § 31.
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its securities."
The next group of regulations covers the holdings of and transac-
tions involving interested parties in the company. The first such re-
quirement arises in situations where a change has occurred in the
holdings of an interested party in any of the categories of securities
issued by the company, its subsidiaries, or an affiliated company.
When such a change occurs, the company must file a detailed report
that includes the following: (1) the name of the interested party; (2)
the identity of the relevant security; (3) the date of the change; (4) the
manner of the change occurring (e.g. by sale, purchase, bonus shares,
etc.); (5) if the change was through acquisition or sale, then whether it
was by way of trading on the TASE or outside of that framework, and
if the change was by way of acquisition from an issue, whether such
issue was to the public or by way of rights; (6) the number of securities
held by the interested party both before and after the relevant change;
(7) the price at which the change was executed and the total consider-
ation received, including details of any arrangements for deferred pay-
ment; (8) the date, where relevant, for the delayed transfer of the secu-
rities; (9) the total proportion of the outstanding share capital of the
company held by the interested party after the change; and (10) the
total proportion of the voting power in the company held by such a
party after the change. 2 Similar details must be provided, in addi-
tion to a description of the person's address and itemized holdings in
the company, its subsidiaries, and affiliated companies, when such a
person first becomes an interested party in the company.'
Various stages of reporting also surround the execution of a trans-
action between a company and a party interested in it. When negoti-
ations between parties begin, the company must inform the Authority
immediately regarding the contemplated transaction (the sides in-
volved, its nature, size, and other details), if the proposed bargain is
not pursuant to market conditions.' The Authority has the discre-
tion to require the company, within a specified period, to submit a full,
immediate report to the Authority and to the Registrar regarding the
progress of the negotiations.' Finally, upon completion of the con-
templated transaction, the company is obligated to fie a further report
231. Id. § 32.
232. Id. § 33(a). Note that an additional immediate report, including reasons for
such, must be submitted if the conditions regarding deferred payment or delayed
transfer of title are not fulfilled in accordance with the conditions described in the
initial report.
233. Id. § 33(b). Section 33(c) of the 1970 Regulations provides that for the pur-
poses of this section, a subsidiary of a company is deemed to be a party interested
in it. See, e.g., Israel v. Elman, (1) P.M. 343 (1990) (dealing with a violation of the
provisions of this section).
234. 1970 Regulations, supra note 197, § 33A(a).
235. Id. § 33A(b).
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to the authorities.'
The next area covered by the regulations concerns changes in
certain personnel of the company. If a ranking officer or alternate
director ceases to be employed, then the name of such an individual,
the vacated position, and the date of his departure must be reported;
further, the report must indicate either that the circumstances sur-
rounding the departure are not of a type that need to be brought to the
attention of the shareholders or that the circumstances, which must
then be specified, are in fact of such a variety. 7 Conversely, if an
individual is appointed to a position of a ranking officer or alternate
director, an immediate report must be filed, including, as the case may
be, the same personal and professional details concerning that individ-
ual that must accompany the list of directors or the list of ranking
officers submitted as part of the periodic report.'
The same dual scheme exists for immediate reports upon the
termination of the employment of and the appointment of accountants
of the entity. On the one hand, if an accountant ceases to be employed
by the company, the name and the date of his departure must be in-
cluded. In addition, the report must include a statement either that
the circumstances surrounding the departure are not of the type that
need to be brought to the attention of the shareholders or that the
circumstances, which then must be detailed, are of that nature. 9 On
the other hand, if an accountant is appointed, a report must be filed
that includes the name and address of the new accountant, the date of
the appointment, and the fact, if relevant, that the accountant, one of
his partners, or a relative of either is an interested party or ranking
officer in the company.' °
The regulations then list a variety of miscellaneous situations that
also require the submission of an immediate report. One such example
is a report on the failure or the delay in the implementation of one or
more of the objectives of the use of the consideration listed in a pro-
spectus."1 Further, a company must report on the date, place, and
planned agenda for the calling of a general meeting, including special
meetings called under Companies Ordinance (New Version) 1983.4
In addition, a company must file an immediate report outlining the
recommendations of the directors before the general meeting and deci-
sions of the directors not requiring further approval regarding the fol-
236. Id. § 33A(c).
237. Id. § 34(a).
238. Id. § 34(b); see also id. §§ 26, 26A (providing the required details regarding
directors and other ranking officers).
239. Id. § 35(a).
240. Id. § 35(b); see also supra note 221 (discussing the definition of "Relative").
241. Id. § 36A.
242. Id. § 36B (referring to Companies Ordinance §§ 109-110 (1983) (New Ver-
sion).
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lowing matters: (i) any distributions of dividend payments or bonus
shares; (ii) changes in the issued or registered capital of the capital;
(iii) amendments to the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the
company; (iv) the redemption of shares; (v) the early redemption of
debentures; (vi) the exercise of any right that the company reserved in
the prospectus to make changes to the objectives of the consideration
of an issue of securities; and (vii) any transaction between the compa-
ny and an interested party, other than in accordance with market
conditions.' A report must also be filed describing any decisions of
the general meeting regarding the foregoing matters if the meeting has
not acted in accordance with the recommendations of the board.'
Lastly, a company must submit an immediate report concerning rec-
ommendations of the board of directors to an extraordinary general
meeting, in addition to any recommendations of the board concerning
the adoption of any decision, a copy of which must be sent, by law, to
the Registrar.'
The final, and perhaps most significant, situation that demands
the submission of an immediate report is described in a broadly cast
provision covering the reporting of "special occurrences." Any extraor-
dinary event that has occurred otherwise than in the ordinary course
of business of the company must be reported if the event has had or is
likely to have material effect on the profits, assets, or liabilities of the
company.2" Similarly, the company must immediately inform the Au-
thority of the conduct of negotiations outside the ordinary course of
business that will likely lead to the occurrence of such an extraordi-
nary event; the Authority is empowered to request a full report on
those negotiations if it feels that such is necessary for the protection of
the investors.2 7 Further, the company is obligated to file an immedi-
ate report upon signing any contract or memorandum of understanding
regarding a material matter if it is executed outside the ordinary
course of business.' However, the regulations add a proviso that the
requirements of this section regarding the report of special occurrences
do not apply if the relevant event has been well-publicized, unless the
event has extraordinary effect on the business of the company, in
which case a report is still required."
243. 1970 Regulations, supra note 199, § 37(a). Note the similarities between the
Section 37 of the 1970 Regulations and the provisions, described above, regarding
periodic reports.
244. Id. § 37(b).
245. Id. § 37(c).
246. Id. § 36(a).
247. Id. § 36(b).
248. Id. § 36(c).
249. Id. § 36(d). The vague tests established by this section have the obvious
potential to create difficulties in interpretation. It is hoped that the combined appli-
cation of common sense by the Authority, the courts, and the companies involved in
these matters will prevent these difficulties from giving rise to litigation.
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E. Interim Financial Reports
The final topic covered by the 1970 Regulations is interim finan-
cial reports. "Interim reports" are defined as interim consolidated fi-
nancial reports of the company that must be prepared on a calendar
quarterly basis. With regard to a company that is not obligated to
draw up consolidated reports under accepted bookkeeping principles,
the term "interim report" refers to the interim reports of the company
alone.' The relevant interim reports must be submitted to the Au-
thority and the Registrar, as well as the TASE if the securities of the
entity are traded there, within two months of the date of the report
and no more than ten days after it was signed by the company.21
The interim reports must be prepared in accordance with general-
ly accepted accounting principles governing such reports and should
follow the detailed format provided in the first three schedules at-
tached to the regulations. 2 The notes to the reports must include
the following: (i) the seasonal effect on the reported results; (ii) the
description of any changes in accounting methods adopted since the
last annual reports and the resultant financial effect of such changes;
(iii) deferred expenses in the interim report, indicating any similar
expenses from the last accounting year which were not deferred in the
last annual report; and (iv) any new presentation or recategorization in
the interim reports as opposed to the last annual reports and any
resulting financial effects of the changes.' If the last annual report
of a company included the financial reports of a non-consolidated sub-
sidiary or of an affiliate, then the interim reports of such a subsidiary
or affiliate for the same period must also be attached to the company's
interim reports unless the Authority, in its discretion, excuses the
company from fulfilling this obligation due to the apparent inability of
the company to comply with this regulation.'
If the company presents its interim reports in an abridged form,
then the notes must include a detailed profit/loss report in nominal
terms.' Further, if the company acquired or amalgamated with an-
other company during the report period, then the effect, if it is mate-
rial, of such an event on the interim report should be indicated. 6
Similarly, the report must disclose any material transactions entered
250. Id. § 38; see also Section 5 of the 1993 Regulations regarding consolidated
reports.
251. Id. § 39.
252. Id. § 40(a) and Schedules 1-3. The format provided in the schedules includes
sample reports for the three, six, and nine month periods covered by the respective
interim reports.
253. Id. § 40(b).
254. Id. § 42.
255. Id. § 43.
256. Id. § 44.
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into with an associated party, as defined by generally accepted ac-
counting principles, during the period between the last annual report
and the date of the signing of the interim report.2 67
The completed report must be approved by the board of directors
of the company or by a committee of the board authorized to act. Be-
fore submission, the report must be signed, in the name of the compa-
ny, by the chairman of the board of directors or by the managing di-
rector and by the chief financial officer." Finally, the company's ac-
countant must approve the interim report and certify the completion of
a review of the report. The review should be filed with the Registrar,
the Authority, and the TASE; if the review included any reservations
on the part of the accountant, then those must be specified."
F. Annual Financial Reports
The 1993 Regulations, adopted pursuant to Sections 17(b)(1) and
36 of the Law, represent a significant effort to tighten accounting prac-
tices of Israeli public companies.' The 1993 regulations, some inter-
im transitional provisions notwithstanding, repeal the previous regula-
tions that covered this topic, Securities Regulations (Preparation of
Financial Reports) 1969.261
The general goal in instituting the new regulations was to update,
the accounting regulations and fully to adopt, as a rule, the principles
that govern modern accounting practices in industrialized countries.
While the extensive 1993 Regulations contain this important frame-
work for the overhaul of the current system, a detailed study of the
minute details is well beyond the scope of this article. The following
examination is confined to a review of some of the guiding principles
behind the enactment and a more detailed study of a few of the provi-
sions that carry special significance for legal practitioners.
The principle of modernization finds particular expression in the
overall requirement for more detailed and more specific reporting of
expenses and profits alike." 2 Furthermore, the Authority insisted on
257. Id. § 45.
258. Id. § 46.
259. Id. § 47. Although the regulations do not state as such, it is assumed that
the requirement to send the survey report to the TASE will only apply in such cas-
es where the interim report itself must be sent to the TASE (i.e. where the securi-
ties of the entity are traded or registered for trading on the stock exchange).
260. The provisions of these regulations, as stated in Section 66(a) of the 1993
Regulations, generally went into effect with regard to the annual reports for the
year that ended December 31, 1992. Section 66(b) of the 1993 Regulations allows for
an exception for Section 64(2)-(3), dealing with income from and transactions with
interested parties, which did not take effect until the reporting year that ended
December 31, 1993.
261. 1993 Regulations, supra note 77, § 66-67.
262. Id. §§ 46-58.
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the adoption of a uniform format for all annual reports, from which
any deviations must be accompanied by an explanatory notice.' Pre-
viously, under the repealed 1969 regulations, it was often left to the
company's accountants to decide on the format of the statements, mak-
ing comparison and examination by non-professionals difficult, if not
impossible. In addition, the 1993 Regulations attempt to provide a gen-
eral mechanism for the uniform definition of the concept of "materiali-
ty" that governs much of the determination of what information is to
be included in or excluded from the statements. Instead of the decision
being left to each accountant on a case-by-case basis, the regulations
were designed to remove the uncertainty of such a procedure by pro-
viding, wherever possible, detailed rules regarding this matter.'
Chapter 8 of the regulations deserves special attention due to its
approach to the issue of interested parties. The term "interested party"
is defined as (i) one who holds at least five percent of the outstanding
share capital or voting rights of the company; (ii) one who may appoint
a director or general-manager of the company or one who serves in
such a capacity; or (iii) a corporate body in which a person described in
(i) or (ii) holds twenty-five of the outstanding share capital or voting
rights therein or may appoint twenty-five percent or more of its direc-
tors.' Previously, the reporting of dealings with such parties was
governed by scattered provisions of the now-repealed 1969 regulations.
Perhaps the realization that the detailed presentation of such transac-
tions was essential to accomplish full and proper disclosure of company
finances led to provision of specified and detailed rules for the report-
ing of such activities in the company's financial statements.'
Without becoming entangled in the intricate details that are best
understood by the accountants, it is possible to take a quick glance at
the general provisions in this area. The statements must, in detailed
fashion, reflect both the company's obligations to such parties and its
investments in them. While the obligations of the company and its
consolidated companies must be divided into sections reflecting long-
term and short-term liabilities, the investments of the company and its
consolidated companies in the interested party are defined to include
capital investments (such as investment in securities and loans) as
well as the giving of guaranties for such party's debts."7 Similarly,
detailed procedures are set out for the report of benefits and payments
paid to, and transactions with, such interested parties by the company
263. Id. § 8.
264. For examples of this trend in the 1993 Regulations, see §§ 37, 45, and 64,
among others.
265. Section 1 of the 1993 Regulations refers to the definition of "interested par-
ty" contained in Section 1 of the Securities Law.
266. 1993 Regulations, supra note 77, §§ 62-64.
267. Id. §§ 62-63.
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and its consolidated companies.'
One of the principles upon which the new regulations are based is
clearly investor security and tighter corporate regulation. Both the
uniform format and the detailed reporting required will allow for closer
scrutiny of companies' actions. This trend is not unique to accounting
regulations; similar interests have been the driving force behind much
of the recent legislation in the area of company law.' As in these
other areas, the lawmakers and the regulatory authorities have shown
a willingness to modernize the sometimes outdated framework provid-
ed under previous enactments.
G. Other Provisions
After a digression concerning the regulations regarding the sub-
mission of certain reports to various authorities, the analysis returns
to the Law itself. After establishing the framework for the enactment
of the regulations and other forms of directives, the Law states that in
a case where the prospectus for the offering of debentures to the public
(covered by Section 35A of the Law) includes the financial statements
of a company that gave guarantees for the fulfillment of the obligations
under the debentures, then the provisions regarding reports to the
various regulatory bodies will also apply to that company for as long
as the guarantees are still effective."'
Further, the Law provides for a framework by which a company
may be exempted from reporting certain particulars required under
this chapter. The Authority is empowered to exempt the disclosure of a
certain particular if, in its opinion, the exemption is justified for the
protection of trade secrets of the company, as long as such a particular
is not of the variety that would deter potential reasonable investors if
it had been included in the report." In addition, the District Court,
on application, can grant an exemption from the disclosure in a report
of a particular if such a disclosure is likely to harm national security,
the State economy, or a continuing investigation of the police or the
Authority, if, respectively, the Minister of Defense, Minister of Fi-
nance, Minister of Police, or the chairman of the Authority, or their
designee, certifies the possibility of such harm being suffered. In such
cases, the Attorney General is to act as respondent to the applications
before the court. 2 If an exemption is granted under this section,
268. Id. § 64.
269. See, e.g., Companies Ordinance, Amendments 4-7 (New Version) 1983.
270. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 36B.
271. Id. § 36C(a). The conditions in this provision are identical to those stated in
§ 19(aXl) regarding exemptions from publication of particulars in a prospectus.
272. Id. § 36C(b). The conditions here are copied from § 19(aX2) regarding exemp-
tions from the prospectus disclosure.
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then this fact must be noted in the relevant report."'
Because of the extensive responsibilities placed on the company to
report particulars, some of which are outside of its control, the Law
provides certain mechanisms, especially in regard to interested parties,
by which the company is assisted in obtaining the necessary informa-
tion to fulfill accurately its obligations. The Law places an obligation
on any interested party to affect a timely submission to the company of
such particulars as are necessary to allow the company to complete its
duty under Section 36. If the securities of the interested party are held
by a trustee, and the trustee has submitted such information, then the
interested party is free from his obligation. Similarly, a report by the
interested party exempts the trustee from any such obligation. 4
The District Court is also given a role in insuring the proper sub-
mission of reports to the Authority. On application of the Authority,
the court may issue an order requiring that the company and its direc-
tors, within a time set by the court, submit or amend a report or at-
tached opinion, if the entity has failed to properly and fully fulfill any
of its reporting obligations. When necessary, the court may also order
that an interested party file his particulars with the company as pro-
vided in Section 37. Further, the company itself has the statutory right
to apply to the District Court in order to force an interested party to
submit or amend a report that he was obligated to submit under this
chapter.275 The Legal Procedure Regulations (Securities) 1991 clari-
fied that the application of the Authority under this section is to be
executed by summary proceedings in the Jerusalem District Court. 6
In order to insure that investor security is not jeopardized by
shortcomings of the company in the fulfillment of its reporting obli-
gations, the Law provides that the Authority may, after consultation
with the chairman of the TASE and after giving the company an op-
273. Id. § 36C(c).
274. Id. § 37(a). See also State of Israel v. David Ben Abraham Blass, 1990 (1)
P.M. 255 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990) (considering the failure of an interested
party to report as a peripheral issue in a criminal case that centered around the
acquisition of the means of control in a banking corporation without the requisite
permits). While the case report does not state which section of the Securities Law
such a failure to report would violate, presumably the relevant provision is found in
§ 37 of the Law, violation of which is grounds for a fine being imposed on the of-
fender. See also State of Israel v. Aviva Elman, et al, 1990 (1) P.M. 343 (Dist. Ct.
Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990) (considering the imposition of criminal penalties for the admit-
ted violations of certain provisions of the Securities Law, including charges of violat-
ing § 37 of the Law and § 33 of the 1970 Regulations as a result of an interested
party's failure to submit proper reports to the necessary bodies). However, again the
issue is not discussed in any detail.
275. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 38(b).
276. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991 § 1. It is presumed that the same pro-
cedure applies to applications by a corporate body under Section 38(b) of the Securi-
ties Law.
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portunity to state its case, stop trading on the TASE of the securities
of the company. Such shortcomings are failure either to submit a re-
port required by the specific deadline or submission of a report that
deviates, in a material and substantive fashion, from the stated re-
quirements." Once the relevant reports have been submitted or
amended to the Authority's satisfaction, then the Authority should in-
struct the TASE to resume trading in the securities."
The Law also provides that an interested party who has submit-
ted a report under this chapter has the same civil liability towards
holders of the company's securities as do signatories and experts who
give opinions in a prospectus." 9
In Boronovitch Properties and Leasing Ltd. v. The Securities Au-
thority,' the Supreme Court, in a leading decision written by the
President of the Court, Justice Meir Shamgar, unanimously upheld the
earlier decision of the District Court. The Court stated that the Au-
thority was correct in demanding the production of the financial re-
ports of a private company that was affiliated with a public company.
The appellant company, before commencing a public offering of its
shares, had transferred part of its operations to a private company
under the control of the same parties who maintained control of the
public company. Before the offering, the appellant company had given
bank guarantees for the general obligations of the private company,
without any security being received in return from the private compa-
ny. The public company pledged a fixed amount of its assets as a secu-
rity for these guarantees, receiving a commission of six percent from
the private company on the obligations for which the guarantees were
needed.
The rental monies that the public company collected from the
properties pledged as security on the guarantees equaled about ninety-
five percent of its total income from rentals in 1987. The Authority,
after a review of the appellant's financial statements, requested a copy
of the financial statements of the private company. The Authority
claimed that examination of the private company's statements was
imperative to the Authority's determination of the appellant's potential
liability due to the guarantees. The appellant company appealed
against the decision of the Authority pursuant to the statutory right of
appeal granted under Section 14A of the Law.
In a sweeping opinion, the Court ruled in favor of the Authority.
Among the reasons given for its decision, the Court relied on some
277. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 38A(a).
278. Id. § 38A(b).
279. Id. § 38B. See also id. §§ 31-34 (concerning liability in connection with a
prospectus).
280. Boronovitch Properties & Leasing Ltd. v. Securities Authority, 46 P.D.(2) 818
(1992).
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issues of technical interpretation of the relevant clauses and their
application to the case at hand. However, more importantly for present
purposes, the Court made a number of general statements regarding
the role of the Authority in the protection of the investing public. The
Court viewed the role of the Authority as twofold. In addition to a one-
time responsibility of insuring the proper disclosure in the prospectus
of material facts at the time of an offering, the Authority also has a
continuing responsibility to ensure full disclosure by the company
when its shares are traded on the secondary markets, in other words
the TASE. The guiding principle behind the operations of the Authori-
ty, expressed in Section 2 of the Law, is the protection of the interests
of the investing public. The subsidiary principle under which the Au-
thority operates, expressed in Section 16 of the Law, is to insure the
full disclosure of any information that a reasonable investor would
consider as relevant to his investment decisions.
Such disclosure serves two purposes: on the one hand, it allows
investors to make rational decisions regarding their investments; on
the other hand, disclosure serves to dissuade controlling individuals of
a company from abusing their positions by fraudulent or manipulative
behavior. As a result, the power to seek further information from a
company concerning particulars, granted to the Authority by Section
36(f), must be viewed broadly, considering the breadth of the task
assigned to the Authority. The section was added in 1988 by Amend-
ment 9, which, according to the representative of the Finance Commit-
tee, MK Yoram Aridor, was primarily based on the principle of full ma-
terial disclosure and the supervision of that disclosure by the Authori-
ty."' In short, the Court stated that the underlying principle of full
disclosure for the protection of the investor outweighs the principle of
the separate corporate personality, whereby a private company need
not reveal details of its financial situation.
In applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court took a
number of factors into account. First, the close, almost inseparable,
relationship between the two companies served to increase the level of
suspicion that any unusual transaction would raise among the Author-
ity, and among investors as a whole. Second, the Court viewed the
obvious accessibility to the public company of the private company's
financial statements as a factor favoring their disclosure. Further, the
level of liability incurred by the guarantors was such that the appel-
lant could not claim that accounting statements and its own financial
reports were sufficient to cover the requirement of disclosure. Lastly,
because the Authority's request for disclosure fell within the bounds of
the test of "materiality," the Court had no place in curbing or limiting
the power of the Authority to request further particulars under Section
36 of the Law. It bears mention that the Court declined to rule defin-
281. Divrei Knesset 109-111, Session of July 20, 1988, at 3871.
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itively on the question of disclosure where it was not within the public
company's legal or practical ability to reveal the documents requested
by the Authority.
With this background, it is possible to give short consideration of
the more general principles that the Boronovitch decision represents.
The Court clearly established the supremacy of the interests of the
Authority, representing the principles of full disclosure and the protec-
tion of the investor. As part of a general trend in all facets of Israeli
securities law, involving the Knesset and the courts, the decision re-
flects a recognition that the courts should take an active role in insur-
ing that the fast-maturing securities markets in Israel provide a level
playing ground for all of the participants. 2 At the same time, the
Law should attempt to avoid overburdening companies with excessive
bureaucratic regulations, and the overriding principle must remain the
protection of the investing public.
VIII. ANCILLARY PROVISIONS
A. Transnational Considerations
The Law contains a collection of miscellaneous provisions relating
to issues and offers of securities to the public and to current reports.
The Law establishes that the issue of securities and their subsequent
offer to the public require a permit from the Minister of Finance or a
person appointed by him for this purpose, without which authorization
the Authority may not grant approval for the publication of the pro-
spectus.' However, the discretion of the Minister is limited so that
the only grounds upon which he can refuse to grant a permit are that
the timing or conditions of the offer are contrary to the economic policy
of the Government.' For many years, this rule was implemented by
a special department of the Ministry of Finance responsible for capital
markets and insurance regulation. More recently, however, a general
permit has been issued by the Minister permitting the issuance of
securities by Israeli companies in Israel, without any special statutory
permission.'
The Law provides that the prospectus requirements, the current
report requirements, and the criminal penalties apply in the case of a
282. See Companies Ordinance, Amendments 4-7 (1983) (New Version) (providing
examples of this trend in the Knesset lawmaking); see also Ido Ben-Yehuda, Adv. v.
Interpharm Industries Ltd., (unreported) (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv-Jaffa June 6, 1993) (fol-
lowing the same trend in the courts).
283. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 39(a), (c), (d).
284. Id. § 39(b).
285. However, Israeli companies must gain approval of the Ministry to issue secu-
rities abroad even though, in practice, this is dealt with as part of the exemptive
proceedings available to foreign companies issuing their securities outside of Israel
pursuant to Section 40(c) of the Securities Law of 1968, which for the most part has
meant issuance of securities in the United States.
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public offering by an Israeli company to the public abroad. This provi-
sion is coupled with authorization to the Authority to provide a com-
plete or partial exemption from any of these provisions, whether such
offering is undertaken by the company itself, by another on its behalf,
or by its consent.' The Authority has discretion to exempt a compa-
ny from the provisions of these sections if the circumstances so justi-
fy."' In proposing adoption of a securities law, the Yadin Committee
had suggested this supervisory authority, stating that "[w]e believe
that this arrangement will to a substantial extent prevent distribution
of Israeli securities [abroad] which carry the country's name and are
not worthy of doing so.'
This exemptive authority has been frequently exercised in recent
years, although in the past there were periods during which all public
offerings in the United States had to pass a thorough Authority review
before being approved. There are today over 50 Israeli companies that
have successfully effected one or more public offerings in the U.S. and
other companies presently involved in the registration process. Shares
of those companies are traded over the counter and on the New York
and American Stock Exchanges. The number and volume of those
public offerings has led to considerable familiarity at the SEC about
the special problems that exist in Israeli companies, and that in turn
has led the Authority to be much more willing to exempt Israeli com-
panies from the dual registration process.'
Conversely, if a foreign-registered corporate entity desires to offer
securities to the Israeli public, then the Authority, in its discretion,
may exempt the offeror from some or all of the provisions of the Law if
the corresponding legislation in the country of registration sufficiently
serves to protect the interests of the investing public in Israel.' As
of late 1993, there have been a few efforts by foreign companies to
raise money in Israel, but none has succeeded. The main barrier has
been Israel's Foreign Currency Law and related regulations, and the
need to obtain a special permit from the Bank of Israel for the financ-
ing in Israel of activities abroad. Two efforts that ultimately failed
included a proposed application of some portion of the proceeds to
Israeli related activities. As a result of the increasing openness of Isra-
el to international securities markets, in August 1994 the Bank of
Israel advised that these foreign currency restrictions will be substan-
286. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 40(a)-(c).
287. Id. § 40(c).
288. YADIN, supra note 1, at 22.
289. In a March 1993 circular, the Securities Authority advised that it was now
willing to provide that exemption on a regular basis to companies that affect public
offerings in the U.S. Those companies now have to submit a copy of their U.S. pro-
spectus to the Securities Authority with a one page summary in Hebrew of the
terms of the offering and are then automatically granted the exemption.
290. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 41.
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tially relaxed, effective October 1994. Foreign companies may then
begin to raise capital in Israel for their international activities.
When the State offers securities for acquisition by the public,
unless the securities were issued by the State itself, the offer must be
effected by way of prospectus."' The definition of "securities" ex-
cludes securities of the State of Israel itself or those issued pursuant to
special law.' The State holds substantial securities in commercial
enterprises, however, and where the State holds more than 50% of the
control of such companies, then the activities of those companies are
regulated by a separate law.' The Government has embarked on a
program of privatization of at least some of these government compa-
nies.
A popular mode of privatization in Israel, and to some extent in
the U.S., has been by public offering. In addition, as a result of certain
problems in the banking system, the government has acquired control
of the major Israeli banks, on a temporary basis, with an articulated
goal of selling such control. Privatization of those banks is also being
effected to some extent by public offering. In each of these instances,
the Law requires that a prospectus be filed pursuant to which the
State is the offeror, and the company provides the prospectus. This
procedure is analogous to the situation in the U.S. when a so-called
secondary offering takes place in which controlling shareholders or
others who have registration rights effect an offering pursuant to a
prospectus of the company itself.'
Distribution of bonus shares is not considered a public offering
and therefore is exempt from the prospectus provisions under the Law,
so long as the bonus shares are the equivalent of a stock dividend
(using U.S. nomenclature), where there is no choice given to the share-
holders."5 As a further step adopted by the Law to insure that the
public has access to all relevant documents that are likely to be of
interest to the reasonable investor, an issuer is required to provide
copies of any prospectus or current report, along with all relevant
291. Id. § 42.
292. Id. § 1. When it comes to trading securities on the exchange, however, Gov-
ernment securities are regarded as securities for all purposes. See id. § 52.
293. The Government Companies Law of 1975, as amended.
294. This approach is envisioned by Section 22(d) of the Securities Law, which
provides that in the case of a public offering of securities for the benefit of a party
other than the company, that other party will also sign the prospectus. Sections 31
and 35 of the Law apply then to such offers as well and create civil liability in the
event of a misleading particular in the prospectus. Recent statutory relief was given
to the Government in connection with privatization of the banks, by a technical
amendment to simplify the definition of interested parties for these purposes and
thereby exclude the disclosure of complex, multifaceted relationships of Government
companies and the banks.
295. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 43.
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attachments, for inspection or duplication at the Registry and at the
main office of the issuer.' A final measure, designed to insure that
conflicts of interest do not adversely affect the interests of the invest-
ing public, provides that any person who gives a professional opinion
required under any section of the Law may not be an interested party
in the issuer for which the opinion is granted.'
B. The Stock Exchange
A separate chapter of the Law is dedicated to the provisions that
govern the activities and make-up of the stock exchange. Currently the
TASE is the only licensed market in Israel; as a result, all references
to the current stock market herein refer to the TASE. The TASE is
located in Tel Aviv, the commercial and business center of the country.
There have been suggestions made from time to time that a second
stock exchange should be established in Jerusalem, the capital of Isra-
el, to provide access to public capital for high-tech and other companies
that do not meet the rules for listing on the TASE. Such a develop-
ment is contemplated by the Law - another example of the implemen-
tation of Commissioner Cohen's prescient proposal that the Law be
broad enough to deal with future developments of the securities mar-
kets.
The rules affecting the TASE were very significantly altered by
amendments to the Law in 1988 and 1990. However, before examining
the affected provisions of the Law and the defects of the previous
clauses that the draftsmen hoped to remedy, it is necessary to examine
the underlying framework established by the Law, much of which has
not been significantly altered since being enacted. Further, there have
been a number of significant court decisions in this area, as are dis-
cussed below.
The Law begins by establishing the general principle that no
person may open or administer a stock exchange without a license
from the Minister, to be granted only after consultation with the Au-
thority.2 ' Further, the Minister is given guidelines to govern his
discretion in granting a license. The license is only to be granted to a
company if the Minister satisfies himself that the company, and the
proposed exchange to be established by it, comply with the following
requirements: (i) it does not limit the number of members; (ii) its
Memorandum of Association limits its function to the operation of a
stock market; (iii) its Articles of Association ("Articles") state that
296. Id. § 44.
297. Id. § 44A_
298. In early 1994, the Ministry of Finance published a preliminary tender with
respect to the establishment of a second stock exchange. Groups promoting Jerusa-
lem and Haifa as alternative sites have responded.
299. Id. § 45(a). The TASE was established long before the Law was enacted.
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profits will only be used to further the company's objectives and will
not be distributed among its members, and upon liquidation, the re-
maining assets will be used for objectives designated by the Minister;
(iv) its charter has complied with the requirements of Section 46 (de-
scribed below) and such charter has been approved by the Minister,
after consultation with the Authority, and by the Finance Committee;
and (v) the exchange will operate in a city where no other exchange is
already operating.'
In addition to these general licensing requirements, the Law also
prescribes various specific rules concerning the operation of the market
and its employees. The first area considered is that of the board of
directors of the exchange. Here, the 1988 Amendments took a signifi-
cant step to tighten the controls of the Government (through the Au-
thority) and the investing public over the Exchange. Overturning pre-
vious provisions, the Law now requires that a majority of the directors
of the exchange be "outsiders". The present statutory composition of
the board creates a balance between the interests of the exchange, of
the public and traded companies, and of the governmental authorities.
Currently, the total board of fifteen must consist of seven directors
elected by the members of the exchange, five "external directors" ap-
pointed by the appointment committee with the agreement of the
chairman of the Authority, one director each appointed by the Minister
of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, and one director
who meets the qualifications of an "external director" who is elected to
serve as chairman by the board with the approval of the chairman of
the Authority, provided that he is not an interested party in any com-
pany whose securities are registered for trading on the exchange."'
The board of the exchange is also mandated to select a non-voting
general manager who must meet the qualifications of an "external
director" and must not be an interested party in any entity whose
securities are registered for trading on the exchange.' The Law pro-
ceeds to define the specially established appointment committee and
the "external directors" that they must appoint. The committee has
four members, including the chairman of the Authority, the chairman
of the board of the exchange, the dean of the Law faculty at the uni-
versity located in the city where the exchange is established (presently
Tel Aviv University) or a member of the academic staff appointed by
such a dean to serve in his place provided that he meets the criteria of
an "external director," and a judge appointed by the Minister of Justice
with the approval of the president of the Supreme Court who is to
300. Id. § 45(b). This limit of one exchange for a given city is the basis for the
suggestion that any second exchange be located in Jerusalem or Haifa.
301. Id. § 45A(aXl)-(5). See also id. § 45A(d) (providing that the definition of
"interested party" in this context means the person himself or in conjunction with
any relative).
302. Id. § 45A(6).
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serve as the chairman of the committee and cast the deciding vote in
case of a tie.' The "external directors," appointed to represent the
interests of the public, may not be any of the following: (i) a member of
the exchange or an employee or interested party in such an entity; (ii)
an interested party or employee of a company that controls a member
of the exchange; (iii) a person who regularly provides paid services to
any of the above; (iv) an interested party due to holdings of shares of
any entity whose securities are registered for trading on the exchange;
or (v) any other person meeting any other criteria established by the
Minister.'
The Law continues by establishing regulations concerning the
terms of office of the various directors and the termination of such a
position. An external director is appointed for a period of two years,
after which he may be reappointed for two further terms of two years
each."° The chairman of the board, on the other hand, is appointed
for a term of five years and may be reappointed for one additional
term of five years.' However, the service of an external director may
terminate prematurely if he resigns, is deemed incapable of performing
his functions by the appointment committee, is regarded by the ap-
pointment committee as fitting one of the disqualifications with respect
to external directors, or is inexcusably absent from a fixed number of
meetings of the board over a period of time.' 7
To prevent the obviously unacceptable position of potential con-
flicts of interest involving staff of the exchange, the board members
and other exchange employees are forbidden, as are employees of the
Authority, from acquiring securities other than under a permit from
the Minister. Such a permit may be general in nature or refer to spe-
cific categories of securities. Similarly, each employee must notify the
chairman of the board of the exchange, and the Authority, of all hold-
ings of securities by himself or his spouse and of any acquisitions of
shares by himself or his spouse, within seven days of his appointment
or the relevant transaction, respectively.'
303. Id. § 45A(d). This is an interesting example of the statutory assignment to a
judge of a role with respect to a quasi-public institution, and one which is itself
subject to judicial review.
304. Id. § 45A(f).
305. Id. § 45A(b).
306. Id. § 45A(c).
307. Id. § 45B. A director absent from four consecutive board meetings or a total
of six board meetings in a calendar year is removed, unless the appointment com-
mittee concludes that the absences are reasonably justified. A similar provision ap-
pears in Section 22(aX2) of the Government Companies Law of 1975.
308. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 45C. The provisions were directly lifted from
§ 5(a)-(b) of the Law regarding similar restrictions on employees of the Authority.
However, the one slight change is that while the required notices there are to the
chairman of the Authority and the Minister, here the notice is to the chairman of
the Authority and to the chairman of the board of the exchange.
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One of the major areas improved under the 1988 and 1990 amend-
ments was the charter of the exchange. "Charter," for these purposes
("takanon" is the term used in the Hebrew original), is the set of rules
that govern the conduct by the exchange of its listing and other re-
sponsibilities, and is to be contrasted with the corporate governing
documents, in Israel (as in England) called the Memorandum of Asso-
ciation and the Articles of Association. The charter of the exchange,
which must be published for public scrutiny, has to include rules that
will generally provide for the proper and fair management of the ex-
change." The Law proceeds to provide a non-exhaustive list of vari-
ous topics that may be covered by these charter rules, only some of
which are considered herein.
While the 1988 Amendment made significant progress towards
defining the rules to be covered in the charter of the exchange, the
lawmakers, when considering the enactment of the 1990 Amendment,
still clearly felt further clarification regarding the authority of the
exchange to establish rules in certain areas was needed. As the ex-
planatory notes to the proposed legislation state,
with respect to a portion of these matters, it was argued that the
exchange did not have the authority to regulate them and this
argument was even accepted in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District
Court .... It is proposed to detail the subjects which may be set
forth in the charter of the exchange, and to determine the authority
to add details, terms, and exceptions with directives of the board of
directors of the exchange, which will require the approval of the
Authority.
The first issue, in this regard, relates to rules governing member-
ship on the exchange. The exchange may, in its charter, adopt rules
concerning, among other things, eligibility requirements for member-
ship, types of activities that members may undertake, and obligations
of the members towards clients and towards the exchange and other
members. However, in order to allow for a smooth and fair transition
to the new provisions of the Law and the regulations, the Law does
state that any person who was a member of the TASE on the eve of
the adoption of the Law is permitted to continue operating in that
capacity, notwithstanding his failure to meet any new qualifications
stated therein.10 In addition, the rules may encompass procedures
for disciplinary offenses and the resulting proceedings. 11
More significantly, this section covers the rules the exchange may
adopt regarding listing requirements for companies that will register
their shares for trade on the exchange. These requirements may in-
309. Id. §§ 46(a), 49.
310. Id. § 55.
311. Id. § 46(aXl), (c), (g).
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clude the following: (i) the types of companies that may register their
securities for trading, regarding the length of time since the company
was established, the scope of and the results of its activities, the value
of its assets and extent of its liabilities, its relationship to other corpo-
rate bodies, and categorization for registration purposes (the exchange
may prescribe different requirements for the various categories of
economic activity undertaken by companies); (ii) the types of securities
that may be registered; (iii) the manner in which the securities will be
issued and offered, and the relationship between the initial offering
price of the securities and the trading price of the securities on the
exchange; (iv) an undertaking by the company that the offering will be
made on terms, at a price, and by a manner that is equal for all pro-
spective investors, or the conditions, where necessary to encourage
investment in the particular circumstances, under which a company
may deviate from such an undertaking; (v) the manner by which secu-
rities that were not issued by way of public offering may be registered
for trading; and (vi) an undertaking on the part of the company that
all of its outstanding issued capital be registered for trading, with cer-
tain exceptions for industrial companies and special Government is-
sued shares."'
In 1990, Amendment 11 provided a similar list regarding the
third subject as to which the exchange may enact rules. In the area of
rules regarding trading activity on the exchange, the regulations in-
cluded in the charter may encompass (i) times and methods of trading;
(ii) supervision and orderly conduct of trading on the exchange; (iii)
circumstances and procedure under which trading may be suspended
or limited with regard to one share or a group of shares; (iv) release of
trading results; and (v) terms and manner of obtaining permits by
members of the exchange and the conditions under which such permit-
ted members may execute trades involving registered securities outside
of the exchange. 1 The Law also provides for the enactment of rules
regarding the continuing obligations of companies whose shares are
registered for trading, the procedures and conditions for organization
and cancellation of trading in a given security, the method of publica-
tion of information by the exchange, the fees for the services of the
exchange, and the applicability and the adjustment of all of these rules
for entities that are not companies. 14
The last major subject covered by this section relates to the
exchange's refusal to register certain securities. The Law provides that
the charter of the exchange may state that the board of directors of the
exchange may refuse to register a security for trading if the board
considers that a material conflict of interest exists between the compa-
312. For the complete list, see id. § 46(aX2).
313. Id. § 46(b).
314. Id. § 46(aX4)-(8).
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ny making the application and a controlling party in that company or
between the company and a company under the control of a controlling
party in the first company.815 However, the Law establishes that such
a decision may only be made by a majority of the board of directors of
the exchange who represent at least two-thirds of the participants in
the relevant meeting; the company must also be given a reasonable
opportunity to present its case at that board meeting. 16
The scope of the rules to be adopted by the TASE was explored in
the 1984 District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa case of Tzvi Shaul v. United
Mizrahi Bank. 17 In the context of a decision that focused on the
agency responsibilities of a bank towards a customer who places an
order for the purchase of securities, the court made several interesting
remarks regarding the TASE and its rules. The court stated that the
discretion granted to the exchange under Section 46 to enact rules
regarding a wide range of topics showed that the TASE was a self-
managing body. As a result, there exists an implied agreement be-
tween the investor and his agent (a member of the exchange) that the
relations of the two sides involved in the complex and fast-changing
business of trading in securities will be governed by the rules estab-
lished by the TASE. Therefore, the rights of the member against his
client will be secured as long as the former remains within the bounds
of the rules adopted by the exchange, while at the same time the client
can be assured of his rights as long as the member of the exchange
does not stray beyond those bounds. Thus, the court was recognizing
that the wide discretion granted to the exchange in enacting its char-
ter made the charter the source of legitimate expectations, and per-
haps even rights, as between parties who transact business within that
framework.
Amendment 9 in 1988 also made a significant contribution to the
provisions under which the TASE is authorized to issue temporary
directives, in addition to the permanent rules contained in its charter.
While prior to the amendment the exchange often issued temporary
guidelines subject to little or no public or governmental scrutiny, now
these temporary directives must, as is the case with the permanent
guidelines, gain the approval of the Authority. 8' The Law states that
315. Section 1 of the Law defines "control' as the ability to guide the activity of
the corporate entity, to the exclusion of such powers that derive solely from an
individual's filling the position of director or other position in the entity. Additional-
ly, it is assumed that a person "controls" a corporate entity if he holds one half or
more or a certain "means of control" in that entity. "Means of control" in a corporate
entity are defined as one of the following: (i) the right of voting in the General
Meeting of the company, or in the corresponding body of another corporate entity; or
(ii) the right to appoint directors or the general manager of that entity.
316. Id. § 46(b), as amended on Feb. 21, 1994.
317. Tzvi Shaul v United Mizrahi Bank, 1983 P.M. 177 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa
1984) (Isr.).
318. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 46A(b). See also id. § 45(bX3) (establishing
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the exchange is authorized to issue trial directives regarding any of
the matters on which they may pass permanent guidelines, for the
purpose of testing their possible inclusion in the charter itself.319
However, the Authority is obligated to inform the Minister of Finance
and the Knesset Finance Committee of the proposed temporary direc-
tives, which will then only take effect fourteen days after the commit-
tee was notified. If a member of the committee objects to the enact-
ment of the temporary directives, they will only take effect after thirty
days following the demand that they be considered by the committee,
unless during that period the committee votes to cancel the proposed
directives completely.' In order to curb the all-too-common abuses
by the TASE of the temporary directive provisions, Amendment 9 also
limited the term of any temporary directives to a period of one year,
subject to the possibility of the Authority approving a further one year
extension. 21 Lastly, the Authority, for supervisory purposes, is also
empowered to demand reports regarding the manner and results of the
enactment of these temporary directives.' 2 These provisions as to
temporary directives have certainly not ended all controversy. In late
1993, the TASE substantially tightened the rules as to new listing
requirements, pulling the rug out from under quite a few companies
who were about to file their prospectuses. An outcry resulted that has
led to discussions in the Finance Committee as well as an action
against the TASE and the Authority. In this action, the District Court
required the Board of Directors of the TASE to reconsider its decision
at a future meeting.'
Similar improvements under Amendment 9 have tightened the
regulations surrounding the adoption of changes to the charter of the
exchange. The exchange itself, through action of its Board of Directors,
may initiate the process of amending the charter. Such a change, like
the provisions of the original charter, requires the approval of the
Minister in consultation with the Authority and of the Finance Com-
mittee.' However, more significantly, the Law now provides a mech-
anism by which the Authority itself can initiate the process of adopting
such a change. If the Authority believes that a change is required to
facilitate the fair and proper functioning of the exchange, then it may
inform the exchange of that belief. If the exchange refuses to change
its charter in accordance with the suggestion, then the Authority may
apply to the Minister who, with the consent of the Finance Committee,
that the permanent charter of the exchange must be approved by the Minister in
consultation with the Authority, and by the Finance Committee).
319. Id. § 46A(a).
320. Id. § 46A(c).
321. Id. § 46A(d).
322. Id. § 46A(e).
323. Association of Public Companies Registered on the Exchange v. TASE and
the Securities Authority (Dist.Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa, Misc. Appeals 1672/93, unreported).
324. Id. § 48(a).
1994
DENy. J. INTL L. & POLYV
may by executive order force such a change into the charter.' 2 Un-
derstandably, a change effected by order of the Minister may in the
future only be amended or removed by the exchange if it has the per-
mission of the Minister.'
One of the most radical changes under Amendment 11 (1990) was
the adoption by Israeli law of provisions regarding what is commonly
referred to as the "one share, one vote" rule. Generally, this rule re-
quires that the exchange ensure the existence of certain conditions of
equal voting rights in both initial and subsequent offerings of securi-
ties that are to be registered on the exchange. The prior situation,
under which no such rule existed, was considered unsatisfactory for
the needs of the maturing capital markets in Israel. As the explanato-
ry note to the amendment stated,
[tihe situation whereby founding shares or shares with preferred
voting rights allow their holders to exert control over the company
in disproportion to the amount of capital that they invested in the
company, while the rest of the public provides most of the operating
capital of the said company, is inappropriate.
The amended Law provides that the exchange is not allowed to
register shares or securities convertible into shares for trading on the
exchange unless the following conditions are met: (i) in the case of a
company first registering its shares on the exchange, the capital of the
company may include only one class of shares that grant equal voting
rights in proportion to their nominal value; or (ii) in the case of a com-
pany whose shares were already registered on the exchange prior to
the amendment, any future offerings of shares must be of the class
that grants the greatest level of voting power.
The Law adds that the provisions for equal voting rights for com-
panies first registering their shares on the exchange do not apply to
"special State shares." These are shares that the government decides it
needs to hold in the interest of protecting a vital matter and that grant
special rights, defined by the Government prior to the registration of
the shares for trading. Such shares, sometimes referred to as "golden
shares," have been created or contemplated as part of the
Government's program of privatization. Israel Chemicals Limited,
Israel's leading natural resources Government company, is the classic
case in which such a special State share was created prior to an Israeli
public offering, as the first phase of privatization. Furthermore, not-
withstanding the other provisions applicable to companies registering
for the first time, a company is authorized, after the expiration of at
least one year subsequent to the date that the shares were registered
on the exchange, to issue non-voting preferred shares. A similar excep-
325. Id. § 48(b).
326. Id. § 48(c).
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tion exists for companies whose shares have been previously registered
and whose capital only includes classes of shares permitted under
provision (i). They, too, may issue non-voting preferred shares, pro-
vided that more than one year has passed subsequent to the date that
the capital of the company met the qualifications of provision (i)."7
In addition to these requirements, a further provision governs the
holders of founders' shares in the company. These are shares that have
been quite popular in Israel historically, particularly in banking, by
which private and public companies have been controlled by founders
or their successors. The 1990 Amendment 11 changed the Law to pro-
vide that anyone who holds founders shares and capital shares in a
publicly traded company as of August 1, 1990, or any person who ac-
quires the said shares, must continue to hold capital shares in a pro-
portion that does not fall below the proportion held on that date, un-
less that proportion falls below the limit by virtue of the exercise of
rights to acquire or convert shares that were granted to the other hold-
ers of securities in the company prior to the said date.'
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the question
of equal voting rights in the period prior to the enactment of Amend-
ment 11. In the 1984 case of Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the
appellant, in his status as an owner of securities traded on the TASE,
sought a court order to force the relevant authorities to effectively
adopt the "one share, one vote" rule before it was finally adopted into
the Law. 2 As discussed below in the section regarding appeals to
the courts against decisions of the exchange, the Supreme Court re-
stated its traditional stance that it would not take sides in an argu-
ment where there were reasonable positions on both sides. The guiding
principle behind the rules that the exchange might or might not enact
is the standard of "fairness" and "propriety." The Court proceeded to
review decisions of the courts, reports of various committees (including
the Yadin Committee) on this topic, and the solutions adopted in other
countries that have a developed securities law. On the basis of this
review, the court concluded that the principles of democratic manage-
ment, proper scrutiny, and unfettered fluidity of markets all stood in
favor of adopting a rule dictating equality of voting power. However,
the court also recognized that the principles of freedom of contract and
other economic interests, such as encouraging private and family con-
trolled companies to seek expansion by using the proceeds of a public
offering without fearing the loss of control in the company to outside
interests, stood equally firm against such a proposal. In the absence of
overwhelming evidence pointing in either direction, the Court conclud-
ed that it could not say that one alternative was "less proper" than
327. Id. § 46B(aX).
328. Id. § 46C.
329. Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 38 (2) P.D. (1984).
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another. In the case at hand, the appellant was unable to convince the
Court that the result of the decision of the authorities not to adopt the
proposed rule caused such manifest unfairness that the decision could
be said to be outside of the realm of propriety. Thus, it was left to the
Knesset, a few years later, to adopt the rule that the appellant had
hoped to force upon the TASE by way of the courts.
The Law provides for a special right of appeal against decisions of
the stock exchange. Any person who feels injured by virtue of a deci-
sion of the exchange regarding an application for membership, the
suspension or cancellation of membership, or the effects of any disci-
plinary proceedings may appeal such a decision to the District
Court.' 0 Similarly, any person who feels wronged by any other de-
cision of the exchange that is not taken in the course of trading may
also appeal to the District Court. However, in the case of this latter
appeal, notice of the commencement of proceedings must be given to
the Authority. The Authority may appear in such proceedings and
present its position if it wishes."1
The Law Procedure Regulations (Securities) 1991, mentioned
above in the context of applications to the Jerusalem District Court for
an order concerning the submission of reports (Section 38 of the Law),
also established procedural regulations regarding the right of appeal
under Section 47(a). The appeal must be submitted to the District
Court in whose jurisdiction the company that controls the exchange is
located - in other words, in Tel Aviv."2 The writ of appeal, stating
certain particulars including the nature of the decision appealed
against and the grounds for an appeal, must be filed within sixty days
of the decision of the exchange.' Next, the company that controls
the exchange, the respondent in those proceedings, must file its re-
sponse to the appeal within fifteen days of the service of the writ upon
the company unless a special exemption has been granted.' Beyond
the limited special procedural provisions in these regulations, the pro-
ceedings are to follow the standard practices established by the Civil
Law Procedures Regulations 1963.'
An interesting case involving this statutory right of appeal
against decisions of the exchange made its way through the Israeli
courts, culminating in a Supreme Court decision in 1992. At first in-
stance, the District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa decided in favor of the
appellant in the case of Marcus David Katz v. Tel Aviv Stock Ex-
change.' The facts of the case can be summarized as follows. The
330. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 47(a).
331. Id. § 47(b).
332. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, § 2.
333. Legal Procedures Regulations of 1991, § 3.
334. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, §§ 4, 6, 7, 8.
335. Legal Procedure Regulations of 1991, § 9.
336. Marcus David Katz v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 1991 (2) P.M. 296 (Dist. Ct.
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TASE, upon receiving notice from the controlling party in a company
that he wished to purchase all of the outstanding shares of the compa-
ny and to delist the shares from trading on the exchange, decided to
begin delisting proceedings upon being informed that this shareholder
had reached the level of holding nearly 99.8% of the outstanding
shares as a result of a tender offer, which was required by TASE pro-
cedures. The appellant, upon receiving notice of the TASE's intention
to delist, advised the TASE that he had an outstanding legal claim
against the controlling party with respect to a block of 60% of the
outstanding shares that the appellant claimed to have acquired. As a
potential major shareholder in the company if his claim succeeded, the
appellant stated his opposition to delisting the shares of the company,
a view rejected by the TASE, which decided nevertheless to delist the
shares. As a party allegedly aggrieved by a decision of the exchange,
the appellant appealed to the District Court under Section 47(b) of the
Law to reverse or stay the decision of the board of the TASE.
The District Court ruled partially in favor of the appellant. The
Court stated that in the circumstances the TASE had two avenues
open to it: it could have either ordered a suspension of trading of the
shares, or it could have adopted the more severe step of delisting. The
Court felt that the TASE had wrongly failed to take account of all the
relevant considerations by refusing to take notice of the interests of
the appellant; in addition, the TASE could have better fulfilled its
mandate, insuring the fair and proper management of the exchange,
by adopting the less severe interim measure of suspension. Further,
the TASE, in its function of facilitating trading rather than stifling it,
should always adopt the alternative that holds out the greatest possi-
bility of the resumption of trading in a security at some point in the
future. Finally, the Court did not doubt that the appellant had stand-
ing to appeal to the District Court under the Section 47(b) test of an
"aggrieved party." Contrary to the claims of the TASE, there was no
need that the applicant to the court be a registered shareholder in the
company. The District Court suspended the decision of the TASE for a
two month period, during which time it said that it hoped that a deci-
sion would be reached in the litigation between the parties.
The TASE appealed to the Supreme Court, which was asked to
consider two questions: What is the scope of the review of the District
Court of TASE decisions under Section 47, and is the exchange obligat-
ed to take the interests of a non-shareholder into consideration when
making decisions? The Supreme Court began by stating that
Amendment 9 had clearly intended that the previous path of appeal
against decisions of the exchange to the Supreme Court sitting as a
High Court of Justice be replaced by the new route via the District
Court. 7 The Court proceeded to define the scope of the review that
Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1991), rev'd, 46 (2) P.D. 441 (Supreme Ct. 1992) (Isr.).
337. While some commentators saw this as an unfortunate move away from tight-
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was available under the old system. The Court, quoting from the deci-
sion in Abramson, stated that it would not substitute its discretion for
that of the exchange.' Where two possible approaches to a problem
could both objectively meet the test of being "proper," the Court would
not force the TASE to reverse its original ruling. Further, as explained
in the Supreme Court decision in Babchuk v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange,
the Supreme Court would only interfere and reverse a ruling where
the decision was void for legal reasons; the Court would not interfere
with the professional judgment of the administrative body."9 The
question before the Supreme Court in the Katz case was whether un-
der the new regime of appeals to the District Court the extent and
scope of the review was to be expanded.
After a detailed discussion of the arguments and authorities cited
by the parties, the Court decided in favor of an expanded scope of
review. The Court stated that the expanded review by the District
Court, allowing the judge to order adoption of a decision that the ex-
change could have adopted in the first place, would not constitute the
substitution of the discretion of the District Court for that of the
TASE. Of course, the District Court would take notice of and give
weight to the professional expertise of the TASE and hesitate to inter-
fere with their decisions, especially where those decisions related to
technical, rather than legal, questions. However, the Court was quick
to comment that the substantial measure of professional knowledge
possessed by the TASE would not render it immune from the review of
the court.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court decided
that the TASE procedure supported by the District Court at first in-
stance varied from the approach expected under the Law. The District
Court should move far beyond the tests of "irrelevant considerations"
and "unreasonableness" available under judicial review and undertake
a fundamental review of the TASE decision being appealed. The Court
addressed whether the exchange, when deciding whether to delist a
er scrutiny, others felt the lower costs and increased efficiency of the lower courts,
coupled with the limits on the time of the Supreme Court, pointed in favor of the
switch under the amendment.
338. Abramson v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 38 (2) P.D. 1 (Supreme Ct. 1984)
(Isr.). In that case, the limitations on the Supreme Court's willingness to interfere
and the resulting negligible scrutiny were evident. The Court in that case stated
that the TASE and the Authority were permitted to take many varied considerations
into account when making decisions. A decision is not nullified, and there is no
violation of the principles of "fairness" or 'propriety," if the body takes a decision
where the authorities and the experts are divided in their support. It is not the role
of the Supreme Court to exercise discretion statutorily granted to a legal body; rath-
er, the court will only review the decision's compliance with standards of administra-
tive law and judicial review.
339. Babchuk v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 32 (2) P.D. 377 (Supreme Ct. 1978)
(Isr.).
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particular security, should consider the interests of a potential share-
holder whose claim to be recognized as a shareholder is still pending in
separate litigation. It is clear that this is not an issue upon which the
District Court should be overly respectful of the expertise of the TASE.
Rather, this question, at its heart, was a quasi-legal question, as to
which the courts of law are more qualified than the exchange to decide
the proper approach.
Despite the expanded review process supported by the Supreme
Court, it still proceeded to reverse the lower court ruling by stating
that, in a specific case, the proper interests to be taken into consider-
ation were limited to those of the current registered shareholders of
the company. The exchange was in no position to begin measuring the
probability of success of the appellant in his legal claim that could
potentially enable him to attain the status of shareholder at some fu-
ture point. The exchange could not predict future events and could
only effectively give credence to the concerns of the present sharehold-
ers. Thus, the TASE had acted appropriately by acceding to the wishes
of the controlling party that the shares be delisted. The Court conclud-
ed by stating that the door remained open for the appellant to seek
civil damages from the current controlling shareholder, if the appellant
were to succeed in his legal battle and the appellant could prove that
the decision to delist the securities had caused him financial damages.
Returning to the Law, provision is also made to protect the inter-
ests of the investing public by insuring the continuity of operation of
the stock exchange. The exchange is generally not allowed to close,
unless in its opinion or in the opinion of the Minister such an action is
necessary to protect the interests of the investing public.' Moreover,
the exchange is not authorized to close on its own initiative for more
than one business day, except with the approval of the Minister of
Finance." If a decision is made to close the exchange for even one
day, notice of that decision must immediately be given to the Minister,
who may order that the exchange not close or, if it has closed, that it
reopen."2 In short, the Law states that there is a public interest in
an ongoing, regular course of exchange activity, an interest which is to
be protected by the Minister rather than by the Authority. This exam-
ple of the dual role played by the Minister and the Authority under the
Law stands in contrast to the pattern of SEC dominance established
by U.S. securities laws, to the complete exclusion of the executive
branch.
Finally in this respect, the Law, in effect reasserting the role of
the Authority, deals with the supervision of the exchange by the Au-
thority. Amendment 9 made significant changes, dramatically increas-
340. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 50(a).
341. Id. § 50(b).
342. Id. § 50(c).
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ing the scope and manner of supervision and conferring a broad dis-
cretion in this regard on the Authority, in lieu of the previous supervi-
sory role of the Minister. The general principle governing the exercise
of this control is that the Authority is responsible for the fair and prop-
er functioning of the exchange.' As a result, the Authority is em-
powered, after allowing the chairman of the exchange to state his case,
to direct the exchange to take corrective action if, in the Authority's
opinion, the exchange is operating in a manner contrary to its charter,
its directives, or the general principles of fair and proper manage-
ment.' In order to enable the Authority to properly exercise these
functions, the Law provides that the exchange must submit all reports
to the Authority and turn over any information on the affairs of the
stock exchange that the Authority may request.' Furthermore, a
representative of the Authority is entitled to be present at all general
meetings and board and committee meetings of the exchange in order
to ensure that the Authority is aware of all decisions and proposals of
the exchange.'
In the period since the adoption of Amendment 9 in 1988, the Au-
thority has shown a willingness to pursue the supervisory responsibili-
ties assigned to it. In order to cope with these responsibilities, the
Authority has established a new committee whose sole task is to pur-
sue the functions of the Authority in relation to the TASE. The com-
mittee focuses in particular on examining the proposed directives of
the TASE and submitting suggestions to the Authority, the Minister,
and the Finance Committee. As a result, the TASE has found that its
heretofore relatively unfettered discretion on various issues concerned
with its operations is increasingly being narrowed by the supervision
of the Authority.
A number of pertinent issues were raised in the case of Nimrodi
Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in the District
Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa." ' While certain technical aspects of the case
were considered in a further 1991 proceeding in the Supreme Court
sitting as the High Court of Justice,' the decision of the lower court
is a more relevant one for present purposes. The case dealt with an
appeal by a company from a decision of the TASE to impose certain
conditions regarding the capital of any company, especially in relation
to founder's shares, that must be met before a registered company may
undertake a public offering."' The TASE was attempting to move in
343. Id. § 51(a).
344. Id. § 51(b).
345. Id. § 51(c).
346. Id. § 51(d).
347. Nimrodi Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 1990 (2) P.M.
89 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1990).
348. Nimrodi Land Development Ltd. v. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, 45 (3) P.D. 154
(Supreme Ct. 1991) (Isr.).
349. See the discussion above of the changes caused to the Law by Amendment
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the direction of the "one share, one vote" rule reflected in Section 46C,
as discussed above, by requiring that holders of founder's shares main-
tain a certain ratio of regular shares to founders shares. It is not so
much the particular facts of the case, but rather the Court's review of
several important principles regarding the TASE and the Authority
and their respective powers under the Law, that is important for pur-
poses of this section.
The District Court confirmed that appealing a TASE decision is
not limited by the usual framework of review. Rather, the District
Court is mandated to undertake a fundamental review of the decision
appealed from and to rule accordingly.' The District Court moved
on to consider the nature of the exchange's powers. It stated that the
exchange acts under the authority of the Law, and, although it is orga-
nized as a corporate entity, it is in fact an administrative body subject
to the general legal principles that govern such entities. Before taking
any action, the TASE had to point to the source, whether in the Law,
its corporate charter or any other source, that authorized it to exercise
such powers. Hence, the exchange was prohibited from limiting or
canceling the rights of shareholders who had acquired their securities
legally and in good faith without appropriate compensation. This espe-
cially held true in the case at hand, where the decision affected holders
of founders' shares that were not even registered for trading on the
exchange. While the Law revolved around the principle of full material
disclosure, it in no way authorized the exchange to set conditions on
an offering or the securities issued therein based on extraneous mat-
ters.
The Court continued by distinguishing the respective roles as-
signed to the exchange and the Authority under the Law. The
Authority's function centered around the protection of the interests of
the investing public. The exchange, on the other hand, is, as its name
implies, a market for trading securities; the exchange's sole mandate is
the management of that market in a manner that guarantees fair and
proper transactions. As a result of this clear distinction, the TASE had
to be careful not to interfere in the realm of functions assigned to the
Authority by the Law.
The Court concluded by considering the principles that must lie
behind decisions of the exchange. A legal entity such as the exchange
could only make decisions in areas authorized by its founding corpo-
rate documents, or alternatively, by the Law or other regulations. Any
decision regarding an issue not expressly within such boundaries was
void as ultra vires. Thus, in the absence of clear authority to enact a
decision such as the one taken by the TASE in the case at hand, the
11 regarding this subject after the Nimrodi decision.
350. For a concurring view, see supra note 336.
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Court concluded that it had no choice but to nullify such a decision.
The appeal of the company was upheld and the decision of the ex-
change reversed.
One other feature of TASE function, not directly related to the
Law, should be discussed. Due to the exemption from capital gains
taxation for listed securities, a strong motivating factor for listing on
the exchange, the TASE review process with respect to new prospec-
tuses has assumed a major role. A company affecting a public offering,
therefore, must overcome the hurdles of both Authority and TASE
review. The TASE, in addition, has adopted substantive rules with
respect to the size and track records of companies offering securities,
including special rules for particular classes of securities, such as those
in more speculative fields like oil and gas exploration. Consequently, to
some extent the TASE has assumed the role of a demanding blue-sky
commissioner in the U.S.
C. Insider Trading
Although the Law in its original format was largely based upon
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
insider trading regulation was added by amendment in 1981. In con-
trast to the extraordinary interpretive structure based upon Rule 10b-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Israeli approach to
insider trading regulation is much more detailed, to a substantial
extent drawn from English and other sources. Furthermore, in contrast
to the vague U.S. approach to insider trading, the Israeli approach was
designed to achieve maximum clarity through detailed rules and ex-
plicit definitions.
The Law defines a company for these purposes to be one whose
shares have been issued to the public by a prospectus or are traded on
the TASE and, in both cases, remain in the hands of the public. The
definition also includes subsidiaries and affiliated companies. The term
"insider information" is specifically defined to mean any knowledge of
a development or expected development in a company, a change or
expected change in its standing, or other information regarding the
company that is not known to the public and that if known would
cause a material change in the price of the securities of the company.
An "insider" in a company is (i) a director, general manager, "prin-
cipal shareholder," 1 or another individual whose standing, position
in, or ties to the company grant him access to insider information on
the "determining day," defined as the day when use is made of the
insider information, or within six months prior to such a date; (ii) a
351. Defined as an individual who holds five percent or more of the nominal
value of the outstanding capital of the company, or of the voting rights in the com-
pany, or who has the power to appoint one or more directors.
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relative of any individual listed above; and (iii) a company or other
entity under the control of any person named in (i) or (ii). Finally, a
"transaction" is defined as the exchange, sale, purchase, or subscrip-
tion of a security, or an undertaking to affect the same, whether the
individual is acting for his own account or on behalf of others and
regardless of whether he acts through an agent or trustee. 
2
The Law establishes a variety of scenarios that, by statute, are
considered the use of insider information. These include the execution
of a transaction in securities of the company while insider information
is in the individual's possession. Another example is passing insider
information or an opinion based thereon to a person where there is
reasonable basis to assume (or it is actually known) that the person
will make use of the information or the opinion to affect a transaction
or pass it to someone else. This is generally called the "tipper" liability
in the "tipper-tippee" relationship in legal scholarship.' Similarly, a
company will be deemed to have access to or possess insider informa-
tion if a director or employee of the company has access to or is in the
possession of the insider information, unless the company has enacted
clearly drawn and properly published directives that strictly prohibit
the use and dissemination of such information by those individuals for
the purpose of undertaking transactions in the relevant securities and
has ensured that arrangements are made for internal supervision to
guarantee compliance with such directives.'
The Law provides that a presumption of the use of insider infor-
mation will arise in certain circumstances. For these purposes, the
Law created a new category, that of a "principal insider," a more tight-
ly defined group than the general class of insiders. A principal insider
is defined as (i) a director, general manager, deputy or assistant gener-
al manager, controller, internal auditor, and any individual who fulfills
those duties under a different title, in addition to a principal share-
holder; (ii) a relative of any of the above; and (iii) a corporate entity
under the control of any individual listed in (i) or (ii). The approach is
somewhat similar to the short swing profit provisions of Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but with significant differences.
Whereas Section 16(b) provides for an absolute, irrefutable presump-
tion of use of inside information for transactions made within a six
month period, the Law provides that when a principal insider profits
from a purchase and sale, or a sale and purchase, of securities within a
352. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52A.
353. Id. § 52B(a). See also LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTAIM OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 83-84 (1983).
354. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52B(b) (prescribing the exact nature of the
directives that must be enacted). The legislative message to companies is clear: com-
panies should institute internal programs to police the access to insider information
and to prevent misuse of that information; otherwise they will be liable for employee
misconduct.
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three month period, that will be viewed as prima facie evidence that
he utilized insider information, unless the principal insider can prove
that he did not have any insider information at the time of the trans-
actions, or under the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that he
did not have such insider information.'
The Law provides that certain information is not considered insid-
er information. For instance, any data concerning a report submitted
to the Authority or to the TASE published or publicized in some ac-
cepted manner is not considered to be insider information once one
exchange trading day passes subsequent to the publication. In the
alternative, the facts cease to be insider information upon the passing
of four days after the report is submitted to the TASE or the Authori-
ty, if they decide not to publish the report.' However, the Law es-
tablishes that the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that the
material was submitted and/or published in accordance with these
provisions. 7
If an insider in a company makes use of insider information, the
Law makes him liable to one year in prison or a fine of NIS 6,000.'
Similarly, a person (the "tippee") who makes use of insider information
that he has received, directly or indirectly, from a person whom he
knows is an insider in the company, is liable to a prison sentence of six
months or a fine of NIS 3,000.s" In addition to the criminal penal-
ties, the Law makes a person who profits from the use of insider infor-
mation liable in a civil action to pay the profits to the company whose
securities were involved in the transaction.' The calculation of the
profit from the transaction is computed by figuring the difference be-
tween the price at which the transaction (presumably the transaction
in which the profit was realized) was executed and the price of the
relevant security immediately after the information is made public." 1
After establishing the scope and extent of the criminal and civil
liability, the Law continues by listing a wide range of defenses that
may be raised by a defendant to escape liability. Thus, the defendant
is free of liability if he can prove one of the following: (i) the sole pur-
pose of the transaction was the acquisition of "qualifying shares" that,
according to the Articles of Association of the company, a director must
355. Id. § 52E.
356. Id. § 52F(a).
357. Id. § 52F(b).
358. Id. § 52C. To appreciate the size of fines, it is worth noting that the current
exchange rate is about NIS 3 to U.S. $1. Thus, the maximum fine under § 52C is
equivalent to approximately U.S. $2,500. Clearly, the prison sentence is the much
more serious deterrent. Note, however, that some of the fines provided for other
offenses, discussed below, are much more substantial.
359. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52D.
360. Id. § 52H(a).
361. Id. § 52H(b).
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acquire as a condition of his service;"' (ii) the transaction was exe-
cuted in good faith in fulfillment of the defendant's responsibilities as
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator, or in the realization of a
pledged security; (iii) the transaction was part of the good faith imple-
mentation of an underwriting agreement; (iv) the reason for the use of
the insider information was not, or was not significantly, for the pur-
pose of obtaining profits or preventing losses to the defendant or an-
other; (v) the transaction was concluded by the defendant in his role as
agent of another, and he did not exercise his discretion and did not
give his opinion or information in a manner that brought about the
execution of the transaction; (vi) the transaction was effected outside of
the framework of the TASE and the other party also had the relevant
insider information in his possession; (vii) the transaction was affected
on behalf of an insider by a "blind trust," defined as a trust that oper-
ates at the sole discretion of the trustee without any input from the in-
sider; (viii) the purpose of the transaction was the stabilization of the
price of the security, as to which the company had established guide-
lines and advised the Authority of these guidelines before the transac-
tion was affected;' or (ix) in the circumstances of the case, the rele-
vant transaction was justified.' A special defense is available to a
company in response to either civil or criminal charges in a case
brought under the provision concerning the vicarious possession of
insider information by the company.' Although a director or em-
ployee had access to or was in the possession of the insider information
about the company whose securities were involved in the transaction,
the company will be excused from liability if it can prove that the
director or employee in question was not the individual who made the
decision to effect the transaction and that there is a reasonable expla-
362. Whereas qualifying shares were once reasonably common in Israeli compa-
ies, especially private ones, they are almost non-existent today in Israeli public
companies or substantial private ones.
363. The existence of the stabilization defense was used by the major Israeli
banks as one of a series of arguments in legitimization for very substantial market
support of their shares. Those arguments were submitted before a special govern-
ment commission, the Beisky Commission, which was established to review these
matters, and more recently in a criminal proceeding against those banks, their chief
officers and some bank accountants. Most of the defendants were convicted on Feb-
ruary 16, 1994 and sentenced on April 14, 1994. Israel v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel
B.M., (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, unreported decision). The case has been appealed to the
Supreme Court. The background to the indictments was discussed in Uri. Ganor v.
Attorney General, 44 (2) P.D. 485 (1990), a case brought in the Supreme Court, act-
ing as the High Court of Justice, as a result of which the Attorney General was
required to reconsider his earlier determination not to prosecute the banks and re-
lated parties.
364. Securities Law, supra note 2. § 52G(a). The last defense constitutes a fully
justified grant of broad authority to the courts, in this complex area, to create addi-
tional defenses where justified on a case by case basis.
365. Id. § 52B(b).
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nation for the execution of the transaction.' The Law establishes
that no transaction will be voided only by virtue of the violation of any
provision as to insider trading."7
The Law adopts rules governing securities transactions by em-
ployees of the members of the exchange.' For purposes of this sec-
tion, an "employee of a stock exchange member" includes a director or
employee of the member, his spouse, his family members whose suste-
nance depends on him, and companies under the control of any of
those. Similarly, "security" is taken to include shares, or securities con-
vertible or realizable into such shares, that are registered for trading
on the TASE.' The Law provides that an employee of a member
may not affect a purchase or sale of securities, otherwise than in the
course of trading on the TASE by written instructions given at least
one day prior to the date of the transaction 7 ° Further, such an em-
ployee must hold all of his securities in an account under his own
name with a member of the exchange." 1 Similar provisions apply to
limit the manner in which an employee of a member may effect a
transaction on behalf of someone else."72 The Minister is empowered
to enact regulations, after consultation with the Authority and with
the approval of the Finance Committee, that place a ban on trading for
various categories of employees of members and in relation to various
categories of securities.7
Some other insider trading issues were examined by the Jerusa-
lem District Court in the 1988 case of Establissement Mollet de Dupont
Freres, Vadus v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. and Aaron Meir.374 The
individual defendant, managing director of United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.,
acquired shares from the plaintiff in an Israeli company for the bank a
short time before the company was to make a public offering and regis-
ter its shares for trading on the TASE. Although the public offering
366. Id. § 52G(b).
367. Id. § 52J.
368. See id. § 45C (concerning acquisition of securities by board members and em-
ployees of the TASE).
369. Id. § 521(a); see also supra note 111 (discussing a case in which this limited
definition of "securities" resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants on a
charge under Section 52 of the Law). Because the change dealt with the purchase of
the shares in an initial public offering, the shares did not yet fit the definition of
"being registered for trade on the TASE."
370. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(b); see also supra note 233, where one of
the charges in the case included offenses against § 521(b), (c) by an employee of an
exchange member.
371. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(c).
372. Id. § 521(d); see also supra note 112 where the judge conducted an exami-
nation of some of the technical aspects of the interpretation of this section in con-
victing one of the defendants of offenses under its provisions.
373. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 521(e).
374. Establissement Mollet de Dupont Freres, Vadus v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.,
1989 (2) P.M. 268 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1989).
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and the act of registration for trading was likely to result in a rise in
the value of the shares, the defendant, who was also a member of the
board of directors of the company, decided that it was not necessary to
reveal the fact of the intended public offering and registration to the
plaintiff. Based on this background, the plaintiffs applied to the court
for a declaratory judgment that the defendants had not acted in good
faith in the negotiations for the purchase of the shares."'
One of the defenses offered by the individual defendant centered
around the question of insider information under the Law. Because the
plans of the company were not known to the public, the defendant
claimed that under Section 52C of the Law he was prohibited from
revealing this information to the other party, information to which
only the defendant had access in his capacity as director of the com-
pany. The judge rejected this claim and instead stated that the terms
of the Law regarding insider information in fact further served as a
basis to criticize the defendant's actions. She stated that the defendant
himself had run afoul of that section of the Law by making use of
insider knowledge in effecting the questioned transaction. 7 Finally,
the judge on her findings of fact rejected outright the defendant's claim
of falling under a number of the defenses listed in Section 52G."77
The judge continued by stating that the provisions of the Law
regarding insider information were meant not only for the protection of
the company but also for the protection of parties who deal with an
individual with inside information. While the Law does state in Sec-
tion 52G(a)(6) that a defense is available where the transaction was
affected with another party outside of the exchange and where both
parties have access to the inside information, the judge stated that
where, as in a case like the one before the court, an individual was
prohibited under the Law from disclosing the information to the other
party, the party with the information was not allowed to execute the
transaction by virtue of his possession of an unfair advantage.
However, as stated above, the Law also provides (in Section 52J)
that a transaction is not voided solely by virtue of a violation of any of
the offenses. Further, the Law does not make anyprovision regarding
the obligation of good faith in the framework of transactions that it
outlaws. Thus, the judge felt that the ordinary principles of good faith
that apply in Israeli civil law must apply to these cases. As a result,
the judge undertook to apply some of those principles, as articulated in
the Contracts Law 1973, to the facts of the case. She pointed out that
375. Contracts Law of 1973, § 12 (requiring good faith in contract negotiations,
just as § 39 of that law requires good faith in contract implementation). These sec-
tions, based mainly upon Continental civil law precedents, have spawned case law
extending the good faith requirement to other fields as well.
376. The judge especially pointed to § 52B(aXl) of the Law.
377. The claimed defenses are found in § 52G(aX4), (5), (9) of the Law.
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the failure to disclose a material fact to the other party in a transac-
tion, when that party could not himself have discovered that informa-
tion, was enough in itself to constitute bad faith. She also noted that
such obligations could apply in the pre-contractual stages of negotia-
tions and that, in certain circumstances, the obligation to disclose may
require the party to reveal the facts of his own initiative, and not nec-
essarily in response to a question of the other party. Therefore, in the
court's opinion the defendant had acted contrary to good faith and the
plaintiff merited the requested declaration.
While there are not many reported cases of litigation in Israel
regarding the insider information provisions, there have been an in-
creasing number of criminal indictments brought in the Magistrate's
Court, with convictions obtained in most of the cases (in non-reported
decisions).378 These indictments and convictions have resulted in a
flurry of news articles that will probably have a material deterrent ef-
fect in this area.
IX. SPECIAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILIrIs
Two chapters of the Law consider the extent and scope of the civil
and criminal liabilities incurred by parties who violate provisions of
the Law and regulations. Liability connected with the publication of a
defective prospectus was reviewed above. Other securities law liabili-
ties are discussed herein.
The Law establishes a general civil liability of an issuer of securi-
ties for all damages caused to a holder of the securities caused by the
issuer's violation of the Law or regulations, of the Joint Investments
Trust Law of 1961 or regulations, or the terms of the trust indenture
under which debentures of the company are held.879 The liability of
the issuer extends to the directors, the general manager, and any con-
trolling party in that company.'
This section may have the unintended effect of adding to the num-
ber of parties potentially liable for misleading particulars in a pro-
spectus. For instance, controlling shareholders and general managers
who are not directors are not obligated to sign the prospectus and,
therefore, are not liable under Section 31 for misleading particulars in
a prospectus. Similarly, a trustee who holds certificates of obligation in
trust for the holders of the issuer's debentures is liable to those holders
for any damages caused to them by the trustee's violation of the trust
378. See e.g. Israel v. Gibor Sabrina, Crim. Action 5322/90 (Tel Aviv-Jaffa Magis-
trates Court); Israel v. Joseph Peleg, Crim. Action 6206/89 (Tel Aviv-Jaffa Magis-
trates Court). The judge in both of these cases, Judge Bracha Ofir, has been particu-
larly active in dealing with securities law cases.
379. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 52K(a); see §§ 35A-350 for the provisions
regarding trust indentures.
380. Id. § 52K(b).
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indenture or of the provisions of the relevant sections of the Law and
regulations."'
The liability may be avoided if a defendant can meet the require-
ments of one of the listed statutory defenses. A party will not be liable
if he can prove that (i) he took all the appropriate steps to prevent the
breach; (ii) he did not, could not have known, or ought not to have
known of the violation; (iii) the injured party acquired the securities at
a time when he did know or ought to have known of the existence of
the violation.s 2 In any case where more than one party is liable to
the plaintiff, a common occurrence in securities cases, the defendants
are liable, jointly and severally, for all damages. Among the defendants
themselves, the rules governing the contributions of tortfeasors will
apply.'
The Law establishes a broad range of criminal sanctions available
against various parties for violations of different sections of the securi-
ties law.' The first portion of the chapter consists of different group-
ings of uniform penalties for sets of violations.
The first category of these offenses renders the party liable to
three years imprisonment or a fine that is calculated as four times a
standard rate set in Section 61(aX3) of the general Penal Law of 1977
(the "Penal Law").' The offenses include (i) the issuance of a pro-
spectus without a permit from the Authority, as required under Sec-
tion 15(a) of the Law, with the intention of misleading the reasonable
investor, the burden of proof being on the defendant to prove that he
did not so intend to mislead; (ii) the violation of Section 16(a) of the
Law, which provides that a prospectus must contain all information
likely to be important to the reasonable investor, if the defendant is
unable to prove that the failure to do so was not calculated to mislead
the investing public; (iii) the giving of an opinion, report, or confirma-
tion containing misleading particulars, that was included or mentioned
in the prospectus with the prior knowledge of the defendant; and (iv) a
variety of violations of the terms of Sections 36-37 regarding current
reports to the Authority or the TASE, including the provision of a
381. Id. § 52L.
382. Id. § 52M.
383. Id. § 52N.
384. See Rubinstein, supra note 112, where the judge stated that the securities
law has focused its attention on civil remedies. The lawmakers have continued to
ignore criminal sanctions at the same time that they have amended numerous provi-
sions relating to civil remedies over the year. The judge especially pointed to the
Knesset's unwillingness to ease the difficult burden placed on the prosecution of
proving fraudulent influence in order to constitute an offense under § 54(aX2) of the
Law.
385. Section 61(aX3) of the Penal Law provides for a fine equal to NIS 36,000, so
that the fine provided for by the Securities Law would be NIS 144,000, roughly
equal to U.S. $48,500 (based on mid-December 1993 exchange rates).
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report under those sections to the Authority or TASE that includes a
misleading particular that is intended to deceive a reasonable inves-
tor.3s
The second, less severe, grouping renders the offender liable to
one year in prison or a fine equal to three times the standard set in
Section 61(a)(2) of the Penal Law. 7 These offenses include (i) viola-
tion of Section 13 of the Law, which provides for the confidentiality of
the proceedings of the Authority and the materials submitted to it; (ii)
violation of Section 16(a) or Section 18(a), regarding the inclusion of all
relevant information in the draft or final prospectus;' (iii) failure to
comply with the provisions of Section 25(d), which outlines the respon-
sibilities of various parties to furnish a report to the Authority imme-
diately upon learning of the inclusion or omission of a particular from
a prospectus that the Authority might consider warrants amendment
of the prospectus; (iv) failure to follow instructions of the Authority
under Section 25(a) or Section 25A(b) regarding the amendment of a
prospectus; (v) neglecting to perform responsibilities under Section
35B(a) regarding the appointment of a trustee by deed before the issu-
ance of certificates of obligation or under Section 35J concerning re-
ports of the issuer to the trustee in such cases; (vi) the offering of secu-
rities to the public without the permit of the Minister, contrary to
Section 39(a); (vii) the operation of a stock exchange without a license,
in violation of Section 45(a); (viii) violation of Section 521(b), which
prohibits an employee of an exchange member from engaging in a
transaction in securities other than in the course of trading on the
TASE via written instructions given at least one day before the trans-
action is effected; (ix) breach of Section 521 (c or d), which governs the
holding of securities and transactions involving them by an employee
of an exchange member on his behalf or on behalf of others; (x) failure
to fulfill the provisions of Section 56A(a) or Section 56C(a), which pro-
vide authority to subpoena information or documents and to interro-
gate involved parties when there exists a suspicion that a provision of
the Law may have been violated; and (xi) breach of Section 56E, which
386. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 53(a) (providing also that certain evidentiary
rules construe delays and improper reports as prima facie proof that the intention to
mislead lay behind the hesitation to submit the proper reports within the time set
by the regulations).
387. Section 61(aX2) of the Penal Law provides for a fine of NIS 14,000. Accord-
ingly, the fine provided for in this section of the Law would be NIS 42,000, equal to
approximately US$14,150 (based upon mid-December 1993 exchange rates).
388. The lack of a distinction between a violation of the prospectus rules in the
draft or final prospectus should be noted. As indicated previously the 1988 amend-
ments added the requirement for director signatures on draft prospectuses. Civil
liability under Sections 31, 32, and 35 of the Securities Law of 1968 only applies to
the final prospectus. Therefore, in order to raise the level of draft prospectus prepa-
ration, stiff criminal sanctions were imposed, an approach that is too harsh and
therefore impractical.
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guards the confidentiality of the information obtained under the pow-
ers of investigation granted to the Authority under the Law.'
The last major grouping subjects offenders to a fine of three times
the standard level established in Section 61(aXl) of the Penal Law"
but does not refer to a prison term. The relevant offenses include (i)
violation of the terms of Section 5 or Section 10(b) regarding the acqui-
sition and notification of holdings of securities by members or employ-
ees of the Authority; (ii) the failure of an interested party to deliver
particulars to the issuer under Section 17(c), which the latter needs in
order to fulfill its disclosure requirements in the prospectus; (iii) publi-
cation of a prospectus where the provisions of Sections 22 and 23 re-
garding the approval and signature of the prospectus by the relevant
parties and the proper manner of dating and publishing the prospectus
have not been fulfilled; (iv) failure to comply with the terms of Section
23(c) regarding submission of the prospectus to the Registry and public
notice of its publication, or with the instructions of the Authority un-
der Section 23(d) regarding the distribution of copies; (v) the accep-
tance of orders for securities offered by prospectus outside of the peri-
ods allowed under Sections 24(c) and 25(c); (vi) failure to fulfill obli-
gations under Section 26(b) or (c) or Section 27(a) or (b)(3) regarding
the refund of payments to those whose orders for securities under the
prospectus were canceled or not filled for other reasons; (vii) violation
of the terms of Section 28(a, b) concerning the investment of monies
received on account of orders for securities and the refund of such
funds, or of the terms of Section 30 regarding the notification to the
Authority of the results of an offering by prospectus; (viii) non-compli-
ance with regulations made under the authority of Section 35D(b)
regarding the nature and obligations of a trust company holding cer-
tificates of obligation on trust for the holders; (ix) violation of the pro-
visions of Sections 36, 36B, or 37 regarding current reports to be sub-
mitted by various parties to the authorities or failure to comply with
regulations or directives regarding such reports that the Authority is
empowered to enact under Section 36A; (x) an offeror or other corpo-
rate entity that fails to fulfill its obligation to provide for the inspec-
tion of documents by the public under Section 44; (xi) failure to publish
the charter of the exchange under Section 49; and (xii) violation of
Section 51(c), which states that the exchange must submit reports and
information as requested by the Authority."'
The Law addresses a number of special provisions regarding par-
ticular offenses. If a continuing offense is committed under the pro-
389. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 53(b).
390. The fine provided for by Section 61(aX1) of the Penal Law is NIS 7,000.
Thus, the fine called for by the Law is NIS 21,000, equal to approximately U.S.
$7,100 at mid-December 1993 exchange rates.
391. Securities Law, 8upra note 2, § 53(c).
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visions of Sections 36, 36B, or 37, regarding the submission of current
reports to the authorities by various involved parties, or under the
regulations established by the Authority by virtue of Section 36A re-
garding such reports, the Court may impose an additional fine equal to
one-fiftieth of the total fine for each day that the offense continues.392
Further, if any of the offenses detailed in this section were committed
by a company, the directors and general manager are also criminally
liable, unless they can prove either that the violation occurred without
their knowledge (and that they did not need to or could not have
known of them) or that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the
commission of the offense.' In one case, a company was convicted of
failing to render periodic reports. The court, however, excused a senior
officer of the company from any responsibility on the assumption that
he had indeed taken all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of
the offense. It took fifteen detailed pages to get to that result.3 "
The final area of criminal liability covered in this chapter regards
the more serious offense of committing fraud in connection with securi-
ties transactions. A person violating one of these rules is liable to five
years imprisonment or a fine equal to five times the standard stated in
Section 61(aX4) of the Penal Law: (i) the inducement or attempted
inducement of a person to acquire or sell securities by way of a fore-
cast or promise, written, verbal, or otherwise, when he knows or ought
to know that such are false or misleading, or by way of withholding of
material information; or (ii) the fraudulent or manipulative influence
on the movement of the price of securities.'
An important case arose under this Section in the State's appeal
to the District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa from an acquittal of the defen-
dants by the Magistrates Court in the 1989 case of State of Israel v.
Yaakov Rosenbach.' The case concerned the execution of "matched
orders" by the defendant in order to arouse a dormant market for trad-
ing in the securities of a certain company. The operation accomplished
its goal of driving the price of the shares to a level that the defendant
392. Id. § 53(d).
393. Id. § 53(e). For similar provisions regarding the civil liability of the issuer
and its employees, but without the defenses specified as to criminal liability, see id.
§ 52K(a), (b).
394. Israel v. Rassco Ltd., Crim. Claim 1298/90 (Magistrates Court Tel Aviv-Jaffa
1991) (unreported).
395. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54(a); see Sassoon H'ugi v. The Int'l Bank,
1985 (1) P.M. 256, (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1985) (concluding that once the judge
had decided that the investment advice given by the defendant to the plaintiff was
not negligent, there could be no finding of violation of the terms of § 54(aXl) of the
Law).
396. Israel v. Yaakov Rosenbach, 1989 (2) P.M. 309 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa).
Under Israeli jurisprudence, the State can appeal from an acquittal in a criminal
case, and the higher court may convict. Such an appeal is a fairly common occur-
rence in Israel.
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felt was appropriate, considering the circumstances of the company, a
level at which investors would have been willing to sell their shares to
allow the defendant to increase his holdings. The question before the
court was whether the execution of matched orders transgressed Sec-
tion 54(a)(2) of the Law, which prohibits the fraudulent manipulation
of the price of securities. The three judges arrived at the same verdict,
overturning the acquittal. However, one judge, Michael Ben-Yair, who
in late 1993 began to serve as Israel's Attorney General, arrived at his
decision by applying different principles than those considered by the
other two.
The other two judges, Judges Ben-Ito and Even-Ari, followed the
standard established by Judge Ben-Ito in her judgment in the 1980
District Court case of State of Israel v. Yaakov Levinkoff."7 There, as
part of a 2-1 majority, she stated that speculation is an acceptable
form of trading in securities - in a sense, as a form of betting on the
market based on evaluations of market conditions, economic knowl-
edge, and an analysis of the available information. Manipulation, on
the other hand, is a direct action that seeks to influence the fluctua-
tions in the value of the securities beyond that which the market itself
justifies. However, in order to constitute a crime, the manipulation has
to be in a deceitful manner.
In Levinkoff, Judges Ben-Ito and Even-Ari held that even a legiti-
mate action could become manipulative in the legal sense if the action
is utilized, in a deceitful manner, to create a false impression regard-
ing the value of the shares and to influence that value. In their opin-
ion, the execution of matched orders was a classic example of such a
manipulative action. Manipulation is not established by the fact that
the action was simply intended to adjust the price of the security to a
suitable level, even if the action did create a false impression regard-
ing the market for the securities. However, Judge Even-Ari added,
creating a false impression of activity in the market for a security
when in fact no such activity existed was enough, in itself, to consti-
tute a violation of the Law, if the purpose was to influence the value of
the security. He rejected as groundless the distinction between the
proper motive and the criminal intention, pointed to as integral by
Judge Ben-Yair. Judge Even-Ari concluded by stating that it is possi-
ble that a situation may arise where there is no legal way to accom-
plish a desired goal. However, the absence of such a legal route does
not in any way validate a violation of the law by a citizen in the pur-
suit of that goal. The prosecution was not required, contrary to dicta of
Judge Ben-Yair, to offer proof of an alternative method of achieving
the goals before it can be said that it had proved criminal intention.
Judge Ben-Yair, on the other hand, showed greater concern for
397. Israel v. Yaakov Levinkoff, 1980 (2) P.M. 221 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv/Jaffa 1980).
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the motives behind the defendant's activities. He stated that the na-
ture of the activities causing fluctuations in the value of the shares
could not be properly established without paying attention to the mo-
tives of the individual who undertakes those actions. He established,
as a principle, that if the motivation for the activity is legitimate and
proper, then the activities will not be illegal regardless of the influence
they may have on the price of the securities. This holds true whether
or not these fluctuations were a principal or concurrent result of the
actions. Thus, transactions in securities, including matched orders that
contain a measure of pretense, may be legal if they are accompanied
by a legitimate motive. The underlying motive of the defendant in this
case, in the end, was to increase his holdings in the securities of the
company; both sides conceded that this was a legitimate motive.
However, contrary to Judge Even-Ari, Judge Ben-Yair felt that
there was an important distinction between a legitimate motive and
criminal intention. He stated that the issue at hand was whether such
a distinction could be drawn, thus allowing the prosecution to prove
the requisite criminal intention. He decided that it was necessary to
prove that the defendant had an alternative method of fulfilling his
desire without influencing the price of the shares, in order for the
court to distinguish between the possibly legitimate motive and a crim-
inal intention. Judge Ben-Yair felt that the possibility of accomplishing
the stated goals by continually entering buy orders on the market, in
conjunction with a willingness to purchase any offered shares until the
price of the shares reached the desired level at which the public would
be willing to sell its shares, showed that there was such a legitimate
alternative. This option, albeit slower than the one selected, was the
proper route that the defendant should have adopted, rather than at-
tempting to reach his goal by creating a false picture of activity that
constitutes an offense. Once this alternative had been provided, the
prosecution had relieved itself of the burden of proving criminal inten-
tion despite the legitimate motives behind the defendant's activity.
In a 1993 case, the District Court held that a money manager who
acted also as a financial reporter had used his newspaper column to
affect the market price of securities, using false information and fore-
casts, while benefitting personally from transactions in those securi-
ties. He was held to have committed fraud in connection with these
transactions, a violation of Sections 54(aXl) and 54(aX2) of the Securi-
ties Law. The Court acquitted him other such claims.'
The difficulties in defining the offense and the circumstances of its
commission, reflected in the varied approaches of the judges in the
Levinkoff and Rosenbach cases, shows the need for legislation to pro-
398. State of Israel v. Aharon Zilberman, Crim. Action 97/91 (Dist. Ct. Tel
Aviv/Jaffa, 1993) (unreported).
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vide a more accurate definition of the elements of the offense.' In
light of the severity of the violations involved and the potential finan-
cial effects on the investing public, lawmakers should overcome their
reluctance to reconsider the criminal sanctions under the Law and
clarify these essential sections in the interests of fairness and certain-
ty.
A. Representative Class Actions
One of the most significant additions to the Law under Amend-
ment 9 was the creation of representative class actions in securities
cases. The explanatory notes to the draft of the Amendment explained
that the goal was to provide a mechanism by which an investor, whose
personal damages are small but are part of a significant potential sum
of collective damages, could seek restitution in the courts without hav-
ing to contend with the large expenditures of money and time required
to prove a claim. This form of action has recently begun to be a sig-
nificant weapon in combating violations of the Law. Israeli securities
law procedures have thus been revolutionized, bringing them much
closer to U.S. procedures.
The Law defines a number of the general principles underlying
the representative class action. Any holder of securities is authorized
to bring a suit in the name of a group of holders on any legal grounds
and against any defendant against whom an individual could have
brought suit in his own right.' If the requested remedy under the
claim is damages, the only prerequisite to establishing the action is
proof that he has suffered such damages." In addition, a decision of
the court in the class action is considered to be a verdict for all mem-
bers of the class, subject of course to the definition of "class" provided
by the Law as described below.'
Before the class can be defined, the court must sanction the pro-
posed representative action. A court will permit an action if it is con-
vinced of the following facts: (i) the action is brought in good faith; (ii)
there is a reasonable chance that material questions of fact and law,
common to the members of the class, will be decided in their favor in
399. See supra note 25. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defen-
dant under § 54(c) of the Securities Law of 1968 for use of misleading offering ma-
terials.
400. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54A(a). Thus, the action may lie against,
among others, an offerer, issuer, underwriter, or interested party, or directors or
senior management, in addition to professionals who rendered opinions to be includ-
ed in a prospectus or report. Interestingly, the Section speaks of a suit "on any legal
ground", suggesting that the Israeli representative class actions may be available for
claims arising from legal theories outside of securities law. The Section has not yet
been tested in this respect.
401. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 54A(b).
402. Id. § 54A(c).
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the course of the proceedings; (iii) the size of the class justifies the
claims being brought as a representative class action; (iv) under the
circumstances, the representative class action is the most effective and
fairest manner to decide the relevant issues; and (v) there is a reason-
able basis to believe that the plaintiff represents the interests of the
entire group in a proper fashion.' One very important factor in the
Law's approach is the need to have court approval of the legitimacy of
the class action, an extremely important safeguard against abuses of
judicial process. This safeguard is even more important inasmuch as
the class action was added to an already busy, competitive judicial
legal system.'
Once the court has certified the class action, it must define the
class on whose behalf the action will be conducted and give directives
for the publication of its decision in that respect. The Law does not
require a potential claimant to opt in to a group action. Rather, it
considers any person falling within the court-defined class as consent-
ing to be included in the group claim. That person may, however, noti-
fy the court within forty-five days of publication of the decision that he
desires to opt out of the class. This period may be extended in special
circumstances for certain persons upon application to the court.'
Because the interests of the group are being put forward by a
single representative plaintiff, that individual is prohibited from drop-
ping the action or arriving at a compromise settlement with the defen-
dants without court approval. Thus, the court has an active role to
ensure that group interests are not sacrificed in favor of a collusive
settlement."
The Legislature authorizes the Minister of Justice to adopt regula-
tions concerning procedural issues regarding the submission of group
claims and of their conduct by the courts. In particular, the Minister
may establish guidelines for proving damages by each member of the
class. Such regulations were published soon after the Amendment was
adopted, under the title Securities Regulations (Procedure in Class Ac-
tions) 1991. Whereas the Law provides that all other regulations are to
be promulgated by the Minister of Finance, the regulations concerning
court procedural matters are to be issued by the Minister of Jus-
tice.'
The regulations state that a plaintiff seeking certification for a
403. Id. § 54B.
404. There were over 12,000 licensed lawyers in Israel in late 1993, and the num-
ber promises to increase very rapidly in the years ahead. Over 2,000 new lawyers
are expected by the end of 1995.
405. Id. § 54C.
406. Id. § 54D. This protection seems fair since many of the plaintiffs will usually
be forced into the class action in default of opting out of the group.
407. Id. § 54E.
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class action should attach a request to the statement of claim, submit-
ted under summary proceedings.' The request should include de-
tails such as the estimated maximum number of claimants in the
class, the material issues of law and fact common to the group, the
bases upon which the request for class certification are grounded, and
the proposed method of remuneration of the lawyer who represents the
claimant.'
The court may accept the application and sanction the class, or it
may amend the application regarding any of the particulars of the
action where necessary to ensure the effective and fair pursuit of the
claim. If the court accepts the application after amending it, the appli-
cant is authorized to amend his statement of claim accordingly or to
drop his claim altogether.4 1 If the plaintiff elects not to pursue the
action, or if the court decides not to certify the claim because of its
failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Section 54B of the Law,
then the "failure" of the class action does not prevent either the rep-
resentative plaintiff from pursuing a claim in his own name or another
claimant from applying for the certification of a class action in the
name of the same or a similar group.
11
The regulations then deal with cases where the court certifies the
class. They detail the approval that the court must give and the notice
that must be publicized. These requirements include (i) the definition
of the class that will be covered by the action; (ii) the basis of the claim
and the desired remedies; (iii) the material questions of law and fact
which are common to the whole group; (iv) any instructions regarding
the proceedings in the court, as the court deems appropriate; and (v)
instructions regarding the manner and content of the notice of the
decision of the court and who will bear the costs of publication of the
notice.12
The notice must contain the following information: (i) the name
and address of the representative plaintiff; (ii) the definition of the
class and the grounds of the claim and the desired remedies; (iii) the
name and address of the lawyer who will represent the group; (iv)
advice of the fact that the decision of the court in the action will be
considered a verdict binding on all members of the class; and (v) notice
that all people included in the group will be deemed to have agreed to
the class action unless they indicate to the court their desire to opt-out
of the group, within forty-five days of the notice or within an extended
period that the court may set, on application, for a particular individu-
408. Id. § 2-5752.
409. Id. § 3.
410. Id. § 5.
411. Id. § 5 & 6.
412. Id. § 7.
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Once these procedural outlines have been established, the regula-
tions deal with the verdict in the action. If the court decides that the
grounds of the claim have been proven in favor of the plaintiff, it is
authorized to instruct each member of the group to prove his entitle-
ment to the requested remedy by way of an affidavit. " If the re-
quested remedy is damages, the affidavit should at least include infor-
mation regarding the type, amount, and value of the securities held by
the claimant at the date relevant to the claim.'15 However, the court
is authorized to waive or amend this requirement for an affidavit if
convinced, in the circumstances of the case, that such a requirement
would place an unwarranted burden on the members of the group."1"
The court may also, as it deems appropriate, direct the manner in
which its decision will be brought to the notice of the members of the
class.417
The regulations state that the withdrawal of one plaintiff from the
representation of an authorized class, with the permission of the court,
does not impair the substitution of another plaintiff as representative
of the class. However, withdrawal of all potential plaintiffs from repre-
sentation of the group will result in the cancellation of the action. 1 '
The regulations conclude by stating that any issue regarding represen-
tative class actions not covered by the Law or the regulations will be
dealt with under the general regulations on civil procedure."9
A plaintiff who submits a class claim is required to notify the
Authority, the exchange upon which the relevant securities are traded
- the TASE - and the Attorney General.' Since it is unfair to ask
the representative plaintiff to bear the full cost of the application and
a claim that is in the public interest, the Authority may accede to a
request to pay the costs, on terms and in an amount set by it, if the
Authority is convinced that the claim is in the public interest and that
there is a reasonable chance that the court will certify the class. 2 If
413. Id. § 8.
414. Id. § 9(a).
415. Id. § 9(b).
416. Id. § 9(d).
417. Id. § 9(c).
418. Id. § 10.
419. Id. § 11.
420. Id. § 54F. In Israel, the Attorney General is the senior legal official in the
Government. His role, a strictly non-political and professional one based on the Eng-
lish pattern, is to provide legal advice on matters of importance and to serve as the
final arbiter of questions whether an indictment should be pursued in a controversial
case.
421. Id. § 54G. It should be considered whether the decision on financing claims
that are in the public interest would be better left to an independent (possibly judi-
cial) figure, better qualified to identify deserving claims and free from possible accu-
sations of conflicts of interest.
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the final verdict includes an award of damages, the court is instructed
to order that the Authority be compensated, on terms and conditions
set by the court, for any expenditures undertaken in the financing of
the representative action.'
Further, the court is directed to set the remuneration of the law-
yer who represents the class in the action, notwithstanding any
agreement between the lawyer and the representative plaintiff. In
addition, the total fees of the lawyer may not exceed the sum set by
the court for these purposes.4 In order to encourage claimants who
are often reluctant to serve as the representatives of the class, the
court is authorized, in its verdict of damages, to order that a specified
share of the total award, after expenses and lawyers fees have been
deducted, be paid to the representatives in recognition of their efforts,
with the remaining amount being divided between the other claimants
in proportion to their damages.'
The Law concludes with this topic by stating that its provisions do
not in any fashion affect the ability of any holder of securities to seek
an alternative form of remedies against the defendant.' The provi-
sions regarding the class actions only apply to cases where the claim
arose after October 31, 1988.'
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of representative
class actions in October, 1993."7 The Court, led by its president, Jus-
tice Meir Shamgar, considered a request for permission to appeal
brought by the Teva Corporation against a decision of the District
Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa to certify a representative action brought by a
group of investors against the company. The action concerns a claim
that the company delayed the release of the news of an approval of one
of its generic drugs by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration until
after the expiration of a group of options held by the investing public.
The plaintiffs claimed that the company wanted to prevent the inevita-
ble rise in the price of Teva's shares on the TASE from occurring be-
fore the options expired in order to ensure that the investors would not
exercise their options. When the plaintiffs applied to the District Court
for certification of the case as a representative action, the company ob-
jected on two grounds. First, the company claimed that the representa-
tive plaintiffs did not fall within the scope of potential claimants con-
sidered by the Law, which includes only holders of securities. Since the
422. Id. § 54I(1).
423. Id. § 54H.
424. Id. § 541(2).
425. Id. § 54J.
426. Id. § 54K.
427. Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. v. Zat Economic Advisors Co. Ltd.,
Civil Request for Permission to Appeal 1701/93 (not yet reported). The decision was
rendered on October 14, 1993.
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claimants had only held options that had now expired, some even sell-
ing them before the expiration, they could only be described as former
holders of securities. Second, the options upon which the claims were
based could not, according to the company, be described as securities
for the purpose of class actions. The District Court rejected both of
these arguments.
In response to the request for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the District Court rejecting the claims of the
company. The Supreme Court held that the only relevant date for the
establishment of a claim was the date on which the grounds for the
claim were established. Thus, the plaintiffs only needed to prove that
they were holders of securities on that date for the purposes of bring-
ing an action. This ruling significantly increases the scope of potential
claims as representative actions. Despite Teva's claims that such a
decision would widen the scope of an action beyond manageable
bounds, it is now clear that the Court was prepared to allow even
those investors who sold their securities to participate in the claim.
Thus, the Court held, it is possible that a defendant will be required to
compensate more than one investor with regard to damages for the
holding of the same security, so long as the class members were dam-
aged.
On the second claim of Teva, the Court held that it went against
the spirit of the Law to claim that options fall outside the definition of
security for the purposes of these actions. As a possible alternative, the
Court suggested that the company should have explicitly stated in the
prospectus the fact that the options are not to be considered as securi-
ties, if the company so desired. Justice Shamgar noted, in all fairness,
that after the Court had reached its decision, but before it was an-
nounced, Teva's lawyers withdrew their argument as to the definition
of "security."
Once a class has been certified, it remains for the courts to consid-
er the claims for damages themselves. It seems that this case, as well
as other cases involving various large Israeli companies that the press
has reported as forthcoming,' will provide the courts with ample
opportunity to make various judicial pronouncements and rulings as to
important mechanism for investor protection. Perhaps, courts in the
future will follow the Supreme Court in the Teva case and maintain a
broad approach to the representative action. In the present market,
such a mechanism is an indispensable tool in the arsenal available to
the courts for policing the conduct of companies towards their share-
holders.
428. For example, a class action was filed in December 1993 against the Isramco
group of oil and gas exploration companies for NIS 96 million.
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B. General Provisions
The final chapter of the Law is a collection of miscellaneous provi-
sions regarding a wide range of issues that were not otherwise covered.
The most important of these provisions are discussed below; a few
provisions in this chapter of the Law have been considered elsewhere
herein.
The Law outlines a number of powers granted to the Minister of
Finance. The Minister is authorized, after consulting the Authority
and gaining the approval of the Finance Committee, to adopt regula-
tions concerning payment and collection of fees to the Authority.4"
Further, in a broad statement, the Minister is charged with supervis-
ing the implementation of the Law. After consultation with the Au-
thority, the Minister may also enact regulations in connection with any
aspect of that responsibility, as long as the Law does not contain provi-
sions to the contrary. Similarly, the Minister of Justice is authorized to
enact procedural regulations regarding various legal issues raised in
different parts of the Law.' In addition, the Minister of Finance, up-
on the proposal of the Authority, consultation with the Minister of
Justice, and the approval of the Finance Committee, is instructed to
issue regulations concerning an underwriter who undertakes to acquire
all of the securities offered under a prospectus and which are not ac-
quired by the public. These regulations should include provisions re-
garding the following: (i) qualifying conditions; (ii) professional liability
insurance and minimum equity; (iii) reports that the underwriter must
submit; (iv) limitations in relation to conflicts of interest between the
underwriter and any individual who acquires securities offered by the
relevant prospectus through his services or at his behest; and (v) any
other issues related to the underwriter's business." Under the same
mechanism, the Minister should also make regulations concerning the
acquisition of control of and an offer for the purchase of securities of a
company registered for trading on the TASE. Further, the regulations
should cover the issue of securities in the registered company that are
not offered to the public and restrictions regarding conflicts of interest
between the registered company and a controlling party in it or a com-
pany under the control of such a party. 2
The last major area covered in this chapter, widely expanded
under Amendment 9, is a delegation of various investigative powers to
429. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 55A.
430. Id. § 56(a), (b).
431. Id. § 56(c). See also Section 25 of the Prospectus Regulations of 1969 for
provisions regarding the inclusion of details of the underwriter in the prospectus.
432. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 56(d). Sections 56(c)-(d) became effective on
March 1, 1992. Subsection (d) applies for only one year after its commencement with
the possibility of extension for another year by the Minister, with the approval of
the Finance Committee.
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the Authority to assist in the enforcement of the various provisions of
the Law and the Joint Investments Trust Law 1961. Prior to Amend-
ment 9, the Law was subject to considerable criticism for failing to
provide for broad investigative powers in these areas. Amendment 9
was designed to grant powers to the Authority similar to those exer-
cised by the SEC. Under the Law, if the suspicion of a violation arises,
or if assistance is needed to administer the rules, the chairman of the
Authority, or any person authorized in writing to act in his stead, may
demand from any person access to any information or document re-
garding the business of any company to which the provisions of the
relevant laws apply. After inspecting the documents, the Authority
must return them to their respective owners within six months of
obtaining them, unless an indictment has been submitted in a case in
which the, document is likely to serve as evidence. A judge of the Mag-
istrates Court may, on the application of the Authority or a represen-
tative of the Attorney General, conditionally extend the six month
period after allowing the owner of the document a reasonable opportu-
nity to state his case.4"
When suspicion arises concerning a possible violation of the stat-
utes, a person authorized by the chairman of the Authority may apply
to the Magistrates Court for a warrant that allows entry to any pre-
mises to conduct a search and to seize any relevant document. The
Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Stop and Search) [New Version]
19694 provides the conditions for such a search. Similarly wide pow-
ers are granted for interrogation. An individual authorized by the
chairman of the Authority may interrogate any person who, in his
opinion, is connected to the matter and to order any individual to ap-
pear before him &md turn over any detail or information related to the
suspected offense.' The chairman of the Authority may apply to the
Magistrates Court for a temporary or permanent injunction against the
commission or the continued commission of certain acts, if the
chairman has reasonable grounds to assume that a violation of the
statutes or regulations thereunder is occurring or is about to occur.' 5
Further, the Authority may, if necessary to protect the interests of the
investing public, to appoint an independent party to investigate, audit,
and demand the production of documents from a company to which the
Law applies. However, the powers to appoint a third party investigator
do not apply in cases where the investigated body is a stock exchange,
433. Securities Law, supra note 2, § 56A
434. Id. § 56B(b).
435. Id. § 56C. For the purposes of the investigation, the authorized individual is
granted the powers of a police officer of the rank of Inspector, as defined in § 2 of
the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Evidence) 1969, and the evidence collected by
that individual is covered by the rules in § 3 of that Ordinance.
436. Id. § 56D. It is interesting again to note that the chairman himself, and not
the Authority as a whole, may take certain action.
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banking corporation, or insurer."
Finally, in order to protect the confidentiality of the material or
persons investigated under this chapter, the Law prohibits the revela-
tion of any information or document that came into the possession of
any individual pursuant to these provisions, other than in the pursuit
of the investigation, or to the chairman, or to other authorized employ-
ees of the Authority. However, this prohibition obviously does not in
any way prevent the disclosure of this information at the request of
the Attorney General for the purposes of a criminal trial or on the
demand of a court of law.'
The inclusion of these broad powers under Amendment 9 was an
important step forward in the protection of those who invest in securi-
ties. The Authority, charged with the task of supervising most of the
provisions of the securities law in Israel, now possesses the requisite
investigative powers properly and actively to pursue this responsibili-
ty. The extent and nature of the powers granted to the Authority are
modeled on the powers granted to the SEC in the United States. Expe-
rience in the U.S. convinced the Israeli lawmakers that the absence of
such wide powers makes it very difficult to collect sufficient evidence
to secure convictions in securities cases, which typically involve com-
plex issues and, usually, intelligent and ably represented defen-
dants.43s
X. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth in securities markets in Israel since the mid-
1980's has forced the Government and the courts to wrestle with in-
creasingly complex issues. As shown throughout the course of this
paper, the Government and courts have taken significant steps in the
right direction. The positive effects of Amendments 9 and 11 and the
increased willingness of the courts to delve into the complex questions
raised in cases like Boronovitch and Rubinstein augur well for the
future development of securities law and markets. There are areas,
however, that have not yet been adequately addressed, such as proxy
solicitations, which in the United States are heavily regulated under
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Proxy regulation is not dealt
with by the Yadin Report, presumably because of the view that this
area of corporate governance is not strictly a part of securities laws.
Nonetheless, proper disclosure in proxy solicitations would generally
seem to be no less important than disclosure in prospectices or interim
reports. Although beyond the immediate scope of this article, increased
regulation of mutual fund activity, now covered by the outmoded Joint
437. Id. § 56F.
438. Id. § 56E.
439. It should be noted that similarly wide powers are granted to the Income Tax
Authority in Israel, presumably for the same reasons mentioned above.
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Investments Trust Law 1961, and regulation of investment advisers
are sorely needed. Proposed legislation for both matters is now being
considered by the Government.
The lawmakers and courts must boldly face the task of balancing
the often conflicting interests of the involved parties, including the
public, the investors, business, and the Government. An overly zealous
approach to regulation could stifle the growth of Israeli companies and
markets; on the other hand, allowing unfettered discretion to the in-
volved parties would be a recipe for disaster, as illustrated at the out-
set by SEC Commissioner Emanuel Cohen. The experience of the Is-
raeli public in the wake of the 1983 crisis involving the collapse in the
prices of bank shares has taught both the Government and investors a
bitter lesson in the dangers of insufficient control over these sensitive
areas. The bad memories of that crisis lie behind much of the move-
ment today in favor of greater investor protection and increased super-
vision of the markets and companies. The continued modernization of
the securities law is essential to the proper maintenance of Israeli
securities markets, which are rapidly attracting world-wide attention
and investment.
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Student Comment
The Failure of International Commodity
Agreements: Forms, Functions, and
Implications
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment began working towards the creation of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO). Plans for the imposition of the NIEO included
extensive use of International Commodity Agreements (ICA's) as a
means by which Lesser Developed Countries (LDC's) could become
more involved in world markets and increase the living conditions of
their citizens.1 Less than thirty years later, ICA's are nearly extinct.
This Note examines the history of ICA's, especially in relation to oil,
tin, coffee, and sugar; analyzes the market factors that have under-
mined the success of ICA's; and illustrates some of the ramifications of
their failure on the international distribution of wealth and the global
economic order.
II. OVERVIEW
A. Chronology
Attempts at international commodity control began around the
time of World War I. Economic conditions during the war increased
general economic awareness and created the perception that commodi-
ty price control could be feasible. In addition, market inconsistencies
and instabilities bolstered the trend towards market control.2 Initial
efforts in this area came in the form of non-governmental, producer
agreements that demonstrated only limited success and were almost
universally destroyed by the Great Depression. However, they did pro-
vide the groundwork for the more comprehensive governmental control
schemes that developed after the Great Depression.'
1. BRANiSLAV Gosovic, UNCTAD: CONFLIcT AND CoMPOMIsE 28 (1971).
2. ALTON D. LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMoDITY AGREEMENTS 38-39 (1975).
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS xii (International
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By the 1940's, International Commodity Agreements were being
examined and constructed at the governmental level. Since these
agreements were driven primarily by large fluctuations in basic com-
modity prices, they tended to focus primarily in the creation of price
stability.' In 1948, the Havana Charter was drafted in order to pro-
vide an organizational framework for a new International Trade Orga-
nization. Although plans for this organization eventually foundered,
the Havana Charter provided another important basis upon which
later International Trade Agreements (ITA's) were built.6
Two important trends developed over the next three decades.
First, in the 1950's, early ICA's, which had focused on price stabili-
zation, began to be more concerned about price boosting through
oligopolistic market control. Second, by the creation of the United Na-
tions Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the
usage (or at least contemplation) of ICA's had intensified considerably.
Support for ICA's was especially strong among the Lesser Developed
Countries (LDC's), which hoped to improve their positions in the global
market.'
The early 1970's was a particularly important time period in com-
modity market history due to the simultaneous impact of a sharp com-
modity price boom and consequent collapse of many commodity mar-
kets, the unforeseen impact of the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), and the formal recognition by the United Na-
tions for the need of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
With respect to the NIEO, UNCTAD adopted the Integrated Program
for Commodities (IPC) in 1976 in response to renewed price fluctua-
tions in the international commodity markets. This program was de-
signed to promote stability in long term commodity development by
creating or renewing ICA's. However, only minimal achievements have
been made since the adoption of the IPC, largely because of increased
resistance to the implementation of the program by industrialized
countries and the increasing difficulty of renegotiating ICA's.7
During the 1980's and early 1990's, there has been a general
downturn in the overall use and effectiveness of ICA's. In many com-
modities, this has been the result of increasing world production in
combination with static demand. Accordingly, there has been a general
reduction in commodity prices with a corresponding loss in bargaining
Labour Office [of Canada], 1943) [hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS].
4. Id. at xix.
5. ABDULQAWI A. YUSAF, The Legal Framework for Stable, Renumerative and
Equitable Commodity Prices in International Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRES-
ENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic ORDER 122, 125 (Detlev Chr. Dicke &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988)
6. L BARANYAI & J.C. MILLS, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 9
(1963).
7. YUSAF, supra note 5, at 129-31.
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position for the producers of primary products. In addition, the imposi-
tion of ICA's has been regularly opposed by developed countries, which
have come to regard them as economic threats.8
Consequently, the future of ICA's is uncertain. The recent dissolu-
tion of the USSR is likely to improve levels of trade in the global mar-
ket, at the same time that the relative strength of the western indus-
trialized countries increases. However, recent clashes between devel-
oped and developing countries may indicate either a shift towards
greater integration and a more active role on an explicit level by the
governments of the west or a widening of the rift between the devel-
oped and developing countries.
B. Function
As the discussion above illustrates, the function that ICA's serve,
or perhaps should serve, depends greatly on one's perspective. ICA's
can be divided into three main categories. The great majority of the
ICA's that remain in operation retain no ability to directly effect the
operation of their respective markets. These ICA's provide important
fora for discussion, supply crucial information to the market place, and
provide needed market surveillance. However, the roles they play in
the world commodity markets are essentially limited. The second type
of ICA focuses on co-operation in production, consumption, and devel-
opment of rare commodities; agreements of this kind include arrange-
ments in commodities such as jute and tropical timber. These agree-
ments are generally of relatively limited scope and play only a relative-
ly minor role in the market place.! The third and arguably most im-
portant type of agreement includes ICA's, such as OPEC, that have
price support/control mechanisms built into their structure. These
ICA's play much more important and active roles in the market place;
however, the number of these organizations has been dwindling in
recent years.10
While the stated objectives for the imposition of ICA's range from
security to health, many of these concerns should be considered "win-
dow dressing." In actuality, the goals of most ICA's are relatively
straight forward.1" When viewed from a traditional market perspec-
tive, commodity agreements essentially serve two primary functions:
stabilizing prices and markets, and increasing income to producers. 12
8. AMER S. ARAIM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC ORDER 212 (1991).
9. YUSAF, supra note 5, at 132.
10. International Commodity Agreements in Decay (part 1), AUSTRALIAN FINAN-
CIAL REVIEW, May 24, 1985, at 2, (hereinafter Agreements in Decay], available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
11. LAW, supra note 2, at 75-79.
12. JERE R. BEHRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS: AN EVALUATION
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These goals make trade agreements politically controversial because
they are a method by which LDC's may be able to better control their
economies and improve their positions in the world economy in rela-
tionship to industrialized countries."3
Within the objective of stabilization lies another contentious issue.
The prices of basic commodities have often fluctuated widely
throughout history, causing extensive social harm to Third World la-
borers and farmers." UNCTAD has consistently endorsed the imposi-
tion of ICA's as one means of mitigating these fluctuations. However,
Alton Law, a professor of economics specializing in ICA's, notes that
closer analysis indicates that the effect of ICA's on stabilization may
be overstated for several reasons:
First, price stability has been greatly increased and instability has
been exaggerated in the first place, especially with respect to its
relationship to the LDC's. Second, that instability which remains is
so heavily dependent upon noneconomic considerations that its
expectations of elimination by manipulation of economic aspects are
slim. Third, one must insist that specific facets of each commodity
situation be examined with considerable care to determine the
desirability and detailed nature of any control effort.'
Further, even if relative price stability is achieved, it is uncertain
whether the revenue stability desired by LDC's will follow."
If price stability were the only objective of ICA's, then they would
probably be much more prevalent. Industrialized countries desire price
stability because it reduces the requirement for large stocks, and re-
sulting high storage costs, due to reduced uncertainty. However, even
if ICA's guaranteed these benefits, the price controls would be likely to
offset any economic gain to LDCs. 7
As a result, price control is the most controversial issue over
which producing and consuming countries differ. Traditional market
economics postulate that market prices will be set by the interaction of
supply and demand for each individual product. If this hypothesis is
valid, the producers of basic commodities may only increase price lev-
els if they can engage in monopolistic/oligopolistic behavior. Whether
producers may do so depends upon the specific attributes of the partic-
ular product and its associated market.
An accurate evaluation of the use of monopoly power by LDC's
will not necessarily dismiss ICA's as inefficient. Proponents of ICA's
OF THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAMME 21 (1977).
13. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 18.
14. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at xi.
15. LAW, supra note 2, at 17.
16. Id. at 77.
17. Id. at 79.
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cite modern theories of economics, such as The Theory of the Second
Best, to demonstrate that resources will be maximized, at least in a
relative way, when producers and consumers employ equal levels of
monopoly power. In addition, some commentators have argued that the
degree of disparity in bargaining position between the industrialized
countries and the LDC's makes traditional market analysis inapplica-
ble. 8 Nevertheless, it is clear that the profound difference in interests
between consumers and producers will remain a large stumbling block
in the implementation of ICA's.
C. Forms of Market Control
There are three means of achieving commodity control in the
global market. Each may be used alone or, more typically, together in
strategic combination. The first method is to form a multilateral con-
tract between international sellers and buyers of commodities. Mul-
tilateral contracts usually allow a number of sellers to coordinate their
efforts either alone or subject to input from one or more buyers. 9
Second, buffer stocks are often used to regulate price and business
fluctuations by buying commodities in times of excess and selling in
times of scarcity.' However, effective buffer stock programs are diffi-
cult to maintain because they require not only adequate storage facili-
ties and careful management but also the continuous, adequate supply
of capital necessary to finance the buffer pool itself. In addition, at-
tempts to use buffer stocks to maintain unrealistic commodity prices in
the long-term is most likely to lead to either a "disposal crisis" or ex-
haustion of the buffer pool capital reserves. 1
Third, trade restrictions and quotas are frequently used to control
the commodity market. These agreements are important both because
they are widely used and because they allow the state to unilaterally
set ceilings on the importation or exportation of commodities. However,
these arrangements can be problematic because they are often affected
by political, non-economic disruptions, and they tend to retard the
development of low cost competition. As a result, the use of restrictions
and quotas has been criticized on economic grounds because of their
potential for creating global misallocation of resources and inefficient
levels of output.'
18. BEHRMAN, supra note 12, at 9-10.
19. LAW, supra note 2, at 70-72.
20. Id. at 72-73.
21. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 65-66.
22. LAW, supra note 2, at 73.
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III. INDIVIDUAL COMMODITIES
Although a detailed analysis of every major commodity is beyond
the scope of this paper, a cursory review of at least some real examples
is necessary to illustrate further discussions on ICA's. Recent history,
structure and function of several major agreements have been detailed
below in order to provide a better framework of analysis. To that end,
some effort has been made to select commodities that have experienced
substantial control efforts. Besides the commodities listed below, con-
trol efforts have been attempted in a variety of other markets includ-
ing wool, tea, beef, bauxite, rubber, and wheat.
A. Oil
1. Chronology
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, oil production for
the United States and European interests dominated the world market
for at least two reasons. First, increasing trade and building industry
created a greater need for a continuous and secure supply of oil in
developing countries. Second, the exploitation of oil reserves was ex-
tremely costly and expensive. Since the countries that had the poten-
tial to produce oil could not generally afford the start-up costs, oil
interests were largely controlled and manipulated by the large corpora-
tions from the U.S. and Europe that had the resources and technology
required to access the oil deposits.'
The Standard Oil Trust, founded in 1877, quickly became domi-
nant in both the American and international oil markets. However, the
development of American anti-trust law caused Standard Oil to splin-
ter into more than thirty separate companies, five of which - Esso,
Mobil, Standard of California, Gulf, and Texaco - remained important
players in the world market. The European oil market developed in a
similar manner with two corporations, Shell and British Petroleum,
eventually winning the largest share of the European market.'
Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, market competition in-
creased, and the seven largest oil corporations - the so-called "seven
sisters" - attempted to find ways to stabilize oil production and pric-
ing. The resulting negotiations culminated in 1928 with the Pact of
Achnacarry, which by 1930 involved all of the major oil corporations.
Acting under the terms of the pact, the major oil corporations maxi-
mized their retained earnings and exercised considerable bargaining
power by combining a high degree of vertical and horizontal integra-
tion with oligarchic trade practices. Consequently, the major oil corpo-
23. IAN SKEET, OPEC: TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PRICES AND PoLITIcs 4 (Richard
Eden ed., 1988).
24. SHuK M. GHANEM, OPEC: THE RiSE AND FALL OF AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB 4
(1986).
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rations were at least majority partners in trade relations with the
major oil producing countries until 1960.'
The relationship between the oil corporations and their host coun-
tries was frequently confrontational. Corporate decisions designed to
maximize profits often conflicted with national security interests of the
individual states. In addition, the secrecy with which these decisions
were made often left the host with a great deal of uncertainty. As a
result, the increasing importance of oil as an international commodity
led to an increased desire, and ability, of the host countries to create
changes in the international oil arena."
The formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) began at the First Arab Petroleum Congress in 1959 with
the Maadi Pact. The Maadi Pact was a confidential but relatively in-
formal arrangement between the representatives of Venezuela, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, designed to promote discussions con-
cerning the production of oil. In addition, the arrangement called for
the construction of an "Arab Petroleum Organization."'
A combination of political and economic factors contributed to the
subsequent formation of OPEC in September of 1960. Political dis-
agreements between President Nasser of Egypt, who dominated the
Arab League, and General Quassem of Iraq, who wished to create an
organization outside of the Arab League, motivated Quassem to issue
invitations to a conference in Iraq to discuss oil issues.' Two key eco-
nomic factors also contributed. First, the bargaining strength of the
members of the Pact of Achnacarry was weakened by the gradual in-
troduction of independent and nationally owned oil corporations into
the international market combined with the opening of a market for
them to exploit, Libya's oil fields. Second, increased competition in the
international oil market and governmental protection of the American
domestic oil market prompted a widespread decline in the price of oil,
culminating in a drastic price cut in 1960.'
OPEC's initial impact upon the international oil market was rela-
tively minor due to several factors. First, the demand for oil in the
1960's was much lower than it became in the 1970's. Second, the bar-
gaining position held by the oil corporations was still relatively strong.
Third, dissention between the members of OPEC prevented them from
presenting a united front until 1964.' In addition, increased produc-
tion and competition world wide led to even further reductions in oil
25. MOHAMMED E. AHRARI, OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT 11-12 (1986).
26. Id. at 13.
27. GHANEM, 8upra note 24, at 21.
28. Id. at 28.
29. SKEET, supra note 23, at 5, 17.
30. Id. at 33, 245.
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prices."1
By 1971, OPEC's position had changed significantly, and it began
to be able to negotiate much more effectively. OPEC's membership had
increased to a total of ten members, adding Qatar (1961), Indonesia
(1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), and Algeria
(1969),' and it had increased its market share to 50.6 percent.' At
the same time, global demand for oil had more than doubled, from
around thirty-six million barrels per day in 1960 to in excess of seven-
ty-seven million barrels per day in 1970." The closure of the Suez
Canal in 1967 cut off a major trade route to the west and further in-
creased oil scarcity. Finally, Libya's ability to effectively negotiate with
the smaller, independent corporations led to increased confidence with-
in OPEC that concerted action could be used effectively against the
larger corporations.'
The Tehran Agreement of 1970 contained the first substantially
effective resolutions made by OPEC members: 1) increased income tax
rates; 2) the elimination of posting price disparities; 3) the establish-
ment of uniform increases in price; 4) a new "gravity" escalation sys-
tem; 5) the elimination of all OPEC allowances granted to oil compa-
nies; and 6) continued support for Libya's actions." The ensuing nego-
tiations with the oil corporations, which culminated in the Tehran
Agreement in February of 1971, effectively began the transition from a
buyer's to a seller's market.37
In 1973, in response to western support for Israel, OPEC stopped
consulting with the oil corporations, began unilaterally setting oil
prices, and cut production by more than 900 billion barrels per day.
Downstream, these actions tripled the transfer price between produc-
ers and refineries, a cost which was passed along to consumers world-
wide.' The result was a worldwide "oil crisis," which dramatically
impacted industrialized areas such as Western Europe and the United
States where both oil consumption and dependence on foreign oil had
been steadily increasing.' The "oil crisis" also interacted profoundly
with the world economy. Developing countries that had little potential
for export related income quickly accumulated large oil related debts, a
31. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 80.
32. SKEET, supra note 23, at 238.
33. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 203.
34. SKEET, supra note 23, at 245.
35. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 33.
36. Id. at 48.
37. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 128.
38. Id. at 144-45.
39. See generally Dario Scuka, O.P.E.C.: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, Background, Review and Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
(CRS No. 74-189 E, 1974) [hereinafter O.P.E.C.] (discussing the impact of petroleum
price increases in the U.S.).
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situation that was further aggravated by the ensuing economic reces-
sion and relatively high inflation rates of the mid-1970's.'
By 1974, the cohesion of OPEC with respect to pricing policy had
degenerated due to the different desires of its member countries. The
"price hawks" advocated further price increases designed to bolster
profit levels in the face of inflation. This position is ironic, since in-
creases in the prices of petroleum have been frequently cited as a ma-
jor source of rising inflation in the world economy.4 1 The more moder-
ate states - Saudi Arabia, in particular - felt that OPEC's continued
success was linked inexorably to stability and prosperity in the world
economy and that further increases in oil prices were unwarranted.
The disagreements were exacerbated by a decline in the demand for
oil, resulting partly from the implementation of conservation policies
by non-oil producing nations and partly from the continuing recession.
As a result, a rift formed between Saudi Arabia, which controlled the
most abundant oil reserves, and the rest of the OPEC membership.42
At the same time that OPEC was struggling to maintain a cohe-
sive front, the industrialized nations began to attempt to find ways to
combat the "predatory price increases." Accordingly, the International
Energy Agency (IEA) was established, largely through the efforts of
the U.S. foreign policy under the direction of Dr. Henry Kissinger.
Specifically, the IEA provided for the creation of a sharing mechanism
to deal with oil supply disruptions; the establishment of energy policies
that would reduce dependency on oil; and an information system that
would enable IEA governments to understand better and to monitor
the oil market."
The IEA initially received only marginal support, largely because
of the economic importance of OPEC, whose members regarded the
IEA as confrontational. IEA also received little support because of the
self-serving attitudes taken by each of the oil importing countries.
However, the International Energy Policy, created by the IEA, greatly
improved cooperation between the Western nations.'
Despite OPEC's ability to control oil price, its oil pricing policy
has been characterized by most commentators as erratic after 1974.
There are several reasons for this. First, the increase in wealth caused
many oil producing states to embark on ambitious domestic improve-
ment plans. The objectives of these plans, in turn, required the mainte-
nance of high levels of oil export related income, the lack of which
leads to increased debt and destabilization. Second, the inability of
40. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 76.
41. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 21.
42. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 149.
43. SKEET, supra note 23, at 119.
44. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 98.
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OPEC to effectively coordinate oil production has resulted in relatively
poor control over the supply of oil compared to that exercised by the oil
corporations before 1960. Third, since OPEC countries are highly de-
pendent on oil exports, their income is highly vulnerable to policy
changes in foreign industry. Fourth, OPEC's increased income has
resulted in massive investment in foreign countries. Accordingly, in-
creases in oil prices adversely affect OPEC's holdings in non-oil pro-
ducing countries.'
During the 1980's, OPEC's economic strength declined consider-
ably. This decline is generally attributed to the reduction in the global
demand for oil brought about by conservation programs instituted in
oil importing nations. However, this factor alone is insufficient to ex-
plain the size of OPEC's loss of power since global consumption of oil
declined by only about two percent from 1974 to 1986.' Instead, two
other factors played major roles in OPEC's decline. First, the dramatic
increase in the production of oil by non-OPEC countries resulted in a
decline in OPEC's global market share by almost twenty percent from
1970 to 1984.' Second, effective manipulation by the IEA and gener-
ally poor market conditions have further decreased OPEC's ability to
control the international oil market.'
8
OPEC's future remains uncertain. On the brighter side, at least
for OPEC, oil consumption has been rising since the late 1980's, a
trend which is expected to continue. Indeed, some analysts have pre-
dicted that OPEC's share of the U.S. oil import market will swell to
more than fifty percent by 1995 because of OPEC's control of the most
extensive known oil resources.' Along with increased market share,
OPEC's technological and oil processing capabilities, its negotiating
skills, and its understanding of economics have improved.'
On the other hand, OPEC's market share continued to decline
through 1992,"' and some economic analysts have projected that cer-
tain individual OPEC nations are likely to encounter substantial eco-
nomic challenges in the near future.52 These downturns could become
worse because of the inability of OPEC to overcome the differences in
opinion among its members concerning pricing policy objectives. This
point is underscored by recent willingness of Saudi Arabia to enter into
45. ABBAS ALNASRAWI, OPEC IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 114-15 (1985).
46. SKEET, supra note 23, at 245.
47. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 203.
48. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 190.
49. Bernard A. Gelb, Oil Imports from OPEC: Recent and Projected Trends, 6
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS No. 88-558 E, Aug. 11, 1988).
50. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 20-22.
51. Gulf States: The Confrontation to Come, MIDDLE EAST MAGAZINE, Mar. 1,
1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Gulf States].
52. FARID ABOLFATHI ET AL., THE OPEC MARKET TO 1985 17 (1977).
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bilateral negotiations with ARAMCO." Finally, the recent invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq has further widened the rift between Iraq, which has
been a traditional proponent of price increases, and Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, traditional moderates.
Finally, the rising discord within OPEC has led to increased im-
portance in a number of other organizations, such as the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC), which includes the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. If relations between the mem-
bers of OPEC do not improve, the GCC could play an increasingly
important role in the oil market."
2. Form and Function
Chapter I, Article 2 of the treaty signed by the five founding mem-
bers of OPEC provides for three principle objectives:
(A) The principle aim of the Organization shall be the co-ordination
and unification of the petroleum policies of member countries and
the determination of the beat means for safeguarding their inter-
ests, individually and collectively.
(B) The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the
stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to
eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.
(C) Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the
producing nations and- to the necessity of securing a steady income
to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular sup-
ply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their
capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.'
In short, the founders of OPEC were attempting to create a cartel
designed to more effectively interact with oligopolistic nature of the oil
corporations.m
Organizationally, OPEC consists of a series of vertically integrat-
ed committees designed to determine, evaluate, and implement oil eco-
nomic strategy. The highest level of the organization is the Commis-
sion, which consists of only the oil ministers of each of the member
states. The Commission is responsible for the general policy and mem-
bership of the organization. Theoretically, this arrangement allows
OPEC to react expediently to changes in the world oil market. Howev-
er, with the exception of procedural matters, the Commission often
faces delays and disruptions because many of the oil ministers do not
have broad leeway to operate on behalf of their respective govern-
53. ARAMCO is a conglomeration of four U.S. oil corporations.
54. Gulf States, supra note 51, at 4.
55. JOHN EVANS, OPEC, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE WORLD ENERGY MARKET
138 (1986).
56. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 31.
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ments. The Commission's operation is further impeded because it
meets only twice a year, except under extraordinary circumstances."7
At the next level is the Board of Governors, which consists of one
governor for each member country. The Board of Governors is theoreti-
cally responsible for the implementation of the directives of the Com-
mission. Functionally, the Board is a bureaucratic level that adds little
to the performance of the organization as a whole. The Board's execu-
tive function is limited to the submitting to the Commission agendas
that are rarely followed. Administratively, the Board's influence is lim-
ited because it only meets twice a year.' The Board is, however, re-
sponsible for some of OPEC's fiscal operations, such as the annual bud-
get.5
The Secretariat is the next level of OPEC and is the principle
body through which OPEC implements market operations. Over the
years, the structure of the Secretariat has changed markedly. The
Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General and Deputy Secretary.
Both of these posts are filled by unanimous election of a member of the
Board of Governors and consist of only three year terms. As a result,
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary positions have frequently been
filled by political candidates. Accordingly, the Secretariat's effective-
ness depends mainly on the quality of its staff.'
Actual operations within the Secretariat are divided by function
into five departments. The Administrative Department handles person-
nel, budgets, and accounting matters. The Information Department
collects and collates information from each of the member countries for
processing and analysis by the Economics Department. The Technical
Department monitors the technological changes that are relevant to
the industry. The Legal Department reviews changes in existing do-
mestic laws and analyzes their potential effects on the industry. Fi-
nally, the Secretariat uses a number of outside consultants as deemed
necessary by the General Secretary.61
Although not in direct conflict with OPEC, the International Ener-
gy Agency also bears some examination. Twelve basic policy principles
of the IEA were set out during Board meetings in 1977. These twelve
principles focus on two fundamental concepts: the reduction of future
oil imports through conservation and substitution of indigenous oil;
and implementation of alternative means of energy production through
"progressive replacement of oil" with coal, natural gas, and nuclear
power.62
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id. at 38.
59. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 10.
60. SKEET, supra note 23, at 237.
61. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 10-11.
62. EVANS, supra note 55, at 163-64.
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Currently, the IEA, which is an autonomous extension of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development, consists of
some twenty member countries. Its policy-making body, the governing
board, is composed of senior representatives from each member coun-
try who determine operation ostensibly by consensus. In cases where
consensus cannot be reached, however, decisions are made by a com-
plex weighted voting system. The U.S., Japan, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom combined hold more than fifty percent of the votes.'
The IEA's Board of Governors oversees five standing groups de-
signed to promote co-operation between member countries. Like OPEC,
two of these groups are oriented towards collection and analysis of
information and technology. The central focus of the other three is to
find ways to reduce oil dependency through cooperation between both
member and non-member states and through a comprehensive emer-
gency oil sharing system."
B. Tin
1. Chronology
Initial attempts at organization of the tin market occurred in 1921
with the "Bandoeng Pool," which was primarily an agreement between
Britain, the Netherlands and their respective colonial interests, the
Malay States and Netherlands' Indies. The Bandoeng Pool, essentially
a buffer stock, enjoyed initial success until its stocks were exhausted
due to insufficient capacity. The pool collapsed in 1925.'
In the 1930's, declining prices caused further attempts to organize
the tin market, such as the tin agreements signed in 1931 and 1933.
These attempts. culminated in the Agreement for the International
Control of Production and Export of Tin, which was signed in 1942.
This agreement created a committee to oversee the production of tin in
the major tin producing states, which at that time included Belgium,
Bolivia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and their associated
colonies, the Belgian-Congo, the Malay States, Malacca, Nigeria, and
the Netherlands' Indies.'
Unfortunately, this agreement was interrupted by the onset of
World War II and the subsequent Japanese control of the Pacific. Mar-
ket control was re-established in the post war period with the first
International Tin Agreement (ITA), which was modeled substantially
after the 1942 accord. Membership of this organization included repre-
sentatives of all the major producing countries but less than half of the
consuming nations. This agreement and its successors continued with
63. Id. at 161.
64. Id. at 161-62.
65. LAW, supra note 2, at 56-57.
66. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 95.
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varying success until 1961 when increased prices completely depleted
the buffer stocks of the ITA, and the pool collapsed. 7
In 1964, the third ITA was negotiated and passed under the new-
ly created UNCTAD. This new ITA included a new preamble that
provided for the raising of the price of tin, in addition to the original
objective of price stabilization. Otherwise, this agreement and its even-
tual successor, passed in 1970, were essentially the same in form as
earlier agreements."
The structure of the ITA remained remarkably unchanged until
the collapse of the organization in 1985. Two important observations
may be made regarding the chronology of the ITA. First, the focus of
the ITA changed from stabilization to increased price control with the
ratification of the third ITA in 1965. This change naturally resulted in
disagreement and friction between consuming and producing nations
by the early 1970's. Second, only the fifth ITA included the United
States. This is important because the United States commands an
extensive and strategically important tin reserve and because the U.S.
is the largest tin consuming nation. The United States is generally
supportive of the objectives of the ITA and offers considerable coopera-
tion.'
The ITA was considered by most observers to have been a great
success, even into the 1980's. This evaluation is based on evidence that
the ITA has been able to moderate market fluctuations relatively effec-
tively. However, with respect to increasing tin price levels, the ITA
was largely unsuccessful, and its demise is directly related to its ef-
forts in this area. Since the collapse in the tin market, the ITA contin-
ues only on a provisional level, a situation which is unlikely to change
without substantial reorganization of the ITA and its policy objec-
tives.7"
Further, despite the fact that tin production is overwhelmingly
concentrated in LDCs, that tin is consumed mostly by the industrial-
ized countries, and that price control may have been effective in the
past,7 1 several factors make supply cartelization unlikely in the imme-
diate future. The most important reason is the Western market orien-
tation of the majority of the tin producing countries. In addition, the
benefit of oligopolistic action is uncertain in light of the potential for
economic repercussions and the existence of extensive stockpiles, espe-
67. BARANYAI & MIUS, supra note 6, at 21-22.
68. WuILAM L. BALDWIN, THE WORLD TIN MARKET. POLrTCAL PRICING AND Eco-
NOMIC CoMiPETrmON 86-89 (1983).
69. LAW, supra note 2, at 58.
70. Eric J. McFadden, The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 AM. J. INTL L. 811, 814-15 (1986).
71. KLAUS E. KNORR, STANFORD UNIVRrrY FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TIN
UNDER CONTROL 196 (1945).
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cially within the U.S."
2. Form and Function
Article I of the first ITA stated four objectives for the* organiza-
tion:
(a) To prevent or alleviate widespread unemployment or under-
employment and other serious difficulties which are likely to result
from maladjustments between the supply of and the demand for
tin;
(b) To prevent excessive fluctuations in the price of tin and to
achieve a reasonable degree of stability of price on a basis which
will secure long-term equilibrium between supply and demand;
(c) To ensure adequate supplies of tin at reasonable prices at all
times; and
(d) To provide a framework for the consideration and development
of measures to promote the progressively more economic production
of tin while protecting tin deposits from unnecessary waste or pre-
mature abandonment."'
In short, the original ITA was created to moderate market fluctuations
and to promote the development of new and efficient ways of tin pro-
duction. So long as it maintained these goals, the ITA seems to have
been at least moderately successful, and the relationship between
producers and consumers remained relatively good.74
With the ratification of the third ITA, "renumerative return to
producers" officially became an objective of the ITA. This development
implied long-term price support that was opposed by consuming na-
tions. The result was a general downturn in relations between consum-
ing and producing nations, a situation which was exacerbated during
the fifth ITA by the U.S., which used its influence to keep the ceiling
price of tin at artificially low levels. This policy angered producing
nations because it prevented the implementation of market support at
a time when production costs were consistently rising. Consequently,
disagreements over policy eventually led to the United States' refusal
to sign the ITA during the sixth continuance. 5
The early 1980's was an important era in tin production for sever-
al reasons. First, the Association of Tin Producing Countries was es-
tablished by several of the larger tin producing nations, including
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Zaire.
However, this organization has had only symbolic influence. Second,
72. JOHN THOBURN, MULTINATIONALS, MINING AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF
THE TIN INDusTRY 32 (1981).
73. McFadden, supra note 70, at 817 n.16, citing International Tin Agreement,
1953, Art. I, UN Doc. E/CONF.12/12 (1954).
74. Id. at 818-19.
75. Id. at 822-23.
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the United States withdrew from the agreement in 1982 on the
grounds that the ITA was "subsidizing" tin prices. 6 Third, attempts
by the ITA to maintain "renumerative" price levels on an extended
basis, in conjunction with insufficient funding and rising volumes of
tin exports from non-member states, led to the eventual collapse of the
ITA and massive losses in bad debt in 1985."
Since the Bandoeng Pool, efforts at control of the tin market have
essentially taken the form of buffer pools overseen by a committee
known as the Tin Council. 8 Funding of the pools was made possible
by the collection of compulsory contributions from each of the mem-
bers, in addition to provisions for the collection of additional funds as
necessary. 9 At a more fundamental level, operation of the pool con-
sisted of a complex system of quotas and restrictions combined with
both a price ceiling and floor.' These two levels were set by commit-
tee vote, but, in the past, policy changes have required a near unani-
mous vote of the major producers and consumers due to the "unrealis-
tic" structure of the voting system. Accordingly, ITA operation has
been criticized for being inflexible in its reluctance to change the ceil-
ing and floor to reflect realistic, long-term price levels and changing
market conditions."
Historically, the structure of the ITA has been much less central-
ized than that of OPEC. Most of its operations have traditionally been
spread among various sub-organizations, each of which were individu-
ally responsible to the council, within each of its member states.8 The
Council was comprised of representatives of each of the member na-
tions and was headed by a chairman who had no vote. The Council
also contained numerous committees defined by function. Administra-
tively, the buffer stock was controlled by a Manager, who reported di-
rectly to the Chairman of the Council. However, due to anomalies in
the charter, the manager of the buffer stock seemed to be required to
act both within the bounds of the ITA itself and under the supervision
of the Chairman. In the past, this arrangement has been somewhat
tenuous at times, since these two directives are sometimes at odds.'
76. Stefan Wagstyl, The Crisis No One is Ready to Resolve, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1985, at 22.
77. Id. at 22; See also, McFadden, supra note 70, at 813.
78. WILLIAM Fox, TIN: THE WORKING OF A COMMODITY AGREEMENT 130 (1974).
79. BALDWIN, supra note 68, at 79.
80. LAW, supra note 2, at 57-58.
81. McFadden, supra note 70, at 817-18.
82. KNORR, supra note 71, at 111.
83. FOx, supra note 78, at 261-62.
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C. Coffee
1. Chronology
Prior to World War II, coffee exports from Latin America consti-
tuted over ninety percent of the world market. It is not surprising,
then, that the first attempts at control of the coffee market, in the
early 1900's, were made by Brazil. Indeed, Brazil alone controlled over
sixty percent of the market share at that time, and its schemes were
basically national output restriction, so it was able to achieve a mar-
ginal degree of success, especially during lean seasons."
In 1923, Brazil attempted to implement a permanent plan to con-
trol coffee prices. Although the plan was disbanded after the crash of
the coffee market in 1929, it did have several important effects on the
coffee market. First, bumper crops in 1927 and 1929 created enormous
excess stocks that made output reduction difficult - Brazil eventually
burned much of that coffee when it no longer remained storable. Sec-
ond, the artificially high price level maintained during the 1920's
spurred increased planting of coffee plants and production. Since a
coffee plant takes at least five years to begin producing beans, and ten
to twelve years to mature, this increased planting led to systematic
overproduction until World War II. Third, the experiment in price
control of the coffee market exemplified a market pattern of demand
leading to increased productivity and planting, falling prices and con-
trol, artificially high prices and eventual market crash, and culminat-
ing in market stagnancy.' Fourth, Brazil's marketing strategy led to
a severe loss of market share. As a result, since no suitable agreement
could subsequently be reached with other producing countries, Brazil
was forced to abandon its attempts to control the market.'
The first real attempt at international organization of the coffee
market came in 1940 with the International Coffee Agreement (ICoA),
which included Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela, and the United States.The Agreement concerned
the division of the U.S. coffee market using import and export quotas
that focused more on the stabilization than the control of prices. 7
The post-war period coffee market showed all the signs of the
beginning of a new market cycle: initial low production rates of coffee
that interacted well with accumulated stocks of coffee and the general-
ly decreased demand that resulted from the closure of much of the
European market. However, demand and price steadily increased
through early 1949. In the 1950's, a period of intense price increase
84. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 186.
85. LAW, supra note 2, at 40-45.
86. BARANYAI & MiLLS, supra note 6, at 149.
87. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 59.
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began, leading to the removal of market controls by the U.S. in 1953.
The removal of these controls, combined with frost scares in 1954,
pushed market prices to record levels. By 1960, however, increased
planting and cultivation efficiency, driven by the high prices, led to
plummeting prices and massive overstocks."
In 1958, coffee prices began to decline, and organizational efforts
began anew and developed piecemeal with the Latin-American Coffee
Agreement. This Agreement was joined by France, Portugal, and their
African colonies in 1959 and by Britain and her African colonies in
1960. Additional marginal producers joined in the next two years,
leading to the ICoA and the formation of the International Coffee Or-
ganization (ICO) in 1962. By 1962, the ICO controlled over ninety five
percent of the world market.'
The imposition of this agreement initially led to both chronically
increasing overstocks and inflated price levels. However, U.S. support
for increased prices declined in the early 1970's, and by early 1972,
differences between producing and consuming nations resulted in the
demise of the Agreement. Until that point, the ICO was generally
considered effective, at least from the standpoint of the coffee produc-
ing countries. In any case, the ICoA was able to produce a sizable
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers over the period during
which it was in effect.'
A review of the market stability factors during the period of 1962-
72 is particularly enlightening with respect to the operation of the
ICO. The period of 1962-68 showed relative cooperation between con-
sumers and producers and can be characterized as a period during
which the central focus of the ICO was market stability. To this end,
the ICO was successful, and market stability increased for those six
years.91 Beginning in 1968, however, the ICO became more concerned
with price control, and dissension between producers and consumers
increased. During the latter period, the ICO's ability to exercise mar-
ket power was at least marginally successful, but it was accompanied
by market instability greater than what would have existed without
the ICO.
The next two ICoA's, signed in 1976 and 1983 respectively, were
largely continuations of the previous arrangements. However, each
contained particular modifications. The imposition of quota systems in
the ICoA of 1976 met substantial opposition both because they con-
tained extensive modifications and because market prices fluctuated
88. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 187.
89. LAW, supra note 2, at 43-44.
90. Id. at 45-46.
91. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 196.
92. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
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widely. Analysis of the agreement of 1983 is important because it has
been largely seen as "an elaborate and advanced attempt to regulate
the market.' s
The U.S. disapproved of the ICO in the 1980's. The U.S. believed
that the ICO artificially maintained high coffee prices and sold coffee
to non-member countries at below market prices. The United States'
dissatisfaction intensified when several large coffee exporting nations
decided to further limit exports in December of 1986." Accordingly,
the U.S. refused to enter into a further ICoA when the 1983 agreement
ended in 1989. With the loss of the support of the largest consuming
nation, the ICO was unable to effectively maintain its quota system,
and the coffee market collapsed. Coffee prices declined rapidly as pro-
ducing countries drastically increased their outputs in order to retain
earnings in the more competitive market."
In response to continually dropping coffee prices in the early
1990's, the first few months of 1993 saw increased pressure from coffee
producing nations for the construction of a new coffee agreement. How-
ever, despite offers of new concessions by the coffee producing nations,
such as banning "below agreement price level" sales of coffee to non-
member countries, a new pact has not been reached for two central
reasons. First, since the present ICO represents fifty two producing
countries, agreement on the distribution of the world market has been
difficult to reach. Second, and far more importantly, continued reluc-
tance on the part of coffee consuming nations, most notably the U.S.,
have stalled completion of a new ICoA."
At first glance, the importance that coffee producers attribute to
creating consensus between producing and consuming nations seems
unwarranted in light of the success of OPEC. There are, however, a
number of teasons why the coffee market is different than that of oil.
The production cycle of coffee cannot effectively be changed in the
short run, so the world supply of coffee is much more difficult to con-
trol than that of oil. Controlling supply is further complicated by the
existence of considerable coffee stocks in the hands of the consuming
nations.' In addition, the relatively large number of coffee producing
nations makes the enforcement of coffee agreements much more diffi-
cult. Indeed, one reason for the initial ability of the ICO to control
coffee prices was consumer cooperation with respect to distribution
93. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 198.
94. Id. at 200.
95. Christina Lamb, A Storm in a Coffee Cup, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1992,
at 18.
96. Coffee-Producing Countries Agree on Strategy for Talks with Consuming
Countries, BRTSH BRoADcASTING CoRP., Mar. 16, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Strategy
for Talks], available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
97. Id. at 18.
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quota enforcement.' Finally, the potential for increased coffee prices
does not represent the same threat to industrialized economies that an
increase in the price of oil does. Coffee plays only a very limited role as
a factor of production for other products and can, to a relatively large
extent, be substituted for or done without.
The role of the U.S. in future ICoA's must be characterized as
important but unclear. Without the support of an economically active
ICoA, prices in the coffee market have declined significantly, despite
previous predictions that increases in coffee prices may be close at
hand." As the largest consuming nation, the U.S. imports nearly
twice the coffee of the next largest importer. Thus, U.S. involvement in
a new ICoA could mean substantial U.S. subsidization of world coffee
production, at least in the short run. However, coffee pricing remains a
volatile issue of political importance for the U.S."® Low coffee prices
threaten to lead to social unrest in many coffee producing nations,
which rely heavily on coffee exports to generate export earnings, and
to increased production of the main alternative crop, coca and its re-
fined product, cocaine.'
2. Form and Function
The initial ICoA of 1940 was created "to allocate equitably the
market of the United States of America," and to "take steps to promote
the orderly marketing of coffee, with a view to asserting terms of trade
equitable for both producers and consumers by adjusting supply to
demand.""° These goals were expanded to a global level by the agree-
ment of 1962, which included the following principles:
1. to ensure by a comprehensive and centralized control of exports,
backed up by supervision and regulation of imports, that the gener-
al level of coffee prices does not decline beyond the level of 1962
and that real export earnings should progressively increase;
2. to promote the consumption of coffee (importing members to
have no financial obligation), and to work for the removal of obsta-
cles to consumption (e.g., import tariffs, quotas, etc.);
3. to adjust production with demand within the lifetime of the
agreement;
4. to establish a policy 'relative to' stocks, which producing mem-
bers 'shall endeavour' by all means within their power to imple-
ment."o
98. LAW, supra note 2, at 43-45.
99. David Blackwell, Report Forecasts Strong Coffee Price Recovery, FINANCIAL
TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1991, at 46.
100. David Blackwell, Time Running Short for Coffee Pact Renegotiation, FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at 26; Strategy for Talks, supra note 96, at 1.
101. Lamb, supra note 95, at 18.
102. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 59.
103. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 195-96, citing J.W.F. ROWE, THE WoRLD'S COFFEE
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Thus, the ICoA has focused, at least partially, on maintaining a price
above market levels.'
When in force, the ICoA operates through an elaborate system of
import and export quotas that serve to control over ninety percent of
global coffee production. Quotas were chosen because buffer stocks
cannot cope with chronic overproduction problems and large capital re-
quirements. The ICoA enforced the quotas by implementing an exten-
sive system of verification of coffee stocks that helped to prevent cheat-
ing.10°
The system of export and import quotas was designed and moni-
tored by the International Coffee Council (ICC).1" The ICC itself is
made up of representatives from both coffee producing and consuming
nations. Decisions made by the ICC are based on a complicated weight-
ed voting system that provides overall equal voting power to consum-
ing and producing factions. A two-thirds majority is required to im-
plement a quota change. A sixteen member Board aids the Council; the
Board is elected by the Council and oversees the Secretariat. The Sec-
retariat is the central administrative branch of the ICC and is headed
by the Executive Director. The ICC is structured similarly to OPEC,
yet its operations are much different. However, since 1989, the ICC
has operated on a provisional level only.' 7
D. Sugar
1. Chronology
Although global efforts to organize the sugar markets did not
materialize until the 1930's, British efforts to control the sugar mar-
kets began in 1891 with the International London Convention. Subse-
quent agreements were reached primarily between European producers
in the Sugar Convention of 1902."° Although this agreement was
limited in scope, it represented a significant first step in the genera-
tion of future sugar ICA's. By 1920, however, the Sugar Convention
was abandoned for political reasons."
The next major attempt to control the sugar market did not occur
until 1931 when negotiations between Cuba, the United States, and
187 (1963).
104. LAW, supra note 2, at 44.
105. UNCTAD Committee Assesses Role of International Commodity Agreements in
Attaining Integrated Programme Goals; United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, UNITED NATIONS CHRONICLE, Jun. 1985, at 57 [hereinafter UNCTAD].
106. GosovIc, supra note 1, at 229.
107. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 191-93.
108. MOHAMED HASSAN EL-GAMAL, LE PROBLEME INTERNATIONAL Du SUCRE 16-17
(1941).
109. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
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Java led to an agreement to restrict output through a system of quo-
tas. Shortly thereafter, similar arrangements were forged between
Cuba, Java, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bel-
gium." ° The "Chadbourne Agreement," as these agreements were col-
lectively called, successfully limited output among the membership
nations. However, this output was quickly replaced by non-member-
ship countries creating, in effect, a transfer of production. With sugar
prices in continual decline, the Chadbourne Agreement was abandoned
in 1935.1
Two years after the initiation of the Chadbourne Agreement, ne-
gotiations towards price stabilization began with the World Monetary
and Economic Conference of 1933. Initial agreement was hampered by
the Chadbourne Scheme, which was still in force. However, by 1937, a
sugar agreement was signed between the governments of South Africa,
Brazil, Belgium, the United Kingdom, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, India, the
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the USSR, the United States,
and Yugoslavia."2 This agreement was unsuccessful in affecting
prices and was interrupted by the onset of World War I.3
By the end of the war, there were shortages and relatively high
prices in the world sugar market; accordingly, the next fifteen years
were characterized by gradually increasing outputs and decreasing
prices. By 1953, prices were low enough to prompt further attempts at
controlling the sugar market. The International Sugar Agreement
(ISA) of 1953 included all major producers (except Brazil and Peru)
and importers, and it operated on the basis of a set of quotas that were
to be enforced by both exporters and importers.""
The 1956 ISA included Brazil and Peru and made several impor-
tant refinements to the quota system. By 1960, however, the agree-
ment faced serious political and functional difficulties, and the ISO
barely moderated wide price fluctuations. In addition, political differ-
ences between the United States and Cuba forced wholesale changes in
the distribution of the quota system. Record production levels world-
wide further strained the quota system, and large landholding in Cuba
became necessary to protect against flucuations." 5 These complica-
tions eventually led to a collapse in the agreement by 1962, as Cuba
withdrew from the world market due to commitments to the Sino-Sovi-
110. EL-GAMAL, supra note 108, at 298-300.
111. BARANYAI & MILTS, supra note 6, at 109.
112. INTERGovERNMENTAL AGREEMEN, supra note 3, at 26.
113. LAW, supra note 2, at 47.
114. Id. at 48.
115. HEINRICH BRUNNER, CUBAN SUGAR POLICY FROM 1963-1970 19-21 (Marguerite
Borchardt & H.F. Broch de Rothermann trans., 1977).
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et Bloc." '
Following a decade of violent price swings and changing political
conditions, renegotiation of the agreement was attempted in 1965.
These negotiations stalled due to differences in opinions with respect
to price range targets and export quotas. Agreement was finally
reached in 1968,1' but, during the early 1970's, the ISO was unable
to prevent skyrocketing prices despite considerable increases in both
production and consumption." 8 These high prices created great in-
centives for increased production. Accordingly, world production
boomed and signs of an impending sugar glut arose as the ISA of 1977
went into effect." '
The ISA of 1977 was further burdened by the refusal of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) to join the pact. Although the EEC's
rationale was -largely political, its failure to join the ISA and subse-
quent increases in sugar exportation made attempts by the ISO to
keep sugar within the proscribed price range impossible. In addition,
the continuing development and use of alternative sweeteners exac-
erbated the downward pressure on sugar prices. Consequently, by
1984, when the agreement lapsed, sugar prices fell precipitously in the
face of huge global surpluses."s
Since 1984, the ISO has been relegated to the non-market role of
continuously monitoring the sugar market, and it has no ability to
perform market operations. Accordingly, controversy has surrounded
the ISA's adoption in 1987" and 1992. Currently, the ISO provides a
forum for discussion about issues concerning the sugar market and
supplies comprehensive statistics on the functioning of the market.
However, the ISO has diminished in importance as an economic actor,
and it is unlikely to recover, at least in the near future."=
2. Form and Function
At least since the end of World War II, International Sugar Agree-
ments have been oriented towards the goals of stability and the provi-
sion of renumerative returns to sugar producing nations. Evidence of
116. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 121-22.
117. Gosovic, supra note 1, at 99-101.
118. LAW, supra note 2, at 50-51.
119. New Sugar Treaty Leaves Dominican Republic Uneasy, LATIN AMERICAN
NEWSLETTERS, LTD., Oct. 14, 1977, at 158, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
120. John Edwards, Why the Sweet Talking Had to Stop, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jul.
24, 1984, at 15.16.
121. David Blackwell, International Sugar Pact Comes into Force, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988, at 34.
122. Nigel Hunt, New Pact Secures Future for International Sugar Organization,
REUTER ASIA-PACiIC BUSINESS REPORT, Jan. 20, 1993, at 2, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Aliwid File.
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the goals were clearly set out by the International Sugar Agreement of
1958:
The objectives of this Agreement are to assure supplies of sugar to
importing countries and markets for sugar to exporting countries at
equitable and stable prices; to increase the consumption of sugar
throughout the world; and to maintain the purchasing power in
world markets of countries or areas whose economies are largely
dependent upon the production or export of sugar by providing ade-
quate returns to producers and making it possible to maintain fair
standards of labour conditions and wages.'
Later agreements echoed these objectives.' In the long run, howev-
er, any claims of success regarding these objectives, other than stabi-
lizing prices,' must be viewed with suspicion.'
As with coffee, the ISO's market control mechanism took the form
of a system of quotas designed to keep prices within a pre-determined
range. Buffer stock arrangements in this area have long been consid-
ered infeasible due to the size of sugar price fluctuations and the enor-
mous amount of capital that would be required to implement a pool.
The most recent attempts at price control failed both because of the
large non-member production of the EEC, currently estimated at about
twenty five percent of world production, and chronic overproduction
around the rest of the world.'7
The ISO of 1937 provided for the creation of a "General Council,
composed of delegates representing all of the contracting governments,
and an Executive Committee of nine members, which are to administer
the agreement through a Secretariat to be established in London." ' 8
The Executive Committee consisted of equal representation of the
sugar importing countries, the cane-sugar producing countries, and the
beet-sugar producing countries. Permanent seats on this committee
were held by the United States, the United Kingdom, Cuba, the Neth-
erlands, and Java.' Subsequent ISO's have continued to utilize this
structure with only minor changes,"8 the most important of which
was the addition of the Finance Committee. The decline in importance
of the ISA has, however, had a corresponding effect at the administra-
tive level, as is illustrated by the merger of the Finance and Executive
123. United Nations Sugar Conference, 1956: Summary of Proceedings, at 53, U.N.
Doc. E/Conf.22/7/Annex H [hereinafter Sugar Conference].
124. Id.; W.R. AYKROYD, SWEET MALEFACTOR: SUGAR, SLAVERY AND HUMAN SOCI-
ErY 114 (1967).
125. BRUNNER, supra note 116, at 62-65.
126. LAW, supra note 2, at 51.
127. Edwards, supra note 120, at 15.
128. MYER LYNSKY, SUGAR EcoNoMIcs, STATISTICS, AND DOCUMENTS 276 (1938).
129. Id. at 276.
130. See generally, Sugar Conference, supra note 123, at 65-67 (discussing the
sugar agreements of 1953 and 1956).
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Committees into one Administrative Committee in 1993.131
IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to make accurate generalizations about commodity
markets because of the degree of variation between markets. As a
result, analysis of the ability of actors to effectively form and maintain
an ICA must necessarily be limited to the provision of factors that bear
on the effectiveness of ICA's. These factors can be loosely separated
into market, commodity, and organization specific factors, as outlined
below.
A. Market Factors
International Trade Agreements do not work in a vacuum. Each
commodity market has important differences and unique attributes
that affect any attempted ICA in that particular market. These attrib-
utes may even prevent an ICA from effectively functioning in certain
markets. Relevant market attributes include the following:
1. The number of producing and consuming entities;
2. Political and functional stability and organization of these entities;
3. Barriers to entry;
4. The degree of variation in international costs of production;
5. The relative "importance" of a product both in the world economy
and individual markets;
6. The degree and severity of price fluctuations; and
7. Demand and supply elasticities.
First, the fewer entities involved in a market, the more effective
an ICA is likely to be. Negotiations are easier to conduct, agreements
are easier to construct, and enforcement is less difficult. For instance,
OPEC's ability to effect control of the oil market was directly related to
the concentration of previous control within the hands of a small group
of multinational corporations. 2 Conversely, the number of producers
and actors involved in the tin market undoubtedly had a negative
effect on the ITA_"
Second, the political and functional positions of each of the eco-
nomic actors can have a positive or negative effect. For instance, the
British colonial system undoubtedly aided the preservation of unity of
131. See, Hunt, supra note 122, at 2 (noting the merger of the Finance and Exec-
utive Committees).
132. ARABINDA GHOSH, OPEC, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, AND UNITED STATES
ENERGY PoLICY 11 (1983).
133. McFadden, supra note 70, at 826.
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the ITA until 1985.184 In addition, the larger the economic entity, the
greater the impact on a particular market. This is especially true for
the Western industrialized countries that enjoy large GNP's and al-
ready trade extensively with one another.'
Third, the ability to control market price depends directly on the
ICA's ability to prevent new sources of production from entering the
market place. A prime example of this is the oil industry. OPEC was
assisted in its efforts to raise prices by the high initial investment
costs required for oil production and the relative scarcity of known oil
deposits. In addition, OPEC's relative decline in power since the early
1970's is directly related to the discovery and exploitation of new oil
deposits.1
The degree of variation in international production costs and the
importance of the product both affect the degree to which the various
producers of a commodity can be enticed to form, make, or agree to an
ICA. If the costs of production vary greatly between producers, then
low cost producers will have to be compensated to a larger extent for
giving up their comparative advantage. Since the price maintained by
the ICA must be higher than the highest cost producer, the incentive
for the low cost producer to cheat is likely to be higher in cases where
there is a large differential between low and high cost producers. Nat-
urally, it is the high cost producers, such as Venezuela in OPEC, who
often initiate the process of creating an ICA.1"'
Similarly, countries that rely heavily on a particular product are
likely to be more interested in the formation of an ICA than countries
who are less dependent on the commodity. In addition, the ICA's abili-
ty to effectively punish a cheating country will decline as a function of
the dependency on the export of the particular commodity."
Wide fluctuations in the price that the ICA is attempting to con-
trol can make the operation of an ICA much more difficult. Price
fluctuations and their subsequent effect on the economies of the pro-
ducing nations is frequently cited as a central justification for the
creation of ICA's: the larger the fluctuations in the target commodity
price, the greater the need for and the cost of some type of commodity
control. However, the larger the price fluctuations a commodity experi-
ences, the greater the capital and commodity stock requirements
are.139 In addition, failure of an ICA can have serious international
economic consequences, as is illustrated by the collapse of the ITA in
134. Id. at 816.
135. SiDNEY DELL, TRADE BLocs AND COMMON MARKET 220 (1963).
136. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 193, 203.
137. SKEET, supra note 23, at 2.
138. Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collu-
sion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295, 303 (1987).
139. LAW, supra note 2, at 82.
VOL. 22:2,3
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
1985.
Finally, demand elasticity is important because it measures the
degree to which a change in supply will impact demand. Therefore,
since the operation of an ICA is integrally involved with the regulation
of supply and the price level, the elasticity of demand is critical in
determining how effective an ICA can be. In general, the less elastic a
commodity is in terms of demand, the more effective an ICA will be at
controlling price. Comparing oil and coffee illustrates this difference.
Since the demand for oil is relatively inelastic, OPEC was able to de-
mand high prices in the early 1970's by restricting supply.' 4 In con-
trast, the demand for coffee is more elastic, so the shortages experi-
enced during the 1950's led to dramatic declines in consumption, rath-
er than prolonged increases in price.""
B. Commodity Factors
The particular attributes of the specific commodity profoundly
affect the ability of an ICA to control market prices. Many of these
elements are important because they affect the supply of the particular
commodity:
1. The renewability and scarcity of the commodity;
2. The storability of the commodity;
3. Crop or production cycles;
4. The ratio of variable to fixed costs;
5. The susceptibility to outside influences such as the weather; and
6. The extent and availability of substitutes.
First, the renewability of the product affects supply as a barrier to
entry into the market. For instance, the scarcity of oil clearly helped
OPEC to effectively control oil prices,' while the relative ease of
growing sugar, especially among traditional sugar importing countries
such as the U.S., creates a natural limitation on the degree to which
the ISO can exercise oligopolistic power.'" Indeed, renewability may
even prevent an ICA from acting oligopolistically at all.'"
Second, the storability of the product is important because it di-
rectly affects the ability of an ICA to control the supply of a product.
This factor is much less important with respect to non-agricultural
140. SKEET, supra note 23, at 85.
141. LAW, supra note 2, at 42.
142. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 79.
143. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
144. See BEHRMAN, supra note 12, at 17 (providing an in-depth economic analysis
of this concept).
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products, such as tin or oil, because these commodities may be either
left in the ground or stored indefinitely once extracted. However, with
agricultural products, natural decay both increases storage costs and
limits storage life.
Third, production cycles, especially with respect to agricultural
products, limits the ability of an ICA to control supply. For example,
coffee plants require ten years to reach full maturity. The ability of
producing nations to expand or contract coffee output quickly is ex-
tremely limited. Sugar, on the other hand, can be harvested the same
season it is planted. However, the shorter season for sugar has provid-
ed no advantage to the ISO because sugar plants can often be harvest-
ed only once. Output, therefore, is difficult to predict far in ad-
vance.14
Fourth, the ratio of variable to fixed costs affects the incentives
that the market provides to the individual producers of goods. For
example, both oil and coffee require extensive initial investment in
order to establish production. Investors in these areas naturally spread
the cost of this investment over the period of yield, even though the
entire investment is made prior to any return. However, producers of
these commodities are likely to consider only the variable costs when
determining the size of periodic levels of production. Therefore, excep-
tionally low prices are required to curtail production in the short run,
so prices that would normally be expected to negatively impact supply
will be less likely to change production. In addition, the lack of respon-
siveness to market signals makes the use of a buffer stock alone par-
ticularly difficult because of the increased capital required to combat
the likelihood of wide price fluctuations.'"
Fifth, weather often affects the availability of certain commodities.
An excellent example of this is coffee, which is particularly susceptible
to changes in supply due to frost. In 1953, for example, one particular-
ly damaging frost raised coffee prices by six percent.' 7
Sixth, the availability of viable substitutes greatly impacts an
ICA's ability to control supply. Without question, the relative "unique-
ness" of oil is one factor responsible for OPEC's success in controlling
prices.'" Conversely, readily available sugar substitutes have un-
doubtedly hurt the ISA's attempts to regulate the sugar market."9
145. LAW, supra note 2, at 40, 46.
146. Success of UNCTAD Common Fund Hinges Upon Commodity Price Supports,
ICA Heads Agree, [Current Reports] Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 25 at 820 (Jun. 19,
1985) [hereinafter Success].
147. LAW, supra note 2, at 41-42.
148. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 79.
149. Robin Stainer, Commodities and Futures: Sugar Organization in Danger, IN-
DEPENDENT, Jul. 13, 1992, at 22, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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C. ICA Organization Factors
The effectiveness of an international agreement depends primarily
on two factors. First, the construction and operation of an economic
system requires that the parties involved hold common interests and
values. Second, there must be general agreement on the objectives of
the political system. ' Translation of these concepts to International
Commodity Agreements has yielded various results. For instance,
Baranyai and Mills suggest that the achievement of continuing success
by an ICA depends on
1) participation by the principle producing and consuming coun-
tries, combined with some reasonable pressure to induce outsiders
to cooperate;
2) governmental management through an administrative board
representing the interests of both producers and consumers;
3) adequate power to control the volume of output so as to ensure a
remunerative price to producers and a sufficiently free flow of com-
modities to the consumers; [and]
4) measures to encourage efficient production and discourage un-
economical operations.'
These elements seem to indicate that the success of an ICA depends
primarily upon its members and the strength of their combined power
in the world market.
"Group B," a committee of delegates from the industrially devel-
oped countries, identified different elements:
1) realistic and market related price ranges;
2) adequate provisions for adjusting price ranges in accordance
with shifts in the underlying market trends;
3) effective economic provisions (in cases where stabilization mea-
sures were deemed feasible and desirable); and
4) support and participation of as many important producing and
consuming countries as possible.l
These factors contrast sharply with those suggested by Baranyai and
Mills because they focus primarily on the operation, management, and
objectives.
Reconciling these two formulas is not as difficult as might be
supposed. Without adequate cooperation between member nations, ef-
fective operation becomes impossible. Thus, the correct constituency
becomes a prerequisite for an effective ICA. Yet even with full support
initially, focusing on achieving objectives that are not desired by a
powerful faction of the ICA can often lead to the destruction of the
150. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 5.
151. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 26.
152. UNCTAD, supra note 105, at 55-56.
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agreement. Therefore, operation within the interests of the full mem-
bership is also a prerequisite. As a result, to be successful in the long
term, an ICA must contain the right members and pursue policy objec-
tives that the full constituency desires.
This is not to say that a group of either producing or consuming
nations acting alone cannot effectively use an ICA to influence a mar-
ket. There is no question that certain ICA's, most notably OPEC, have
had profound influences on their individual markets. However, at-
tempts to raise prices through collusion generally tend to produce
confrontational situations between producers and consumers. Main-
taining the ICA then becomes even more difficult because implement-
ing the four elements above unilaterally is far more difficult than a
bilateral operation and also because market conditions eventually tend
to shift in favor of the "other side," which can then exert pressure for
change.
In addition, the ability of an ICA to control prices effectively de-
pends heavily on its ability to control commodity supply. However, the
ability of an ICA to control supply is limited for several reasons. First,
with respect to food, demand curves are relatively inelastic, so an in-
crease in price will have only a small effect on demand since food is a
primary item that people must have. It does not follow, however, that
demand curves will be inelastic for individual commodities because a
rise in the price of a single commodity may lead to the substitution of
others."
Second, the creation of an artificially high price naturally creates
incentives for each member of the ICA to cheat. This is especially true
for countries in dire economic straits since the monetary gains for
breaching the ICA are likely to be substantial, and the restriction of
output will often result in production surpluses. From the ICA's point
of view, this problem is exacerbated by the relatively ineffective pun-
ishment measures it can exercise, especially if the breaching party is a
major actor."5
Third, an increase in prices brought about by ICA action is likely
to provoke a variety of negative responses from consuming nations.
Increased prices are likely to speed up the search for suitable substi-
tutes and motivate consumers to impose conservation measures. In
addition, consuming countries may attempt to find relief through in-
ternational anti-trust measures, an area of law that is steadily expand-
ing.1" Further, prolonged periods of prices above market level are
153. LAW, supra note 2, at 3-5.
154. But see, Ayres, supra note 138 (discussing enforcement measures a cartel can
use to enforce its decisions).
155. Deanna Conn, Note, Assessing the Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements
and New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to
International Mergers, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 128-29 (1993).
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likely to provide incentives for the consuming countries to form their
own ICA's to attempt to mitigate the effects of price control."s
It is interesting to note that neither of the two sets of criteria
listed above mentions the organizational structure of the ICA as a
factor involved in success. A comparison of the industries outlined
above, particularly when OPEC is compared to the relatively ineffec-
tive ICO, seems to support that omission. Indeed, an ICA's choice of
structure seems to play a minor role in the ability of that ICA to par-
ticipate effectively in the market place.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, these factors indicate that ICA's may effectively
provide market stabilization measures, even in the long run. However,
most ICA's have been relatively unsuccessful in controlling prices,
largely because of political differences among their constituents and
the inability to effectively control global supply.157 Furthermore, at-
tempts at global market and price controls have frequently resulted in
destroying the ICA and exacerbating supply problems in the long run
or both.
V. GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Introduction
During the early 1970's, some commentators predicted that a
"New Era" was beginning in the commodity markets. These commenta-
tors were encouraged by the ability of some ICA's, especially OPEC, to
successfully control market prices. In addition, the high rates of infla-
tion globally combined with relative scarcity of commodities led to
decreased bargaining power by consuming nations and a corresponding
increase in commodity prices.' This initial success led many Lesser
Developed Countries (LDC's) to view ICA's as a means of altering the
global economic order. At the same time, the Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), made by the
Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, called for changes
in global economic structure and a general redistribution of the world's
156. LAW, supra note 2, at 78.
157. Given the theoretical framework outlined above, a logical next step would be
an econometric analysis to determine the relative importance and validity of the
factors listed. Construction of a model of this nature is beyond the scope of this
Note. In addition, an econometric model may not prove useful because of problems
obtaining relevant data, the incompatibility of some of the factors for conversion into
a numerical form, and the large number of theoretically relevant factors, which is
likely to lead to regression multi-colinearity. As a result, this study will have to rely
on the authorities cited and the logical connection of each of the factors to the actu-
al experience of the commodities.
158. C. FRED BERGSTEN, TOWARD A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF C. FRED BERGSTEN, 1972-74, at 287-88, 294 (1975).
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wealth."' 9 The combination of these two concepts found expression
most clearly in the resolutions of the "Group of 77" and UNCTAD. 1
Yet even in the 1970's, during the pinnacle of ICA support, the
propriety of the use of ICA's as the vehicle to promote redistribution of
wealth was by no means universally accepted. As Lincoln Gordon
wrote,
[i]nternationally managed commodity markets do not hold out a
true prospect of huge additional foreign exchange earnings or re-
source transfers to the developing countries. They cannot substitute
for the internal structural changes that are at the core of real de-
velopment."'
Today, this view is endorsed by the majority of commentators, al-
though some have predicted a re-emergence of ICA's, at least in some
commodity markets.1'
B. The Decline of ICA's
ICA's are slowly disappearing from commodity markets and being
replaced by free market forces. Indeed, only two ICA's still conduct
market operations in substantial commodity markets, both of which
must be considered special cases. First, OPEC has survived, at least in
name, due to the unique and important nature of oil. However, inter-
national economies, market structure,'" and political considerations
make its future unclear. Second, the International Rubber Organiza-
tion (IRO) has been able to continue market operations largely because
of the increased demand for condoms and rubber gloves caused by the
AIDS crisis.'"
One major reason for the decline of ICA's has been a general de-
cline in support for them within the industrialized countries. The col-
lapse of the Tin Agreement in 1985 resulted in extensive bank losses
and greatly impacted the reputation of commodity pacts."e In addi-
tion, industrialized countries have increasingly seen commodity agree-
159. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 28-30.
160. LAW, supra note 2, at 17.
161. Lincoln Gordon, Natural Resources and the International Economic Order, in
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 45, 55 (Don Wallace, Jr.
& Helga Escobar eds., 1977).
162. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 213-15.
163. FADmL J. AL-CHALABI, OPEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY: A
CHANGING STRUCTURE 2-6 (1980).
164. Greg McCune, International Commodity Accords Face Hard Times, REUTER
Busnmss REPORT, Sep. 1, 1988, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid
File.
165. Jane Merriman, Outlook Bleak for Commodity Stabilization Pacts, REUTER
BusINEss REPORT, Mar. 21, 1989, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
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ments as mere vehicles for the transfer of development aid, as opposed
to true efforts at market stabilization. Claims that ICA's are not prac-
tical due to enforcement problems further buttress this view.' ICA's
may even exacerbate existing market problems," 7 and they require
capital investment that far exceeds the benefit they yield.'
ICA's have also been criticized on the grounds that they promote
inefficient resource allocation because their decisions are most often
based on political or past production rationales rather than on objec-
tive market analysis.'" Examples include the failure of the tin agree-
ment to adjust its price levels in response to long term market condi-
tions, the political wrangling in the coffee market, and even the agen-
da of some of the proposals of UNCTAD.
Nonetheless, some commentators believe that ICA's may have a
future regulating international commodity markets, perhaps even
through mere price stabilization efforts.170 However, should recent
trends continue, even modest advancements are unlikely unless the
LDC's gain more realistic views of the current commodity markets.'
C. Conclusions
The prevailing trend in world commodity markets away from
ICA's is likely to impact the global structure in several important
ways. First, since ICA's have constituted an important part of plans for
the NIEO for several decades, the failure of ICA's in general may
cause changes in the strategy and means by which UNCTAD and other
world organizations attempt to implement the NIEO. Second, the
disappearance of ICA's may affect the degree of stability in world com-
modity markets. Third, multinational corporations and other non-gov-
ernmental organizations are likely to play an increasingly important
role in commodity markets.
Even a cursory analysis of the world economy reveals a continuing
need for support of the LDC's. This remains true particularly since
falling commodity prices has significantly affected the ability of many
LDC's to maintain levels of export earnings."7 Falling prices have
166. Commodity Pacts More Oriented Towards Market, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 1987, at
6 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; see also, Ayres, supra note 138
(discussing cartel enforcement).
167. Success, supra note 146, at 820.
168. Agreements in Decay, supra note 10, at 1.
169. LAW, supra note 2, at 111.
170. Success, supra note 146, at 820.
171. Robin Stainer, Commodities & Futures: Producers and Consumers Start to
Focus on the Pacts, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 6, 1992, at 19, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File.
172. Gordon, supra note 161, at 55.
173. UNCTAD, supra note 105, at 55.
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led, in turn, to increased pressure by LDC's for greater participation
by industrialized nations in the construction of ICA's.
Prior to examining the potential for alternatives to ICA's that may
warrant consideration in the future, two important points must be
discussed. The fundamental role of such a mechanism must be deter-
mined. As discussed above, the goals of ICA's tend to go beyond mere
price stabilization. Indeed, LDC's tend to see ICA's as mechanisms to
control the markets of the commodity they sell and to enhance the
wealth they receive from those products. In short, LDC's are really
looking for greater economic participation in the market place. 74
Second, the goal of price stability has been placed at center stage
in many of the negotiations concerning ICA's. Ironically, general agree-
ment exists among industrialized and developing countries that in-
creased stability of commodity markets would be beneficial.'75 For the
industrialized countries, stability is important because they continue to
produce the vast majority of the world's commodity supply.' For
LDC's, stability is important because even though the aggregate quan-
tity they export is relatively limited, the income generated by these
primary products represents a significant proportion of their overall in-
come. 1
77
Without ICA's, instability within commodity markets is likely to
increase. First, it is clear that ICA's contributed, at least to a limited
degree, to the stability of some commodity markets. Second, since
many of the LDC's are "fringe" suppliers to the world economy, market
instability is more likely to be reflected in demand for their goods. For
example, since the U.S. both produces and imports sugar, a decline in
sugar demand is likely to mean a decline in imports rather than pro-
duction. 7 ' Third, increased "regionalization" is likely to result in
"minilateral" trade agreements that are likely to place LDC's even
more on the fringe. For example, agreements within the EEC are likely
to lock out at least some of the LDC trade to Western European Na-
tions.1
79
One way in which LDC's can and do continue to seek improve-
ment in the global economy is through the UNCTAD, which has been
uniformly committed to the development of LDC's and to improving
174. Stephen D. Krasner, United Nations and Political Conflict Between North
and South, in THE US, THE UN, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL CHANGE 210,
212-13 (Toby T. Gati ed., 1983).
175. Success, supra note 146, at 820; see also, LAW, supra note 2, at 105-06
(discussing instability).
176. LAw, supra note 2, at 11.
177. Gordon, supra note 161, at 51.
178. SHAILENDRA J. ANJARIA ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEVELOP-
MENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 52 (1982).
179. Id. at 33.
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their terms of trade. As a result, UNCTAD has been an avid supporter
of ICA's and has frequently provided a forum for their negotiations as
well as for the Integrated Programme for Commodities.' ° UNCTAD's
attitude towards commodity pacts continues to be favorable. However,
in the face of declining popularity of ICA's among the more industrial-
ized countries, UNCTAD has begun to focus more heavily on the opera-
tions of LDC's in the market place and on possible free market related
solutions to the LDC plight.18 '
The keystone of UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodi-
ties is the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), a large money pool
earmarked for use for financing buffer stock arrangements and for
enhancing the long term competitiveness and development prospects
for various commodities."2 Financing for the CFC requires contribu-
tion from industrialized and developing nations as well as regional
groups such as OPEC.'" Nonetheless, plans for the completion of the
CFC have run into difficulties similar to those experienced by other
ICA's, and prospects for final ratification look bleak.'8
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is another
forum allowing LCD's to improve their position vis-a-vis the industrial-
ized world. GATT seeks the expansion of free trade and the lowering of
trade barriers, goals which have recently been endorsed by the seg-
ments of the industrialized nations that are most interested in the
development of LDC's. However, some scholars have argued that fun-
damental discrimination exists within the structure of the free market
itself. If they are correct, then the free market alone is unlikely to
provide solutions to the LDC problem."
Finally, some potential exists for regional integration to help pro-
vide solutions to the trade problems of the LDC's. In certain cases -
ASEAN, for example - regional integration has provided a more sta-
ble framework of trade, opportunities for economies of scale, and in-
creased specialization, that has benefitted the region generally. Howev-
er, the potential for regionalization is limited for several reasons. The
political diversity between LDC's in many regions makes the process of
integration more difficult. In addition, natural obstacles, combined
with geographical dispersion, make integration difficult, especially for
the LDC's that have little to invest in domestic infrastructure.'
The decline in the importance of ICA's is likely to result in in-
180. Gordon, supra note 161, at 58.
181. Adrian Croft, UNCTAD Seeks More Open Commodities Markets, REUTERS,
Feb. 18, 1992, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
182. YUSAF, supra note 5, at 140-41.
183. AL-CHALABI, supra note 163, at 156.
184. Success, supra note 146, at 820.
185. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 56.
186. DELL, supra note 135, at 226-27.
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creased importance of other international organizations, especially in
light of the continual decline in U.S. strength. 8 In particular, non-
governmental organizations are likely to play an increasingly impor-
tant role, especially within the operations of the United Nations.'"
Private agents of international trade, such as multinational corpora-
tions, which already exercise extensive power in the international
commodity market, are likely to increase in significance."' Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that the decline in the economic
strength of the U.S. may present opportunities for increased bilateral
trade with the Third World." °
From a global perspective, it is difficult to see who benefits from
this, but scholars disagree. On one hand, it is clear that the host coun-
try receives more direct benefit, especially in terms of usage of labor,
than the home country.9 Multinational corporations may also pro-
vide access to markets that would not otherwise be open to the host
country.
On the other hand, the home country of a multinational corpora-
tion clearly benefits, not only monetarily through stockholder benefits
and indirect taxation but also with respect to increased commodity
control. Indeed, the political importance of the link between the home
government and the multinational corporation has been a central
source of discontent within the LDC's,1" many of which have sought
to increase their control of the means of production in recent years. 93
In any case, the role of multinational corporations in the world
commodity markets has been ignored for too long. Just as charges that
these corporations are merely the agents of their home countries seem
simplistic, arguments that multinational corporate presence can only
be beneficial to a host country should be regarded with skepticism.
More likely, multinational corporations act to maximize their own
utility, so they represent separate and independent economic ac-
tors. " It seems odd, then, that multinational corporations have not
187. See Robert W. Cox, Problems of Global Management, in THE US, THE UN
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL CHANGE 64, 66-67 (Toby T. Gati ed.,
1983Xdiscussing the relevance of the decline of the US as a global hegemon).
188. Angus Archer, Methods of Multilateral Management: The Interrelationship of
International Organizations and NGO's, in THE US, THE UN, AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF GLOBAL CHANGE 303, 304 (Toby T. Gati ed., 1983).
189. See ARAIM, supra note 8, at 204 (noting that multinational corporations al-
ready play a large role in international trade).
190. Emmanuel I. Osagie, The Linkage Between U.S. Agriculture and Third World
Development, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPEC-
TriVE 239, 244 (Khosrow Fatemi ed., 1988).
191. Raymond Vernon, Multinational Enterprises: Performance and Accountability,
in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRADE AND THE DOLLAR 65, 75 (Jules Backman &
Ernst Bloch eds., 1974).
192. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 65.
193. Krasner, supra note 174, at 212.
194. BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVER-
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been included more in formal attempts to organize the commodity
markets. Considering the power that multinational corporations exert
over commodity markets, the failure to include them may be a crucial
factor in the general lack of success of ICA's.
Edward Quill*
NANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 124
(1992).
* Candidate, J.D., University of Denver, 1995; BA, Bates College, 1988. The
author would like to thank his family, friends, and Carolyn Carnell for their sup-
port.
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European Community Law After 1992: A
Practical Guide for Lawyers Outside the
Common Market
REVIEWED BY THEODORE L. BANKS"
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET; Edited
by Ralph Folsom, Ralph Lake and Ved Nanda; Kiuwer Law and Taxa-
tion Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands (1993); $162.00; ISBN 90
6544 643 5; 780 pp. (hardcover).
In order to be effective, a good business lawyer must know the
facts relating to the business, understand the business problems facing
the client, and then apply the law to that situation in order to solve
the legal component of the client's business problem.
When working in one's home community, it is relatively easy to
speak with authority about the local legal environment. When a U.S.
lawyer is dealing with a foreign government, or an entity like the Eu-
ropean Community (EC), things become a bit harder. First, the legal
problems may not be evident, since a foreign jurisdiction presents
issues that may not be of concern in the United States. Second, ap-
plication of the foreign law may not be understood.
A U.S. lawyer may enlist an advocate in the foreign jurisdiction,
assuming a competent attorney can be found who speaks a common
language. It is important to find one who not only speaks your lan-
guage, but who is also on your "wavelength." This means someone who
understands business in general and can readily appreciate a client's
commercial goals. This foreign lawyer also needs to be able to commu-
nicate quickly and clearly - he or she needs to be able to identify the
key problems and express legal risks in a way a client can easily eval-
uate. In short, an ideal foreign lawyer has to be able to represent a
client as you would.
* Assistant to the General Counsel, Kraft General Foods, Inc., Northfield, Illi-
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Searching for the ideal lawyer is hard and time-consuming. There
is often little time to conduct a thorough search, and the client needs
answers quickly. The impatient client, or one facing a business dead-
line, will turn to someone else, or may just act on his or her own intu-
ition. In that case, the lawyer may have lost a client; worse, the client
may be in deep trouble. Therefore, a lawyer should be expected to be
able to give a fairly quick preliminary answer to a client on how things
are. This can at least provide some "go"'/"no-go" guidance and will
avoid a monetary investment in legal impossibilities or wasted time
searching for problems that do not exist.
For this preliminary answer, the U.S. lawyer needs to have a
relatively easy path to the law. A great deal has been written about
EC law since the 1950s, but trying to pin down the different sources
can be daunting. This is where European Community Law After 1992:
A Practical Guide for Lawyers Outside the Common Market comes in.
This handy, manageable volume provides briefing on EC law to
help the U.S. lawyer become comfortable with the basics of European
Community Law. The book covers most business situations and en-
ables the uninitiated lawyer to help prevent an enthusiastic client
from walking into a black hole. No matter how thorough this book is,
however, remember the immortal words of Hans Solo to Luke
Skywalker: "Don't get cocky." Local help will be essential to a compe-
tent representation. This book provides the basic instruction that a
U.S. lawyer will need, but it won't substitute for the expertise of coun-
sel based in an EC country. If the path seems clear, the client's plan-
ning process can proceed while the right local lawyer is lined up.
As the title suggests, this book provides a practical guide for law-
yers dealing with common business situations in the European Com-
munity. For instance, if a client wishes to export technology to an EC
member state, a lawyer may turn to the chapters entitled "Licensing of
Technology in the European Community," by David Schollenger, as
well as "Intellectual Property in the European Community," by Mark
Abell. For a client selling products in the European Community, the
book provides a section on "EEC Competition Law," by Stephen
Johnson; "Product Liability," by Hanne Biltoft-Knudsen and Mogens
Yde Knudsen; "EC Regulation of Agency and Distribution Agree-
ments," by Thomas Clasen and Christian Cabou; and "Franchising," by
Martin Mendelsohn. Before selling products to the public sector, one
should consult "Public Procurement Law," by Velia Leone.
In order to set up a business office or subsidiary in Europe, a
lawyer would be well-advised to review "European Community Compa-
ny Law," by Michael Gordon; "Securities Regulation," by Samuel Wolff;
"Banking and Capital Movements," by Andrew Gamble and Gordon
Travers; "EC Taxation in 1992: Harmonization Efforts and the Remov-
al of Fiscal Frontiers," by Randall Costa, Robert Rich, and John Wil-
son; and "Mergers and Takeovers," by Joseph Griffm. The equal oppor-
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tunity laws governing how employees are treated are covered in "Equal
Pay," by David Larson, and "Employment Matters and the Social
Charter," by Donald Dowling, Jr. If manufacturing operations are
contemplated, then "European Community Environmental Policy and
Law," by Ian Bird and Miguel Veiga-Pestana should be reviewed.
High-tech industries are also addressed in "Television Without
Frontiers: The EC Broadcasting Directive," by Maria Nelson; "The EEC
Directive on Computer Software," by Louis Bertone des Balbes; and
"Telecommunications Law in the European Community," by Christina
Beaton. Concerns under trade laws are covered in "Trading with Mem-
bers of the European Economic Area (EEA)" by Leo Schmid and
Waltraud Hakenberg and "Antidumping Proceedings," by William
Davey.
Ultimately, lawyers may be called upon to advise clients regard-
ing legal problems that require a visit to court. In such a situation,
"Litigating European Community Law," by Ralph Folsom, may be
helpful. Such problems may be avoided by drafting documents appro-
priately, and the section on "Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Within the European Communi-
ties," by Ved Nanda and Deborah Bayles will be useful. If certain EC
regulations disrupt the plans of a client, the chapters, "The European
Community Law-making Machine," by Ralph Folsom and "Lobbying in
Brussels and Strasbourg," by Patrick Thieffry and Philip Van Doom
may prove helpful. Special attention is given to problems presented by
the reunification of Germany in "German Integration," by Michael
Abels (pointing out that the use of the word "reunification" may be
misleading).
The authors provide helpful historical backgrounds to make the
reader comfortable with the topics before plunging into the current
regulatory environment. The authors are distinguished by their exper-
tise in their respective fields. The result is an excellent balance of ih-
house counsel, lawyers in private practice, and law professors, and the
coverage presented in the book is neither too abstract nor too muhn-
dane.
An index would be helpful, and much of the regulatory source
data could have been collected in appendices rather than in volumi-
nous footnotes. Yet, on the whole, the material in the book is easily
accessible through a logical organization structure, clear writing styles,
and a welcome habit by practically all of the authors to get to the
point. For a single volume reference to the EC legal environment, the
breadth of this volume, combined with its relatively compact format,
makes it a good investment.
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1991, Vol. 2.
REVIEWED BY W. PAUL GORMLEY
THE FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1991, VOL.
2. Helsinki: Ius Gentium Ry. Acta Societatis Fennicae luris Gentium A
II, 1991; Pp. viii, 596; $40.00.
Although it is one of the newest yearbooks of international (and
comparative) law, the Finnish Yearbook constitutes a major contribu-
tion to legal literature. It parallels existing volumes in that the full
range of international problems fall within its scope. Yet one of the
unique contributions rendered by this most recent series is that a
Finnish perspective is, to a significant degree, transmitted to a wider
audience. This is not to say that volumes one and two are centered
exclusively on Finnish scholarship or to Scandinavian legal issues;
rather, a delicate balance between regionalism and internationalism
has been struck. For instance, world-renowned scholars have joined
the distinguished local academics and practitioners for the purpose of
dealing with legal issues facing all of humanity, such as the need to
stimulate environmental protection while simultaneously facilitating
global development. Other common themes include preservation of
water resources, fisheries, human rights; plus economic guarantees,
social forces, the future role of international institutions; along with
rubrics of traditional law and jurisprudence. Therefore, this huge vol-
ume will take its place alongside comparable volumes.
Eight major studies - that are in reality lengthy monographs -
constitute the bulk of the text. Supplemented by shorter articles and
comments that also render significant insights (plus a well chosen
section of documents and reports dealing with Finland's International
relations, including summaries of case law and appropriate treaty
instruments), the Finnish perspective is dealt with in terms of contem-
porary international jurisprudence. This approach can be seen in the
opening study by M. Fitzmaurice, entitled "New Developments in the
Legal Regime of the Baltic Sea Fisheries." Following a review of geo-
graphical factors and ecological considerations, the Gdansk Convention
is discussed from a law making perspective as the first phase leading
toward the common fisheries policy of the European Union (EU). Deli-
cate considerations had to be harmonized as a result of the EC acces-
sion to the Gdansk Convention and the introduction of the common
* A.B. San Jose State University; M.A. University of Southern California;
Ph.D. University of Denver;, J.D., LL.M. George Washington University; M.Int.-
Comp.L., D.Jur. Free University of Brussels; LL.D. Victoria University of Manches-
ter. Member of the District of Columbia and United States Supreme Court bars.
Formerly, Leverhulme and Simon Fellows, University of Manchester, England.
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fisheries policy, with the transfer of competence by EU member states
to Brussels. The important factor is the extensive conservation mea-
sures that currently protect the Baltic Sea, especially its fishery re-
sources, by the EU and the International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commis-
sion (IBSFC). This evolution was complicated by the unification of
Germany and the inclusion of the East into the EU sphere. This trend
of regionalism is being advanced by the IBSFC in its closer cooperation
with the International Baltic Environmental Protection Commission.
These recent developments should be closely monitored.
The second essay, "Restriction on Military Activities in the Baltic
Sea - A Basis for a Legal Regime?" by Maija Lehto, logically follows.
The legal rules imposed on warships necessarily affect the ecology of
the region, along with the protection of fish stocks and, in fact, all life
in the Baltic. Here, then, the force of customary law becomes involved
with the United Nations' Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), as these
bodies of law regulate the innocent passage of warships and over-flight
aircraft. In this instance, attention is placed on the exercise of power
when coastal states seek to enforce their legal rights, pursuant to spe-
cial regimes that are permitted by the LOSC. Furthermore, national
legislation is applied by littoral states.In addition to the Scandinavian
countries, the former Soviet Union imposed severe regulations on for-
eign vessels. For instance, notification was required prior to passage.
Thus, a large corpus of military legislation and treaty law have become
applicable. The as yet unresolved conflict concerns the relationship
between these unilateral military restrictions, placed upon the use of
the sea, with the "new" spirit of Baltic regionalism that should include
a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. There is obviously a need for sta-
bility within enclosed seas.
The third contribution, "Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others," by Katri Silfveberg, is a
lengthy monograph that deals with an entire rubric of law, originating
from the illegal traffic in persons. Attempts have been made by the
League of Nations and currently by the United Nations, the Council of
Europe, and the Nordic Council to control transboundary prostitution
and traffic in persons, and even indentured slavery. However, the
purpose of the study is to evaluate the modern approach, namely to
place the protection of women and children within the orbit of human
rights. This class - women and children - is the most helpless
against the horrors of warfare, natural and man-made disasters, and
sheer exploitation in defiance of national and international law. The
author demonstrates how human rights law is emerging with regard to
both limited, municipal rights, as well as universal guarantees. Special
emphasis is placed on the protection of children by multi-national and
international organizations. Also included is the newer topic of traffic
in human organs and tissues, to the detriment of peoples in the devel-
oping countries. However, the thrust of this study is placed upon pros-
titution: its control and eventual elimination.
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The numerous treaties and conventions and their sponsors are
analyzed in considerable detail. These include the League of Nations,
the United Nations, the Council of Europe, ECOSOC, and regional
institutions. The valuable contributions of non-governmental bodies in
furthering these programs are also accorded full attention.
The evolution of rights that are applicable to human beings gener-
ally, and women, children, handicapped persons, tortured individuals,
prisoners of war, civilians in occupied territories, and classes of minori-
ties specifically, has already achieved notable success. Nonetheless, the
study concludes with a plea on behalf of those persons and groups still
held in bondage and who are continually suffering.
Professor L.C. Green carries forward the examination of criminal
justice in his study entitled "The Intersection of Human Rights and
International Law." Professor Green explains how jurisconsults created
traditional law, and the development of the field of international crimi-
nal law ensued. Accordingly, Professor Green employs a textual analy-
sis to illustrate the manner in which this newer rubric is evolving from
the classical norm of piracy, as interpreted by the Permanent Court of
International Justice. Considerable attention is focused on those classi-
cal writers who set the foundation for newer, universal human guaran-
tees, possibly encompassing humanitarian intervention, in appropriate
circumstances. Indeed, he examines the opposing positions in consider-
able detail. Moreover, the scope of the inquiry is enlarged to encom-
pass crimes that are committed against civilian populations in wartime
or during occupation.
The essay does not have a set of conclusions; instead the tech-
nique selected is to indicate the weaknesses in contemporary law.
Regrettably, on two occasions he slights the legal force of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by stating that it "is nothing but a Reso-
lution of the General Assembly and, as such, [is] devoid of any intrin-
sic legal authority," and that "the Declaration is a mere Resolution of
the Assembly and therefore lacking in legal force." On the positive
side, his approach leads up to a proposal that an international crimi-
nal court be established that would have jurisdiction to try offenders.
Such jurisdiction would arise from a surrender of national sovereignty
to the tribunal, presuming that states shall first agree on the nature of
those human rights to be protected at the global level. Alternatively, if
such agreement is lacking, national law must be modified in order to
enable municipal courts to act against perpetrators. "In the absence of
an international criminal court the only way that there can be a real
intersection of human rights and international criminal law is by a
universal codification indicating those human rights, the breach of
which is to be considered criminal jure gentium and erga omnes grant-
ing every party the right to try."
The discussion of criminal law continues with Dr. Barry
Feinstein's detailed chapter entitled "The Interception of Civilian Ves-
1994
DENT. J. INTL L. & POLY
sels at Sea in the Fight Against Terrorism: Legal Aspects - An Israeli
View." This discussion carries forward some of the issues examined by
other contributors. In dealing with global issues, such as the law of the
high seas and the nationality of vessels in terms of the law of the flag
state, Feinstein is well aware of the rules governing innocent passage
through territorial waters.
This review stresses that a logical and scientific approach should
be adopted, relative to legal precedent; the study is even-handed when
dealing with recognized exceptions, namely the duty of states to pre-
vent hostile acts from taking place within their territories. Thus, an
absolute duty is imposed on sovereign states. From this premise the
author's main thesis emerges: the freedom of the high seas can become
subject to the unilateral exercise of national jurisdiction in clearly
recognized circumstances to freedom of navigation, primarily national
defense, and also actions that endanger the integrity of coastal states.
At this juncture, the exceptions of terrorism and hostile acts di-
rected against a specified territory give rise to the right of the coastal
sovereign to board and search vessels, in contravention of the right to
"innocent passage." In the instance of terrorism, a universal jurisdic-
tion may be applied. Similar rights exist concerning the seizure of air-
craft, especially those that have been hijacked. From this perspective,
a full examination of previous seizures of vessels on the high seas,
applicable conventions, and resulting case law are analyzed. Complete
discussions of such events as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Falkland
Islands, and Algeria are employed to advance his thesis of acceptable
unilateral action.
Naturally, Feinstein recognizes that this "right of self-defense" is
not unlimited and must, henceforth, be exercised with considerable
caution, even though the security of the state seems to be compromised
by a particular set of circumstances. On the other hand, "the target
State... will not sit idly by and allow the potential terrorist aggres-
sors to retain the advantages of a buildup of resources and to be used
ultimately against and to injure that State or its citizens. It is beyond
doubt, then, that such a foreign vessel, even while sailing the high
seas, will be the object of interception by the endangered State."
Notwithstanding the logical and forceful theses defended, this
subject matter is far from settled; many additional controversies will
arise in the future, when the competing rights of sovereign states nec-
essarily come into conflict.
In the fifth study, "Self-Determination: An Overview of History
and Present State With Emphasis on the CSCE Process," Juha Salo
comes to grips with a topic of conflict that is present in every major
area of the globe. In an article of nearly one-hundred pages, the author
traces the historical roots of the concept, springing from President
Wilson's Fourteen Points up to the present time. The author's specific
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purpose is to determine "whether the CSCE process has added to the
meaning of the concept." Indeed, a huge corpus of precedent exists,
applicable to political and legal norms, particularly in the post-World
War 11 period. Beginning with the common Article I of both United
Nations Human Rights Covenants, self-determination arises as a hu-
man right, largely as the result of action within the United Nations. In
fact, as a phase of the new international economic order, political and
civil self-determination are being "extended" to include such approach-
es as economic self-determination. This extended focus of the norm will
attract considerable attention in the future, notwithstanding its
controversial nature, owing to the reaction within the United Nations
General Assembly against economic colonialism.
A number of unique legal issues arise, as for example the place of
self-determination within the orbit of human rights. To illustrate, it is
being argued, with some justification, that "the realization of the right
of self-determination has been claimed to constitute a necessary pre-
condition for the enjoyment of all other human rights." Such issues as
the rights of minorities and humanitarian intervention are ever-pres-
ent, for these disputes have still to be resolved because of the distinc-
tion between peoples and minorities.
An even more troublesome issue is the possible imposition of jus
cogens - a peremptory norm of international law - to self-determina-
tion. Salo quite correctly concludes that while applicable in the politi-
cal realm, when applied by the U.N. organs, "self-determination does
not fit very easily into the category of jus cogens." It cannot be includ-
ed within this category.
The final portion of the study, Part III, is directed to the CSCE
process. The thrust of the work returns to a European and Finnish
viewpoint. From this context, it is helpful to recall that it was a 1969
Finnish initiative that led to negotiations relative to security and coop-
eration in Europe. These negotiations led to the signing of the Final
Act at Helsinki.
The CSCE process, which remains closely tied to Helsinki, was
followed by successive conferences in Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna
that proved somewhat less than encouraging. On the other hand, the
availability of this forum may ultimately prove to be of considerable
value, at such time as Europe and the United States seek to aid East-
ern Europe. The potential of the CSCE process must not be minimized.
Admittedly, there is some question whether the CSCE can deal with
these issues - including the deterioration of Yugoslavia - so clearly
recognized.
Self-determination is set forth in Principle VIII; however, the
mention of territorial integrity seems to set some limits on the exercise
of this principle. The author reviews the lengthy process of negotiation,
begun at the Geneva Preparatory Meeting, during 1973 to 1975. A
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number of rubrics, such as peoples and minorities, are discussed by
several of the contributors and the conclusion reached is that minori-
ties are not accorded a right of succession by the Final Act. Nonethe-
less, these issues continued to be discussed at the follow-up conferenc-
es in Belgrade, but no additional rights were granted to minorities -
nor was self-determination strengthened. Claims for independence are
still being pressed by minorities in European states. An example is the
Baltic region.
Despite pressing political and legal controversy, the concept of
self-determination remains ambiguous. As a result, each case must be
decided on its own merits. Hopefully, certain guidelines will be perfect-
ed, since some degree of certainty in law and practice is required.
"There are signs that such guidelines may be attainable, and their
desirability has become apparent within the CSCE. But it must not be
forgotten that every situation has its special features, and thus no all-
embracing, universal formula can be given," in spite of the Helsinki
Final Act.
"Recent Developments in the Work of the International Court of
Justice," by Professor Ruth Donner, sheds considerable insight into the
current case-load of the ICJ and the precise legal questions at issue. At
the beginning of June, 1991, eleven contentious cases were pending
before the court; additional cases are being filed. Accordingly, it is
valid to conclude that the ICJ is assuming a greater role in the rela-
tions between states. Hopefully, the United Nations Decade for Inter-
national Law has some relevance in promoting the peaceful settlement
of disputes.
Professor Donner divides her text into three main sections. First,
there is the new trust fund administered by the U.N. Secretary-Gener-
al. This fund is designed to assist poorer states in their resolution of
disputes through the utilization of the International Court of Justice,
which in reality also supports the parent United Nations in maintain-
ing peace and security. Here, then, financial support is provided in
those instances in which disputes are submitted by means of a special
agreement or the execution of a judgment resulting from such special
agreement. Conversely, the fund does not provide financial support for
proceedings based on compulsory jurisdiction. The reviewer submits
that this unduly limits the aid that can be provided to lesser developed
countries. On the other hand, the court's jurisdiction is not placed in
contention. Though narrow in scope, these measures for assistance
may stimulate the use of special agreements.
In a departure from the all too numerous cases from the 1970s
and 1980s, in which respondent states refused to appear in the Hague
and defend their positions, there are no pending cases wherein states
are refusing to enter an appearance. Though there are still challenges
to the court's jurisdiction by means of preliminary objections, when
compulsory jurisdiction is invoked, the huge majority of cases are sub-
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mitted by mutual consent. Yet, the possible utilization of the prelimi-
nary objection remains a source of difficulty. As such, Professor Donner
reviews the various means by which compulsory jurisdiction can be
obtained. Under present conditions, the main sources are to be found
in treaties and conventions, pursuant to article 36(1) of the court's
statute.
The court must determine in which instances states may be per-
mitted to intervene in a pending case. Specifically, a great deal of
discretion lies with the judges, but it is exercised sparingly. In fact, the
first instance in which a state was permitted to intervene occurred in
the 1990 Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application by Nicaragua for Permis-
sion to Intervence, (1990 I.C.J. 92). Professor Donner's extended analy-
sis continues with a review of the employment of chambers, for the
reason that it has become the newest and possibly the most effective
source of the court's competence.
There remains the issue of interim measures of protection; it is
one of the most difficult and challenging measures of relief that can be
granted, because of the fact that an extremely high (possibly excessive-
ly severe) standard of proof is demanded by the judges.
The Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt, Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Finland v. Denmark) (Or-
der of 29 July 1991, 1991 I.C.J. 12; this order is also abstracted in the
documents section of the Yearbook at 559-90) was discontinued on
September 3, 1992, pursuant to a friendly settlement between the
parties. Yet its precedent will remain significant, as part of the ICJ's
jurisprudence.
Professor Maurice N. Andem deals with pressing problems that
are being intensified by the new international economic order (NIEO)
in his study "International Law as an Evolutionary and Dynamic Legal
System - With Special Reference to the New International Economic
Order." Professor Andem seeks to detect solutions to adverse situations
that have been building up for the past several centuries. In rejecting
selected norms from classical international law (e.g., the use of force
and colonialism), he attempts to support the evolving world order,
concluding "that significantly greater progress has been made in the
development of contemporary international law during the last four
decades of this century than in previous centuries." Not only have
greater numbers of peoples become independent, but there is a growing
awareness of the need for economic cooperation. Yet, despite exper-
iments in bilateral and multilateral cooperation at the regional level,
there is a definite need for the establishment of a NIEO. Moreover,
considerable attention is devoted to substantiating this thesis, which is
based on the lack of consent on the part of former colonies at the time
of the formation of the United Nations and related agreements, such
as the Bretton Woods system, the IMF, World Bank, and GATT. Be-
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yond question, the historical discussion - including his analysis of
appropriate resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly - sheds needed
insight into the current North/South crisis. A significant portion of his
reasoning necessarily depends on the legal force of resolutions of the
U.N. General Assembly and other institutions. Henceforth, resolutions
and declarations in appropriate situations, "particularly in politically
and economically sensitive areas of contemporary international rela-
tions, should be recognized both in theory and practice as having bind-
ing force on all the member states of the UN." He concludes that "it is
imperative to recognize some aspects of the law making functions of
the UN system." Accordingly, he quite properly maintains "that resolu-
tions, decisions and declarations adopted by its principle organs (the
General Assembly and Security Council) will play a major role in the
implementation of the New International Economic Order." Fundamen-
tal to any advanced economic system, precise recommendations (e.g.,
model laws), a total commitment, and the active participation of all
states, institutions, and peoples will be required, for the purpose of
perfecting new legal solutions that can deal with ongoing relations
between states and economic blocs.
Following these major contributions, a section of shorter articles
and notes is offered. Special notice should be taken of Professor Raimo
Lahti's "Life's Beginnings: Law and Moral Dilemmas," in which he
attempts to detect how human dignity and integrity can be protected
by moral reasoning, i.e. structural reasoning. The goal is legal regula-
tion based on harmonization of rules.
Johanna Jalas presents an excellent insight into global migration,
a difficulty confronting all industrialized states, in "Immigration Into
the European Community - the Community in Need of a Common
Policy." Although devoting the scope of the study to the European
Union, the author is well aware of the impact caused by the migration
from the former Eastern Bloc.
Given this situation, the unique regime perfected by the European
Union - currently being strengthened by the Single European Act and
the Maastricht Treaty - is now confronted by extreme pressure as the
free movement of persons and the right of establishment come into
play, particularly as to nationals of non-member states. Obviously,
measures have been taken, as for example the Community Charter of
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, the Convention on Asylum,
the External Bonds Convention, and the Schengen Convention, that
represent stages leading toward a common immigration policy. The
goal, for humanitarian and economic reasons, is the integration of
foreign workers. Consequently, the Maastricht Treaty on Political
Union may prove to be a significant stride forward in the realization of
a common immigration policy, that may serve as inspiration for other
regional groupings and the international sphere.
The volume concludes with a carefully selected section of docu-
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ments with appropriate commentary. "The Restoration of the Indepen-
dence of Estonia, 1991" is especially useful, as are the documents de-
voted to seizures of aircraft during 1990 in the Soviet Union. As shown
above, the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in the
Case Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt is reproduced.
In sum, these studies and current documents are a welcome addi-
tion to existing yearbooks. In the present instance, the Finnish Year-
books constitute a permanent contribution that will not become out-
dated. These fundamental legal issues, explored at length, will remain
relevant and timely. Hopefully this review has demonstrated that a
Finnish perspective is extremely helpful to practitioners and scholars,
even though the contributors demonstrated an international perspec-
tive. The contributors all seek global solutions based on a peaceful
world order, pursuant to their unyielding respect for humankind.

International Law in Transition: Essays in
Memory of Judge Nagendra Singh
REVIEWED BY DR. LYAL S. SUNGA°
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
JUDGE NAGENDRA SINGH; Edited by R.S. Pathak and R.P.
Dhokalia; with Foreword by R.Y. Jennings, President of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston (1992);
ISBN 0-7923-1715-7; 415 pp.
International Law in Transition brings together articles from
twenty-one leading international jurists in tribute to the late Dr.
Nagendra Singh, distinguished Judge of the International Court of
Justice, who served as its Vice-President (1976-1979) and President
(1985-1988). Throughout his illustrious career Judge Singh was in-
volved in various diplomatic conferences as delegate to the Second
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Indian delegate to the U.N.
General Assembly, Chairman and delegate to numerous U.N. commis-
sions and conferences on such diverse areas as trade and development,
shipping and maritime matters, and uses of atomic energy, among
many others.
Judge Singh's scholarly accomplishments are reflected in his ex-
tensive academic writings. His more notable works are Nuclear Weap-
ons in International Law (London, Stevens, 1959); treatises and pub-
lished lectures on merchant shipping: The International Law Problems
of Merchant Shipping in Recueil des Cours, 107 (1962-I), Internation-
al Conventions on Merchant Shipping (British Shipping Law Series
Vol. 8, London, Stevens, 1963); and books on the relation of interna-
tional law and the law of India: India and International Law: Ancient
and Medieval (State Practice of India, Series Vol. 1 Part A, New Delhi:
Chand, 1973), The Theory of Force and Organization of Defence in
Indian Constitutional History (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969),
and Commercial Law of India (Delhi: Thomson Press, 1975). Perhaps
his last work, The Role and Record of the International Court of Jus-
tice (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989), will prove to be his
most famous.
That international law is presently in danger of being overtaken
by the events of the day is a recurrent theme in International Law in
Transition. Dissolution of the Cold War order has brought greater
political instability with attendant new dangers to international peace
and security. Gross violations of international humanitarian law per-
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petrated in the territory of the former Yugoslavia exemplify the hor-
rors wrought by increased instability and political uncertainty in the
post-Cold War world. Increasing political violence in many of the for-
mer Soviet Socialist Republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Arme-
nia, if left unchecked, also carry the potential for a devastating rup-
ture in international peace and security. These new threats to world
peace have arisen when chronic open sores on the international body
politic, such as the gross denial of human rights of the people of East
Timor, have yet to be treated effectively, let alone cured. However, new
opportunities for international cooperation to solve these problems
have appeared as East-West tension has diminished. The U.N. Securi-
ty Council's unequivocal condemnation of Iraqi aggression against
Kuwait and the extensive United Nations humanitarian involvement
in Somalia indicate that with the reduction of East-West political ten-
sion, the U.N. can operate as an effective institutional means to re-
store international law and order.
The book is split into two parts: the first, entitled "Contemporary
Issues," focuses on problems presently facing the global community;
the second, entitled "Perspectives," focuses on emerging trends in in-
ternational law.
In "Internal Conflicts and International Law," Oscar Schachter
summarizes, in remarkably succinct fashion, the international law
relating to internal conflicts. He states straightaway that internal
conflicts, as a general rule, lie beyond the application of international
law. There are two categories of exceptions to this general rule. These
exceptions flow from (a) the application of international humanitarian
law and of international human rights law to certain kinds of internal
armed conflict; and (b) cases of intervention by a foreign State in the
internal affairs of another, contrary to principles of non-intervention in
international law. Following a clear treatment of the international
legal norms applicable in each of these two categories, Schachter deals
with two other related cases not generally considered: intervention of a
non-forcible character and United Nations intervention in internation-
al conflicts. Schachter's concise analysis brings an accurate perspective
to the international law on internal conflicts.
Ian Brownlie's "Politics and Principle in Major International Set-
tlements" studies the "interplay of political principle, policy deci-
sion... in relation to major settlements of the kind which followed the
two world wars." Brownlie reminds the reader of the sweeping impact
of general multilateral settlements of European territory in the nine-
teenth century, those affecting Europe and parts of Africa put in place
by the 1919 Peace Treaty of Versailles following World War I, and
peace settlements concluded after World War II relative to Europe,
Asia, and Africa. He argues persuasively that the political machinery
that brought these momentous changes have been by and large ne-
glected by international law scholars. Brownlie argues that principles
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of openness, fairness, and impartiality were well served in the peace
treaty conclusion process, especially following World War II, lending
them a much more juridical character than is commonly assumed.
Following a brief survey of the process and effect of postwar settle-
ments on the legal status of territory, Brownlie concludes that "[wihat
is remarkable about the settlement machinery created by the United
Nations after 1942 is not the dominance of politics but, given the scale
of the political operation, the extent to which considerations of interna-
tional policy, matters of principle, and decision by consensus entered
into the procedures of settlement."
In "Complexities of the Distinction between Old and New Interna-
tional Law: Empirical Question Marks," the late George
Schwarzenberger examines the distinction between "old" and "new"
international law from four angles: 1) pitfalls of reasoning; 2)
comparabilities; 3) relativities; and 4) implications. The paper attempts
to promote a clearer understanding of international law as a normative
system that mirrors its social environment. He advocates conscientious
attention be paid to the origins and infrastructures of contemporary
international law to reduce distortions in the image of international
law. Schwarzenberger's paper is replete with headings and subhead-
ings that appear to add little of explanatory value to the treatment of
the distinction between "old" and "new" international law and is overly
analytical. Nonetheless, Schwarzenberger properly lays emphasis on
the use of inductive and empirical methodology in the study of interna-
tional law. His arguments provide a much needed corrective to tradi-
tional doctrinal approaches that try to deduce principles of internation-
al law from general abstractions, glossing over inconvenient complexi-
ties in the law.
Gillian White's "Structural Adjustment with a Human Face and
Human Rights in Development: New Approaches in the Fourth Lom6
Convention" draws attention to certain innovative and important pro-
visions of the most recent Lom6 Convention concluded between the
European Community (with its twelve member States) and sixty-nine
developing States of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. She analyz-
es provisions on financial support from the EC and the effect this sup-
port has on structural adjustment and the populations of recipient
countries. She looks also at provisions designed to incorporate human
rights as a fundamental factor of development. White's treatment of
the subject provides readers with a useful background on structural
adjustment policy in the Convention and on pertinent policies and
practices of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, before
turning to consideration of clauses relating specifically to human
rights and development. White examines Article 5 - the non-discrimi-
nation clause - with respect to the issue of ensuring that living and
studying conditions of developing country nationals in E.C. countries
are accorded legal protection no less favorable to that of other foreign-
ers in Europe. Article 5 links international cooperation, structural
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adjustment development policy, and human rights, but it recognizes
development only as a principle, not as a right. The author concludes
that "[only time will tell whether the approaches taken in Lom6 IV to
both human rights as such and to structural adjustment 'with a hu-
man face' are well founded politically and psychologically and whether
they can be said to have contributed positively to the development, in
its fullest sense, of the [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] countries and
their peoples."
"The New Law of the Sea and Navigation: A View From the Medi-
terranean," by Budislav Vukas, discusses solutions to problems on in-
ternational navigation adopted in the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of special relevance to Mediterra-
nean countries. The author focuses on new developments brought by
UNCLOS concerning the right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea, straits used for international navigation, the Exclusive Economic
Zone, and settlement of disputes concerning navigation.
In "The Concept of International Law at the End of the Twentieth
Century," Milan Sahovic raises critical questions on the changing na-
ture of inter-State relations against the backdrop of a panoramic view
of international law. He observes that in the past three centuries, the
imperative of mutual cooperation between States gave rise to expecta-
tions that the effective functioning of the international legal system
would find support in the municipal law of each State. However, due to
the highly decentralized nature of law-making at the international
level and the lack of a super-State to enforce and implement interna-
tional legal norms, these expectations were never fulfilled.
Instead, the creation of international law became subject to the
individual consent of the States - a situation that remains fundamen-
tally unchanged today. Limits to the effectiveness of international law
derive chiefly from the inability of the international community to
enforce compliance where a State refuses to honor its international
legal obligations. Nevertheless, unprecedented change in international
relations since 1945 has altered the structure and character of interna-
tional law.
A new era of increased international cooperation and institutional-
ized interdependence has been heralded in with the emergence of the
U.N. and other international organizations, the emergence of newly
independent States from colonialism, revolutions in science and tech-
nology, and the blossoming of international human rights law. Sahovic
maintains that evolution in the modern system of international law
"... is going in the direction of the construction of one united, inte-
grated and coherent system of law." He cites two trends in particular
to support his thesis: the emergence of a hierarchy of norms and the
"foundation of one objective international legal order independent of
the subjective wills of States."
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Further, the monist approach to international law appears to be
gaining ground as States increasingly adopt constitutional provisions
that accord formal recognition to norms of international law. Institu-
tionalization in the codification and progressive development of inter-
national law through the International Law Commission continues to
represent an active "legislative" approach to international norms. One
would have hoped that Sahovic's treatment of these important struc-
tural changes would not have been so brief - his article is a mere six
pages - because his arguments raise some of the most critical issues
in contemporary international law in a most coherent fashion.
Two articles on the global refugee problem appear in the book.
The first, entitled "Problems of Refugees in the Developing Countries
and the Need for International Burden-Sharing," by J.N. Saxena,
sketches the dimensions of the current refugee crisis, discusses the
definition of "refugee," and reviews the principles of non-refoulement,
asylum, international solidarity, and burden-sharing. The definition of
"refugee," codified in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, has become sorely outdated as both the volume and complex-
ity of the world refugee problem has exploded. The author argues that
rather than calling into question the mandate of the U.N. High Com-
missioner of Refugees or the principles set forth in the 1951 Conven-
tion or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the latter
broadened the definition of "refugee"), these instruments should be
rendered more effective through expansive interpretation.
In the other article on the refugee problem, "Progressive Devel-
opment of Refugee Law and Its Codification," Luke Lee discusses the
need for a systematic codification of refugee law, Lee also draws atten-
tion to the work and considerable influence of Judge Singh in the pro-
gressive development of refugee law in connection with the Interna-
tional Law Association, located in Brussels.
In "The Human Rights Committee in 1990," P.R. Gandhi high-
lights precisely and succinctly recent developments in the Committee's
practice and procedure. He examines the more significant develop-
ments in recent cases on procedural questions (such as admissibility)
as well as on substantive aspects. Gandhi remarks accurately that
while the volume of work of the Committee and of human rights or-
gans in the United Nations Centre for Human Rights has increased
greatly, funding, staffing, and administrative support for the Centre
remains terribly inadequate.
In "Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Some Reflections,"
B.S. Chimni considers the argument sometimes put forward that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons is not a violation of international law
because there is an absence of express prohibitions in treaty law.
Nagendra Singh countered that existing conventional law already
prohibits nuclear weapons by way of the de Martens Preamble to
Hague Convention No. IV concerning the Law and Customs of War on
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Land, which codified customary law. In the context of international
humanitarian law the question is whether nuclear weapons can possi-
bly figure in the balance between military necessity and humanitarian
considerations, since the distinction between combatants and non-com-
batants - basic principles of international humanitarian law - would
likely be rendered irrelevant in the event of nuclear attack.
International legal norms on the environment have shown per-
haps the most rapid development in recent years. In "The Greenhouse
Effect - Need for Legal Control," Gurdip Singh relates the greenhouse
effect to depletion of the ozone layer-and then briefly chronicles land-
marks in the emergence of legal norms on the problem, albeit in a
rather superficial way.
The changing role of the World Court and the International Law
Commission's role in the codification and progressive development of
international law are examined in "Perspectives of the New Trends in
Contemporary International Law" by T.O. Elias, late Judge of the
International Court of Justice. Elias surveys trends in international
law mentioning important developments in U.N. codification, the Unit-
ed Nations operations in the Congo as a watershed in contemporary
international law, and the upsurge in human rights and international
humanitarian law.
In "A New Political Thinking and International Law," Grigory
Tunkin argues that international law must attain primacy over the
narrow political self-interests of States such that common interests can
prevail over national egoism. However, Tunkin contends that for this
to occur, international mechanisms for international dispute settle-
ment, control mechanisms, and mechanisms of law enforcement must
be improved.
G.H. Guttal's "Sources of International Law: Contemporary
Trends," considers law-making at the international level. It begins
with an arid and somewhat disjointed discussion of the question as to
whether "international law" is "law" before discussing the law-making
significance of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
R.P. Dhokalia's "Reflections on International Law-Making and its
Progressive Development in the Contemporary Era of Transition," is
perhaps the heart of International Law in Transition. The author
brings the outmoded character of international law - a set of norms
that continues to represent a crumbling status quo - into disturbingly
sharp contrast with irrepressible and momentous world change.
Dhokalia focuses on social revolutions that currently undermine the
legitimacy and authority of the modern nation-State. Contemporary
international law, premised on the classical foundation of inter-State
relations, is also suffering through a crisis of identity and legitimacy.
Many countries object to the blatant double standard whereby the
more powerful States flout international law when convenient for them
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to do so yet insist that weaker States accord international law scrupu-
lous observance. Against the backdrop of a world undergoing tumultu-
ous change, effective codification and progressive development of inter-
national law becomes all the more imperative. As Dhokalia observes,
the International Law Commission, hampered by problematic working
methods, has achieved only limited success.
The final six articles in International Law in Transition explore
the operation, function, and legitimacy of the International Court of
Justice and prospects for a greater role in future - issues to which Dr.
Singh devoted much of his attention and energy.
Yogesh Tyagi, in "The World Court after the Cold War," observes
that the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of superpower rivalry
enhances prospects in the peaceful settlement of disputes and that
these developments have raised expectations that judicial organs such
as the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) will be allowed to be more
effective. The author critically examines various initiatives that have
been put forward to strengthen the World Court relative to psychologi-
cal, jurisdictional, and functional aspects of international adjudication.
In "The World Court on Trial," R.P. Anand praises the Court for
its demonstrated impartiality and for excellence in the quality of its
decisions. He then draws attention to the hostile attitude shown by the
United States toward the jurisdiction of the Court, despite the major
role of the United States in the Court's establishment. Anand places
particular emphasis on the U.S. Government's disastrous withdrawal
from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case.
Stephen Schwebel surveys questions of human rights that have
arisen before the Court in "Human Rights in the World Court." As
Schwebel points out, few cases or advisory opinions in the World Court
have centered on human rights questions. He reviews the human
rights jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
centered primarily on interpretation of minority rights guarantees in
peace treaties concluded after World War I. Turning to jurisprudence
involving human rights in the I.C.J., Schwebel provides a useful syn-
opsis of a number of advisory opinions and contentious cases from the
human rights angle.
A distinctly Indian perspective is brought by V.C. Govindaraj to
"Law, Human Rights and Socio-Economic Justice - An Indian Experi-
ment." In this piece, Govindaraj examines Indian jurisprudence on the
protection and promotion of civil and political rights on the one hand,
social and economic human rights on the other, and then discusses the
Indian approach to integration of the two in relation to the rise of the
welfare State in India. He first outlines provisions of the Constitution
of India relative to the protection of human rights. Under the Indian
Constitution an individual has a right to challenge a law or govern-
ment action where an abridgement of fundamental rights is alleged by
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invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India direct-
ly, rather than having to petition the High Court first. The author
surveys landmark Supreme Court of India cases on basic human
rights, highlighting constitutional provisions designed to advance socio-
economic reform, and then focuses on international human rights as
interpreted and applied by Indian courts.
In "Selected Recommendations to Enhance the Effectiveness of the
international Court of Justice: Perfection and Application of Confi-
dence Building Measures," W. Paul Gormley looks incisively into the
way the I.C.J. actually functions. The Court's jurisdiction in each case
depends upon the consent of parties to the dispute. The author ex-
plores the United States policy in the Nicaragua Case and the U.S.
objections to the filing of the memorial by Iran in the Aerial Incident
Case. In a number of other cases, respondent States have chosen to
ignore the I.C.J., rather than to defend their position. This trend un-
dermines the legitimacy of the Court.
On the other hand, the Court has earned the confidence of the
international community for consistently producing work of excellent
quality. Gormley takes note of short and long range innovations in the
Court such as revision in the rules of the Court and the novel use of
special Chambers.
Finally, the author examines some far-reaching recommendations
for improving the operation of the Court, including widening the locus
standi of the Court to include individuals and non-governmental enti-
ties, using the I.C.J. as an appellate tribunal rather than as a court of
first instance, widening the Court's advisory jurisdiction, developing
"evocation procedures" (which authorize the Court or perhaps a Cham-
ber of the Court to clarify a particular point of law in a case or dispute
pending in another forum), and improving the Court's investigatory
and fact-finding powers.
In the last article, "The International Court of Justice: The Integ-
rity of an Idea," I.C.J. Judge M. Shahabuddeen considers the balance
that must be maintained between the judicial character of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, on the one hand, and the fact that its jurisdic-
tion is based on the voluntary consent of States on the other. The au-
thor considers whether the I.C.J. is truly a court of justice.
Shahabuddeen contends that in practice States accept the jurisdiction
of the I.C.J. or not, but this is not the same as saying that States con-
fer jurisdiction upon it. He argues the difference is not merely termino-
logical but relates to the fact "that the International Court of Justice is
a court of justice independently of the voluntary acceptance of its juris-
diction in any particular case, with the consequence that its claim to
be considered a real court is not affected by the voluntary nature of
that jurisdiction." The author then emphasizes differences between
arbitration and judicial settlement and argues that the use of Cham-
bers is likely to undermine the judicial character of the Court because
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the process whereby parties may indicate which Judges they prefer to
preside militates against universal, impartial, and independent adjudi-
cation.
Unless international legal norms keep pace with rapid change in
the contemporary human condition, they will fail to serve interests
vital to the international community and be judged anachronistic,
outmoded, and irrelevant. International Law in Transition affords rich
insight into the perplexing transformations presently under way in
international law and politics, especially on current problems and
prospects facing the International Court of Justice. By bringing togeth-
er views of a number of eminent authors on pressing problems of our
time, the book offers clear-eyed vision on prospects for a more respon-
sive international legal system. International Law in Transition will
undoubtedly be of interest to both generalists and specialists in inter-
national law and relations.

BOOK NOTES
FOX, WILLIAM F., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
AGREEMENTS: A PRIMER ON DRAFTING, NEGOTIATING AND
RESOLVING DISPUTES; Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
Deventer, The Netherlands (1992); ISBN 90-6544-587-0; 491 pp.
(softcover) Index.
International commercial agreements tend to be complex, impos-
ing entities so filled with legal intricacies as to strike fear into the
hearts of the average attorney or businessman. The uninitiated may
find such agreements ominous and may, as a result, pass by an other-
wise profitable business opportunity. International Commercial Agree-
ments: A Primer on Drafting, Negotiating and Resolving Disputes was
written to educate the uninitiated with "fundamental information and
analysis."
Professor Fox succeeds in creating a compilation of information on
international commercial agreements bereft of legal jargon. His primer
lays out an overview of issues involved in handling international
business transactions. It covers topics from formation of agreements to
preventative issues of dispute resolution to the practical aspects of
litigation and arbitration in the international arena. As with any
simplification, however, this work stumbles in a few areas.
This primer was written for the truly uninitiated, yet at times the
author relies upon the reader to understand certain esoteric legal
concepts. On the other hand, the legally educated reader may have
trouble wading through the discussions of basic legal terminology to
get to the nuggets of specialized information found therein. This is
especially true for the lawyer with experience in international issues,
and to an extent, for the business person with experience in the inter-
national market.
Educating the reader is not so much an end in itself. The book's
greatest strength lies in the outside sources to which it points the
reader. Throughout the book Fox covers complex areas in enough
depth for the reader to understand the basic issues involved. He then
points the reader to other sources that explain the more complicated
details. The footnotes alone are worth the price of the book.
The first four chapters cover the very basic issues confronted in
international agreements, including elements of contracts and dispute
resolution. This section would be an excellent tool for educating clients
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as to the basic issues that attorneys must cover in such transactions.
Considerations that clients seldom consider, such as dispute resolution,
are covered in a such a way as to explain their importance while
allaying fears commonly felt when discussing such topics. This section
is somewhat cursory for the experienced attorney. Chapter six covers
contract elements in more detail, with thorough coverage of the differ-
ences between international and domestic contracts.
Chapter five gives an overview of negotiation across cultures. As
in any such discussion, his comments tend to be vague and theoretical.
But he gives good coverage to an area that should remain slightly
theoretical to account for individual style. Chapter seven explains the
difficulties involved in international litigation and takes the reader
through some of the loopholes involved.
Chapters eight through ten are the most valuable portions of this
primer. Good, thorough coverage is given to the issues involved in
arbitration and methods for resolving basic weaknesses in internation-
al dispute resolution. The author's coverage of relevant conventions
and methods of enforcement are especially useful - not only for
business people - but also for attorneys involved in international
commercial agreements.
International Commercial Agreements should be used as a basic
reference tool, a point of departure and a method of educationg a new
client or one new to the area of international commercial transactions.
Jeff Delmon
LONBAY, JULIAN AND LINDA SPEDDING, INTERNATIONAL
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE; Chancery Law Publishing, New York,
NY (1992); ($265); ISBN 0471-9365-8; 281 pp. (hardcover) Index.
International Professional Practice is a manual which sets out the
structure of the legal systems in major nations throughout the world.
Lonbay and Spedding begin by examining the international law rele-
vant to harmonizing international commercial and trade relations such
as GATT, but they focus primarily on the European initiatives that
have resulted in the doubling in size of the European Economic Com-
munity. The common thread of these laws is that they are intended to
reduce barriers to the globalization of trade. This book's scope is limit-
ed to the globalization of services, namely the practice of law, which
inevitably accompanies the global expansion of trade.
The European initiatives discussed include trade blocs, the Treaty
of Rome, The European Economic Community,and the European Eco-
nomic Interest Grouping. Also discussed are emergent trends relating
to the practice of international law such as specialization, incorpora-
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tion, multi-disciplinary practice, multi-jurisdictional practice, the inter-
national mobility of lawyers, networks, and branch offices.
The Nations covered in this edition are Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The Nations to be provided in forthcoming updates are Austra-
lia, Austria, Finland, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Lichtenstein,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, and
Spain.
The book also includes excerpts from the Code of Conduct for
Lawyers in the European Community with a supplementary explanato-
ry memo, relevant European Economic Community Council Directives,
excerpts from the International Code of Ethics of the International Bar
Association, the United States Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
and the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.
This work would be of aid to a practicing international lawyer,
however it is by no means all inclusive. The summaries of each
Nation's legal system will help one to gain a broad understanding of
their methods of practice, but in order to actually be competent prac-
ticing in another Nation, a wise lawyer would employ much more than
this text.
Rob Buford
MERRILLS, J.G.; THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS; Manchester
University Press, Manchester, UK (1993);($79.95); ISBN: 0-7190-3737-
9; 265 pp. (hardcover) Index.
According to J.G. Merrills, "the key to decision-making in the field
of human rights is... the spirit and philosophy which animate the
work of the judge." Merrills' aim in The Development of International
Law by the European Court of Human Rights is to demonstrate hoio
the judges of the Strasbourg Court approach the task of interpreting
the principles of human rights laid down in the European Convention,
and effectively, how these interpretations contribute to the internation-
alization of human rights law.
Merrills begins his analysis with a chapter describing how the
Court functions as an international institution, walking the reader
through the procedures which confer jurisdiction on the Court. He
explains that once the European Commission on Human Rights has ac-
cepted a petition filed by one Contracting Party against another Con-
tracting Party, it seeks a friendly settlement of the dispute. If this
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fails, the Commission files a report of the facts and a preliminary opin-
ion on the merits with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe. If the Parties accept jurisdiction, either through compulsory
jurisdiction or a case referral, the Court proceeds with the case.
Merrills places particular emphasis on the role of the judge and the
limited applicability of stare decisis in the European Court's analytical
jurisprudence.
Contrary to Common Law systems, the European Court of Human
Rights follows the European tradition of a single collective court judg-
ment. This does not permit the expression of an individual judge's
views. Quoting a judge from the International Court, Merrills states
that reconciliation of divergent viewpoints causes the Court's draft
judgments to suffer "the fate of a whale attacked by a school of killer-
whales which tear big chunks of flesh from its body." In effect, poten-
tially sweeping decisions of the Court are typically watered down
through compromise. Merrills explains how the Court has shifted from
the historical single-sentence judgments to ordinary language in its
judgments. The latter approach allows for a more universal compre-
hension of the Court's ruling.
The next three chapters deal with the Court's conception of the
Strasbourg system and its methods of interpretation. Describing the
Commission as the "defender of the public interest," Merrills discusses
the role of the individual applicant in the European Court of Human
Rights. Although individual applicants technically do not have stand-
ing in the Court, the Commission has fought to establish precedent
granting individuals the right to provide the Court with their own
observations. Citing the Vienna Convention on Treaties, Merrills states
that the Convention should be interpreted according to the text and
the ordinary meaning of its terms.
In order to interpret the purpose of the Convention, Merrills ana-
lyzes the applicability of the teleological school of interpretation.
Merrills' discussion of the "effectiveness principle" is particularly inter-
esting when compared with the rigid jurisprudential interpretation
often found in American Law textbooks. While interpreting the mean-
ing of specific provisions in the Convention, the Court prefers a "practi-
cal and effective" interpretation, as opposed to a "formal" one. Merrills
uses the Airey case as an example of his observations. In Airey, the
Court reviewed a High Court of Ireland case which denied a woman
free access to the courts when it failed to provide her with counsel for
her judicial separation case. Noting that divorce is not legal in Ireland,
the Court stated that "the Convention is intended to guarantee not
rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and
effective ... particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view
of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a
fair trial."
In Chapter Six, Merrills analyzes the Court's democratic procedur-
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al guarantees such as free elections, the right of access to the courts,
the principle of legality, judicial safeguards, freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Although Merrills'
analysis provides insights throughout the book, his keen analysis of
relevant Court decisions in this chapter eclipses the complexity of the
subjects discussed therein.
In the final chapters of the book, Merrills shifts his focus from a
micro study of the Court itself to the broader concepts of democratic
values, general principles of law, international law, and ideology as
they relate to human rights in the European Court of Human Rights.
Here, Merrills debates the competing ideologies of judicial restraint
and activism. After much analysis, he concludes that the Court has
generally adopted an activist approach towards the Convention, based
on his observation that statements of judicial ideology typically found
in dissenting judgments articulate the case for restraint. He then de-
bates the differences between tough conservatism and benevolent liber-
alism before concluding that both surface intermittently in the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights.
This book is absolutely essential for the specialist in human rights
law. Although the book focuses primarily on the European Court of
Human Rights as a legal institution, Merrills' analogies help the read-
er to understand otherwise highly technical terms. Merrills concludes
the book by stating that the Court "has done far more, and through an
ever-growing jurisprudence, has provided a remarkable demonstration
of the role which courts can play in the elucidation and development of
international law." As a reader, you can expect to find this principle
echoed throughout the entire book.
Sandra Jamison
WESTERN APPROACHES TO EASTERN EUROPE; Edited by Ivo
John Lederer; Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York (1992);
ISBN 0-87609-130-3; 107pp. (softcover).
The three essays included in this volume are revised versions of
papers prepared for a symposium entitled "The United States and
Eastern Europe" held in New York City on September 10-11, 1991 by
the Council on Foreign Relations. The essays chosen cover various
aspects of the political and economic challenges facing the former Sovi-
et satellites of Eastern and Central Europe and enlighten the reader
as to how this region should be handled by the United States and the
West.
Mr. Lederer starts the work off with an introduction that gives a
general overview of the political and economical climate in Eastern
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Europe and what implications it has for the West - especially the
United States. He also warns of the possibility of a conservative back-
lash in Eastern Europe - where the tendency of glorification of the
past might prove stronger than in the former Soviet Union.
In the first essay, 'The East European Agenda," J. F. Brown
breaks the Eastern European dilemma down into four problem areas
for analysis. The first area discussed is economic and political develop-
ment. While Brown suggests the need for strong leadership to facilitate
development, he does not identify appropriate action for Western Pow-
ers. The second area discussed is overcoming the past, which concen-
trates on the inherited communist frame of mind and resultant social
and economic stigmas.
The third problem area is nationalism and regional relations,
which covers the wide gamut of religious and ethnic tensions that span
centuries and threaten to spill over into Western Europe, Turkey and
Russia. The final area discussed is international relations. Brown dis-
cusses Eastern Europe's desire to join Western economic and defense
oriented organizations such as NATO and the European Community.
Brown points to these organizations as potential avenues for change
and resolution of many of the regions' problems.
In the second essay, "An Economic Policy for the United States
and the West," Robert D. Hormats discusses individual nations' ap-
proaches to democratization and the switch to a market system. He
also contemplates the interests of the United States and Western Eu-
rope in Eastern Europe. Mr. Hormats begins by comparing the drastic
methods used by Poland to transform its system to the gradual meth-
ods used by the Czech Republic. He then compares the needs and his-
tory of each of the other nations to these two methods of change.
Mr. Hormats also examines the interests of the United States and
Western Europe in an economically stable Eastern Europe - from the
new economic markets it would provide, to its potential stabilizing
effect on an otherwise volatile situation in the wake of the fall of the
Soviet Union. He also looks at potential sources of resolution and sta-
bilization effectuated by the Western European nations. Starting with
the European Community and its influence, Hormats moves on to open
trading systems and Most Favored Nation status for the Eastern Euro-
pean nations. He warns, finally, that Western support would reduce
the temptation or need for Germany or Russia to impose order on the
region, since the current situation is reminiscent of the elements pres-
ent at the start of the First and Second World Wars.
In the third essay, "Harmonizing U.S. and European Interests,"
William H. Luers examines the needs shared by the United States and
Europe. Luers demonstrates that the pressures and interests present
in Eastern Europe mirror those affecting the world. For example, the
struggle between the "haves" of the industrialized North and the "have
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nots" of the South exists in Eastern Europe as elsewhere. Luers con-
cludes that every European Nation should be interested in a united
Europe, inclusive of Eastern Europe, to avoid single nation domination.
Further, Europe must pay close attention to migration and nation-
alist reactions as the emergence of Eastern Europe redefines Europe
itself. The search for access to the elite club of Western nations could
be used to influence the political struggles of the Eastern European
Countries. By using organizations such as NATO and the World Bank,
the United States can have a strong hand in advancing its interests
without dominating or politicizing the form of resolution.
As a whole, this work gives a good overview of the pressures and
interests present in the development of Eastern Europe. It also gives a
general suggestion as to potential avenues of resolution of the political
and economic problems present in this region. The book fails, however,
in its scope and form.
By its diminutive size, "Western Approaches to Eastern Europe"
has limited itself to a cursory presentation of the problems present in
this region and their potential solutions. Though a multi-volume trea-
tise would be needed to cover the historical, economic and political
aspects of this situation in their entirety, this work covers, too lightly,
very complex topics.
This work also falls short in that it is a book. Given the slow time
frame over which books develop, and that they are often relied upon as
having more lasting significance, areas of volatility such as Eastern
European political and economic development are ill-suited to the tem-
poral limitations of such a medium. These essays refer to and discuss
entities that no longer exist, such as Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union. They also contemplate situations such as a resurgence of the
conservative party in Russia, which have already occurred, rendering
moot their observations.
Jeff Delmon
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